The British and Norwegian Labour parties in the interwar period with particular reference to 1929-1936: electoral prospects. by Redvaldsen, D.A.
SHL ITEM BARCODE
llllllli
19 1762785  1
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THESIS
Degree Year 7 .0 0 ^ - Name of Author p \ J  / \L - D  ^
COPYRIGHT ( V v l \ c \
This is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London. It is an 
unpublished typescript and the copyright is held by the author. All persons 
consulting this thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.
COPYRIGHT DECLARATION
I recognise that the copyright of the above-described thesis rests with the author 
and that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without 
the prior written consent of the author.
LOANS
Theses may not be lent to individuals, but the Senate House Library may lend a 
copy to approved libraries within the United Kingdom, for consultation solely on the 
premises of those libraries. Application should be made to: Inter-Library Loans, 
Senate House Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
REPRODUCTION
University of London theses may not be reproduced without explicit written 
permission from the Senate House Library. Enquiries should be addressed to the 
Theses Section of the Library. Regulations concerning reproduction vary according 
to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.
A. Before 1962. Permission granted only upon the prior written consent of the 
author. (The Senate House Library will provide addresses where possible).
B. 1962-1974. In many cases the author has agreed to permit copying upon
completion of a Copyright Declaration.
C. 1975-1988. Most theses may be copied upon completion of a Copyright 
Declaration.
D. 1989 onwards. Most theses may be copied.
This thesis comes within category D.
^  This copy has been deposited in the Library of
V This copy has been deposited in the Senate House Library,   Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
R E F E R E N C E  ONLY

David Aly Redvaldsen
‘The British and Norwegian Labour Parties in the 
Interwar Period with Particular Reference to 1929- 
1936: Electoral Prospects’
A thesis submitted for the award of the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, University College London,
2007.
UMI Number: U591911
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U591911
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I, David Aly Redvaldsen, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. 
Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has 
been indicated in the thesis.
Abstract
The thesis compares the British and Norwegian Labour parties between 1918 
and 1939. It argues that the Norwegian Labour Party was more successful than its 
British counterpart in the interwar period. This was particularly true for the 1930s, 
which after the Depression started in 1929 were the crucial years for resolving the 
political struggle between the wars.
Success clearly depended on the outcome of elections. For this reason two 
chapters concern the British party’s campaigning in 1929, 1931 and 1935. The 
object is to discover how strong it was, what resources were available to it, its 
electoral tactics and to whom it appealed. Two parallel chapters treat the Norwegian 
party’s electioneering in 1930, 1933 and 1936.
The question of electoral appeal is important because highly influential 
research by Gosta Esping-Andersen (1985) and Gregory Luebbert (1991) found that 
an alliance between urban workers and the family peasantry was the key to Socialist 
success. This thesis aims to move beyond such a view. In the comparison of Britain 
and Norway it explains relative success in terms of the trajectories of the two 
parties, the effect of the Depression as well as labour movement strength and 
funding.
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Introduction
Comparative history
This thesis is a study of the British Labour Party’s participation in the elections of
1929, 1931 and 1935 and the Norwegian Labour Party’s involvement in the elections of
1930, 1933 and 1936. More than that, however, it attempts to contribute to the discussion 
about what factors made for success for a Socialist party in the period. It is for this reason 
that a comparative approach was chosen. Studying two parties side by side is likely to bring 
out differences, and these differences have continuously been considered through the prism 
of success. Chapters 1 and 2 deal with electioneering, and here the relevant factors are the 
strength of each labour movement, the level of funding, the volume of propaganda, how the 
planning was conducted and how each party presented itself before the public.1 Chapters 3 
and 4 ask to whom each party addressed itself, and the subtext is whether they focused on 
the same groups. Chapter 5 brings out the differences uncovered in the other chapters, 
considers which were the important ones and covers the trajectories of the two Labour 
parties in the 1920s and 1930s.2 An argument is made for why the last three elections in the 
interwar period were crucial.
The comparative method has the advantage of throwing new light upon an historical 
situation previously studied in isolation. It has a tendency to emphasize aspects that may 
not have been thought particularly important before.3 This is a function of its more rigorous 
scheme of establishing causality. John Stuart Mill’s “method of agreement” entails looking 
at several cases having in common the phenomenon to be explained and the proposed 
causal factors.4 If closer investigation reveals vital similarities, the chances that the causes 
are true have been strengthened. It is also possible to contrast instances where a 
phenomenon is absent as are the proposed causes for the positive case. This is the “method
1 For a discussion of the sources used in each chapter consult appendix 5.
2 From now on the Norwegian Labour Party will be called by its abbreviation DNA (Det norske 
Arbeiderparti), while the British Labour Party will simply be called “Labour”. “Labour” will only refer to 
DNA as a variant when the context is exclusively Norwegian.
3 The classic example of this is Marc Bloch’s study of French agrarian history using the paradigm of the 
English enclosure movement. He found that similar developments had occurred in France, highlighting a 
factor that had scarcely been recognized before. H-G Haupt in International Encyclopedia o f the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences. Volume 4 (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2001), p. 2400.
4 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers ‘The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 22:2 (1980), p. 183.
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of difference”. The latter method was recommended by Max Weber to examine a single 
factor as a cause: take as many cases as possible which differ in this one respect and see 
what the outcomes are.5 Depending on the results of the analysis, the proposed cause may 
either be ruled out or accorded “facilitating” or “necessary” status for the phenomenon to 
occur. These are some of the building blocks of comparative social theory. More than two 
national contexts are needed to “explain” Socialism, but my study interacts with what other 
scholars have discovered through comparison. In particular, it uses these two parties as case 
studies to comment upon an existing debate about what made Socialist parties successful in 
the interwar period.
The concern about relative success among Socialist parties has by its nature to be a 
comparative issue. Weber noted that the Socialists were actually one party extended to 
different polities.6 The French Socialist Party stressed this view in the interwar period by 
calling itself Section Frangaise de V International Ouvriere. It follows that Labour parties 
are perhaps especially suited for an international comparison.7 Since success is the primary 
question, studying elections is a good way of approaching this. Incidental questions treated 
here include the degree of central control exercised by party headquarters, the support 
received from the wider labour movement when campaigning, the role of the main daily 
newspaper, funding, details about electioneering in the capital and social coalition building. 
These are compared, where relevant, in chapter 5. While not all the details about the parties 
have a direct bearing on the conclusion, it is a strength that they are there. This is because 
much comparative history is based on secondary sources, thus being interpretations of 
interpretations.8 There is equal coverage of both parties. Symmetry has been aimed for 
throughout. This is to ensure that “the historian is equally interested in both cases.”9 It also 
goes some way towards avoiding the pitfall of comparing historiographies rather than
5 Stephen Kalberg, Max Weber’s Comparative-Historical Sociology (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), p. 152.
6 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978), p. 286.
7 They promoted Socialism, an international movement of thought, which may fruitfully be studied in its 
national variants. George M. Fredrickson ‘From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in 
Cross-National Comparative History’, Journal o f American History 82:2 (1995), p. 600.
8 A. A. Van Den Braembussche ‘Historical Explanation and Comparative Method. Towards a Theory of the 
History of Society’, History and Theory 28:1 (1989), p. 22.
9 John Breuilly, Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Essays in Comparative History 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 2.
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empirical details.10 The focus on Oslo, necessitated by the sources when describing 
electioneering, meant that London also had to be treated in some depth. For this reason, 
when choosing constituencies for a closer look at 1929 and 1935, those in London and the 
Home Counties were selected where possible. The other consideration was to examine seats 
where there was evidence of Labour’s electoral appeal widening. This, in particular, means 
where there were white-collar workers, new housing developments, country people or, in 
1935, Liberals belonging to declining associations. As for the candidate statements in 
chapter 3, they were chosen to make relevant points about national electoral appeal, 
although it is hoped there is some geographical variety. While random selection is an 
acceptable form of sampling,11 both the constituencies and candidate statements were 
chosen to be relevant to the concerns of the thesis. It was possible to make the same point 
with a number of different locales; within these limits candidate statements were picked at 
random and for the constituencies described in chapter 1, areas in and around London were 
preferred. The selections and the sources used allowed the author to gain a good picture of 
certain trends, but for a fully-fledged social science investigation of local campaigning, 
more data would have been needed. Only in this way could universal generalizations be 
deduced from the facts.12 As a contribution towards increasing validity, appendix 4 gives a 
statistical breakdown of Labour’s national electoral appeal in 1929,1931 and 1935. This 
mostly relates to topics rather than the social groups which are the focus of chapter 3. 
Overall, it should be possible for the reader to gain a wider understanding through the use 
of these, albeit limited, local examples.
When writing comparative history the researcher should be careful not to reify 
particular schemes or typologies. While these concepts are abstracted from historical 
practice, a great many comparisons fit only approximately into these boxes or are a 
combination of two or more.13 Charles Tilly’s classification of works according to the two 
dimensions of multiplicity offorms and share o f all instances has been highly influential,
10 See Stefan Berger ‘Herbert Morrison’s London Labour Party in the Interwar Years and the SPD: Problems 
of Transferring German Socialist Practices to Britain’, European Review o f History 12:2 (2005), p. 299.
11 Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic o f Comparative Social Inquiry (New York, Wiley- 
Interscience, 1970), p. 31.
Ibid., p. 37.
13 Van Den Braembussche ‘Historical Explanation and Comparative Method’, History and Theory 28:1 
(1989), p. 12.
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but there are other ways.14 His ideal types of individualizing, universalizing, encompassing 
and variation-finding comparisons could for instance be regrouped as follows:
Table 0.1. Charles Tilly’s categories: a different schema.
FEW CASES MANY CASES
DIFFERENCES Individualizing Variation-finding
SIMILARITIES Universalizing Encompassing
This is because whether the scholar is primarily interested in differences or similarities 
seems more vital than share o f all instances. A different three-case typology is provided by 
Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers: comparative history as macrocausal analysis, parallel 
demonstration of theory or the contrast of contexts.15 These have the virtue of being 
complementary, studies of one kind suggesting the need for further investigations along the 
lines of the other types.16 How do these categories relate to my thesis? In the three-case 
typology mine is a study closest to the contrast of contexts.17 It does not try to show that a 
given theory is valid for both cases. Instead it does largely the opposite, endeavouring to 
show the limitations of a given social science explanation (to be described later) in two 
cases where such an explanation seems to be highly relevant. There is also the question of 
why historians compare, and the reasons may perhaps be subsumed under four main 
headings: 1. to ask questions, 2. to identify historical problems, 3. in designing research and
4. in reaching and testing conclusions.18 The fourth of these was the motivation when 
embarking upon the present study.
So why conduct this particular Anglo-Norwegian comparison? Although there is a 
great disparity in size between Britain and Norway— the population of the former was 16 
times that of the latter in the 1930s— on a global scale the countries are similar enough to 
be relevant to one another. They are both kingdoms in North Western Europe with long 
histories of constitutionalism. Since the purpose of comparison is to discover causes rather
14 Big Structures Large Processes Huge Comparisons (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), p. 81.
15 Skocpol and Somers ‘The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 22:2 (1980), p. 175.
16 Ibid, p. 196.
17 Ibid., p. 178.
18 Raymond Grew ‘The Case for Comparing Histories’, The American Historical Review 85:4 (1980), p. 769.
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than just differences and similarities,19 these societies are not so alien to one another as to 
immediately call the results into question. While the author does not operate with a success 
against failure paradigm, as arguably Sheri Berman does in her interwar history by lauding 
the Swedish and damning the German Social Democrats, the advent of New Labour in the 
1990s highlighted the limited electoral success that the party traditionally enjoyed.20 A 
sideways glance at a party like DNA, which was hegemonic and lost no election between 
1933 and 1965, is surely thus of interest. This study should provide a novel framework for 
British historians working on Labour. Some writings about DNA already exist in English; 
mostly they are the work of a single political scientist21 A valid aspect of the comparison is 
the contingency of the timing of each party to government, which, it will be argued, had 
profound effects. This point is particularly well brought out by the Homsrud episode in 
1928 when DNA was in government for two weeks, but was turned out because it refused 
to be captured by the bourgeois parliamentary system or make compromises with its 
beliefs.22
Just as different typologies exist for classifying comparative research, so there is a 
variety of methods for conducting such studies. Weber may be regarded as one of the 
founders of the discipline. Tilly describes his method as individualizing, and famous 
Weberian notions such as charisma, rationalization and bureaucratization were formulated 
with reference to world history.23 Weber contrasted various instances of a particular 
phenomenon in order to understand the peculiarities of each instance.24 He wrote history 
along analytical lines, and following in his footsteps makes for rigorous, thematic studies. 
The main problem for historians is his concept of ideal types. Weber believes reality to be
19 Mary Hilson, Political Change and the Rise o f Labour in Comparative Perspective. Britain and Sweden 
1890-1920 (Lund, Nordic Academic Press, 2006), p. 18.
20 The reasons for why DNA is felt to be more successful in the interwar period are on record in chapter 5, 
and are open to debate by those who dispute the findings herein. Berman, The Social Democratic Moment. 
Ideas and Politics in the Making c f Interwar Europe (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1998). See 
p. 14 of this introduction
1 Knut Heidar ‘The Norwegian Labour Party: Social Democracy in a Periphery of Europe’ in William E. 
Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas (eds.), Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe (London, Croom 
Helm, 1977); Knut Heidar ‘Towards Party Irrelevance? The Decline of both Conflict and Cohesion in the 
Norwegian Labour Party’ in Donald S. Bell and Eric Shaw (eds.), Conflict and Cohesion in Western 
European Social Democratic Parties (London, Pinter, 1994).
22 The government led by Christopher Homsrud lost a confidence vote on its Socialist accession statement. 
See Ivar Arne Roset, Det norske Arbeiderparti og Homsruds regjeringsdannelse i 1928 (Oslo, 
Universitetsforlaget, 1962).
23 Tilly, Big Structures Large Processes Huge Comparisons, p. 88.
24 Ibid., p. 82.
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infinitely complex and ideal types are simplifications designed to bring out particular 
features.25 They are not accurate descriptions of reality, like most historical writing aims to 
be, but yardsticks against which that reality may be measured.26 As such, they seem like 
“counterfactuals” in the eyes of many historians, who deride this way of gaining insight.
More firmly grounded in the discipline of history is Marc Bloch. Although Emile 
Durkheim explicitly made this point as early as 1895,27 a single idea underlies Bloch’s 
comparative studies namely the logic of hypothesis-testing.28 It is an adaptation of the 
experimental method to subjects where no experiments are possible, and a good test of the
90validity of explanations. Using comparison Bloch was able to dispose of several “pseudo­
causes”, which historians with insufficient evidence gleaned from just one case had made 
into explanations of phenomena. Even if all of Bloch’s comparisons were directed towards 
testing hypotheses, today’s scholars see many reasons for pursuing such studies.
“Historians undertake comparisons because they want to question national explanations, 
build typologies, stress historical diversity, encourage scepticism vis-&-vis global 
explanatory models, or contextualize and enrich research traditions of one society by 
exploring and contrasting them with research traditions of historical identities,” according 
to Stefan Berger.30 As mentioned earlier, the rationale behind the present study is to 
encourage scepticism about the established social science explanation of Social Democracy 
by Gregory Luebbert and Gosta Esping-Andersen. But since most of the thesis deals with 
what was identified as incidental questions, how is the study of these aided by a 
comparative approach?
With the incidental questions of labour movement strength, central control, the role 
of the main daily newspaper, funding, etc. the goal is to isolate those factors which were 
significantly different between the two parties. Any such disparities will provide empirical 
causes answering to the main focus of differential success. If they largely point towards one 
of the parties as stronger, that is significant. If there are great similarities between Labour
25 Kalberg, Max Weber’s Comparative-Historical Sociology, p. 85.
26 Ibid., p. 87.
27 Stefan Berger ‘Comparative-History’ in Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner and Kevin Passmore (eds.), Writing 
History. Theory & Practice (London, Hodder Arnold, 2003), p. 165.
28 William H. Sewell jr. ‘Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History’, History and Theory 6:2 (1967),
p. 208.
59 Ibid., p. 209.
30 ‘Comparative History’ in op. c it., p. 164.
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and DNA on these, that emphasizes the trajectories and historical context more. But the 
thesis does not use causal analysis to determine whether the empirical factors or the 
trajectories of the parties were more important. The reason is that it would have required 
“mental experiments” of “thinking away” certain elements in a factual chain of events.31 In 
this way it would have become a work of historical sociology rather than history. In any 
case, Weber, who is a proponent of this approach, is clear that causality cannot be 
established with exact certitude. “It is not [...] possible to prove a strictly inevitable causal 
relationship in [historical] cases, any more than it is possible in any other case of strictly 
individual events.”32 All of the incidental questions are juxtaposed in the final chapter, 
which means that they are considered analytically there as well as being part of the 
narrative in the earlier chapters. The incidental questions are thus set in the context of their 
own societies and also in the context of comparative labour history. This is important 
because losing sight of these questions could have meant narrating parallel stories rather 
than comparing.33 Of course, what is really important in this comparison is success, while 
elections and other research questions are means of getting at that issue.
Comparisons are almost synonymous with transnational or international history, but 
it is not the only approach within these. Transfer history is especially associated with the 
names of Michel Espagne and Michael Werner, and looks at the interrelationship between 
two entities.34 It originated in the 1980s with a group of researchers studying 19th century 
French and German intellectual history.35 It is suitable for breaking down assumptions 
about cultures being monolithic. Although the approach is in fact complementary to 
comparative history and arguably a different facet of the same project, it does offer a 
number of criticisms of the other discipline. According to transfer scholars, comparison 
supposes no links between the entities in order to fix them into abstract categories 
developed from the outside.37 While it is perfectly valid to compare Bordeaux with
31 Kalberg, Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology, p. 152.
32 Ibid., p. 145.
33 Berger ‘Comparative History’ in op. tit., p. 168.
34 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jttrgen Kocka ‘Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems’ in Deborah 
Cohen and Maura O’Connor (eds.), Comparison and History (New York, Routledge, 2004), p. 81.
35 Michel Espagne, Les transferts culturels franco-allemands (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1999),
p. 11.
6 Chris Lorenz ‘Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives’, History and Theory 38:1 (1999), 
p. 30.
7 Espagne, op. cit., p. 36.
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Hamburg and Bremen, there is a risk of losing sight of the fact that these cities form a 
network within a European territory enjoying economic growth in common and having an 
overlapping culture.38 This is a good example of where common developments affecting 
several entities may go unrecognized, but it has already been argued that comparative 
history is useful in finding such factors. It is what Bloch did when eliminating “pseudo­
causes” brought up by historians studying a single topic.
Other criticisms of comparative history from this school relate to privileging the 
nation-state and differences between states.39 These differences are further compounded by 
such studies, which ignore the transfers that are going on between these so-called 
homogeneous entities.40 Furthermore, comparison is often used to promote a national point 
of view.41 However, in recent years some historians have begun advocating comparisons 
that do not put nations alongside each other 42 It is entirely possible to study a phenomenon 
in two or more nations without bringing in the state as such. Moreover, the history of a 
single nation can be comparative if the research questions are formulated using that method 
and explanations validated in the same way.43 Such comparisons may be between regions, 
institutions or other entities, and prove that the method does not necessarily promote a 
national point of view more than any other type of history.
For their part, comparative historians point out that concentrating on transfers tends 
to be of limited use outside the histories of science, ideas or culture.44 There is insufficient 
focus on resistance to transfers, such as by social groups that are subjected to them. It may 
be added that the paradigm of transfer derives from studies of France and Germany, two 
neighbouring countries. The approach may be far less useful when dealing with countries 
geographically or culturally further apart. Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions 
(1979) deals with France, Russia and China; how much cultural transfer can be expected 
among these? Another weakness with transfers is that causality is at risk of disappearing. 
When studying networks of intermediaries between two nations or entities, tracing
™ Ibid., p. 41.
39 Haupt and Kocka ‘Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems’ in op. cit., p. 32.
40 Berger ‘Comparative History’ in Berger, Feldner and Passmore (eds.), Writing History, p. 171.
41 Espagne, op. cit., p. 37.
42 Fredrickson ‘From Exceptionalism to Variability’, Journal o f American History 82:2 (1995), p. 588.
43 Sewell jr., ‘Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History’, History and Theory 6:2 (1967), p. 214.
44 Haupt and Kocka ‘Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems’ in Cohen and O’Connor (eds.), 
Comparison and History, p. 32.
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borrowings does not explain why change came about. A list of mutual borrowings does not 
give an answer to why these transfers were accepted.
Despite these criticisms by practitioners of transfer history and the allied histoire 
croisee, which seeks to bring the macro-, meso- and micro- levels of history together,45 
comparative history remains a valid undertaking. In a small way this is exemplified by the 
present study, where it is shown that Labour and DNA can be relevant to each other from 
an historical point of view, although there were few links between them in the interwar 
period. (This is because the Norwegians left the Socialist International in 1919,46 only 
rejoining in 1938. The Labour Year Book in Britain consistently listed the Social 
Democratic Party as its counterpart in Norway, even after that party had ceased to exist in 
1927.) Comparative history brings a fresh perspective to issues and possibly new 
explanations, and for these reasons it will not be supplanted by similar transnational 
schools. Transfer historians have reminded comparativists that cultures are not monolithic, 
which is not a bad thing. They also have a lot to offer historians of Socialism as an 
avowedly international movement.
The literature
Individual chapters fall within the boundaries of each national historiography, but in 
totality the thesis is a contribution to the comparative literature of Socialist parties. Despite 
some very interesting and worthwhile studies, this is somewhat thin on the ground. Stefan 
Berger wrote The Labour Party and the German Social Democrats 1900-1931 and his 
study found that the differences between these two parties were smaller than had hitherto 
been realized. In particular, Labour as well as the SPD had a culture built around i t47 A 
primary source such as The Labour Organiser bears his interpretation out. The question of 
how strong the labour movements were in Britain and Norway contributes to the success of 
each party, and social activities played a part in determining this. My findings are that the 
recreational side of the movement was more developed in Norway. It was for this reason 
that DNA’s campaigning was more theatrical.
45 Ibid., p. 30.
46 Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy. The History o f the Left in Europe, 1850-2000 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 177.
47 Berger, The Labour Party and the German Social Democrats 1900-1931 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994)
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Another study of Britain and Germany is John Breuilly’s book Labour and 
Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe. It sets out to defend the comparative historian’s 
practice of explaining differences in terms of concepts and debates derived from another 
national context. Breuilly argues against the historicist view that every situation has to be 
understood on its own terms. The concluding chapter in this book is an essay treating 
national peculiarities; in particular it advocates the Sonderweg thesis in Germany’s case. It 
seeks to legitimate the practice of enquiry into the absence of some modem developments 
in German history pre-1918. This thesis does not apply Breuilly’s method to a great extent. 
Although it notes, and indeed predicates, the weakness of Labour compared to DNA in the 
1930s, it does not explain this judgement on the basis of an absence of an urban-rural class 
alliance, as some have, or the lack of counter-cyclical economic policies on Labour’s part. 
Adumbrating part of the conclusion, counter-cyclical economic policies are instead seen as 
a product of the times and the timing of the Socialist party to government is considered 
more important.
One historian who objects to comparing one nation with another in terms of the 
“absence” of certain factors is Mary Hilson. Her recent Political Change and the Rise o f 
Labour in Comparative Perspective discusses Britain and Sweden in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. She argues against the notion that Britain was exceptional 
compared to continental Europe, by pointing to the fact that every nation has some 
peculiarities not found elsewhere. Historians are in danger of supporting a constructed 
dichotomy between “British” and “European” so it is laudable that Hilson sets out to 
challenge this. The long introduction in this book is a statement of how comparative history 
may be done. It is particularly interesting that she is able to combine local and comparative 
history. At the same time her empiricism in abjuring teleological arguments and ideal types 
(understanding one country’s history in terms of one or more others) means that she 
voluntarily renounces some useful hypothesis-forming tools.
A study which also treats Sweden but in relation to Germany is Berman’s The 
Social Democratic Moment** Its emphasis is on the role of ideas in influencing political 
outcomes as far as the Swedish SAP and German SPD are concerned. Berman’s view is 
that both parties faced two major challenges in similar national contexts during the interwar
48 See earlier reference to this.
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years, which is the period concerned in her study. These were democratization at the 
conclusion of the First World War and then the Depression after 1929. The SAP’s flexible, 
practical-minded Socialism put it in a good position to solve these problems, while the 
SPD’s dogmatic and theoretical Marxism scuppered its chances of playing the leading role 
at these turning points. Furthermore, the SAP was open to pursuing counter-cyclical 
policies and sought to attract peasants; both policies which were regarded with a great deal 
of scepticism in the SPD. Although the countries concerned are different, her notion of 
crucial moments in history when political outcomes are decided has been useful for the 
present study. The Depression as one such moment seems to tally with the experience of 
nearly all democratic societies, as will be noted in chapter 5. On the other hand, it can be 
argued that for all the SPD’s failings it was not so rigid and unbendable in choosing 
permanent co-operation with the Catholic Centre Party and the liberal German Democratic 
Party throughout the Weimar years. In the established explanation, discussed in the next 
paragraph, it was co-operation with other parties (albeit Agrarians) which allowed Socialist 
parties to gain power.
As mentioned at the outset, in the comparative literature there are two studies which 
have played major roles in the present thesis. They are Esping-Andersen’s Politics against 
Markets and Luebbert’s Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy.49 Berman mentions the 
role of peasants, but the two scholars noted here focus on them and are responsible for the 
established social science explanation whereby the political role played by the classes of 
the countryside is crucial. For Esping-Andersen gaining the smaller farmers and 
smallholders for the party was a sine qua non, while Luebbert argued that a crisis 
agreement with agrarian interests cemented a new Social Democratic order. Both of these 
points of view are based on a Scandinavian paradigm, though Luebbert’s study 
encompasses not just Denmark, Norway and Sweden but most countries in Western Europe 
and even Czechoslovakia. As a response to their findings, the politics of the period is 
covered in chapter 5 of this thesis, including the opportunities that existed for a deal with 
farmers, and chapters 3 and 4 deal with the social coalitions each party hoped to mobilize.
49 Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets. The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton N.J, 
Princeton University Press, 1985); Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy. Social Classes and 
the Political Origins o f Regimes in Interwar Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).
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It is a particularly important finding of chapter 3 that Labour earnestly tried to gain the 
support of farmers and agricultural workers. If major differences between the parties had 
been found on this issue, it would have confirmed the conclusions of Esping-Andersen and 
Luebbert: in Britain Labour failed to gain ascendancy due to not seeking the support of 
rural inhabitants like its Scandinavian counterparts. The thesis does not invalidate what 
these two social scientists discovered because there still remains the question of how much 
support the British party received in the countryside, which is not answered here.
The established explanation is really directed towards the question of why social 
democracy came about, and why the system took root in the Scandinavian countries. The 
often illustrious records of the Socialist parties of Denmark, Norway and Sweden are 
followed back to the 1930s, when it is found that each of the three secured their grip on 
power by coming to an agreement with one or more rural parties. Thus it is concluded that 
an alliance between urban workers and the family peasantry based upon guaranteeing the 
existing distribution of wealth in the countryside, was the key to a political breakthrough.50 
Where no such compromise with farming interests came about for whatever reason, the 
Socialist party failed to gain a predominant role in government.51 It was “stifled”. By 
extension the hegemonic parties must have been more successful in the 1930s than those 
which failed to establish pre-eminence, such as Labour or the German SPD.
The method of going back to the origins of a phenomenon to explain it is by no 
means a bad one, but the established explanation in reality presupposes that there was only 
one path to democratic Socialism. As a starting point the explanation informed the chapters 
about to whom Labour and DNA sought to appeal in the crucial elections of the later 
interwar years. Though Luebbert’s version of the theory outlined above argues that there 
was no need to organize the rural masses in the Socialist party (in fact it might be inimical 
to do so52), the absence of a separate Agrarian party in Britain meant that for any urban- 
rural alliance to take place, Labour must itself gain the support of farmers. A less strident 
version of the theory recognizes that there might not have been enough industrial workers 
in the population to secure a parliamentary majority, and it was therefore necessary to 
branch out to the people of humble means in the countryside. This is precisely what was
50 Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy, p. 268.
51 Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets, pp. xv-xvi.
52 Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy, p. 288.
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found for DNA, and the justification for gaining support from smallholders and fishermen 
was either that they belonged to the working class too, or that industrial workers alone 
could not provide a majority.53 Labour was not in the same situation, because Britain was 
much more industrialized than Norway or indeed any country at the time. Only 6.2 % of the 
population made its living from agriculture in 1931, and in the same year 78. 07 % of 
English people belonged to the working class, according to one historian.54 Thus Labour 
could easily gain the increment it needed in terms of votes from the urban workers. 
Nevertheless, it took a great deal of effort to attract both farmers and agricultural labourers 
in all of the three elections studied. Luebbert’s thesis works for Norway only if it is 
conceded that the urban-rural alliance might take place also within the Socialist party. It 
was no hindrance to its deal with the Agrarian Party in 1935 that DNA successfully 
mobilized many people of humble means in the countryside. It had no option but to do so 
as the Norwegian constitution allocated 2/3 of the seats in Parliament to the rural areas. An 
urban-rural alliance was thus a necessary cause behind DNA’s accession to government, 
but it does not follow that it was the same in Britain where conditions were different.55
The electoral systems also differed, and it may be thought that DNA derived some 
advantage from proportional representation, and consequently that Labour suffered to a 
degree from the British system of single- or double-member constituencies.56 In both 
countries the Communists were a minor grouping, so it stands to reason that proportional 
representation fragmented the unity of the capitalist parties, while leaving the Socialist 
party intact. In 1931, for instance, Labour was left with 46 endorsed MPs, whereas by its 
national result of 30.6 % of the vote, it might have had 180 MPs under proportional 
representation.58 In the Parliament elected in 1933 in Norway from which DNA’s first
53 The classic contemporary article was Dag Bryn and Halvard Manthey Lange ‘Klasse eller folk’ in Det 20. 
arhundrede 1930, pp. 67-75. Cf. Knut Kjeldstadli ‘’’Arbeider, bonde, vdre haere...” Arbeiderpartiet og 
bondene 1930-1939’ in Tidsskriftfor Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 2/1978, especially pp. 135-136.
54 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures. England 1918-1951 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p.
108, p. 106.
55 Witness the 1945 election which Labour won with a majority of 97, but left the Conservatives in control of 
rural England. Cf. Michael Kinnear, The British Voter. An Atlas and Survey since 1885 (London, Batsford 
Academic and Educational, 1981), p. 57.
56 And Norway had fixed-term parliaments of three years, which meant that DNA knew when elections were 
to be held, unlike Labour.
57 At least after 1927 when DNA was reunited with the breakaway Norwegian Social Democratic Labour 
Party.
58 Andrew Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 262.
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serious government emerged, there were five capitalist parties represented but no Socialist 
party other than DNA. But it is not unambiguous that proportional representation worked to 
the advantage of DNA It received 40.1 % of the votes in 1933, which is usually enough to 
form a government in a majoritarian system unless matched by another party. If Labour had 
reached the same percentage, there is no reason why it should not have enjoyed equal 
parliamentary clout.
In the British context two books and a thesis have proved very useful in preparing 
this study.59 For Labour, and certainly in comparison with DNA, the election of 1931 was 
pivotal. Andrew Thorpe, who wrote a monograph on this election, argued that by the 
summer of 1931 the Conservatives were cruising to a great victory. Labour lost its chance 
of being a serious contender for power in the 1930s on account of this election. At the time 
of writing Thorpe believed his was an unusual position to take. The rejoinder to his 
determinism is that MacDonald’s government achieved slightly better by-election results 
than the previous Baldwin government and, in any case, Labour was not planning on a 
1931 election.60 Much of Thorpe’s work deals with Labour in office, as it does with the 
state of the Liberal and Conservative parties. The present thesis does not go into details 
about the 1929-1931 Labour government except for a few facts having a bearing upon the 
party’s subsequent electoral difficulties. As such the government’s failure to solve the 
unemployment problem has been discussed extensively by historians. As for the formation 
of the National Government, Thorpe claims that Sir Herbert Samuel, the acting Liberal 
leader, wanted to avoid a Conservative government because it might interfere with free 
trade.61 This indicates the damage that those who became National Labour did to their 
former party 62
Like Thorpe, Tom Stannage in his book on the 1935 election, also considers media 
coverage, including the radio which was coming into its own in those years. He includes a
59 E. A. Rowe, ‘The British General Election of 1929’, Oxford B. Litt. thesis 1959; Thorpe, The British 
General Election o f 1931; Tom Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition. The British General Election o f 
1935 (London, Croom Helm, 1990).
60 M. W. Hart, ‘The Realignment of 1931’, Twentieth Century British History 3:2 (1992), p. 197.
61 Thorpe op. cit., pp. 87-88.
62 By agreeing to serve, the Labour renegades influenced the free trade Liberals who might otherwise not have 
entered what would have been a Conservative government. If politics had remained on a party basis, Labour 
would have done better for the rest of the 1930s.
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statistical breakdown of the topics covered in the candidates’ election statements.63 This is 
besides plenty of material about how Labour campaigned. After Arthur Henderson’s return 
to Parliament at the Clay Cross by-election in September 1933 on a peace and disarmament 
platform, in six more contests in October and November 1933 the party candidates 
followed suit.64 The general success of these appeals ensured that the peace card was 
played at the subsequent general election. In 1935 Labour combined a principled foreign 
policy of disarmament and support for the League of Nations with an attack on the 
Government relating to the means test for unemployment benefit. Stannage also deals with 
the effects of the party apparatus coordinating the appeal of Labour in the run-up to the 
election, such as the membership campaigns in the aftermath of 1931, followed by 
“propaganda weeks” and then the “call to action.”65
In short, Stannage’s monograph is very useful —as is Thorpe’s— because they 
contain masses of information in a single place with a central overview. For the 1929 
election the equivalent is the thesis by E. A. Rowe,66 and all three have proved helpful in 
writing the present work. In particular the charts which each author provides with the topics 
of the election addresses by party, go to the heart of the question about electoral appeal. 
This has been an under-researched topic within the historiography of elections. To whom 
Labour appealed probably seems self-evident because the party was associated with the 
proletariat, but, as William Miller points out, it frequently stressed it was for the “workers 
by hand and by brain.”67 In 1929, until 1945 its best-ever result, Labour explicitly sought to 
defend the “lower middle classes” (more on this in chapter 3). Broad electoral appeals 
mattered because it seems that in the context of the 1930s, the Popular Front tactic was 
what brought left-wing parties to power.
In the Norwegian historiography there has hitherto been next to no focus on 
elections. The one exception, to my knowledge, is a thesis about DNA and the election of 
1936.68 There also exists a very long article about DNA and the peasants in the 1930s, and
63 Stannage op. tit., p. 11.
64 Ibid., p. 69.
65 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
66 See previous page for full details.
67 Miller, Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918 (London, Macmillan, 1977), p. 37.
68 Odd Sverre Norrene, ‘Arbeiderpartiet og Stortingsvalgkampen i 1936’, Cand. Philol. thesis, University of 
Oslo, 1978.
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this goes beyond its ostensible remit to deal with social coalition building. Its author, Knut 
Kjeldstadli, argues that in 1930 DNA sought the support of 7 or 8/10 of the Norwegian 
population rising to 9/10 in 1936.69 The latter assertion is verified in chapter 4 and there is a 
relevant new discovery as to who was constituted as the ninth decile, in that the situation of 
small employers is clarified.
For a systematic overview of the period, possibly the greatest contribution has been 
made by the political scientist Stein Rokkan. Because he wrote from a comparative 
perspective, many of his results and observations are of particular use. Rokkan was a 
theorizer of the urban-rural cleavage in Norway, and pointed out that there was such a 
cleavage also within DNA. Basing his argument on a famous 1930 article by young party 
theoreticians Dag Bryn and Halvard Lange, he pictured the incipient conflict as one about 
the nature of the party. Should it cater primarily for the industrial working class or be a 
people’s party?70 Bryn and Lange had pointed out that whereas DNA received many more 
rural than urban votes in 1927, the members were still concentrated in the cities, 
particularly Oslo. The ratio of members to voters was 1:2.4 in Oslo, 1:5.1 in other cities but 
1:8.5 in the countryside. They claimed that if fishermen, clerks and smallholders were 
added to the industrial proletariat of wage earners, then this “genuine” working class was 
about twice as prevalent in sheer numbers in rural than in urban areas.71 This claim by Bryn 
and Lange must have serious consequences for how (and where) the party campaigned.
Rokkan thought DNA had little choice in the matter of trying to appeal beyond its 
core constituency of unionized industrial workers. Making a comparison with Britain, he 
noted that the Conservatives of that country were able to stay in power for very long 
periods “due to their hold on the working class.”72 In Norway there was not enough 
industry, and too few urban dwellers for DNA to obtain a majority solely from the 
proletariat of the cities. That the industrial segment of the population was in relative decline 
was noted by contemporaries. There were no more factory workers in 1930 than in 1920,
69 Kjeldstadli "’Arbeider, bonde, vfire haere...’” , Tidsskriftfor Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 2/1978, p. 151.
70 Rokkan ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’ in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Political 
Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966), p. 83.
71 Bryn and Lange ‘Klasse eller folk’, Det 20. Arhundrede (1930), p. 69.
72 Rokkan ‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’ in Seymour 
M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross-National Perspectives 
(London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967), p. 431.
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whereas the population of working age had increased by 212, 000.73 That was laid at the 
door of the crisis in the economy, a curable condition, but also put down to rationalization 
which could not really be stopped. Even so, there were voices calling for DNA to continue 
expanding among its old-time supporters.74 It is in this context that Ole Colbjomsen’s 
articles of September/October in Arbeiderbladet, the party’s main newspaper, calling for a 
“national campaign to build factories” must be seen.75 At that stage Colbjomsen believed 
that only industrial workers could be relied upon by the labour movement. These concerns 
are dealt with throughout the thesis and have also informed the chapters about Britain.
The issue that has concerned historians the most relating to DNA has been ideology; 
that is the 1918 radicalization of the party, subsequent Comintern membership and the 
timing of the shift back to reformism.76 In the early 1920s among European Socialist parties 
DNA had probably “the most extreme position,” but it was short-lived.77 The moderation 
vs. radicalism issue does play an important part in the historical explanation offered for the 
question of success, but in an indirect and perhaps counter-intuitive way. In chapter 5 it is 
argued that radicalism in the context of the 1920s and 1930s was perhaps a better strategy 
for ultimately gaining governmental power than moderation. Reference is made to 
ideological shifts within the time period, and it is investigated to what extent this had a 
bearing on electoral appeal. In the case of DNA it will be seen that its leftward shift in 1930 
had a greater effect on how rather than to whom it appealed. Similarly, Labour took on 
more of a Socialist guise in 1935, which made its appeals more about principles than in 
seeking support from particular groups. It had noted after the 1931 election that in future it
7ftwould concentrate on making Socialists rather than seeking ephemeral support. But the
73 Kjeldstadli ‘’’Arbeider, bonde, vSre haere...”’, Tidsskriftfor Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 2/1978, p. 135.
u  Ibid., p. 120.
75 Hans Fredrik Dahl, Fra klassekamp til nasjonal samling. Arbeiderpartiet og det nasjonale sporsmal i 30- 
arene (Oslo, Pax, 1969), p. 58.
76 For a very comprehensive treatment of the debate see Hallvard Tjelmeland ‘ Avradikaliseringa av Det 
norske Arbeiderparti i mellomkrigstida. Ei historiografisk drafting’, Cand. Philol. thesis, University of 
Tromso 1982. DNA was a member of the Comintern 1919-1923. See Knut Langfeldt, Moskva-tesene i norsk 
politikk (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1972); Per Maurseth, Fra Moskvateser til Kristiania-forslag. Det norske 
Arbeiderparti ogKomintem fra  1921 tilfebruar 1923 (Oslo, Pax, 1972).
77 Stefano Bartolini, The Political Mobilization o f the European Left1860-1980. The Class Cleavage 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 28.
University of Manchester: Labour History Archive and Study Centre. Labour Party Archive. Notes for 
Speakers, p. 1745 in LP/ELEC/1931 folder marked SERIALS JN 1055 1931.
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context and political circumstances of each election mattered more than ideology as for the 
broadening or contraction of electoral appeals to various groups.
The two parties
This final section of the introduction sketches the history of the two parties. The 
Labour Party’s evolution in Britain did not diverge significantly from other Socialist parties 
on the Continent, but in the pre-1914 Socialist International it was “understood to be unique 
in Europe.”79 It was founded as the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 and became 
a regular party six years later after 30 of its candidates were returned to Westminster.
Unlike the other parties it did not combine revolutionary goals with reformist practice, but
O A
was wholly reformist. Its component parts were unionists affiliated through the Trades 
Union Congress and members of Socialist societies like the Independent Labour Party and 
the Fabian Society. In 1910 the Miners Federation of Great Britain affiliated to the party. 
This provided the bedrock of support in the coalfields, which later became its most secure 
constituencies and perhaps ultimately helped Labour replace the Liberals as the party of the 
left. That year saw two elections, caused by the issue of House of Lords reform, and in the 
second of these Labour won 42 seats and 6.4% of the vote.
War, revolution and working-class insurgency across Europe affected Labour too.
In its new constitution of 1918 Clause 4 proclaimed the party’s goal of national ownership 
of the means of production. It now allowed individual membership, making it a more 
regular political party and encouraging more women and middle-class people to join. 
Electoral reform meant that all men over 21 and most women over 30 henceforth could 
vote. This was to Labour’s advantage, but a more direct reason for its great progress in that
O l
year was its much higher tally of candidates— 361 in 1918 compared to 56 in 1910. 
Whatever the reason, Labour advanced to 22.2% of the vote and got 63 seats in the 
Commons. Lloyd George remained premier of the Coalition of Conservatives and his wing 
of the Liberal Party.
79 Ross McKibbin, The Ideologies o f Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p.l.
80 Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f Socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century 
(London, I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 16.
81 Robert Self, The Evolution o f the British Party System 1885-1940 (London, Longman, 2000), p. 143.
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The forward march of Labour continued. In the 1922 election the party increased its 
representation to 142 seats in the lower chamber on a level of support of 29.7%. The 
background to 1922’s general election was the Conservatives withdrawing from the 
Coalition, and Tory leader Bonar Law formed his own government. But clearly ill, he 
decided to hand over power to Stanley Baldwin the following year, and the new 
Conservative prime minister chose to go to the country to receive a mandate for tariffs. 
Instead he lost his majority and the free-trade parties, Labour with 191 seats and the 
Liberals with 158, combined to turn him out. Thus the stage was set for a minority Labour 
government. Ramsay MacDonald, who had been leader since 1922, became prime minister. 
The 1924 Labour government lasted less than a year, but in 1929 the party won the 
election, still without a majority, and Ramsay MacDonald again entered number 10.
An important point in the debate about the politics of the 1920s is the fact that there 
was competition between the parties not just to form a government, but also to be the 
official opposition. That accounts for Labour’s unwillingness to co-operate with the 
Liberals, as made clear by the resolution at the 1922 party conference against electoral 
pacts or alliances of any kind. Interestingly, in 1921 Labour spumed those left-wing 
Liberals who wished to combine forces against Lloyd George, though the terms were such 
that the mines, railways, canals and electricity would be nationalized.82 The leadership of 
Labour found common ground with the Conservatives over the issue of which the main 
parties should be. Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin said priority number one was “the 
disappearance of the Liberal Party [...] The next step must be the elimination of the 
Communists by Labour. Then we shall have two parties, the Party of the Right and the 
Party of the Left.”83
The 1929-1931 Labour government was a disappointment. Unemployment 
represented by far its greatest challenge, but beyond nationalization and some tentative 
plans for public works Labour had no solution. Within a year of taking office the crisis of 
the international economy pushed unemployment to its highest level since 1922.84 By 
December 1930 it stood at an unprecedented 2.5 million. In August 1931 a financial crisis 
occurred and a National government was set up to deal with it, still led by MacDonald.
82 Richard W. Lyman, The First Labour Government 1924 (London, Chapman & Hall, 1957), p. 88.
83 Eley, Forging Democracy, p. 294.
84 Ben Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 10.
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Labour went into opposition, apart from just over a dozen parliamentarians who supported 
the National Government. Later in the autumn an election was held in which the 
Conservative-dominated National Government trounced Labour. The last phase of Labour’s 
development between the wars thus occurred from 1931, and was a matter of rebuilding the 
party. It launched campaigns like “A Million New Members and Power” in 1932 and 
“Victory for Socialism” in 1934. Clement Attlee became leader in 1935, and in the election 
of that year it won back almost all the support it had had in 1929 and more than half its 
parliamentary representation.
As with Labour, the interwar years marked the coming of age of DNA, and hence 
was an exceptionally turbulent period. Founded in 1887, the party benefited from 
extensions of the franchise in 1898, when near-universal male suffrage was introduced, and 
1913 when women got the vote on the same terms as men.85 Its programme was copied 
directly from the SPD.86 In the first parliamentary election after independence from Sweden 
had been attained, in 1906, DNA achieved 16% of the vote. Then followed an upward trend 
until 1918 when the party dropped by just over a percentage point to 30.9%, while getting 
more votes than in 1915. DNA had established itself as one of the major parties in Norway. 
It was of comparable size in terms of votes to the Liberals (32.7%) and the Conservatives 
(30.0%), although the electoral system worked to the advantage of the capitalist parties. A 
candidate needed more than half the votes in a constituency to win it outright, failing that 
there would be a second round, in which the other parties generally combined to keep the 
Socialists out. As a result of this system, the Liberals had three times more parliamentarians 
than DNA in 1918.87
The perceived unfairness relating to parliamentary representation was undoubtedly 
a factor in the sharp leftward swing of DNA at its conference in the spring of 1918. Another 
important consideration was the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, of which DNA were 
enthusiastic supporters. It brought out certain radical strands in the party which had hitherto 
remained below the surface, unable to alter the dominant policy of steady reformism. One 
such group was the “Trade Union Opposition of 1911”. They were Syndicalists, centred
85 Knut Kjeldstadli, Et splittet samfunn 1905-1935. Aschehougs Norgeshistorie 10 (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1994), 
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Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f Socialism, p. 12.
87 Kjeldstadli, op. cit., p. 24.
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around the city of Trondheim and with Martin Tranmael as their acknowledged leader.
Other revolutionaries were based in DNA’s youth organization. They wanted soviets and 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. The new leadership took DNA into the Comintern in 
1919, and the party accepted the Twenty-One Conditions in 1921. At this stage its moderate 
wing broke away and formed the Social Democratic Party. Two years later, however, 
Comintern control proved too cumbersome for all but dedicated Communists, who formed 
their own party, while DNA left the International.88
In 1927 DNA and the Social Democrats were reunited. In the parliamentary election 
later in the year, DNA achieved its best-ever result: 36.8%. In 1920 a new system of 
proportional representation had become law, so that in the 1920s DNA received its fair 
share of MPs. After the election it therefore took pride of place as Parliament’s largest party 
for the first time. The next year a constitutional crisis occurred when the Conservative 
government resigned and attempts to mobilize a coalition of the capitalist parties failed. 
Would the King turn to DNA as the largest party and would it accept the commission? It 
did not have a majority behind it and scepticism of “ministerialism” was widespread.89 
DNA nevertheless accepted governmental responsibility with Christopher Horsnrud as 
prime minister. His accession statement was jarring in an extreme sense to the capitalist 
parties. It stated that the government’s task was to implement Socialism, though it accepted 
that it was not a realistic prospect at the present time, and promised to be led by the 
interests of the working class in all its actions.90
The government lasted only 18 days. Its principles proved unpalatable to the 
majority in Parliament. In addition, the director of the Bank of Norway influenced the 
Liberals behind the scenes to vote against Homsrud. This is what DNA later meant by 
extra-parliamentary pressure being responsible for the defeat of its first government. 
Possibly as a result of the near-acceptance of “ministerialism” in 1928, the party’s 
programme was radicalized somewhat in 1930. The capitalist parties had been given a 
fright by the emergence of DNA as the largest party, and concentrated on defeating it in the 
election of that year. DNA duly lost the contest, although it continued to advance in terms
88 Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f Socialism, p. 33.
89 For a discussion of this team see Eley, Forging Democracy, p. 89.
90 Tim Greve, Det norske Storting gjennom 150 dr. Bind 111. Tidsrommet 1908-1964 (Oslo, Gyldendal, 1964), 
p. 322.
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of votes. In 1933 DNA presented itself as the party willing and able to deal with the 
Depression. It had formulated counter-crisis economic policies in opposition, and after 
winning the election it tried to form a minority government to implement these. Only in 
1935 did it succeed in taking office under Johan Nygaardsvold. A deal with the Agrarians, 
who remained in opposition, allowed this to go ahead. The government remained in office 
for the rest of the interwar period, although it never had a majority.
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Chapter 1. The Campaigning of the British Labour Party in 
the Elections of 1929,1931 and 1935.
Introduction
This chapter examines how the Labour Party fought the three most important 
elections of the interwar period. In the six-year interval here under consideration the 
outcome of the political struggle between the wars was decided. The questions of interest 
here are the state of the labour movement at each election, the amount of money that was 
spent on campaigning, relations between associated groups within the party such as the 
Independent Labour Party, the Co-operative Party and the trade unions, how propaganda 
was produced and distributed, the role of Labour’s main newspaper the Daily Herald and 
how the elections were prepared in general. The purpose of looking at these is to furnish 
data for the comparison. There is also coverage of London in particular and some examples 
of campaigning from various constituencies. The latter will provide a picture of how the 
party dealt with some practicalities on the ground. Many of these issues will be returned to 
in chapter 5.
The themes dealt with include central control, which is a vital aspect of how the 
campaigns were fought. The limits of it are obvious. Labour did not even have a single 
colour across the land; the divisional parties used whichever ones were traditional in their 
locality.1 Another interesting point is that the lack of a fixed election date presented some 
problems for Labour. It did not choose the timing of any of these elections, which meant 
that its opponents held the advantage. This is particularly well brought out in 1931 when 
Labour had to interrupt its conference due to the announcement of a general election. But 
although Labour never knew the exact date of a contest, the central planning was conducted 
in an overarching way and did not greatly depend on the timescale. With no information on 
the electoral preparations of constituency parties, it cannot be said to what extent they were 
hampered by this factor. The question of electoral appeal is left to chapter 3, but where such 
considerations were entirely local they have been brought out here. For instance, the
1 Witness attempts at the annual conferences to impose a unified colour. Cf. Annual Reports to Conference. In 
1929 the Edmonton branch suggested just one colour (p. 33), in 1932 the Bristol Central Division suggested 
that the unified colour be yellow (p. 13) and in 1934 Enfield Trade Council and Labour Party had a preference 
for red (p. 25).
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London Labour Party appealed to the middle classes through its newspaper in 1929, which 
was not the case for the national campaign in that year.
1929,1931 and 1935 provided completely different contexts for the labour 
movement. In 1929 Labour was realistically aiming for a majority, although it was a tall 
order since the Conservatives had 396 MPs at the dissolution compared to Labour’s 163.2 
1931 was an extraordinary occasion because Labour had much shorter time to prepare, and 
its opponents included Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden and Jimmy Thomas who had 
been recognized as some of the most senior Labourites in 1929. The party was forced to cut 
comers such as not standing in agricultural constituencies, which it had identified as the 
key to electoral progress two years before. For all its claims to be seeking governmental 
power in 1935, Labour probably had no chance of winning that election, either. The 
imperative was on returning as a credible opposition. Such concerns did not appear in the 
written records, which were strictly matter-of-fact. In newspapers and propaganda, on the 
other hand, the party constantly exaggerated its capabilities. The elections will be covered 
chronologically with sub-headings under each section to treat particular topics.
Background to the 1929 election
An important facet of importance in the 1929 election was the Trade Union Act of 
1927, which sought to limit the political role of the Trades Union Congress by forcing 
unionists to contract-in if they wanted to affiliate to the Labour Party. In the two years since 
the passing of the Act, Labour had lost more than a quarter of its income from affiliation 
fees. Arthur Henderson, Secretary of the National Executive Committee, did not believe 
that the General Council of the TUC would be able to sign Labour’s manifesto for the 1929 
election, like it had in 1924, and suggested instead that the latter body issue its own 
manifesto dealing with industrial questions.4 Relations with the trade unions, however, 
would remain as close as was possible within the law. Union leaders might not have signed 
the manifesto, but they were closely consulted about the party’s programme Labour and the 
Nation upon which it was based, as proved by the necessity to negotiate with the Miners’
2 Calculated from F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British Electoral Facts 1885-1975 (London, Macmillan, 1976), p. 14, 
p. 49.
G. D. H. Cole, A History o f the Labour Party from 1914 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 195.
4 Minutes of the NEC 26 March 1928.
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Federation and the Transport and General Workers Union over the details.5 In a joint 
session of the NEC and the General Council of the TUC, Ramsay MacDonald explained 
that suggestions from various affiliated bodies had been incorporated into the draft.6 The 
Rules Sub-Committee of the NEC dealt comprehensively with the effects of the Trade 
Union Act of 1927 in its meeting of 12 December 1928. In a memorandum attached to the 
minutes it was stated that most divisional Labour parties were reporting withdrawals of 
trade union branches, and in some constituencies the situation was “very serious indeed.”7 
The reason for the branches leaving die party was inability to pay the affiliation fees to 
Labour, obviously caused by too few members contracting-in. In future, therefore, efforts to
o
increase individual membership would have to be prioritized.
In response to the 1927 Act Labour had set up a Bid for Power Fund which it 
hoped would amount to no less than £ 100,000 by the appropriate time. On 8 June 1928 it 
stood at £ 11,250 in hard cash with promises of another £ 5, 150 to come. The separate 
General Election Fund had a balance of £ 875 on 31 May 1928. A committee had been 
formed to administer the Bid for Power Fund; at its meeting in the late spring of 1928 it 
was noted that £ 5,275 had been received from trade unions in answer to a circular with 
suggested methods for raising contributions.9 Later in June 1928 a cheque for £ 1, 000 was 
received from the Amalgamated Engineering Union as well as several smaller contributions 
of £ 250 each from various unions.10
In 1927 an agreement was reached between the Co-operative Party and Labour.11 
Known as the Cheltenham Agreement, it involved the former, while remaining a separate 
party, running candidates under the auspices of the latter and working in tandem with 
Labour during elections. Thus early in 1929 details of how to approach the coming contest 
were hammered out. George Shepherd, acting as Labour’s chief agent, reported on the 
plans his party had made for public meetings to be held before the dissolution of
5 Minutes of the NEC 23 May 1928.
6 Also taking place on 23 May 1928, but later in the day.
7 Marked “The Allocation of Political Levies as between the Central Political Funds of Trade Unions and their 
Branches.”
8 Stefan Berger, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900-1931 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1994), p. 101.
9 Minutes of the Consultative Committee on Labour’s Bid for Power Fund 31 May 1928.
10 Minutes of the NEC 27 June 1928.
11 Labour had long wanted some sort of alliance with the co-operative movement. Ross McKibbin, The 
Evolution o f the Labour Party 1910-1924 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 43.
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1 9Parliament, and invited the participation of the Co-operative Party. It was agreed that
leading figures from the Co-operative productive and distributive sections would take part
in some of the most important of these events, the cost of furnishing a speaker to be borne
by the party to which he or she belonged. Furthermore, election agents in every
constituency would be recommended to involve local Co-operative speakers and societies 
1 1in their campaigning. What existed of posters and leaflets that would be used had already 
been sent to the Co-operative candidates and to their party centrally. The manifesto that the 
Co-operative Party was working on would in turn be sent to Labour at an early date.
Relations with the TUC, already considered in passing, were the last major issue 
pertaining to the campaign on which the minutes of 1929 shed some light. At the Joint 
Committee meeting two months before polling day, one of the items on the agenda 
concerned the Daily Herald.14 The TUC secretary Walter Citrine raised the matter of the 
formal ownership of the newspaper, and since his organization had been compelled to take 
full responsibility for it, it was appropriate also for the TUC to have sole ownership.
Labour was in agreement about this, and ironically the only obstacle was that the matter 
had not been treated by the General Council.
State of the party and movement 
Linked to the above is the question of how developed Labour was when it went into 
the 1929 election. The following table shows its vital statistics.
Table 1.1 Labour before the 1929 election.
Constituency parties Individual
membership
Affiliated trade 
unionists
Affiliated Socialists 
and Co-ops
578 227, 897 2, 044, 279 (91 
chapters)
58, 669
12 Minutes of the National Joint Committee of the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party 19 March 1929.
13 Some of these were affiliated to Labour anyway such as the powerful Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society. 
Rita Rhodes, An Arsenal fo r Labour. The Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society and Politics 1896-1996 
(Manchester, Holyoake Books, 1998), p. 72.
14 Minutes of a joint meeting of the Trades Union Congress General Council and the NEC of the Labour Party 
27 March 1929.
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(Source: Labour Party, Reports o f Annual Conferences. Thirty-sixth Report (London, 
Labour, 1936), p. 59.)
There were 1, 867 women’s sections with roughly a total membership of 250,000.15 The 
party had a newspaper for female members entitled The Labour Woman, but it was not 
gaining a greater readership.16 The Research Department was wholly responsible for The 
Labour Bulletin, which had grown in size from 16 to 24 pages during the first few months
17of 1929 “in view of the General Election.” The Labour League of Youth was still very 
much a subsidiary organization. During the previous year the NEC had considered the idea 
of setting up a national organization of youth, but had come to the conclusion that the time
1 ftwas not right. Financial difficulties prevented the hiring of staff for the League, and no 
subsidy could be forthcoming either. As a result the League of Youth consisted of some 
scattered branches and was not much in the way of an independent entity or electoral tool. 
The TUC had 3, 673,144 members in 202 affiliated organizations.19 The damage caused to 
Labour by the 1927 Act can be seen from the fact that it lost more than 1.2 million 
affiliated trade unionists between 1927 and 1928.
The Labour Year Book was not published in 1929, which means that the number of 
Socialist newspapers existing in that year must be guessed at. This is unfortunate because 
between 1928 and 1930, Labour lost a number of newspapers including the Aberdeen 
Citizen, the only daily apart from the Daily Herald™ The table shows the situation in 1928 
and 1930.
15 Labour Party, Reports o f Annual Conferences. Twenty-ninth Report (London, Labour, 1929), p. 21.
16 Ibid., p. 23.
17 Ibid., p. 53.
18 Labour Party, Reports o f Annual Conferences. Twenty-eight Report (London, Labour, 1928), p. 22.
19 Walter Citrine (ed.), Report o f the Proceedings o f the 61st Annual Trades Union Congress (London, Co­
operative Printing Society, n.d.), p. 79.
Losing local newspapers could be detrimental to the expansion of the party in a locality. To take Wales as 
an example, in the 1920s the publications in Swansea, Merthyr, Caernarfon and Llanelli folded. It was no 
compensation that the Daily Herald had a national reach. Circulation was low in Wales and party members 
were often reluctant to promote it. Duncan Tanner ‘The Pattern of Labour Politics, 1918-1939’ in Duncan 
Tanner, Chris Williams and Dei an Hopkin (eds.), The Labour Party in Wales, 1900-2000 (Cardiff, University 
of Wales Press, 2000), p. 123.
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Table 1.2 Labour and Socialist newspapers in 1928 and 1930.
Year Dailies Weeklies Monthlies Quarterlies Irregulars
1928 2 25 74 5 1
1930 1 16 71 - 1
(Sources: Labour Year Books 1928 (pp. 540-542), 1930 (pp. 557-559).)
In addition, Reynolds News, a co-operative Sunday newspaper with a circulation of about 
283,000 in 1929, supported Labour.21 The Co-ops also had two weeklies in 1928 and three 
in 1930 not included above.22 The Daily Herald had a circulation of about 325, 750 before 
the election. The locations of the 16 weekly newspapers which almost certainly existed in 
1929 shows that two were London papers, one was published in Birmingham, one in 
Edinburgh, one in Leeds, one in Glasgow, one in Bristol and the rest were scattered around 
usually medium-sized towns across Britain.
Electoral preparations 
It is difficult to state exactly when Labour began preparing for the general election, 
as it naturally did not know when it would be called. A good starting point, however, is a 
circular letter from Arthur Henderson to the constituency and local parties dated February
1928. Although no autumn poll took place in that year as assumed in the circular, the 
document serves to define what the party centrally considered to be essential tasks. The 
branches must keep themselves in a state of alertness. The central party wanted a list of 
supporters or sympathizers to whom Ramsay MacDonald could direct an appeal for 
financial assistance. Money accruing from these donors would be added to the central 
election fund. The branch must, however, itself raise money for its election expenses if its 
candidate was running under the auspices of the divisional Labour party, and must report to 
Henderson on this as early as possible. The name and address of the election agent for the 
constituency must be sent to the Head Office, if none had already been appointed. The 
divisional Labour party must begin distributing propaganda and literature across its 
territory both systematically and regularly. Another very important task was making sure
21 E. A. Rowe, ‘The British General Election of 1929’, B. Litt. thesis, Oxford University 1959, p. 218.
22 Labour Year Books 1928 (p. 544), 1930 (p. 560).
23 Rowe, op. tit., p. 217.
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potential supporters were on the register of voters. Just as with the election agent, a 
candidate should be selected immediately if there was not already one in place and details 
sent to the Head Office for approval. It was advised that the candidate should be put before 
the public through “meetings, literature and general publicity.” Perhaps needless to say, the 
electoral machinery should be built up as for ward and polling district committees plus 
women’s sections. These had to carry out the crucial tasks of organizational work, literature 
distribution, canvassing and registration. The women’s sections must naturally try to secure 
an increase in female Labour members, especially focusing on the enrolment of young 
women over 21, who were to be enfranchised in the course of the year. In concluding, 
Henderson asked for these matters to be put especially before the executive committees of 
the branches.
When another circular to local parties was sent in December 1928, it was clear that 
there would be a contest in 1929.24 Thus they were asked again to prepare. Every divisional 
Labour party that was fielding a candidate must immediately set aside £ 25- £50 for the 
run-up to the polling. It was hoped that sample election literature could be sent out in 
January 1929; that month would also witness area conferences of local agents. Any 
attempts to co-ordinate efforts within regions would be discussed at these, and Head Office 
also wanted to be informed about the use of parliamentarians as speakers. Henderson 
suggested that all constituency Labour parties should be made to send the names of MPs 
who had agreed to speak for them to the central organization before 1 June 1929. The 
rationale behind this was to ensure an even spread of qualified speakers. Equally, MPs 
should be sent a letter asking them what speaking engagements they were due to carry 
out.25 Henderson, as secretary of the NEC, also reported that the national party had 
confirmed it would be holding a “demonstration” at the Albert Hall on 27 April 1929 to tie 
in with the day of the F. A. Cup Final. This would mark something of a starting point to 
the official campaign, as Henderson thought that polling would take place within a month 
or six weeks of that date.
24 Minutes of the NEC 19 December 1928.
25 I have looked for lists of speeches in various constituencies in 1929, 1931 and 1935, but without success.
26 Cf. minutes of the NEC 29 September 1928 and 5 November 1928. It was the brainchild of the Workers’ 
Travel Association.
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Channels of communication were not exclusively top-down, though. The area 
conferences were the local parties’ chance to be heard. Previous area conferences had 
thrown up the suggestion that the Party avoid issuing pamphlets for the purposes of 
campaigning, but confine itself to leaflets.27 This was taken up by William Henderson, the 
son of Arthur and secretary of the Research and Publicity Committee, and as a result the 
Committee agreed to reduce the number of pamphlets planned. This hinted at efficiency in 
winning votes over the need to convince the people of the rightness of Socialism, because 
leaflets only covered the basic policies without a great deal of explanation or argument. The 
same meeting also gave the thumbs-down to a previously considered idea about releasing 
gramophone records for the campaign, when it became clear that the cost would be £ 500 
for 12 records.28 No more was heard of plans to produce “a good Labour film” either, 
which had been an item on the agenda for a previous meeting 29 It had in any case required 
feedback from the constituency parties on what use they could make of one.
Finance
The election took place on 30 May 1929, and naturally Labour was busy preparing 
throughout the early months of the year. Because the Daily Herald, Labour’s only daily 
national newspaper, would shoulder much of the burden for the party’s outreach to the 
public, it was agreed that the associate editor or his boss should be present at future 
meetings of the Press Committee.30 The object was to apprise an understanding of the 
general election arrangements, and it was agreed that it was a good idea. By the end of 
February the total value of receipts and promises was nearly £ 28, 000.31 It was now agreed 
that all outstanding promises should be called in. It was also decided that there should be a 
“self-denial week” to raise more fimds and a voluntary trade union levy, but the suggestion 
of a certificate of subscription was rejected.
27 Minutes of the Research and Publicity Committee 2 November 1928.
28 Although under a different partnership with Columbia Gramophone Co speeches by MacDonald, Snowden, 
Henderson, Thomas and Margaret Bondfield were in fret recorded and sold at election time, the Party getting 
royalties of 2d. a record. Cf. Report on General Election Propaganda presented to Research and Publicity 
Committee 18 July 1929.
29 Minutes of the Research and Publicity Committee 25 September 1928.
30 Minutes of the Research and Publicity Committee 22 February 1929.
31 Minutes of the NEC 27 February 1929.
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The Bid for Power Fund continued to grow in the run-up to the election. By 26 
March receipts and promises had reached a total of approximately £ 36, 000.32 
Advertisements for binding would cost £ 500 and would be deducted from the Fund. A 
month later it was concluded that the advertising and other attempts to “stimulate this 
Fund” had been reasonably successful, although no large donation had been received.33 The 
total now stood at just under £ 40, 000. In the month of April, within five weeks of polling 
day, it was possible to discuss the specificities of how the money would be spent. 
Henderson suggested that the number of candidates be increased to about 575. This would 
necessitate about £ 20,000 from the Fund to bankroll candidates not able to bear the whole 
of their campaigning costs. Taking into account the money already transferred to the 
General Fund (£ 14,500), that would leave only £ 5, 000 for other expenses. What was 
decided at this meeting did not necessarily come to pass and Labour’s planning was not 
conducted with machine-like precision. Another plan of Henderson’s was to fund six to 12 
local speakers, primarily women, to campaign in the last three weeks before polling day. 
These agitators would have a reasonable salary and be granted an expenses account, and the 
meeting accepted this idea also in principle.
The election
Possibly the first mention Labour made of the correct election date came two and a 
half months before 30 May.34 Information that the Conservatives were booking halls for 29 
May was interpreted as signalling what would be the end of the campaign. Knowing the 
election date 10 weeks in advance “gave Labour an excellent opportunity to prepare.”351 
May 1929 saw the publication of the Labour manifesto, which was reproduced in full in the 
Daily Herald?6 The official “kick off’ to Labour’s electioneering had taken place four days 
earlier with Ramsay MacDonald’s 65-minute speech at the Albert Hall.37 The meeting had 
been many months in the planning. According to the newspaper, exuberant enthusiasm was 
displayed by the audience, who had paid for admission, but who nevertheless gave
32 Minutes of the NEC 26 March 1929.
33 Minutes of the NEC 26 April 1929.
34 Daily Herald 15 March 1929, p. 1
35 Labour Organiser IX (January 1934), p. 1.
36 Daily Herald 1 May 1929, p. 1.
37 Daily Herald 29 April 1929, p. 1.
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handsomely to a collection. MacDonald began by rounding on the other parties, and 
particularly laid into Lloyd George for his unemployment record during Coalition days.
The reason was that the Liberal leader had recently unveiled We Can Conquer 
Unemployment, a counter-cyclical economic blueprint. Five-minute speeches were given by 
the five victors of 1929 by-elections, and there was communal singing led by F. O. Roberts 
MP.
From April deliveries of electoral materials started reaching the constituency parties 
and while the starting point for local campaigning must have varied, it is likely that the 
local branches actively began their electioneering efforts at this point, permitting a month­
long campaign. A lot of preparation had gone into producing Labour’s arsenal of 
propaganda. From the autumn of 1928 and until May 1929, the Press and Publicity 
Department concentrated on election work to the exclusion of other activities. A scheme 
for the production of election literature was drawn up in September 1928, including the 
topics to be addressed and the use of props (loudspeakers, silent films, talkies, small 
projectors, signs and gramophone records). During February and March constituencies had 
word of the pamphlets, leaflets, speaker’s notes (a joint venture with the TUC), election 
specials (i.e. newspapers), films and strawboards they would be using. A total of 20 
pamphlets and 66 leaflets were available. 43,000 leaflets were distributed, all of which 
were new or in revised form. In round numbers the manifesto reached a circulation of 8.9 
million and 640, 000 copies of the two editions of the election newspapers were 
distributed.40 There were 30 regular posters of which 10, 000 were hung up during the 
campaign; in addition there was a colour portrait of MacDonald and 11,000 of these were 
hung 41 Most of the leaflets, pamphlets and posters about agriculture were available in 
Welsh.42 The last publications disseminated to the public for which the Department was 
responsible were the three special issues of The Citizen, 700,000 of which were given
38 The National Union of Labour Organisers and Election Agents suggested in their publication that 
collections should be taken at every meeting if possible. Labour Organiser IX (May 1929), p. 85.
39 Labour Party Annual report 1929, p. 49.
40 Ibid., p. 51. 643,000 newspapers according to Report of the General Election Propaganda presented to the 
Publicity and Research Committee 18 July 1929.
41 Sales of it were 10,000 rather than 11, 000 according to ibid. and it was one of the 30 posters.
42 University of Manchester: The Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC), Labour Party Archive, 
LP/ELEC/1929/1. Order form no. 1 marked JN 1055 1929.
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away.43 Among other props were two films shown in a portable projector (“lantern”), one 
relating to the mining industry and one about nursery schools. There was thus no panoramic 
Labour film as had been discussed. But the projected gramophone records did see the light 
of day, containing speeches made by prominent figures in the party.
The Daily Herald'was used as a forum to raise funds during the campaign. As an 
example, take its front page on Saturday 13 April, which was devoted to Arthur 
Henderson’s call for money to fight the election. This was followed by an editorial 
commending Henderson’s initiative.44 The ILP ran an advertisement seeking money for its 
own election fund.45 The Herald also had a direct role to play in driving the campaign 
forward It published a propaganda broadsheet known as an election special and ran a daily 
series on Labour accomplishments called “The Labour record”, with equivalents 
lambasting those of its opponents. It also began printing “little letters”, which were appeals 
to specific groups to vote for its preferred party.46 From the Socialist point of view the 
Herald was also the place to keep track of major events in the campaign. Labour’s first 
national broadcast relating to the election was given on 11 April by Arthur Henderson, 
some time before the campaign “kicked off.”47 It brought a reply to a new scare story that 
Labour would abolish war pensions, and the newspaper lauded the speech as “[A] powerful 
appeal” which had committed a future Labour government to a great crusade against 
unemployment and want, including disease and human suffering caused by poor social and 
industrial conditions. Along with the peace issue this constituted Labour’s rhetoric and 
policies in a nutshell.
Labour could also contrast its ameliorations in municipal politics with the limited 
economic success of the Government48 Early in May Philip Snowden debated economic 
policy with Winston Churchill on the wireless, and showed that Labour intended to pay for 
projected improvements by taxing the rich more, increasing death duties and saving money
43 707,000 according to Report of the General Election Propaganda,
44 Daily Hercdd 13 April 1929, p. 1 and p. 4.
45 Daily Herald 14 May 1929, p. 5.
46 See chapter 3, p. 163.
47 Daily Herald 12 April 1929, p. 1.
48 Duncan Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party 1900-1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p. 438.
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through cuts in wasteful expenditure, especially armaments.49 The newspaper of course was 
of the opinion that Snowden had triumphed in the debate. He had in any case promised to 
abolish all taxes on food and necessities and to revise income tax downwards for people of 
humble means. He also accused the Conservatives of scaremongering tactics; this was a 
facet of election discourse of which Labour was highly aware, and had been at least since 
the Zinoviev letter in 1924. At the same time MacDonald was urging Daily Herald t&A&s 
to strive for victory, saying it had never been nearer. So Labour’s newspaper was utilized to 
boost morale. A week before the election, the front page carried news of “Labour’s 
Whirlwind Campaign for Power.”50 For good measure, it additionally claimed that there 
was a slump in the fortunes of Lloyd George. The capitalist parties had each held 
conferences on how to kindle some enthusiasm, while MacDonald was setting “the North 
ablaze during his tour.” It was calculated that Labour’s candidates had planned a total of 
14, 000 meetings before 30 May. The one due to take place in Birmingham later that 
evening, featuring the Labour leader, was predicted to be greater than anything held since 
the Chartists. Of course making such predictions was easy.
The regional campaign 
A fundamental problem in describing Labour’s electioneering is that it is hard to 
grasp the regional dimension of it. The records of the central party are confined to basic 
facts and figures, and in the annual reports the information about elections is spread out. 
This is primarily a result of the British constituency-based system, whereby each divisional 
party is responsible for its own campaign.51 Apart from a page’s coverage in every issue of 
the Daily Herald during the election, which will be referred to later, there is no place where 
this information is collected.52 This is despite claims that Labour was “the most centralised
49 Daily Herald 4 May 1929, p. 1. Taxing the rich logically followed on from Labour’s representation of 
poverty and wealth. Cf. LHASC, Labour Party Archive, LP/ELEC/1929/1. Labour Speaker’s Handbook 1929, 
p. 48, p. 51 and p. 105 with statistics on the enormous wealth of aristocrats and industrialists, contrasted with 
the poor and unemployed.
50 Daily Herald 22 May 1929, p. 1.
51 Although writing for an earlier period, Duncan Tanner suggests that what happened in the constituencies 
was important because local parties could undermine the “national” image and strategy. They could also, 
however, reflect local views better. Political Change and the Labour Party 1900-1918, p. 79.
52 There is a blueprint for an ideal constituency election campaign which, however, leaves much to the 
discretion of the divisional party. See Labour Organiser IX (May 1929), pp. 102-103.
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and disciplined of the three parties.”53 A list of grants and loans afforded to constituencies 
exists, but very little can be derived from it. (For what it is worth it is reproduced as 
appendix 1.) In London, for instance, 32 divisional Labour parties received grants, covering 
half the seats in the city.54 15 of these were won by Labour in the election. The affluent 
residential constituencies of Lewisham West and Westminster Abbey received loans of c. £ 
45 and £18 respectively, which showed some interest in progressing in difficult areas for 
Labour.55 Showing the benefits of recruiting rich candidates are the Birmingham 
constituencies of Erdington, Ladywood and Sparkbrook, receiving between £ 100 and £
250 each, which was much more than average, as gifts from Sir Oswald Mosley, the 
candidate for Smethwick. Other national-local interaction included the Press and Publicity 
Department preparing draft leaflets on local affairs for candidates and a specimen election 
address for each constituency. It also wrote articles rebutting charges from local opponents 
and helped with information on various issues.56
Details of the leader’s election tour are available only because they were reported in 
the Daily Herald. From 14 to 25 May he took the following route around the country 
addressing mass meetings: Seaham to Scotland taking in Kilmarnock, Hamilton and 
Glasgow, then Kilsyth, Stirling, Perth and Inverness.57 Next he travelled to the West of his 
homeland visiting Oban, then crossing south and across the border by way of Carlisle, 
Bradford, Liverpool, Birmingham, Bristol, Stoke-on Trent, Crewe and Manchester, before 
returning to his own constituency. Many short speeches were made along the way in places 
not mentioned above. MacDonald was an excellent orator.58 His tour mostly took place in 
the strong Labour areas of Scotland and the North of England, with occasional visits to the
53 Stuart Ball, Andrew Thorpe and Matthew Worley ‘Elections, Leaflets and Whist Drives. Constituency 
Party Members in Britain between die Wars’ in Matthew Worley (ed.), Labour’s Grass Roots. Essays on the 
Activities o f Local Labour Parties and Members, 1918-45 (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), p, 11. One of their 
reasons for supposing this is the frequency with which divisional party executives met. This is of little use in 
the present connection because it still means electioneering was planned in the constituencies.
54 Grants to Candidates— General Election 1929.
55 Conversely, too much money should not be spent in safe seats. Labour Organiser DC (July 1929), p. 225.
56 Labour Party Annual report 1929, p. 51.
57 Daily Herald 8 May 1929, p. 1. See map at the end of the thesis.
58 Rodney Barker ‘Political Myth: Ramsay MacDonald and the Labour Party’, History 61:201 (1976), p. 51.
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Midlands. Snowden’s campaigning took place in the North, but that of Jimmy Thomas took 
him all over the country where he addressed scores of meetings.59
Electoral expenditure 
At least it is possible to tell how much Labour spent on campaigning. The Bid for 
Power Fund eventually reached the total of £ 49,200.60 Central expenditure in connection 
with the general election amounted to approximately £ 40,000. A later calculation of how 
the Bid for Power Fund had been spent is as follows:
Table 13 The Bid for Power Fund 1929.
To Central Party for administration £14, 500
Election grants to constituencies £15,000
Printing of pamphlets and leaflets £10, 500
To General Fund £9,200
Total £49,200
(Source: Labour Party Annual report 1929, p. 221.)
This tallies with expenditure of £ 40, 000, because the £ 14, 500 for central party 
administration is supposed to have been spent on preparing for the election before the 
campaign had officially started.61 That still leaves the question of how much was spent in 
the constituencies. Including the £ 15, 000 which was channelled from central office, on 
average each Labour candidate spent £ 452.62 There were 569 candidates, thus spending a 
total of £ 257,188. Adding the £ 25,000 of central spending (£ 40, 000 minus £ 15, 000 in 
electoral grants) a figure of £ 282, 188 is arrived at for total expenditure.
59 Daily Herald 30 May 1929, p. 1. Thomas has been credited with a great deal of charisma and the ability to 
appeal to the middle classes and the “rough” working class alike. Both might be attracted to his centrism, and 
the latter by his royalism, deference and denial that he was a Socialist. Andrew Thorpe ‘J. H. Thomas and the 
Rise of Labour in Derby, 1880-1945’, Midland History XV (1990), p. 112, pp. 122-123.
60 Labour Party Annual report 1929, p. 46.
61 Cf. Labour Party Annual report 1929, p. 45. The sum “for General Election preparation” is here given as 
£12,000. There is, however, a sum of £ 2,500 noted as being transferred from the Bid for Power Fund to the 
General Fund in January 1929.
62 David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900-2000 (Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 2000), p. 260.
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London
Labour’s official opening of its campaign had as mentioned taken place in the 
Albert Hall, but although MacDonald did not return to the capital after speaking there in 
early May, he wrote an article for the London Labour Party stressing the importance of the 
city.63 Including the University seats, it had 63 Members of Parliament and could thus 
make a sizeable contribution to Labour’s hopes of a majority. In conjunction with pieces 
from the Herald, the sources provide a few, but not many, details of how electioneering 
was conducted. It is not known how many members the London Labour Party had in 1929, 
but a year before the figure was listed as 32, 290.64 This was correct according to the data 
submitted to the annual conference in 1928.65 After that time some branches reported 
updated figures for 1928. The revised data brought forth another 2, 165 members for a total 
of 34,455 close to the beginning of 1929. This is not an absolute figure, but it shows a 
healthy trend since 1927 when there were 29, 227.66
As for the resources of London Labour, the data closest to the election mentioned a 
General Fund of £ 245 and an Election Fund of £ 350 as of May 1929.67 It may be assumed 
that the Election Fund was drained completely, and it seems likely that the General Fund 
was also used primarily for campaigning. Otherwise it would not have grown exponentially 
from £ 27 to £ 245 in just one month. It stood at £ 675 as of 3 April, and the depletion of all 
but £ 27 of it later in the month is likely, but not certain, to have been due to election
fkSiexpenses. It must remain guesswork how much London Labour spent, though it would be 
consistent with these numbers. Among the activities of the party were the issuing of a 
general election issue of The London News (May 1929 had 16 pages instead of the usual 
eight), the putting up of a polling day poster and the making of grants to constituency 
Labour parties where it was considered to be beneficial.69 These were not especially 
comprehensive tasks, especially as it is clear the idea of a poster only just made it.70 The
63 The London News, May 1929, p. 1.
64 The London News, February 1929, p. 4.
65 The London News, April 1929, p. 2.
66 The London News, February 1929, p. 4.
67 The London News, June 1929, p. 3 and p. 6.
68 London Metropolitan Archives, Acc 2417/A/l. Minutes of the Executive Committee of the London Labour 
Party 3 April 1929.
69 Loc. cit. Minutes of the Executive Committee of the London Labour Party 7 March 1929; Minutes of the 
Executive Committee of the London Labour Party 2 May 1929.
70 It was decided not to hang up such a poster in the 3 April meeting. See minutes for that meeting.
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reason for these limited efforts lies in the constituency-based nature of British 
electioneering. It was the divisional parties who performed the campaigning, higher bodies
71only did so to a limited extent.
It may be taken that the monthly publication was London Labour’s most noticeable 
contribution to the campaign. The London News did not differ significantly from the rest of 
Labour’s propaganda. The election issue was available for constituency parties at the rates 
of 6s. for 100 copies, 25s. for 500 copies or 42s. for a thousand.72 May 1929 brought the 
manifesto of the London Labour Party on the front page, page 3 was devoted to co- 
operators and page 5 had the heading “We Shall Conquer the Liberals,” an instance of 
negative campaigning designed to stave off the perceived Liberal revival. But some issues 
mentioned were specific to Londoners. The party in the capital said it opposed Tory plans 
to transfer control of the tramways from the London County Council to the Traffic 
Combine.73 This would turn a service run for the public good into a concern mostly run in 
the interest of private profit. Labour wanted the capital to have a municipal bank. 
Birmingham already had such an institution, and it would allow municipal expenditure with 
fewer running costs. These were the London-based issues with which Labour hoped to 
appeal in its manifesto, which appeared on page 1. Like the rest of London Labour’s 
rhetoric and policies, the manifesto echoed the party’s message centrally. This was what 
might be expected, but in one significant way London differed from the emphasis in the 
national campaign. A page in the election special contained an article intended for the 
middle classes.74 This piece attempted to enter into the mindset of professionals and gave 
reasons why those with a white collar had hitherto shunned Labour. In actual fact, London 
Labour propaganda had throughout the 1920s stressed the unity of interests between it and 
this group.75 It said there was nothing to fear, because Labour would elevate the workers in
71 This was seen as something of a problem within London Labour. At the most recent conference held on 1 
December 1928 the Executive Committee of the London Labour Party was instructed to report on the 
feasibility of amalgamating all 29 borough parties into one giant organization. This might make parliamentary 
and municipal campaigning more efficient. See Labour Organiser IX (August 1929), p. 159.
72 The London News, April 1929, p. 5.
73 The London News, May 1929, p. 1.
74 Ibid., p. 15.
75 Tom Jeffery ‘The Suburban Nation. Politics and Class in Lewisham’ in David Feldman and Gareth 
Stedman Jones (eds.), Metropolis London. Histories and Representations since 1800 (London, Routledge, 
1989), p. 189.
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order to achieve equality, rather than bring down the intelligentsia. And it would give the 
latter a security which their savings “for a rainy day” could not.
Examples from the constituencies 
To illustrate what was happening on the ground a few examples from the fights in 
the constituencies will be appended. The localities were chosen to bring up points of 
interest, and are largely from the London area. Conservative-held Streatham was the sort of 
place where Labour was hoping to make progress. Even in “the tree-lined avenues of 
middle-class villas” every home was being canvassed and reports stated that the electoral 
machine was in good condition.76 There were a few signs that Labour might advance in the 
division. New housing estates, albeit of owner-occupiers, at Streatham Vale were adding 
diversity to the area. Its candidate, Fred Hughes, assistant general secretary of the National 
Union of Clerks, hoped to woo Streatham’s tens of thousands of white-collar workers, 
including female typists and secretaries who might be new voters. There were a number of 
similar seats in well-to-do suburbs where Labour stated it hoped to gain the support of civil 
servants, city workers, women voters and new residents. At Putney the party used the 
incumbent Tory’s record of opposing votes for young women against him.77 Labour’s 
candidate here, J. C. Lawder, also hoped for support from the 8,000 domestic servants in 
the constituency. In nearby Wimbledon 20,000 citizens had been added to the electoral 
register since 1924, and Labour was hopeful of doing well since the capitalist vote was 
split.78 In Richmond there was “an uphill task” ahead, but the candidate claimed he was 
winning new adherents every day, especially young workers from the Ministry of Pensions 
at Kew.79 In Kingston Labour’s candidate John W. Fawcett was a member of the National 
Union of Commercial Travellers, and aided by co-operators and trade unionists he claimed
OA
to be winning many votes from black-coated workers, who had a real presence there. One 
of the best prospects was Lewisham East. Again, Labour claimed to be gaining much 
support from city workers and civil servants. The new housing estates at Bellingham and
76 Daily Herald 9 May 1929, p. 7.
77 Daily Herald 10 May 1929, p. 5.
78 Daily Herald 16 May 1929, p. 4.
79 Daily Herald 24 May 1929, p. 7.
80 Loc. cit.
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Downham were full of Labour-voting people.81 Lewisham West retained more of its old- 
time bourgeois character.
An even greater challenge was the Kent constituency of Chislehurst. It was 
described as one of the most difficult seats in the country to contest.82 Trade unionism was 
practically non-existent owing to the lack of industry, save the occasional paper mill. The 
residents were either millionaires or slum dwellers. Agricultural labourers and smallholders 
were to be Labour’s target groups in this division, but they tended to be so badly off that 
many were alienated from the whole political process. To make matters worse, Labour had 
consistently been denied the use of halls to spread its message. Meetings were therefore 
held in the open air, often village greens. Such conditions made the Home Counties 
uncertain territory for Labour.
Of course the story was a different one in Labour strongholds like West 
Bermondsey and Rotherhithe. These two areas would have their candidates returned “with 
bigger majorities than ever.”83 So confident was Dr Alfred Salter of winning West 
Bermondsey that a devoted a week to campaigning in Maidstone, Kent.84 The agent, John 
Douglas, spent half of his time bringing voters in two wards of North Soutwark to the poll.
Home County intimidation was reported from Colchester, Essex, where a landlord 
had sent window bills advertising the Conservative Party to his cottage tenants with the 
instruction to display them.85 The newspaper reported, however, that rural voters were 
beginning to take in that the ballot was secret. Only a few of the above window bills were 
to be seen, and Labour was hoping to gain the support of half the rural population. Another 
constituency where Labour was hoping for support from those engaged in the primary 
occupations was Lowestoft. Its candidate Captain Basil Hall, R. N. had been visiting farms 
in the agricultural hinterland for a year leading up to the election.86 He found the farmers 
friendly, and the labourers and their families were solidly Labour. Lowestoft had a fishing 
population o f6,000 whom it was hoped would turn out for the party.
81 These were working-class developments. Cf. Matthew Worley, Labour Inside the Gate. A History o f British 
Labour between the Wars (London, I. B. Tauris, 2005), p. 189.
82 Daily Herald 13 May 1929, p. 7.
83 Daily Herald 14 May 1929, p. 7.
84 The Bermondsey Labour Party “adopted” a poor local party in 1929 and tried to build an effective 
organization for it. Berger, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900-1931, p. 98.
85 Daily Herald 22 May 1929, p. 7.
86 Daily Herald 15 May 1929, p. 4.
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These examples complement the coverage in chapter 3 about Labour target voters. 
Together with the sparse information about the national campaign, it is hoped that some 
interesting features of the contest have been brought out.
The end of the election 
An issue of special importance to the party was that its most active campaigners 
should not go to their usual job on polling day, but should devote the entire day to helping 
Labour in their constituency.87 Agents were therefore repeatedly asked to urge them to 
apply for leave. The morning should be spent on persuading the elderly, tradesmen, 
housewives and those working locally to vote.88 Incoming trains carrying employees 
returning from work should be met. Towards the end of the day canvassers should try to 
persuade those living near the polling stations to vote.
MacDonald gave Herald readers special updates on how things were going, the last 
telephoned from Seaham two days before the election. “Go forward and spare no pains to 
make our cause triumph!” he said.89 That night he also spoke on the wireless, apologizing 
for his hoarse voice caused by addressing 250,000 people at election meetings.90 He 
devoted some of his speech to debunking myths about his party, and completely denied that 
it was not a constitutional party.91 He warned against the Conservative misrepresentation of 
Labour as being against widows’ pensions and other social ameliorations. It had voted 
against certain such bills only because they were unfair and inadequate. He stated that his 
party believed in national unity, but that unity had to include “all classes and factions which 
give service to [...] the community.”
The result was a real boon to Labour. For the first time it became the largest party in 
the House of Commons. The share of the votes and seats were as follows:
87 Labour Organiser IX (May 1929), p. 88.
88 Ibid., p. 94.
89 on i mo .  iDaily Herald 29 May 1929, p. 1.
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Table 1.4 The general election 1929.
Party Votes (change from 1924) Seats (change from 1924)
Conservatives 38.1% (-10.1%) 260 (-159)
Liberals 23.6% (+5.8%) 59 (+19)
Labour 37.1% (+4.1%) 287(+137)
Although Labour thus did not receive a majority, it had overturned the massive 
Conservative victory of 1924 and seen off a spirited Liberal revival. Once Labour had 
digested the results it pronounced itself satisfied with winning so many industrial 
constituencies and those with a mixture of manual and black-coated workers, but it urged 
even greater attention to the countryside, where there had been only modest progress.92 
It was thought the key to a majority lay in the rural seats.93
Conclusion: The 1929 election 
The purpose of what has gone before was to determine how Labour fought the 
election of 1929. The central party monitored the electioneering, for instance by asking 
leading MPs about their speaking engagements and, conversely, divisional parties which 
speakers would be visiting them. This was to maintain an even balance across the country. 
Head office also sold propaganda to the local parties and carried out the central planning of 
the election campaign. This took place to a small extent after February 1928 and intensively 
after December of that year. Central planning included such considerations as what the 
pamphlets and leaflets would be about and what props were to be used (i.e. films, 
loudspeakers, gramophone records, etc.). Head office ran the national campaign, that is to 
say what was in the media and what was of general interest. It awarded grants to the 
constituency parties, and inside the capital more money could be forthcoming from the 
London Labour Party. This body also performed some electioneering tasks like publishing 
a manifesto and an election special of its newspaper, as well as putting up posters on 
polling day.
92 Daily Herald 4 June 1929, p. 4.
93 Cf. McKibbin, The Evolution o f the Labour Party 1910-1924, p. 151. He calls it a “mistaken view.”
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Central control of what was happening in the constituencies was limited to 
approving nomination of the chosen candidates, being told who the election agent was and 
communicating with the branches in the run-up to the election. Within these limits and 
those imposed by the propaganda available, the divisional Labour parties could do as they 
pleased. Really good coverage of what went on locally is not available in the form of an 
overview, but the nearest it is possible to get is the constituency page of the Daily Herald. 
This source suffers from being propagandists, with perhaps a too optimistic slant on what 
was going on. There were also area conferences consisting of die members of the NEC, the 
central party and election agents from constituencies in particular regions. These permitted 
two-way communication about the technical and principal issues facing the party. The 
national campaign as treated above naturally had an impact on the result in every single 
constituency. Of the leading figures in the party MacDonald spoke primarily in Northern 
England and Scotland, Snowden in the North, while Jimmy Thomas’s engagements took 
him all over the country.
Two great events of 1927 had an impact on the election two years later. The first 
was the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act which had the effect of reducing Labour’s 
affiliated membership by 1.2 million in its first year of operation. Many local associations 
were lost due to the political fund of unions dwindling.94 The response of the party was to 
set up a Bid for Power Fund which took donations from individuals, trade unions, local 
branches and women’s sections. It ensured that Labour’s campaign was well funded; more 
so than in 1931 and 1935 as will be seen later. The other notable development was the 
Cheltenham Agreement linking the Co-operative Party to Labour for electoral purposes. 
Co-operative societies consequently made a great effort in campaigning two years later in 
various constituencies, and not just where the Labour candidates were from their party. In 
this election relations between groups within Labour were not an issue. The Daily Herald 
was used to press the Labour cause, to collect funding and also to play a part in the 
organizing effort. For instance, it sought to inspire its readers to perform valuable tasks for 
the party. It also published electoral material of its own, like the “Little Mauve Book” 
which contained useful facts for activists.
94 Labour Organiser EX (March 1930), p. 38.
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Background to the election of 1931
The origins of the general election of 1931, held on 27 October, go back to the 
financial crisis of August of that year. Most of the plans made for fighting the campaign 
were laid after that time. This was certainly true as far as propaganda materials were 
concerned. In the summer of 1931 the Press and Publicity Department was engaged in 
writing and publishing literature for an autumn campaign, and it was envisaged that those 
materials would form the basis of Labour’s election propaganda on a subsequent 
occasion.95 Owing to the realignment of forces caused by MacDonald’s, Snowden’s, 
Thomas’s and Sankey’s defection to the National Government, most of this literature had to 
be pulped.
Straight after the formation of the National Government on 26 August 1931 an 
emergency meeting of the NEC was held at Labour headquarters in Smith Square. At the 
afternoon session it was decided that no official reaction to the events be promulgated until 
the entire labour movement had met.96 At the evening session the first steps were taken by 
way of preparing for an imminent election. The NEC, General Council of the TUC and 
Consultative Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party having met at half past two, the 
NEC put out a statement calling for the establishment of a “Labour majority” fund.97 It 
instructed local branches to put their organizations in readiness, and help provide the means 
whereby Labour at a national level might gain a majority. The next day the three national 
committees met again, issuing a manifesto relating to the political crisis and an appeal for 
electoral funds with the signatures of the chairmen and secretaries of the three bodies.98 The 
manifesto and financial appeal were naturally printed in the Daily Herald the next day.99 
Arthur Henderson was elected chairman at a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party on 
28 August, but it was not yet clear that the MacDonaldites’ break with the party was 
final.100 Lord Sankey was cheered when he turned up at the meeting to explain his actions 
and to pledge that he would never leave the Labour Party.
95 Labour Party, Annual Reports o f Conferences. Thirty-second Report (London, Labour, 1932), p. 63.
96 Minutes of the NEC 26 August 1931 at 2 p.m.
97 Minutes of the NEC 26 August 1931 at 5 p.m.
98 Minutes of a meeting of the Three National Committees 27 August 1931.
99 Daily Herald 28 August 1931, p. 1, p. 3.
100 Daily Herald 29 August 1931, p. 1.
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Early preparations and problems
Labour’s troubles, however, had not begun with the defection of the MacDonaldites. 
To be in government during the Depression was no easy task, especially without a majority 
in Parliament behind it. A meeting held during the party conference at Llandudno in 1930 
and chaired by George Shepherd, the National Agent, threw up a whole host of electoral 
problems, which indicate the low morale prevailing after 15 months in government.101 The 
rank and file was deemed not to have a proper connection with the movement nationally, 
and there was no contact between the leadership and even senior figures in the provinces. In 
other words, the grassroots were disappointed with what the government had achieved. The 
prestige of the Daily Herald had sunk in the eyes of the party members, as it was no longer 
a political organ but a popular newspaper. As a corollary it was not as effective in 
marshalling opinion within the labour movement, especially relating to the party’s 
parliamentary activities. The party’s speakers were not performing as well as they could on 
the platforms. According to the report from which these difficulties are taken, too much 
time was spent on apologizing for the Government’s failures and not enough talking up its 
successes. A defeatist spirit was rife. At present the literature failed to meet the 
requirements of the movement and was “rather patchy.” The two most important issues 
identified for the next election were unemployment and education. During the same 
meeting it also came up that it was difficult to find candidates for backward areas far from 
London.
It was the daily business of the NEC to prepare for the next election, whenever it 
would come. Since Labour was in charge of a minority government it was known that 
Parliament might have to be dissolved at relatively short notice.102 Thus at the end of 
October 1930 are found the beginnings of an electoral fund to replace the Bid for Power 
Fund of 1929. Henderson sent a letter to 550 known supporters of the party to try to raise 
cash for the next general election.103 Not long thereafter the Election Appeal Fund 
contained £ 5,525 compared to just £ 800 in the By-election Fund.104 The endorsement of 
candidates was a regular business for the NEC, and the more candidates it had at an early
101 Minutes of Annual Consultation on Organizing Staff 10 October 1930.
102 The National Agent said the next election might come “as a ‘thief in the night’.” Labour Organiser X 
(January 1930), p. 1.
103 Minutes of the NEC 27 October 1930.
104 Minutes of the Finance and General Purposes Sub-Committee 18 November 1930.
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stage the better, because it would allow the chosen men and women to become familiar 
faces in the constituencies. At the beginning of 1931 it looked as if Labour would have a 
base of 519 candidates in readiness relatively soon.105 Owing to defections and the hurried 
nature of the election, Labour was eventually only able to put 490 candidates in the field, 
but at the time the intention was of course to endorse many more.
There were some problems at this time between Labour and elements among its 
component parts. This is evident from the record of the same meeting mentioned above in 
connection with the tally of candidates. Two ILP candidatures were held up in the 
constituencies of Glasgow Kelvingrove and Camborne.106 A letter was sent to Glasgow 
confirming the NEC’s policy of not endorsing candidates on the financial responsibility of 
the ILP. This was a policy change from last time when the ILP had sponsored no less than 
54 candidates. It suggested Labour wanted a greater degree of control of its MPs or of its 
constituent parts. Indeed, what precipitated the separation of the ILP from Labour was the 
1931 Labour Party conference decision to uphold the standing orders against recalcitrant 
members.107 The ILP wanted a free hand to vote according to the principles of Socialism. 
Relations were never put on a completely even keel again. In the election six unendorsed 
ILP candidates were returned to Westminster, and are usually counted as in the Labour 
group until 1932 when the ILP disaffiliated from Labour.
As for the Co-operative Party there was always at least the potential for tension, 
since two separate parties were in a perpetual working relationship. For instance, the new 
programme of the Co-operative Party had to be sent to the Joint Standing Committee to see 
whether it was compatible with Labour and the Nation.10* At a later stage a Labour official, 
George Dallas, raised the issue of what was to be done about the monopolizing of 
divisional Labour parties by the Co-operative organization where it had the candidate, 
saying that “matters were becoming rather serious.”109 As an initial response it was decided 
that the National Agent should prepare a report for the committee. At least during the crisis 
it became clear that Labour in opposition continued to have the support of the Co-operative
105 Minutes of the NEC 28 January 1931.
106 Minutes of the NEC 24 February 1931.
107 Worley, Labour Inside the Gate, p. 142.
108 Minutes of the NEC 24 February 1931.
109 Minutes of the Organization Sub-Committee 18 June 1931.
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Party.110 The latter’s National Executive and Co-operative Parliamentary Group affirmed 
that its MPs would be part of the Official Opposition under Arthur Henderson. The bodies 
completely approved that its minister A. V. Alexander had resigned along with the 
government. Any bureaucratic problems about who should be in control of constituency 
Labour parties would thus not have major repercussions at the national level, though it 
illustrated the semi-independent nature of the Co-op MPs which was potentially a problem 
for Labour.
State of the party and movement 
Despite the crisis atmosphere and the utterly unpropitious situation Labour had 
found itself in during the election, in some ways the party was better off in 1931 than in
1929. This can be seen from the following table:
Table 1.5 Labour membership in 1929 and 1931.
1929 1931
Constituency parties 578 608
Individual members 227, 847 247,000
Affiliated trade unionists 2,044,279 2,024,216
Affiliated Socialists and 
Co-ops
58, 669 36,847
(Source: Labour Party Annua report 1936, p. 54.)
The greater number of constituency parties this time had no effect on the election as Labour 
fielded 79 fewer candidates than in 1929. At the annual Trades Union Congress held 
between 7 and 11 September, the delegates were well aware than an election was upon 
them.111 The TUC at that time had a membership of 3, 719,401; this was somewhat higher 
than in 1929.112 Although the membership affiliated to Labour is a more important variable 
(and this had sunk as shown above), the frill strength of the TUC may be of some
110 Daily Herald 1 September 1931, p. 3.
111 Walter Citrine (ed.), Report o f Proceedings at the 63rd Annual Trades Union Congress 1931 (London, Co­
operative Printing Society, n.d.), p. 72.
1,2 Ibid, p. 91.
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importance especially in its unions’ ability to give donations to the party and as an 
influence on voting.
As for the League of Youth it received something of an improvement in its status in 
1931. The League asked for its branches to be allowed to appoint representatives with full 
voting powers to constituency and local Labour parties.113 Conference agreed to this on the 
proviso that such representatives were at least 18 years of age. The League became 
affiliated to the Youth Hostels Association, the Socialist Youth International and the 
National Workers’ Sports Association in the course of the year. The first and third of these 
showed the League’s role in the creation of and participation in labour culture.114 It 
recruited on the basis of its recreational activities and its radical, anti-militaristic 
ideology.115 It wanted to strengthen the political side and part of the proof lies in joining the 
Socialist Youth International, which it did upon the basis of having 3,000 members.116 The 
NEC agreed to this after several resolutions in favour were passed at the League’s annual 
conference. The League continued to have its own monthly bulletin.
The organization of women appeared to have suffered slight setbacks in 1931 in 
terms of numbers. There were now 1, 824 Women’s Sections, a figure below 1930’s tally 
of 1, 969 and also that of 1929 (1, 867).117 It is possible, though, that many of the sections 
apparently lost had been non-existent for some time. More complete records were 
beginning to be introduced and given the inaccuracies in the previous registers, it is hard to 
tell whether there had in fact been any real reductions at this stage. It was thought that just 
under 250, 000 women were members of sections of this type. Labour believed there had 
been some real reductions in numbers and blamed this on poverty. The Labour Woman, the 
monthly newspaper, had improved its content and circulation in the last year, but the party 
was still dissatisfied with its sales.118 The Labour Magazine continued to be published
113 Labour Party, Annual Reports o f Conferences. Thirty-first Report (London, Labour, 1931),p. 14.
114 It was often reported how active the League was in promoting sports and leisure pursuits. The best 
example is a list showing the great range of activities taking place. Labour Organiser IX (November 1929), p. 
219.
115 Stephen G. Jones, Workers at Play. A Social and Economic History o f Leisure 1918-1939 (London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 150.
1,6 LHASC: The Labour Party Report of the Conference of the League of Youth 9 January 1932 in folder 
marked Organisation Sub-Cttee Membership papers Jan-Apr 1932. Box marked By-election reports 24 July 
1929- Sept 1937 Election Sub-Cttee Minutes 3 May 1934-1 Dec 1944 Box I.
117 Labour Party Annual report 1931, p. 34; Labour Party Annual report 1929, p. 21.
118 Labour Party Annual report 1931, p. 37.
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jointly with the TUC,119 and the Research Department maintained its monthly Labour 
bulletin.120
As for the Labour press, there continued to be some reduction in the number of 
newspapers published. In 1931 the party had newspapers as follows:
Table 1.6 Labour and Socialist newspapers in 1931.
Daily Weekly Monthly
1 16 69
(Source: Labour Year Book 1931, pp. 549-550.)
These figures hide one amazing success story. Despite the views among some Labourites 
that the prestige of the Daily Herald had diminished, the increase in circulation was 
phenomenal after 1929. As explained earlier the Daily Herald passed into TUC hands in 
that year, and soon the General Council reached a deal with Odhams, the publishing firm. 
Both the former and the annual conference of Labour agreed to Odhams’s vision for the 
newspaper, and accepted the arrangement whereby the political and industrial coverage of 
the Daily Herald would continue.121 All of the movement took part in a campaign before 
the launch of the new version on 17 March 1930, and in the first week it reached a 
circulation of 1 million copies or four times the previous circulation. A debate then ensued 
about whether to ask the new readers to join Labour immediately or wait until they had got 
used to the newspaper.122 The party organizers thought it would be best to press ahead, 
manifested in the slogan “Every member a Herald reader and every Herald reader a 
member.”123 Circulation remained at that level for some time, later in 1931 it reached about 
1.25 million copies.124 From at least the beginning of the year, a campaign was in place to 
raise the circulation to 2 million by the anniversary of the new version.125 This level would 
eventually be reached, but not during the 1931 election.
1,9 Ibid., p. 48.
120 Ibid., p. 49.
121 Labour Party, Annual Reports o f Conferences. Thirtieth Report (London, Labour, 1930), p. 60.
122 Labour Organiser X (April 1930), p. 71.
123 Labour Organiser X (May 1930), p. 77.
124 Labour Party Annual report 1931, p. 61.
125 Minutes of die NEC 28 January 1931
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Electoral preparations 
Preparations for the election were a hasty and improvised affair, but a series of 
moves were taken before the party conference at Scarborough at the beginning of October.
It was decided then that the conference should be terminated two days early on Wednesday 
7 October in the event of the announcement of a general election while it was going on.126 
In a small way this is testimony to the powerlessness with which Labour faced the 
situation. It had had some degree of control while in government, but owing to the sea 
change that had taken place in Parliament it was now at the mercy of its opponents. Still, it 
had not been defeated quite yet. Rose Rosenberg, MacDonald’s secretary, wrote to him that 
she had had lunch with Sir Patrick Gower, a senior civil servant, and the latter felt an 
election was imperative.127 In four to six months’ time Labour would be sure to be returned, 
in Gower’s opinion. The announcement of a general election did indeed come on 6 
October, and conference had to end early.128 In closing it Henderson revealed that with 
limited resources, Labour would have to concentrate on marginal constituencies.129 He 
completely understood why some delegates wanted to focus more on rural constituencies, 
and he drew attention to the number of agricultural conferences that had been held since the 
previous year (35) and that, on many occasions, Labour propagandists had been working in 
purely rural areas. At the conclusion of the previous election campaign, the party had 
reasoned that the key to a majority lay in agricultural constituencies.130 Now it had set up a 
“majority fund”, but reluctantly had to postpone its efforts to gain those seats for the party. 
For all its talk of being “confident of victory” in the manifesto, Labour knew it was 
engaged in a damage-1 imitation exercise.131 When Henderson on the eve of polling said 
Labour could not be destroyed because it was entrenched in the heart of the masses, it was a 
tacit admission that the party could not win.132
126 Minutes of the NEC 2 October 1931.
127 The National Archives, PRO 30/69/388 Political General Election October 1931. Letter from R.R. to the 
Prime Minister 29 September 1931. Cf. PRO 30/69/1320 Pol. Party General Election Correspondence & 
Cuttings. Letter from R. R. to the Prime Minister 29 September 1931.
128 Labour Party Annual report 1931, p. 202.
129 Ibid., p. 227.
130 Daily Herald 4 June 1929, p. 4.
131 Cf. Daily Herald 10 October 1931, p. 1.
132 Andrew Thorpe, ‘Arthur Henderson and the British Political Crisis of 1931’, Historical Journal 31:1 
(1988), p. 137.
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Agriculture was an important matter for Labour, based both on its lessons from last 
time and a long-standing desire to do well in the countryside.133 But for all its emphasis on 
the issue, the many leaflets and pamphlets published and the schemes designed to make a 
breakthrough, the obstacles loomed large. Dr Christopher Addison, who was Minister of 
Agriculture in the Labour Government, was anxious to get the rural campaign underway in 
November 1930, but no money for special propaganda was available from the General 
Fund.134 There would have to be a Special Fund along the model of Philip Noel-Buxton’s 
earlier campaigns. (Noel-Buxton had been Minister of Agriculture in the 1924 Labour 
Government.) Three months later the NEC received a delegation from the National Union 
of Agricultural Workers. The latter group had circulated a memorandum in advance dealing 
with the Government and farm workers.135 Branches of Labour and the NUAW had also 
sent resolutions complaining about the absence of an agricultural bill in Parliament to push 
unemployment insurance through for rural workers. It was by far their greatest grievance, 
and the memorandum came with a note giving the history of this vexed question. 
Accordingly it was the first demand of the delegation, along with the abolition of the tied 
cottage and a strengthening of the Central Wages Board— all Labour policies. But Will 
Holmes, the leader of the delegation, said bitterness was spreading in the countryside due to 
the assurances received from the annual conferences of Labour not being followed up. He 
put it that the agricultural labourer was getting tired of the Party.
Unfortunate though the upshot of all this was, as Henderson reminded the 
conference, Labour was doing something to have success in rural areas. Under the auspices 
of the Agricultural Campaign Committee conferences on this topic were being held across 
the land.136 They were well attended, and offered a speaker the chance to deal with rural 
issues at length. The meetings, which had the assistance of the National Agent’s and Press 
and Publicity Departments, also put representatives of the rural constituency parties in 
touch with the speaker.
133 Cf. for instance Philip Snowden, I f  Labour Rules (London, Labour Publishing Company, 1923), pp. 44-45.
134 Minutes of the NEC 25 November 1930.
135 Minutes of the NEC 24 February 1931.
136 Labour Party Annual report 1931, p. 9.
59
The pre-election
Just as in 1929 the election campaign in reality began long before the dissolution of 
Parliament. It was vitally important to Labour that it had clear proposals for dealing with 
what it agreed was a financial crisis. Thus when the NEC, General Council of the TUC and 
the Consultative Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party met on 27 August, they 
drew up and issued a “manifesto” or alternative crisis plan. The statement argued that the 
new coalition government was determined to attack the standard of living of the workers to 
deal with a difficult situation caused by private, unaccountable banking interests.137 The 
salient points were reproduced in the Daily Herald the next day. The proposals included 
mobilization of the country’s foreign investments, a temporary suspension of the Sinking 
Fund which repaid the National Debt, taxing fixed-interest bearing securities and other 
unearned income and reducing the burden of war debt.138 These policies would be credible 
enough if Labour achieved a majority at the election. This was what Labour claimed to be 
fighting for, but up against nearly all its opponents united under its former leader, and not 
even having been successful in government, its chances were non-existent.
It is a measure of the upheaval caused by the political crisis that in the 1931 election 
Lloyd George, who had been repeatedly ridiculed and had his motives questioned by 
Labour in 1929, should become somewhat of an ally, while Philip Snowden, one of 
Labour’s leaders in 1929, should provide the most devastating attack on the party. The 
rapprochement of Lloyd George and Labour began at the beginning of October, when the 
Liberal MPs who were serving in the National Government agreed to a general election.139 
This was highly controversial. The declared aims of the National Government had been to 
act as a temporary caretaker during the financial crisis, and its leading participants had 
specifically assured the public that the next general election would be fought on party lines. 
Remaining a free trader, Lloyd George’s response was to tell Liberal voters in a broadcast 
that they could opt for Labour if no Liberal pledged absolutely to free trade was standing in 
their constituency.140 A great many Labour candidates printed Lloyd George’s statement in
137 Appendix to minutes of a meeting of the Three National Committees 27 August 1931.
138 R. Bassett, Nineteen Thirty-one. Political Crisis (London, Macmillan, 1958), p. 185.
139 Cf. Daily Herald 2 October 1931, p. 1.
140 Daily Herald 10 October 1931, p. 1. Although bed-ridden, Lloyd George played some part in the drama by 
correspondence. Cf. e.g. National Archives, PRO 30/69/388 Political General Election October 1931. J. 
Ramsay MacDonald to Lloyd George 30 September 1931.
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their election addresses, and Labour decided not to oppose the “Welsh wizard” and his son 
and daughter who were standing as Liberals. In this way the party could make free trade vs. 
protection a rallying issue during the campaign.
The election
In 1931 Labour’s official campaign opening can be said to have been 8 October. 
That was the day after the dissolution of Parliament and the day of Arthur Henderson’s 
return from Scarborough with his principal officers. It was reported that the Labour 
electoral machine would now “begin work at the fullest possible pressure.”141 Labour 
hoped to nominate 500 candidates, and although this was significantly fewer than last time, 
it might be enough to do well. Constituency parties were urged to bring candidates into the 
field even if it was late, and were told that emergency procedures meant that Head Office 
might rubber stamp their nomination.142 An official at Transport House claimed there were 
signs of great Labour enthusiasm across the country.143 Henderson left Scarborough with £ 
10, 500 in his pocket towards the election fund.
Table 1.7 Funding received at Scarborough conference 1931.
Union Amount
Transport and General Workers £2, 500
General and Municipal Workers £ 5,000
National Union of Railwaymen £2,000
Railway Clerks’ Association £500
Distributive and Allied Workers £500
Total £ 10, 500
(Source: Daily Herald 8 October 1931, p. 11.)
141 Daily Herald 8 October 1931, p. 3.
142 Labour Organiser XI (September 1931), p. 164.
143 This was because many Labourites had been unhappy with their government’s performance. “The Labour 
Movement [...] saw its Government go out of office with a sigh of relief- certainly with ill-concealed 
satisfaction.” Labour Organiser XI (November 1931), p. 202.
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A report to the NEC gives some salient facts about how Labour experienced the 
election and what resources it was able to mobilize. As for candidates, Labour managed to 
nominate 490, just short of its target. There were four main reasons why it did not meet 
it.144 Difficult constituencies experienced a dearth of suitable candidates, and then there 
were financial problems. In addition, the ILP or constituency parties sponsored by the ILP 
put forward 22 candidates who were not endorsed by the NEC. Lastly, there were problems 
finding candidates to run against the MacDonaldites in constituencies where it had been 
assumed the sitting MP would be running for Labour. It was moreover the deliberate policy 
of the Central Party this time not to encourage backward constituencies to put a candidate 
into the fray.
There were also difficulties in printing election materials at relatively short notice. 
As a result there was no Speaker’s Handbook this year, but notes for speakers were 
circulated on cards of which 123, 610 were issued.145 There were 5.3 million copies of the 
election manifesto146 and 21 million other leaflets, representing 32 different types in 
circulation. 6.6 million leaflets representing seven different kinds were sent free to the 
constituency parties. As for posters there were seven types of which 80, 800 were 
dispatched.147 Three different pamphlets were sold to the constituency parties, which 
ordered 15,000 copies.148 Lastly, 75, 000 copies of The Labour Elector were distributed.149 
There are some noteworthy differences here between the annual report and the report to the 
NEC. The latter described the materials more fully since it mentioned the “Mauve Book” of 
which 19, 000 were sent out. It contained 100 election points, many facts, figures and 
arguments to use while speaking or canvassing.150
Equally interesting is the timeline for the distribution of election materials. The 
election manifesto was sent to the branches no later than two days after the close of the 
party conference.151 Then everything but the “Mauve Book” was put in circulation for
144 Report on the General Election to the National Executive Committee dated 10 November 1931.
145 Labour Party Annual report 1932, p. 63.
146 Or 5.5 million according to the report to the NEC.
147 Or eight according to die report to the NEC.
148 Or five pamphlets of which sales were 18,300 according to the above.
149 Or 77,000 copies according to the report to the NEC.
150 Cf. Daily Herald 16 October 1931, p. 11.
151 Report on the General Election to the National Executive Committee dated 10 November 1931.
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Monday 12 October, and most of it had been sent out by Saturday 17 October. It will be 
seen that there was less written propaganda than in 1929, and the party centrally spent only 
half the amount it did on that occasion. The election fund reached the total of £ 30, 350 by 
the end of the campaign, including interest earned.152 Labour spent £ 19, 340 on grants to 
candidates, speakers’ expenses, printing the election literature and advertising. In other 
words, it could have spent more if it had felt the need. The 490 candidates spent a total of £ 
179,265.153 Adding this to central expenditure and subtracting grants to candidates (£11, 
872) the total sum arrived at is £ 186, 733. This is a fair amount below what was spent in 
1929. Expenditure per candidate was lower, and there were fewer of them. The figures are 
hardly surprising given the relatively short campaign and Labour’s rearguard action to 
avoid annihilation rather than genuinely trying to win as it did in 1929.154
Henderson began his campaigning tour in his own constituency of Burnley, 
Lancashire on 13 October and from there travelled to Bolton, Leeds, Coventry,
Birmingham and West Bromwich.155 This was nowhere near as extensive as MacDonald’s 
tour of 1929. The itineraries of other senior figures in the Party were not mentioned. At his 
adoption meeting Henderson came close to describing the former leader as a traitor. He said 
MacDonald was allowing himself to be used by his life-long opponents against his life-long 
political friends who had faithfully served him.156 Moreover, it was the case that
1 ^ 7MacDonald had been brooding on serving in a national government for several months.
The damage that the MacDonaldites did to Labour was to a great extent that they made it 
seem like there was a broad consensus about matters which were in fact controversial. If 
some form of Conservative and Liberal government had implemented the cuts, it would 
have seemed like a political issue. As the situation stood, it instead seemed that everybody 
was pulling together, except Labourites who were putting narrow sectional interests above 
those of the country.
152 Labour Party Annual report 1932, p. 58.
153 Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 185.
154 As evidenced by the party referring to “the most vital electoral struggle in the history of our Party.” It also 
said the penalty of losing would be “too awful to look upon twice.” Labour Organiser XI (September 1931),
p. 161.
5 Daily Herald 13 October 1931, p. 2.
156 Daily Herald 14 October 1931, p. 1.
157 This is borne out by die sources. Cf. e.g. John D. Fair, ‘The Conservative Basis for the Formation of the 
Rational Government of 1931 ’, Journal o f British Studies 19:2 (1980), p. 146.
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In some cases the havoc caused to Labour by its former politicians was entirely 
intentional. The most vitriolic speech of the campaign was given by Snowden on the 
wireless on 17 October when he described his former party’s policies in the following 
terms: “I hope you have read the election programme of the Labour Party. It is the most 
fantastic and impracticable document ever put before the electors [...] It is Bolshevism run 
mad.”158 This may have been the first ever “negative” political broadcast in Britain.159
In contrast Lloyd George virtually endorsed Labour in the campaign. Towards the 
end of it the Herald resuscitated the story by sending a special correspondent to visit him. 
The resulting headlines described his statements as an “election bomb”, and that he was 
telling Liberals to vote for Labour free traders.160 He had already done so once, but perhaps 
he made the point more explicitly when he confirmed he would vote Labour if there was no 
genuine free trade Liberal standing. Naturally the story was run at the end of the campaign 
for maximum effect. The editorial in the eve-of-poll issue contained some very interesting 
points. It could be described as scaremongering, but it alleged that admiration for Fascism 
had been in the background of the National campaign.161 It claimed that MacDonald was 
thinking in terms of dictatorship with himself as dictator and Parliament transformed into a 
“Council of State” along Fascist lines. MacDonald’s Conservative supporters were even 
more comfortable with the idea. If the Government were allowed to remain in power, it 
would attempt the setting up of a dictatorship under a parliamentary guise. The very 
existence of democracy was at stake, and already the labour movement and the TUC were 
being seen as dangerous threats to the state.162
London
In London the local Labour party had had a setback with the L. C. C. elections 
earlier in the year.163 Its conclusion was that the organization must be improved, as it was 
not thought the bad results had anything to do with Labour policy on the L. C. C. Whatever
158 A. D. Edwards, 1931: The Fall o f the Labour Government (London, Edward Arnold, 1975), pp. 55-56.
159 Dominic Wring, The Politics o f Marketing the Labour Party (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 
23.
160 Daily Herald 24 October 1931, p. 1.
161 Ibid., p. 8.
162 This exactly foreshadowed the rhetoric of the Norwegian party in 1933.
163 The London News, April 1931, p. 1.
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the reason, the London party was in any case due to fight local elections in the boroughs on 
2 November, so preparations for the general election could be combined with the pre­
planned campaign.164 Of course, even after the Labour government had fallen it was not 
clear exactly when an election would take place. Thus it was decided to hold a conference 
of Labour MPs, candidates, representatives from Borough and Divisional parties in 
London, and also some from Surrey, on 17 October, just ten days before what would be 
polling day.165 And although London Labour was fighting an election anyway, its resources 
were not tremendous, as can be seen from its decision not to engage in a 16-sheet poster 
campaign owing to lack of funds.166 The Committee did, however, authorize the sale of 
leaflets which could be bought by local branches.
Once again it is difficult to determine how much London Labour spent on the two 
elections. The figures available stretch no further than September when there was £ 560 in 
the Election Fund and £ 540 in the General Fund.167 At the end of the campaign there was 
£95 left in the Election Fund, and an anonymous gift of £ 100 was received for distribution 
among branches to cover their expenses in putting forward a parliamentary candidate. At 
the same time, but in fact probably earlier due to printing deadlines, the Fund showed a 
total of £ 150, all of which was from new donations.169 This may suggest that all of the 
funds were used up sometime in October. The month before, from 5 to 19 September, there 
was a big membership campaign in London, planned in advance but with fortuitous timing, 
given the rolling-up-of-sleeves atmosphere engendered by the fall of the Labour 
government.170
There is very little about the political crisis in the papers of London Labour, mostly 
because it happened suddenly and taking into account the delays of printing. Moreover, it 
was a crisis on the national level which in an immediate sense did not bother the workings
164 Though it was warned against the practice whereby a meeting jointly covered the parliamentary and 
municipal elections. The reason for this was probably that it could lead to accounting difficulties, and 
electoral expenses had to be declared. Labour Organiser XI (October 1931), p. 190.
165 LMA. Acc 2417/A/2. Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the London Labour Party 17 
September 1931. This again illustrates the difficulty of not knowing the election date in advance.
166 Loc. cit. Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the London Labour Party 9 July 1931.
167 The London News, September 1931, p. 4.
168 LMA. Acc 2417/A/2. Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the London Labour Party 12 
November 1931.
169 The London News, November 1931, p. 4.
' 170 The London News, September 1931, p. 1.
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of London Labour. Its net effect was simply that it lost the election and that Herbert 
Morrison could rejoin the Executive Committee as secretary, having ceased to be a 
minister.171 Morrison’s was the main voice to explain to ordinary members in London what 
had happened to their government. He spoke at South Hackney on 7 September, and his 
speech was reproduced in written form.172 What he said gave canvassers and other party 
activists the arguments they needed for the campaign. The financial crisis had come about 
through what Morrison called “anti-British propaganda” because it lowered not only the 
prestige of the Labour government, but the reputation of the nation as financially 
responsible. Foreign financiers as well as domestic investors had believed absurd stories 
about the policies of the government, had moved out of Sterling and precipitated an 
economic crisis which could not just be ignored. But the lesson was that Labour must 
become truly Socialist again. Merely redistributing wealth in “a nationalized charity 
organization society” would not lead to Socialism. As members returned to party work to 
face an impending general election, however, they should remember that Labour had in the 
two and a quarter years of its government made significant progress in foreign and 
domestic affairs.173 A pamphlet called “The Work of the Labour Government”, published 
by Head Office, bore witness to that fact.
This was essentially how Labour presented its case nationally. Its government had 
done reasonably well, but it lacked a majority. In order to implement its policies fully it 
needed the House of Commons behind it. That was what it sought to achieve. The 
MacDonaldites, now calling themselves National Labour, had betrayed the party and had 
no right to the Labour name in any form. Labour had, moreover, stuck to its principles by 
refusing to make cuts, which showed it remained uncorrupted. As such it was absolutely 
essential to deny the story put about by opponents that the Labour ministers had agreed to 
most of the cuts anyway. Henderson had not committed himself to a single proposal until 
all the options were laid on the table, it was underlined.174 He and his colleagues had not
171 It was largely due to Morrison that London Labour was probably the strongest local party. Stefan Berger 
‘’’Organising Talent and Disciplined Steadiness”: The German SPD as a Model for the British Labour Party in 
the 1920s?’, Contemporary European History 5:2 (19%), pp. 172-173.
172 The London News, October 1931, p. 3.
173 Ibid., p.5.
174 Daily Herald 9 October 1931, p. 6.
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seen the complete scheme, as they had resigned when told the bankers were insisting on 
cuts in unemployment benefit.
As a last word on the campaign in London, the manifesto of the London Labour 
Party for the borough elections will be considered briefly. The rationale is that since those 
elections followed the general election in quick succession (five days), London issues may 
potentially have had an impact on the national contest (though more obviously the other 
way around). The manifesto said the economic crisis had given Conservative local 
authorities the perfect excuse to cut essential health and social services.175 The only reason 
was to save money for wealthy rate-payers, because the Government had not instructed 
them to do so. The opposite of this approach was the Labour authorities, which had been 
lauded for their public health work such as providing better sanitation, saving or improving 
the lives of many mothers and children, combating the adulteration of food and lifting 
public health administration to a “high standard of efficiency.” Sixteen boroughs had 
Municipal Electricity undertakings, and the practice of Labour boroughs showed that its 
policy was to make tariffs low, to make electricity more widely available through pre­
payment meters and also to provide cheap electricity for industry. These bread and butter 
issues may have been part of the reason why a great many voters stuck with Labour, despite 
the extraordinary conditions under which the election was fought.
The end of the election 
On polling day the front page of the Daily Herald brought three important 
headlines. The first was simply the request to vote early and to encourage friends, family 
and colleagues to do the same.176 The second was the disclosure that Baldwin in 1923 had 
begun the practice of lending Post Office Savings Bank deposits to the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund. This mattered because the National Government was pretending that not 
cutting unemployment benefit would have meant losing customers’ savings in the post 
office. And Labour had a scare story of its own, but of undoubted veracity. If the National 
Government won the humiliating and inquisitive means test would come into force for 
“hundreds of thousands of unemployed men and women.” Also important to Labour’s pitch
175 The London News, October 1931, p. 8.
176 Daily Herald 27 October 1931, p. 1.
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was the reminder that it was the only such party.177 The “National Labour Party” was in 
fact an anti-Labour group, a name chosen by MacDonald, Baldwin and other coalition 
leaders to confuse the electorate. This argument was a necessary one, because some 
loyalists may have felt they were continuing to support Labour by voting for candidates 
who had their political background in the party. And Labour-sympathizing Nationalist 
voters may have rationalized their choice by arguing to themselves there was a “Labour 
component” to the new Government. Whatever the discourse it was ultimately a near­
impossible task in which Labour was engaged.
1931 marked the greatest setback Labour had experienced in its history. The 
“Forward march of Labour” had at the very least been decidedly halted. The results were as 
follows:
Table 1.8 The general election 1931.
Party Votes (change from 1929) Seats (change from 1929)
Conservatives and National 60.5% 521
Labour 30.6% (-6.5%) 52 (-235)
Samuelite Liberals 6.5% 33
All of Labour’s senior figures with Cabinet experience were defeated, except George 
Lansbury, who duly became the new leader of die Parliamentary Party.178 Henderson lost 
so badly at Burnley that he abandoned domestic politics until 1933.179 There is evidence 
that in some places Labour’s defeat came as a surprise to its activists. In more than a 100 
constituencies which were lost the confidence of candidate and agent were not shaken till 
polling day.180 The activists had thought Labour “could not be beaten.” The new coalition 
had penetrated into the heartlands of Labour. Only two consoling facts were apparent to the 
party. In terms of votes it lost less than seven percentage points, and the scale of the defeat 
would at least provide a fresh start. “We are not broken, “declared Henderson the day after 
the election “The Labour movement [...] will rise again stronger and more vigorous than
X11 Ibid., p. 2.
178 Paul Adelman, The Rise o f the Labour Party 1880-1945 (London, Longman, 1972), p. 72.
179 Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931, p. 128.
189 Labour Organiser XI (November 1931), p. 203.
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1 ftlever.” There were also complaints that under the voting system. Labour had suffered 
disproportionately and its real strength was greater. The results or the preceding political 
crisis also provided a wake-up call to those in the industrial wing of the movement who had
slackened their efforts, because they thought happy times were ahead with a Labour
182government.
Conclusion: The 1931 election 
Labour fought the campaign on a business-as-usual basis despite its former leader 
acting at the head of the opposing bloc. In reality, it knew it could not win as it did not run 
candidates in difficult constituencies this time, and gaining more of those was a 
precondition for a majority. Moreover, it faced an unprecedented number of two-way 
contests against a National candidate. There were 434 such contests in 1931, a fourfold 
increase over 1929.183 This was a disaster for Labour as the National candidates could 
generally rely on both Conservative and Liberal votes.
Major differences did not exist between how electioneering was conducted in 1931 
and 1929. Of course the former campaign was prepared at much shorter notice, and there 
may have been some disparities in the constituencies. The Daily Herald did not publish 
information about the divisional parties this year, so no comparison may be made. Less 
money was spent, fewer candidates were put forward and less propaganda was produced. 
The leader’s tour was significantly shorter than in 1929. The sources do not allow much to 
be said about central control this time. The impression given is that the divisional parties 
were given grants, sold propaganda or in some cases given it for free, and told to get on 
with the job. Not every constituency party received a handout, and Central Office tried to 
even out resources by urging the wealthier divisions to support the poorer ones 
financially.184 In the capital more money was available from the London Labour Party. The 
amount of central control would almost certainly have been greater if there had been more 
time to prepare.
181 Daily Herald29 October 1931, p. 1.
182 London Metropolitan University. Trades Union Collection. Box local Labour parties. London Trades 
Council. Seventy-second Annual Report (1931) and Statements of Accounts (marked JN 1129L), p. 3.
,8* Nick Smart ‘Constituency Politics and the 1931 Election’, Southern History 16 (1994), p. 126.
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To compound Labour’s misery its internal coalition began to be put under pressure 
in 1931. There was disagreement with the ILP about the nomination of candidates under its 
own auspices and financial responsibility. The dispute was not settled within the time that 
was available until the election, leading to the return of six ILP candidates to Westminster 
without endorsement by Labour. The scene had been set for the ILP’s disaffiliation from 
Labour in 1932. There was also the beginning of a long-running dispute with the Co­
operatives relating to the control of constituencies where the candidate was from that party. 
This was, however, to have a greater effect before the election of 1935. Fundamentally 
these disputes related to how much autonomy the parties affiliated to Labour were to have. 
Labour preferred these in a subordinate capacity and probably eventually wanted these to 
dissolve within it. The same fear of independence for component parts could be seen in 
Labour’s treatment of its League of Youth. In practice it meant that it lost MPs who would 
otherwise have taken its whip. But Labour’s standing in Parliament after the 1931 election 
was so disastrous anyway that this problem did not amount to much.
Background to the election of 1935 
The general election of 1935 can be said to have brought politics back to normality. 
Labour’s opponents were still the National Government, but since the Samuelite Liberals 
had left it in 1932 it had taken on more of a Conservative shade. Stanley Baldwin took over 
from MacDonald as prime minister in 1935. The crisis atmosphere was at an end, but 
Labour was dissatisfied with the timing of the campaign because it occurred at a time of 
heightened international tension following Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia. This was thought 
to work to the Government’s advantage. On the other hand, Labour’s message was one of 
principle and the invasion showed up the kind of anarchic world order the party wished to 
transform through the League of Nations. It went into the election to recover its position in 
Parliament. Labour’s programme For Socialism and Peace had been published the 
preceding year. It also had a new leader in Clement Attlee after George Lansbury stood 
down on a point of principle regarding disarmament.185 Arthur Henderson died in a nursing 
home during the campaign.186
185 Daily Herald 9 October 1935, p. 1.
186 Daily Herald 21 October 1935, p. 1.
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There were many other changes since the last time. The ILP finally disaffiliated 
from Labour in 1932. A conflict with the Co-operative Party came to a head in 1934. A 
report was written by the NEC just over a year before the election, which outlined Labour’s 
version of the problems between it and the Co-op.187 At the National Joint Committee the 
Labour representatives had suggested a new agreement to replace that of 1927. The Co­
operative Party did not, however, want a change of terms and conditions. It had begun by 
sidelining the Labour organization in seats where the candidate was a Co-operator. Some 
agents had become dependent on the Co-operative Party for their salaries. There had been 
cases of trade unions and other affiliated bodies paying grants directly to the agent instead 
of to the constituency Labour party. So the NEC ordered that local agreements should not 
establish joint parliamentary committees, but leave control of electoral activity to Labour. 
No agreement should be made outside the auspices of the NEC. Relations between the two 
parties had been a cause of concern for some time,188 and the issue did not reach a 
conclusion until the following year.
Only some months into 1935 was a modus vivendi reached, taking into account both 
points of view. At a summit in March Herbert Morrison explained that the 1927 Agreement 
had always been seen as provisional in the Labour Party until full affiliation could be 
arranged.189 It was imperative that Co-operative candidates sign the standing orders of the 
Parliamentary Party, otherwise a situation could arise in which a future Labour government 
was held to ransom by 20 or 30 Co-operators in the House. Agents should be responsible to 
the local party, never to a section which might not even be affiliated. On the part of the Co­
operative Party its leader Alfred Barnes explained that the seriousness of these matters was 
fully appreciated. Until something like two years before his party had believed it was up to 
them to decide the degree of joint work undertaken. He believed that the two parties had 
worked harmoniously together in the constituencies, in Parliament and in government. The 
main problem from his side was that Labour should not dictate policy to his party. 
Following this meeting a letter was sent to the Co-operative Party requesting that its 
circular advising its candidates not to sign the standing orders be withdrawn. There would
187 NEC memorandum “Relations with the Co-operative Party” dated 30 August 1934.
188 It was no coincidence that Labour wanted to revise the agreement of 1927, as outlined in the National Joint 
Committee meeting 11 May 1934.
189 Minutes of the NEC 8 March 1935. A delegation from the Executive Committee of the Co-operative Party 
was received at this meeting.
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be proper mechanisms in place to ensure that a joint understanding on all questions 
concerning the Co-operative movement would be reached. As for agents, in future none 
would be appointed answering solely to the Co-operative Party. Further details would be 
negotiated later. Similarly no new parliamentary joint committees would be set up, except 
with the consent of the National Joint Committee. These terms were suitably framed to 
allow continued joint efforts, and two Co-operative candidates were endorsed by the NEC 
later the same month, having signed the standing orders.190
State of the party and movement 
After the debacle of 1931 some interest may attach to the state of the party four 
years later. This may be summarized in the following table:
Table 1.9 The Labour Party in 1935.
Constituency
parties
Male individual 
members
Female
individual
members
Affiliated trade 
unionists
Affiliated 
Socialists and 
Co-ops
614 246,401 172, 910 1,912,924 45,280
(Source: Labour Party Annual report 1936, p. 59.)
A total individual membership of 419,311 compares with 297, 003 in 1931. The number of 
affiliated trade unionists had continued to fall, however, although 1934 had been a turning 
point, and the increment was now positive. The number of affiliated Socialist and Co­
operative members had risen from the year before, and was higher than in 1931. As an 
indication of the strength of the entire labour movement, the TUC had a total membership 
of 3,388, 810, an increase of 94,229 over 1934.191 The Daily Herald, still the 
responsibility of the TUC though run in partnership with Odhams Press, was achieving rare 
distinction. Its circulation was well over 2 million copies a day, making it the biggest 
newspaper in the world.192 It owed this position to efforts within the movement to increase
190 Minutes of the NEC 27 March 1935.
191 Sir Walter Citrine (ed.), Reports o f Proceedings at the 67th Annual Trades Union Congress (London, Co­
operative Printing Society, n. d.), p. 83.
192 Ibid., p. 200.
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circulation. Flyers often bore a recommendation to begin reading the Herald, and both 
Labour and the TUC campaigned internally for it as well. In recognition of this work the 
board of directors of the Herald lent the two organizations a film motor van to be used in 
the backward areas.193 It also financed the services of a propagandist for a year. A list of 
Labour and Socialist papers does not exist for 1935, though from other sources it seems 
there were 1 daily, 12 weeklies, 25 monthlies, 1 quarterly and 11 irregulars.194 If this is 
correct, there had been the loss of four weeklies since 1931 and a very large number of 
monthlies.
The organization of women and the young remained important to broaden the 
appeal of the party beyond male trade unionists. It is undeniable that Labour sought to 
extend these sections, and yet small indications suggest they were not given the very 
highest priority. The lack of reliable statistics kept is one such indication. The party did not 
afford the League of Youth much independence because it feared that the League could 
become a centre of opposition to the leadership. As a result it was doomed to impotence as 
a social club. The sections were forever in a state of development, but never seemed to 
make an impact. For what it is worth, from the autumn of 1934 to the autumn of 1935,110 
new branches of the League of Youth were set up.195 526 branches of the League existed at 
about the time when the 1935 election was fought, and all of these were active. There were 
about 1, 600 women’s sections.196 There had been no significant change of numbers over 
the previous year. The Labour Woman was still up and running and making a profit.197 
During 1935 its average circulation was 14,612.198
By 1935 there was also a genuine National Workers’ Sports Association in 
existence. It received a constitution in 1930, but although recognized by the NEC and the 
General Council of the TUC, it remained in an incipient state of being.199 Both of these 
bodies believed it would play an important part in strengthening the whole movement. In 
1932 it had 5,000 members in 18 affiliated sports bodies and associations (of which nine
193 Labour Party, Annual Reports o f Conferences. Thirty-third Report (London, Labour, 1933), p. 55.
194 Calculated from Royden Harrison et a l., The Warwick Guide to British Labour Periodicals 1790-1970. A 
Check List (Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1977). The titles are reproduced as appendix 2.
195 Labour Party, Annual Reports o f Conferences. Thirty-fifth Report (London, Labour, 1935), p. 35.
196 Ibid., p. 37.
197 Ibid., p. 39.
198 Statement of Accounts for the Year Ending December 31st 1935. Minutes of the NEC 25 March 1936.
199 Cf. Labour Party Annual report 1931, p. 60.
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were district committees).200 In 1934 it had 8, 000 members in 250 affiliated associations or 
bodies 201 Half the members and just over half the sections were involved in cycling, 
organized by the National Clarion Cycling Club. In 1935, lastly, it boasted 9, 000 members,
‘j fy y
still in 250 sub-organizations. Tennis, cycling, swimming and athletic championships 
had been held in the past year, showing that the Sports Association had reached a 
noticeable level of development. This is in keeping with the idea that Socialist parties were 
movements and not just concerned with politics.
Victory for Socialism 
Since Labour was not unwillingly thrown into an unexpected election this time, it 
could spend longer on thinking through its plans. Immediately after the meltdown of 1931 
the NEC set to work rebuilding the party. It instituted membership, constituency and youth 
campaigns as well as educational conferences.203 Faced with a National Government 
majority of more than 500, the official Opposition could afford to think seriously about the 
long term. The fruits of this included the Victory for Socialism campaign, set up in October 
1933. The idea behind it was that 15 million votes were needed to establish “The Socialist 
Commonwealth” (or 400 Labour MPs and more than 13 million votes next time).204 Not 
only would Labour present itself openly as a Socialist party at elections, but it must work 
all the year round to make Socialists. The activities of the campaign were the usual tasks of 
holding meetings, demonstrations and rallies as well as the distribution of literature. In this 
instance the aim was to give every home in the land a monthly Socialist newsletter. 
“Victory for Socialism” is not directly relevant to the election, because in June 1935 it was 
decided to merge its fund with that set up to fight the election.205 That spelled the end of 
this phase in Labour’s retrenchment. However, it is worth bearing in mind that once 
“Victory for Socialism” got underway in 1934, Labour was more or less permanently 
electioneering. It had been decided that £ 5, 000 was needed to get the campaign going. 
This level was attained in March 1934, triggering the onset of activities other than
200 Labour Party Annual report 1932, p. 70.
201 Labour Party Annual report 1934, p. 21.
202 Labour Party Annual report 1935, p. 56.
203 “Victory for Socialism” letter dated 3 October 1933.
204 Victory for Socialism (London, Labour, 1935), p. 14; “Victory for Socialism” letter dated 3 October 1933.
205 Minutes of the Finance and General Purposes Sub-Committee 21 June 1935.
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fundraising.207 The mass conferences in particular, would be directed at the eight million 
workers’ homes containing 18 million electors.208
Electoral preparations
The first evidence of real planning for actual electioneering in competition with the 
other parties stems from the end of 1934 209 This memorandum worked on the assumption 
that the party must be ready to fight an election in the autumn of 1935. Preparations should 
therefore be in an advanced state the following July. In the first month of 1935 it was 
possible to see steady progress with regard to Labour’s plans. A Victory for Socialism 
campaign handbook was now available, and discussions continued on how to turn the 
general election literature out210 It was understood, however, that only materials of a 
general kind, criticizing the National Government and stressing Labour’s main policies, 
could be taken in hand at once. Special election literature could not be produced until 
guidance was forthcoming on what Labour’s priorities would be. A meeting was going to 
take place with the trade unionist directors of the Herald about possible assistance with 
regard to posters and literature. A few days later the NEC confirmed that 27 February had
911been chosen as the date for a pre-election meeting with the General Council of the TUC.
The primary result of this meeting was to be found in the circular issued by the 
National Council of Labour, representing the TUC, the Labour Party and the Parliamentary 
Labour Party.212 Once again, there would be a drive to increase the circulation of the Daily 
Herald, as it was recognized to be one of the most effective ways of reaching 2 million 
households every day. (The very best method of disseminating a message was by a 
broadcast on the wireless, but it was assumed that the BBC would accord the National 
Government the lion’s share of time on the basis of its representing several parties.) The 
idea therefore was that every new member of a trade union or the party should receive 
complimentary copies of the Herald. It was hoped to publicize the scheme in trade union
207 Minutes of the NEC 27 March 1934.
208 Minutes of the Finance and General Purposes Sub-Committee 14 May 1934.
209 Research and Publicity Committee, Memorandum on General Election Literature Preparations marked 21 
November 1934.
210 Minutes of the Research and Publicity Committee 17 January 1935.
211 Minutes of the NEC 23 January 1935.
212 ‘The General Election and the Daily Herald*, February 1935.
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journals, and general secretaries of unions were to request the assistance of branch officers 
and committees in bringing about the desired outcome.
Later preparations
Once the general election was closer at hand, it became possible to issue some 
specific and less overarching plans for how to fight it. In June it was decided that six basic 
leaflets, four pictorial posters, one placard type poster, a canvasser’s handbook and 12 
pamphlets should be sold at once as election propaganda.213 Although these were to be sold 
at an inexpensive price, it was expected that they would be self-financing for the central 
party. At this stage the local parties were told to put their electoral machines in readiness.214 
It was suggested they might like to hold divisional conferences on how to campaign. Even 
closer to the beginning of the actual campaign an approach from the Communists for an 
electoral agreement was rebuffed.215 This was hardly a surprise given the continual 
rejections of the CPGB’s offers of a united front and its affiliation to Labour.
The next development of any interest occurred in October 1935. The month before 
it had become clear that the Victory for Socialism Fund had been exhausted, and the cash 
balance on 27 September 1935 was only £ 180.216 As a result of the precarious state of the 
Fund, it was decided that recent spending on the campaign of £ 1, 785 must be borne by the 
Election Fund.217 This was in accordance anyway with the plan to merge the two funds, but 
it was not intended that expenses should fall on the Election Fund until the official 
campaign had got underway, and it had not in early October. In recompense £ 900 received 
primarily from the sale of literature was put towards the Election Fund. At this stage its 
balance was £ 8, 000. The difficulty for the Party was that it could not keep running down 
its Election Fund by issuing leaflets and paying propagandists, if the poll was not be held 
for some months. No real decision was reached about what to do, but it was noted that 
losses on literature averaged only £ 100 a month and that £ 834 had hitherto been spent on 
propagandists in 1935.
213 Minutes of the Research and Publicity Committee 18 June 1935.
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Fortunately for Labour the official election campaign did start in October. A 
fortnight after the above meeting the first inkling of a 14 November poll was registered.218 
It was therefore possible to begin work on the manifesto, and it was agreed that it should be 
of a somewhat different format from previous years. It should be shorter and not merely 
consist of a list of policies. The drafting of it was entrusted to Arthur Greenwood. On 
broadcasting facilities it was noted that Greenwood and Attlee had been in touch with 
Prime Minister Baldwin on the time to be afforded the political parties by the BBC. Less 
than a week later Attlee could report that Labour would be given four speaking slots to the 
Government’s five, with the Liberals being granted two or three slots 219 Discussion 
henceforth moved on to who those four speakers should be. Attlee had wanted the recently 
replaced leader George Lansbury to be one of the four if he was willing, but the meeting 
decided on Attlee, Greenwood, J. R. Clynes and Herbert Morrison. Also at this meeting 
was Greenwood’s draft manifesto first considered, and a sub-committee appointed to
0*}fiamend it. The next day the amended manifesto was accepted by the NEC.
The NEC bore ultimate responsibility for Labour’s electioneering, but die day-to- 
day running of it was left to Head Office. On 14 October 1935 a meeting was held at 
Transport House involving the chiefs of various departments.221 The purpose was to report 
on preparations for the election. The Co-operative Wholesale Society Savings Bank had 
agreed to allow Labour candidates overdrafts for electoral purposes. Meanwhile the 
selection of candidates for hitherto vacant seats was continuing. Some election agents were 
also being appointed in constituencies which lacked them. The role of agent involved 
various electoral duties, and these tasks were made explicit by Head Office. New agents 
were issued with these guidelines as soon as they were appointed, while the established 
ones had been sent information about their tasks during the summer. All candidates had 
also received this information, and there would be further reminders as the campaign 
progressed. This was one of the methods whereby the central party could influence the 
running of electioneering in the constituencies. Another way of influencing local 
campaigning was through grants for candidates. Information about the electioneering would
2.8 Minutes of the Election Sub-Committee 16 October 1935.
2.9 Minutes of the NEC 22 October 1935.
220 Minutes of the NEC 23 October 1935.
221 Memorandum marked “General Election 1935” dated October 1935.
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be asked from the constituency party making the application, and cheques could be sent 
immediately to a maximum of £ 40 for borough parties and £ 60 for county parties. This 
principle had been the same for the other elections, though the sums may have varied.
Finance and the materials 
The Election Fund eventually amounted to £21, 830.222 Surprisingly, given the 
thoroughness of the preparations this time, the figure was £ 8,000 less than was available 
in 1931 and £ 27, 000 less than in 1929. The reason seems to lie in the £ 11, 000 “loan” to 
the General Fund which was never repaid.223 In other words, the economy of the party did 
not permit a central campaign as great in scope as on the two previous occasions. Labour 
received £ 12, 600 from trade unions, the lion’s share put forward by the National Union of 
Railwaymen (£ 4,000), the National Union of General and Municipal Workers (£ 2, 500) 
and the Transport and General Workers’ Union (£ 2, 000).224 A total of £ 8, 571 was 
received from individuals and £ 558 from local parties and women’s sections. Out of the 
money contributed by individuals, £ 2, 605 came from the “Shilling Fund”, an appeal for 
money run in conjunction with the Herald. Expenditure is given in the following table:
Table 1.10 Labour central expenditure in 1935.
Grants to candidates £ 15, 840
Leaflets, pamphlets and posters £2, 649
Speaking, printing and postage £3, 731
Total £ 22,220
(Source: Labour Party Annual report 1936, pp. 98-99.)
The grants to candidates were higher than in 1929 and 1931, everything else was on a 
smaller scale.226 Labour spent an average of £ 365 per nominated candidate and there were
222 Labour Party, Annual Reports o f Conferences. Thirty-sixth Report (London, Labour, 1936), p. 52.
223 Labour Party Balance sheet 21 December 1934.
224 Labour Party Annual report 1936, p. 53.
225 Ibid., p. 52.
226 It was thus suspected that 1935 was Labour’s cheapest interwar election per candidate. This was not the 
case as 1931 was less costly even by this measure. But that did not stop The Labour Organiser complaining 
about unpreparedness. Labour Organiser XV (December 1935), p. 227.
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777552 of them. This makes for a total expenditure in the constituencies of £ 201,480. 
Adding central expenditure minus the grants to candidates a grand total of £ 207, 860 is 
arrived at as Labour’s spending on the election of 1935.
The materials produced consisted of 23 types of leaflets, 36 kinds of pamphlets, five 
pictorial posters, 23 letterpress posters, an illustrated broadsheet (election newspaper), 
notes for speakers and articles that appeared in the press.228 A memorable feature of the 
campaign were the two booklets “Fifty Reasons Against the ‘National’ Government” (175, 
000 copies) and “Fifty Reasons Why You Should Vote Labour” (50,000 copies). On this 
occasion there were a total of 5, 501, 000 manifestos, 15,491, 750 leaflets, 150, 635 
pamphlets, 135,000 pictorial posters, 100, 000 letterpress posters, 350,000 electoral 
newspapers and 127, 500 notes for speakers on cards. The Labour Organiser thought the 
newspapers would be particularly useful, especially where there was no monthly 
periodical.229 Head Office made a profit on the manifestos, leaflets and pamphlets, but the 
posters, broadsheets and speaker’s notes sustained a loss, so there was a net outlay on the 
materials. Towards the end of the campaign free materials were dispatched to all the 
Labour candidates, but it should be noted that except for the letterpress posters, this only 
amounted to a small fraction of the total print. Thus, unsurprisingly, the more affluent 
divisional parties had a great advantage over the less well-funded ones when it came to the 
quantity of propaganda.
The election
Labour’s pre-election autumn campaign “To Win Power” began the weekend of 14- 
15 September.230 The plan was to hold 200 big meetings a month until the beginning of the 
election. Regional rallies would be staged in 40 key centres of the country. Hull and York 
had been chosen for the first two, while Leicester, Huddersfield and Nottingham were to 
follow the next weekend. Leading figures within the Party such as Lansbury, Attlee, 
Morrison, Greenwood and Harold Laski would take part. Thus from late September until 
polling day on 14 November, Labour was in permanent electioneering mode. It is therefore
227 Butler and Butler, Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900-2000, p. 260.
228 General Election Literature Preliminary Report.
229 Labour Organiser XV (August 1935), p. 142.
230 Daily Herald 14 September 1935, p. 11.
79
not exactly clear when it may be deemed to have started its official campaign, but 26 
October with the publication of the manifesto is a convenient landmark. Also the Herald 
announced on 23 October that Labour would take three more days to plan before the “great 
drive will start.”231 Notable highlights of the election included the four radio broadcasts 
made by its leaders and Attlee’s tour of Britain, which probably exceeded anything before 
attempted by the party for range or number of meetings.232 His itinerary began at 
Southampton on 30 October, followed by South Norfolk and Norwich 233 He would then 
travel home to London, before visiting Stoke and Crewe the day after. Without taking a day 
off, he would go on to address a meeting in each of Warrington, St. Helens, Liverpool, 
Birkenhead, Bolton, Oldham, Manchester and Salford. Still not taking a break, he visited 
Birmingham, Gloucester, Cardiff, Newport, Limehouse, Frome, York, Stockton, 
Middlesbrough, Newcastle, Gateshead, various towns in Yorkshire and Derbyshire 
followed by Nottingham. Only then would he return to his own constituency of Limehouse 
for a great eve-of-poll demonstration. In the usual absence of details about where the other 
senior Labour figures spoke, it may at least be noted that the leader travelled more widely 
and intensively than MacDonald had done in 1929.
On 28 October Attlee spoke to the nation by wireless in the first of Labour’s four 
broadcasts. He chose to concentrate on issues of principle like peace and security.234 This 
was a crucial, and sometimes controversial, part of the party’s pitch. One of its posters bore 
the message “Election Crosses or Wooden Crosses” and another featured a baby wearing a 
gas mask.235 Without disarmament and international agreements between states, the 
ordinary family listening to the broadcast was at risk of being wiped out by bombs dropped 
from an aeroplane. To really bring the issue home, he said “People are being killed as you 
listen to me.” The Labour Party wanted the world to be like a well-governed city in which 
no nation had precedence. Switching his concern to domestic affairs, he brought up the 
issue of the iniquitous means test, which he said was responsible for the break up of 
families. It would be abolished under a Labour government, which would improve social
231 Daily Herald 23 October 1935, p. 3.
232 By 1935 “broadcasting had become the most important agency of political communication.” John Antcliffe 
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services and pensions. Ironically the next speaker on the BBC national programme was 
Snowden, now a viscount and a Liberal, who on this occasion urged voters to back Labour 
where no opposition Liberal was standing.236 This was advice repeated from his speech to 
the National Liberal Club earlier in the month, and he said calling the election was “a mean
93*7and partisan act.” Voters should not be deceived by a “spurious appeal to patriotism” and 
the Conservatives would lose 200 seats, in his opinion. He thought the Opposition would 
pursue a better course in foreign policy, and lambasted the Government for its complacency 
over unemployment. Thus he was either very much in line with Labour thinking again, or 
the Herald emphasized those parts of his speech which approximated to the party’s 
message.
J. R. Clynes dealt with the same issues upon which Attlee had concentrated when 
time came for him to broadcast 238 Arthur Greenwood’s speech on the radio on 4 November 
confined itself to domestic bread and butter issues in keeping with the non-ideological side 
of Labour’s pitch. He said the unemployed were suffering from a hold-up of work schemes, 
and naturally criticized the means test.239 He went on to deliver a litany of complaints 
against the National Government, using language that emphasized its servitude to privilege 
and its meanness to the poor. Through its tariffs and subsidies to landlords, industrialists 
and ship owners it had created worse conditions for consumers. Greenwood said he had left 
behind him at the Ministry of Health a scheme for building 40, 000 cottages in the 
countryside, but it had been “ruthlessly scrapped” and fewer than 2, 000 homes had been 
built under the present Government. If Labour won it would successfully apply the 
principles it had learnt in local government to the national level. And there was nothing to 
be afraid of. Probably “the happiest and most prosperous countries in Europe today” were 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, which all had Labour governments. The final Labour 
broadcast was delivered by Herbert Morrison, and has been judged the most effective.240 
His approach was to highlight Labour’s foreign policy achievements, damn the National 
Government and question whether Baldwin really was in charge of the Conservatives. He
236 Daily Herald 30 October 1935, p. 1.
237 Daily Herald 17 October 1935, p. 1.
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seemed moderate enough on defence matters, but could his colleagues be trusted? This was 
an important issue, and historians differ on whether the election was called to give the 
Government a mandate for rearmaments.241 Morrison admitted unemployment had fallen, 
but put this down to an improvement in the world economy.
As before the Herald carried news, articles and points of view designed to further 
the Socialist cause. It published its own “Everybody’s Book of Politics”, a companion to 
the 1935 election, which contained many articles about the daily issues likely to affect most 
people. At 2s. lOd. it promised to enable readers to discuss these topics intelligently, and 
was therefore a useful tool for formal or informal canvassing.242 Its services continued right 
until the last moment with exhortations to lend automobiles to the party on polling day.243 
Polling day arrangements were particularly important to the outcome of the campaign. It 
was claimed successful electioneering in a division could be nullified by bad organization 
when it mattered. Even a losing fight apparently could be turned around by “first rate 
polling day work.”244 The value to Labour of the Daily Herald cannot properly be 
quantified, but propaganda and appeals clearly mattered enormously. For the 1924,1929, 
1931 and 1935 elections it is a fact that Labour improved its position whenever there was 
no last minute scare story.
London
The campaign on the part of the London Labour Party seems on this occasion to 
have been a short one. It was exactly a week before polling day that its manifesto, penned 
by Herbert Morrison, was debated and approved with modifications 245 At the same time it 
was agreed that an advertisement should be taken out in the Liberal Star newspaper for the 
evening of 13 November, at a cost of £ 36. Officers were granted the right to approve 
expenditure from the Election Fund to be given to local parties and for posters as part of the 
scheme for central billposting. As usual an election special of The London News had been 
edited, and it was available to branches at 2s. 6d. per thousand for the first 10, 000 and
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thereafter at 5s. The front page carried an article by Morrison, which laid down the aims of 
London Labour and its take on what was happening. The headline claimed Labour was out 
for a parliamentary majority in order to form a new government, but as London Labour 
could not capture the country, its self-appointed task was to become predominant in the 
capital.246 Jackets off, was the message, to fight this “trick election” coming at a time of 
international crisis, but be sure not to complain too much about its timing. London Labour 
felt it was in a position to do well. The previous year it had secured control of the L. C. C. 
and a majority of the metropolitan Borough Councils.
The same page of the issue carried an appeal for funds from the Executive 
Committee of London Labour to fight the forthcoming election. It was perhaps hampered 
by being written before an election was announced. Seeking to get around this problem, it 
argued that an election could not be put off for much longer, but in actuality the 
Government could have waited until October 1936. It is difficult to say exactly how much 
money was available. The total on the Election Fund till 30 September was £ 470 with 
another £ 440 on the General Fund coming from annual subscribers.248 By 23 November, a 
week and a half after polling, the Election Fund contained £ 800. 249 Naturally London 
Labour may have continued to spend, through reimbursing branches for outlays during the 
campaign. It is fair to assume that it at least expended the £ 470 received before November, 
as the £ 800 mentioned in the next issue was all new money.
Examples from the constituencies 
In 1935 the Herald began reporting from individual contests again. One of the 
themes was the same as in 1929: how previously “difficult” constituencies were becoming 
more congenial to Labour. In at least one case the trend had continued since 1929. In 
Wimbledon most new voters came from housing estates in the St. Helier, Merton Park and 
Cottenham Park districts.250 Especially the first of these had a great number of Labour 
supporters. There was also new industry in the constituency employing between 10, 000 
and 20,000 people. On the basis of these changes, Labour was hoping to treble its vote. If
246 The London News November 1935, p. 1.
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the party hoped to progress in Wimbledon due to more working-class voters living there, in 
another “difficult” constituency, Chelsea, it was hoped to create a cross-class alliance. Thus 
it was reported that both manual and non-manual workers were in action for the candidate, 
Mr G. S. Sandilands. His nomination papers had been signed by Dame Sybil Thorndike, 
Lewis Casson and Vera Brittain. The basis of the appeal to workers was that their dwellings 
were being pulled down in order to make space for luxury flats. The candidate was vice- 
president of the League of Nations Union and it was instrumental in helping his campaign. 
In view of the uncertainty about the strength of the League of Youth, it is interesting to 
have a report that the organization was assisting the Labour candidate in Stoke 
Newington.252 Housing was an issue there as well, but from the reverse angle: the 
Conservatives objected to the erection of working-class housing.
But if there was a new theme for 1935, it was how Labour was replacing the 
Liberals at a local level. In Saffron Walden prominent Liberals were working on behalf of 
Labour’s candidate Clara Rackham.253 They included Alderman E. W. Turner, who had 
fought the seat for his own party more than once. Again housing was a major issue, and 
Labour’s peace and agricultural policies were highlighted too. In North Bucks, Labour’s 
candidate Mr J. A. Sparks also had the support of influential Liberals, who had signed his 
nomination papers. The Liberal Party was still “very strong” in the division, but Sparks had
been endorsed by Lloyd George’s Council of Action 254 In Acton Labour’s candidate won 
the endorsement of the local Liberal Association after triumphing over his Conservative 
opponent in a debate. It had been convened by the Liberals to decide which way their 
members should vote.
The end of the election 
Labour’s electoral effort of 1935 ended the night before polling day with a series of 
demonstrations and meetings across the country, taking in almost every city, town and 
village.255 Clement Attlee wrapped up his campaign in Whitechapel and Mile End before 
returning to his own constituents in Limehouse. In the event, he spoke challengingly about
251 Loc. cit.
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the state of the world. “What we are witnessing today is the breakdown of the capitalist and 
imperialist system, and the question is whether, in this country, we can lead the world away 
from disaster.”256 He claimed victory was theirs for the taking, if only everyone did their 
best to get Labour supporters to the polls. By addressing audiences at several meetings in 
the East End, he notched up a personal total of 50 speeches given in a fortnight. When the 
results came out Attlee’s reaction was that the tide of the Party was turning.257 The main 
parties fared as follows:
Table 1.11 The general election 1935.
Party Votes (change from 1931) Seats (change from 1931)
Conservatives 53.7% 432
Labour 37.9% (+7.3%) 154 (+102)
Liberals 6.4% 20
Attlee expressed disappointment at the number of seats gained, although Labour advanced 
by more than a hundred, making the party’s presence in Parliament substantial again. 24 
former ministers who lost their seats in 1931 were returned.258 He was more satisfied with 
the total number of votes cast for Labour, which constituted a higher percentage than ever. 
This showed how widespread was support for the policies of Socialism and peace. The 
editorial in that day’s Herald was clear-sighted in view of what would happen 
subsequently. It summed up the feelings of the Party by saying the result was not as good 
as had been hoped, but better than it at first appeared 259 It noted that the idea of 
overturning such a massive Government majority was probably illusory in the first place. 
But the future was between Tory and Labour, as the Liberals had effectively been 
eliminated. The Simonites would be incorporated in the Conservative Party as had the
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Liberal Unionists before them. And Labour’s basis in terms of both policies and support 
was “sounder than ever before.” Its vote was more evenly dispersed around the country.260
Conclusion
Due to “Victory for Socialism” and the pre-election campaign “To Win Power” 
Labour’s electioneering in practice started very early for the 1935 election. From March
1934 it conducted a lot of the kinds of activities that were associated with elections. This 
was a reaction to the party’s disastrous performance in the 1931 election. The campaign of
1935 was fought along the lines of 1929 and 1931, except that there were a few alterations 
in 1931 owing to unpreparedness. Plans for how to campaign were drawn up by the NEC 
and its subcommittees from the autumn of 1934. The final shape of the electoral efforts was 
decided at a meeting on 14 October involving the various heads of departments. A 
modicum of central control was ensured by Head Office’s asking the divisional parties on 
what they would be spending any money for which they applied. All agents, old and new, 
were sent guidelines from the central party about their electoral duties. Candidates also 
were primed about what to do. The production and distribution of propaganda and the 
running of the national campaign were the other tasks of the central party. Its control over 
what the divisional parties were doing was very slight.
Before the 1935 election some of the disadvantages associated with having whole 
parties affiliated to Labour were shown up. The ILP left the Party three years previous to 
the election, but the Co-operatives caused serious difficulties with their actual takeovers of 
some constituencies. Correcting this was cumbersome and time-consuming for Labour, 
which wanted them to have less autonomy not more. This was not a sign that central 
control was particularly intense. It was rather that Labour risked having to abandon some of 
its core areas if its influence was not reinforced. And as was said, a future Labour 
government could find itself at the mercy o f20-30 Cooperative MPs in the Commons. In 
1935 the sources do not show it as clearly, but there were advantages to be gained from 
such alliances as well. The Co-operative Party produced its own propaganda and greatly 
strengthened Labour’s electoral machine in areas where co-operation was prevalent.
260 John Swift, Labour in Crisis. Clement Attlee and the Labour Party in Opposition, 1931-40 (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave, 2001), p. 95.
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Labour’s spending on the election was somewhat higher than in 1931, but 
substantially below 1929, which produced its until then best results. In 1935 it was forced 
to transfer some of the funds meant for electioneering to the maintenance of ordinary day- 
to-day activity. The volume of propaganda was somewhat lower than it had been in 1931, 
but grants to candidates were higher than in either 1929 or 1931. Like for the other years, it 
has not been possible to establish how much was spent in London. The campaign directed 
by the London Labour Party was in any case a short one. Its main feature was the 
production of the usual election issue of its newspaper The London News, and additionally 
it included the placing of an advertisement outside the Labour press and extra grants for 
candidates.
Turning to the three elections as a whole, more interesting features may be brought 
out. 1929,1931 and 1935 were crucial for the resolution of political instability existing in 
the interwar period. They confirmed what seemed to be indicated after the Great War that 
the Liberals could only play a part in government in coalition with the Conservatives. 
Labour started as outsiders in 1918, but had moved to become one of the two parties of 
government in 1935. That was not least because of its two periods in office, but it was only 
able to govern when the Liberals and Conservatives did not want to co-operate with each 
other. The matter lay not in Labour’s hands. Labour fought the elections of 1929, 1931 and 
1935 under three different leaders, but the continuity of policy and general thrust is 
noticeable. At the 1931 conference delegates rejected a motion that Labour should not form 
another minority government, though the political crisis caused inter alia by having 
Parliament against it was the topic uppermost in everyone’s mind.261
In these three elections Labour continued its task of becoming a truly national party. 
It tried to stand in as many constituencies as possible, whatever their social composition or 
type of local economy. It was especially hopeful of overturning the support of the capitalist 
parties in the rural areas. Even where it could not win immediately it wanted to announce 
its presence. For similar reasons it accepted governmental responsibility in 1929 as another 
trial run for when it would have a majority. Unlike in 1924 at least Labour would be the 
largest party in the Commons. The party’s strategy for gaining power was entirely
261 Daily Herald 9 October 1931, p. 4.
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constitutional and while criticizing social conditions and British foreign policy, it strove to 
appear as respectable as possible.
It may be concluded that co-ordination rather than control was the order of the day 
in Labour’s last campaign of the 1920s and those in the 1930s. The central party produced 
propaganda, sent it to divisional parties, often gave grants and carried out the advance 
planning required. It ran the national campaign each time including broadcasts, speaking 
tours and occasional rallies, but everything else was delegated to the branches. Usually the 
endorsement of the candidates chosen by the local parties was a formality, but in 1931 the 
National Agent’s Department refused to give the go-ahead to the candidates belonging to 
the affiliate parties, which it feared could become too independent. 1931 was a year of 
crisis and, after the election, of soul-searching. A renewed emphasis on Socialism was 
Labour’s defiant answer to the charge that it had been stopped permanently in its tracks by 
the events of 1931. Hence the “Victory for Socialism” campaign set up in October 1933, 
which in practice prolonged Labour’s electoral efforts by more than a year. In 1935 Labour 
won back nearly all the support it had lost in 1931, and its forward march can be said to 
have resumed.
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Chapter 2. The Campaigning of the Norwegian Labour 
Party in the Elections of 1930,1933 and 1936.
Introduction
The intention in the following is to survey how DNA fought the crucial elections of 
1930,1933 and 1936 and what resources were available to it in doing so. Like chapter 1 it 
provides data on crucial indicators of success like the state of the labour movement in each 
election, which will then be compared in chapter 5. The questions looked at include how 
planning was conducted, the level of central control, how much money was spent, how 
much propaganda was available and how it was distributed and what the role of the leading 
daily Arbeiderbladet was. There is also a significant amount about electioneering “on the 
ground.” Details of the last point will come almost exclusively from Oslo, a consequence of 
the imbalance of sources. Even so a justification for including the Oslo Labour Party, but 
not the other regional associations, would lie in the recognized importance of the city for 
the labour movement.1 As an example of this, take the extended finance committee set up 
to lead the 1933 campaign. The only geographical contingent represented, apart from the 
party centrally, was Oslo and its environs.2 This was replicated for the local elections of 
1934 which will play no further part here. Again in 1936 the committee leading the 
election campaign consisted of local party officials and trade unionists from Oslo, but not 
from anywhere else.4 This indicates the dominant position of the branch, and justifies its 
inclusion where others have been neglected. Also, since Arbeiderbladet was an Oslo paper 
the campaign fought locally is well described therein. In a very real sense what occurred in 
the capital constituted the national campaign, as opposed to minor events across the country
1 According to one writer it was DNA’s strong position in the capital which allowed it to survive during the 
years of being split. Aksel Zachariassen, Fra Marcus Thrane til Martin Tranmcel. Det norske Arbeiderparti 
from til 1945 (Oslo, Tiden, 1977), p. 254.
Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek (AAB), Oslo: Minutes of meeting of the Joint Committee 13 July 
1933 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge; LOs saksarkiv 1934, sak nr. 2-34, Da 0140, folder marked 
Finanskomiteen sak 525 1933 9 1934.
3 AAB: Letter from OT (Oscar Torp) to Norsk Murerforbund 21 September 1934 in Archive: 
Landsorganisasjonen i Norge; LOs saksarkiv 1934, sak nr. 574-835, Da 0150, folder marked Kommunevalget 
sak nr. 601 1934.
4 AAB: Minutes of a meeting of the AFL Representative Committee 28 February 1936 in Archive: 
Landsorganisasjonen i Norge; LOs saksarkiv 1936, sak nr. 132-275, Da 0166, folder marked 
Representantskapet sak nr. 244 1936.
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and in the smaller cities. The other reason for the extensive focus on Oslo is that the records 
of the national party are sketchy and often missing. To describe the electioneering 
adequately it is thus necessary to concentrate on one area, and naturally die capital with 
environs is the best choice.
This explains why Arbeiderbladet is a much-used source in this chapter, and the 
others are the archival materials of DNA and, more commonly, the Trade Union 
Confederation AFL (Arbeidemes Faglige Landsorganisasjon), the printed and published 
sources of these two organizations and Oslo DNA, as well as the sections of the labour 
movement aligned to Labour such as the youth organization AUF {Arbeidemes 
Ungdomsfylking), the Workers’ Educational Association AOF {Arbeidemes 
Opplysningsforbund) and the Workers’ Sports Association AIF {Arbeidemes 
Idrettsforbund). DNA itself operated with a hierarchy of the central party as the highest 
authority with parties organized at county or city level answerable to it. These would in turn 
have local chapters which were either geographical divisions or trade unions. A joint 
committee {samarbeidskomite) existed to coordinate the affairs of DNA and AFL in tandem 
and was in the first instance responsible for the election campaigns, though as will be seen 
it delegated that authority to a wider body. Membership of the above-mentioned 
organizations was separate but overlapping, in particular in the case of DNA and AFL. 
Belonging to a trade union affiliated to AFL conferred collective membership in DNA, but 
only individual members of the latter were considered to be officially in the party. It will be 
seen presently that Communists and non-aligned workers bitterly resented paying money 
indirectly to DNA through the AFL.
It is proposed to cover the propaganda routine of the party chronologically, that is, 
election by election. This chapter will later be complemented by an account of which 
groups DNA addressed itself to in these elections. At the outset, however, it is possible to 
state that each campaign was conducted in very much the same way, though with greater 
and greater resources. The general plan remained more or less identical.
Background to the campaign of 1930
The 1930 election is less fully described in the archives than those of 1933 and 
1936. Partly this is because DNA was on an upward curve in the 1930s, devoting greater
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efforts and achieving more support with each election. That is not to say that DNA 
neglected its preparations for the 1930 election. On the contrary, it was claimed that the 
electioneering had been better than ever before, that more meetings had been held and that 
a greater number of people had taken part in them than previously.5 There may have been 
an element of election day rhetoric about this, but the evidence suggests it may well be 
true,6 and if so it is significant, because the previous parliamentary election in 1927 had 
represented DNA's great breakthrough. That was the year it became the largest party, 
enabling the formation of a Labour government in 1928, although it only lasted two weeks, 
and seriously disturbing the supporters of the capitalist parties. Another reason why it 
might be less well documented is to be found in the correspondence of AFL with the party. 
The Trade Union Confederation agreed to provide DNA with a sum of 75, 000 kroner (£ 4, 
120), but the letter announcing this good news for the party specifically stated that this 
must not be publicized.7 In 1933 and 1936 AFL's contributions to DNA's campaign were of 
a completely different magnitude.
In what sort of shape was DNA in 1930 when it was called upon to fight the first of 
these elections? It may have felt it had momentum behind it as the victor of the previous 
parliamentary election in 1927, when it had gained nearly 37% of the vote. On the other 
hand, it was undecided on the question of how important elections were, apart from as a
A
show of strength and a means of testing its support among the public. DNA had been a 
member of the Comintern 1919-1923 and continued to be more radical than the members of 
the Socialist International. An editorial in Arbeiderbladet ten days after the election, 
explained the position of the party: "We are passionately interested in ascertaining how 
many there are who support the policies of the party. It is in itself a strength that as many as 
possible vote for the party [...] providing it with greater representation[...]"9 Above it added 
"that is why we so forcefully contest the elections." However, the mere fact that it should
5 Editorial in Arbeiderbladet 20 October 1930, p. 3
6 More speeches were made in 1930 than in 1927 and canvassing was taken up in a major way in 1930.
7 AAB: Letter from AFL to DNA 6 September 1930 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 
1930, sak nr. 34-128, Da 0113, folder marked DNA-Arbeiderbladet sak nr. 77 1930.
8 A recurring theme during DNA's radical period was uncertainty about how much attention to devote to 
Parliament. It was generally considered, however, that Parliament was useful to the movement as a platform 
for agitation and provided an opportunity to show up the other parties. Cf. Per Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til 
makt (1920-1935). Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge 3 (Oslo, Tiden, 1987), p. 254.
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be necessary to state this underlines the point that DNA was still unsure about 
parliamentary democracy. And speaking earlier in the year the vice-chairman of DNA, 
Professor Edvard Bull, declared that it was not so much winning elections in the 
conventional sense which was important. He opined that attaining a majority in an election 
was by no means inconceivable. Such a victory would be hollow, though, for as he 
famously said, "So-called democracy is no more than an old superstitious phrase from the 
nineteenth century."10 What was of value was building a coherent and united organization 
of people belonging to the movement whichever way the electoral tide flowed. In line with 
this, conference approved a resolution by the National Executive that DNA had no interest 
in forming a government so weak that it must rely on certain capitalist sections to 
implement reformist policies.11 It also amended the programme of principles. In 1927 it had 
said it wished to organize the entire working people, which was the majority of the 
population. Now the clarification that the working people were in a majority was taken 
out.12 While DNA was hoping for further progress in 1930, the tenor of what has been 
stated and other comments made at the conference suggest the party did not expect an 
outright victory. So why bother about the election? The answer lies both in Bull’s vision 
and in the editorial. DNA wanted to increase its support (especially among workers) 
preparatory to winning a majority in Parliament later. Or if it envisaged coming to power 
by other means, that was all the more reason for gaining the adherence of as many as 
possible.
State of the Party and movement 
Indeed elections were usually good times to effect an expansion of the membership. 
During 1930 a total of 104 party branches and 15 trade unions were set up as constituent 
parts of DNA.13 By the end of the year, according to admittedly less than perfect statistics, 
the state of the labour movement was as follows:
9 Arbeiderbladet 30 October 1930, p. 3
10 AAB: Protokoll av forhandlingene pa Det norske Arbeiderpartis 28. ordincere landsmote i Oslo 14-16 mars 
1930 marked 329 (481) 15 N82 La/1930, p. 45
11 AAB: Conference report 1930, p. 124.
12 See chapter 4, p. 201.
13 AAB: Det norske Arbeiderparti. Beretning 1930' in Det norske Arbeiderparti. Beretning 1930-33 marked 
^28(481)15 N81 br,p. 11.
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Table 2.1 Membership of labour organizations 1930.
Organization Membership Branches
DNA 80, 177 1,713
AFL 139, 591 1,861
AUF 14, 000 275
(Sources: DNA Annual Report 1930, p. 11 and p. 44. Arbeidemes Faglige 
Landsorganisasjon. Beretning 1930. For sekretariatet ved Halvard Olsen og Alfred Madsen 
(Oslo 1932), pp. 104-105.)
Perhaps more important than these figures in absolute terms was the perception that Labour 
was advancing. AFL's delegate to DNA's conference in March 1930 said his organization 
boasted roughly 130,000 members, a figure rising on a daily basis.14 This was true as AFL 
had only 127, 017 members when the year started.15
At the end of the year DNA had a portfolio of 45 newspapers of which 20 were 
dailies, one was published four times a week, two were weeklies and the remaining 22 were 
published two or three times a week.16 Since 1915 the party had devoted part of its 
members’ dues to the newspapers and in 1929 AFL also started giving financial support. 
After 1930 many became self-supporting, but note the contributions paid to labour 
newspapers in 1933 and 1936 given in appendix 3.17 There was also a 16-page magazine 
for women, Arbeiderkvinnen, published once a month and regularly selling 20, 000 
copies.18 Lastly, Arbeiderungdommen, the youth magazine, was published twice a month 
and Bamebladet, for children, monthly.19
The location of the 21 papers published four times a week or more may be thought 
to shed some light on which were DNA's strongest areas.20 Unsurprisingly, the larger cities
14 AAB: Conference report 1930, p. 11.
15 AAB: AFL Annual report 1930, p. 105.
16 AAB: DNA Annual report 1930, p. 51.
17 Zachariassen, Fra Marcus Thrane til Martin Tranmcel, p. 213. p. 315.
18 DNA Annual report 1930, p. 42.
19 Ibid., p. 52.
20 And one comparative historian explains the large number of labour newspapers in Norway on the 
decentralized structure of the party. Nils Elvander, Skandinavisk arbetarrdrelse (Stockholm, Liber FSrlag, 
1980), p. 83.
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were well represented among the 21: Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Drammen, Stavanger and 
Tromso (see map at the end of the thesis) each having one of the main papers. The 
remainder tended to be clustered in DNA's strongholds in the east of the country, but 
surprisingly the small county of Vestfold, where DNA was weak, had two of the dailies. 
Furthermore, the south, where the lay-Christian movement was highly influential, had 
another two DNA dailies, but these were in the towns of Kristiansand and Arendal. Even in 
problematic areas for DNA, the urban environment was conducive to creating class 
consciousness and hence DNA support.
Finance
Of course the printed media network did not run itself. It required significant 
support from DNA and AFL. During 1929 the former transferred 236, 000 kroner to its 
press outside Oslo.21 More than half of this amount, 131, 000 kroner, went to the Labour 
newspapers of Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and Skien. DNA chairman Oscar Torp was 
of the opinion that financial support for the regional press was the best way to apply 
resources in the electoral campaign.22 The central party left the district organizations of 
Labour to operate rather freely within broad parameters, but support for the newspapers 
was intended to make sure DNA continued to grow 23
The question of finance may be seen as crucial because the vastly greater sums 
expended by DNA in 1933 and 1936 were surely contributory to the great increment of 
support received in those years over 1930. As has already been mentioned, AFL 
contributed 75, 000 kroner to DNA's campaigning in 1930. This had to be done in secret 
because non-aligned workers and Communists resented paying for DNA propaganda. On 3 
March 1930 a circular from the AFL was sent to all federations calling for extra dues to be 
levied on individual trade unionists to the tune of 0.50 kroner for fully paid-up members 
and 0.25 kroner for those paying half the standard rate for 20 weeks from that date 24 The 
ostensible justification for the extra dues was the need for AFL to pay off debts. A number
21 AAB: Memorandum by Oscar Torp dated 18 January 1930 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs 
saksarkiv 1930, sak nr. 34-128, Da 0113, folder marked DNA-Arbeiderbladet sak nr. 77 1930, p. 1
22 Loc. tit., pp. 8-9.
23 Interview with Haakon Lie 26 June 2006.
24 AAB: Circular no. 3 from the Secretariat of AFL signed by Halvard Olsen in Achive: Landsorganisasjonen 
1 Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1930, sak nr. 134-196, Da 0114, folder marked Ekstrakontigenten, sak nr. 139 1930.
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of unions saw straight through this subterfuge, and registered their protests.
A letter from Svean Working Man's Union {Svean Arbeidsmandsforening) in Sor 
Trondelag stated that the extra dues had created a flood of rancour. Not only would the 
union lose some of its members if the decision were enforced, but the bitterness was all the 
greater because the dues were political and intended for "reactionary Social Democracy."25 
A number of protests from various unions were received by AFL, two such letters of 
interest stem from the Federation of Norwegian Working Men (Norsk 
Arbeidsmandsforbund) dated 12 March and 1 April 1930.26 Both of these mentioned five 
unions which had written to the Federation protesting against the extra dues. And there is 
evidence that previous attempts to raise money for DNA, surreptitiously or otherwise, were 
also resisted. The West Country Railway Trade Union Executive (Vestlandsbanenes 
stedlige styre) not only protested against proposed extra dues from 1 January 1930, but 
demanded that DNA repay AFL all the money the latter had granted the party.27 Making a 
clean breast of its revolutionary sympathies, Skien Mill Workers' Union {Skien 
mollearbeiderforening) protested against AFL's financial support for DNA, and thus the
AO
proposed extra dues in a letter of 29 January 1930. Many more examples could be 
adduced.
A reply from AFL to the Federation of Locomotive Drivers (Norsk 
Lokomotivmandsforbund) on this issue is revealing. Their chapter in Trondheim had written 
to the Federation agreeing to pay the extra dues on the strict condition that none of the 
money thus raised should be used for political agitation. AFL responded that, "It seems to 
us somewhat peculiar that an organization of public servants which wholly stands to gain 
from the working class being represented to the greatest possible extent in Parliament 
makes such a resolution."29 It then went on to repeat that the extra dues were to be used for 
repaying debt to various local working-class organizations.
For all the controversy over AFL and trade union support for DNA, extra dues 
during the year 1930 raised a sum from the federations of 848, 000 kroner (c. £ 46, 600), or
25 Letter from Svean Arbeidsmandsforening to AFL and Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund dated 5 April 1930 in
26 Signed by 0deg&rd and Henriksen respectively in loc. cit.
27 Dated 3 December 1929 signed Martin Dyrseth in loc. cit.
28 Signed G. Lunden and Bj. Andersen in loc. cit.
29 AFL to Norsk Lokomotivmandsforbund, Oslo dated 15 August 1930. Loc. cit.
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almost as much as the receipt of the regular dues of 874, 000 kroner (c. £ 48, OOO).30 The 
former sum was vastly greater than the 75, 000 kroner contribution to DNA's election 
campaign, but AFL's finances were so entwined with DNA's anyway, that whether any of 
the extra dues levied were intended specifically for the election is largely irrelevant. AFL 
supported the Labour press and paid a total of 112, 500 kroner (c. £ 6, 200) to joint regional 
trade union organizations (samorganisasjoner) during 1930, organizations which often 
campaigned for DNA during elections.31 The Oslo chapter of DNA reported electoral 
contributions from trade unions of 30, 680 kroner (£ 1,685).32
The bourgeois resistance 
An equally important influence on the campaign was the intense pressure the party 
came under from its capitalist rivals. The reactionary bourgeois pressure group the 
Fatherland Association (Fedrelandslaget), which in 1925 had proposed proscribing DNA 
and the Communists, declared a 1,000 day campaign against the former after it emerged as 
the victor of the 1927 contest and shocked the political right.33 In his party's press the 
Liberal Prime Minister Johan Ludwig Mowinckel had announced that the struggle against
XAthe "revolutionary Labour Party" would be the prime concern in the coming election. 
During the campaign on 3 October, right-wing newspapers brought reports that a General 
Gulbrandson had declared that Socialists and Communists in major towns had formed 
secret companies armed to the teeth with flamethrowers and machine guns.35 Nearly two 
weeks later the chief customs official in the town of Vadso in Finnmark stated that there 
was widespread smuggling of shotguns, revolvers, machine guns and ammunition to the
30 AAB: AFL Annual report 1930, p. 12.
31 And AFL supported individual chapters of DNA with election expenses too. See AAB: Archive: 
Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1930, sak nr. 376-461, Da 0116, folder marked Bergens 
forenede Arbeiderparti for one such example.
32 Oslo Arbeiderparti. Beretning og regnskap 1930 (Oslo, DNA, 1931), p. 16. See the specification pp. 49-51.
33 Knut Kjeldstadli, Et splittet samfunn 1905-35. Aschehougs Norgeshistorie 10 (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1994), pp. 
208-209. Die Association existed to promote capitalist unity against Socialism and wanted a strong 
government independent of Parliament.
34 o Hans Fredrik Dahl, Fra klassekamp til nasjonal samling. Arbeiderpartiet og det nasjonale sporsmal i 30-
arene (Oslo, Pax, 1969), p. 46. Also see Arbeiderbladet 8 October 1930, p. 3.
35 Arbeiderbladet 4 October 1930, p. 1. It tried to parry the blow showing that the state authorities had no 
such information.
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Socialists in Trondelag, presumably from nearby Communist Russia. These allegations 
were potentially devastating because they seemed to come from respected people “in the 
know.” The most persistent argument against DNA used by its opponents was that it would 
abolish Christianity, to which DNA replied that it was unfortunate both Mowinckel and 
Conservative leader Carl Joachim Hambro were confirmed freethinkers.37 While there was 
no truth in these allegations, it is somehow understandable that DNA's democratic 
credentials should be doubted given that it had in principle believed in the dictatorship of 
the proletariat until reunification with the Social Democrats just three years previously.
And Hambro contrasted DNA in a speech with British Labour and the other Scandinavian 
Social Democrats. Those parties had the country’s welfare at heart, he said, while DNA
I Q
continued to be guided by principles learnt in Moscow.
Preparations and the election 
It is not difficult to summarize DNA's campaign in a few facts and figures. The 
plans for the campaign were agreed in May and were presented to the National Executive 
on 21 July, in preparation for the election on 20 October.40 (Norway had fixed-term 
parliaments of three years so the date was known in advance.) These included tours of the 
country by party veterans from mid-August onwards lasting from one to five weeks. A total 
of 840 speeches were made during these, 550 speeches were made in the last two weekends 
before the poll and another 3, 000 during the rest of the campaign. During the whole year a 
total of 4,455 speeches was given, compared to 4, 176 in the election year of 1927.41 This 
indicates that the preparations for the 1930 election were at least as good as in 1927. As for 
the written literature 300, 000 copies of the programme were printed, 100, 000 copies of the 
manifesto were distributed and there was a statement to women of which 50,000 copies 
were printed.42 An election newspaper was sent to the local branches with a total print of 
150, 000 copies. The figure is the same as for the brochures, the individual titles being "The
36 Arbeiderbladet 15 October 1930, p. 11.
37 Arbeiderbladet 6 October 1930, p. 9; Arbeiderbladet 15 October 1930, p. 2.
38 Walter Galenson, Labor in Norway (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 68.
39 Hans Fredrik Dahl ‘Fra nod til sejr’ in Knut Kjeldstadli and Vidar Keul (eds.), DNA-fra folkevegelse til 
statsstette (Oslo, Pax, 1973), p. 141.
40 AAB: DNA Annual report 1930, p. 71.
41 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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Countryside and the Election" (35, 000 copies), "Forward to Disarmament" (30, 000 
copies), "The Conservatives and the Fatherland" (30,000 copies), "The Soil and the 
Peasants" (20, 000 copies), "Unemployment and Rationalization" (20, 000 copies) and "The 
Fishermen and the Election" (15, 000 copies). The last-mentioned title was available free of 
charge to the branches, the remainder cost 10 kroner for a hundred. Together they provide a 
good picture of DNA’s concerns and priorities. Among the other electoral materials four 
films were used during the campaign. Two were made by DNA: the silent "Forward to 
Victory" and one relating to a conference of agricultural workers in Trondheim. It is 
interesting that the topic of the second should be what it was, as DNA had not yet begun 
seriously concentrating on farm labourers. There was also one about "Red Vienna" and 
lastly the German anti-war film "Poison Gas". The latter was first shown to a specially 
invited audience on 24 September.43 It was a polemic against war which linked with DNA’s 
pacifism.
Because of the paucity of information available on DNA's campaigning across the 
nation, what is on record is set out in table 2.2 below (and see map). This will allow 
increased concentration on the capital thereafter.
Table 2.2 Campaigning during August, September and October 1930.
Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
Aldor
Ingebrigtsen
Troms and 
Nordland
Sept-Oct 70
Olav Oksvik Sogn og Fjordane September c. 10 Estimated from 
convoluted 
details of three 
tours in June, 
September and 
October.
Olav Oksvik More October 41
Olav Oksvik Hordaland September 18
Thina Thorleifsen Aust-Agder September 16
Ibid., p. 72.
43 Arbeiderbladet 25 September 1930, p. 1.
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Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
Olav Steinnes Telemark October 15
Helga Karlsen South and West 
Country
1-14 September 16
Johan
Nygaardsvold
Trondelag 22 Sept-9 Oct 21 A future PM
Johan Wiik Nord Trondelag October 22
Anders Lothe Sogn og Fjordane Sept-Oct 57
Olaf Johansen Nordland 18 Sept-10 Oct 30
Olav Versto Telemark Sept-Oct 14
Johannes Boe Sogn og Fjordane September 22
Kristian Berg Finnmark 20 Sept-19 Oct 27
Andreas Moan Nordland Sept-Oct 35
Meyer Foshaug Troms 28 Sept- 19 Oct 50
Fredrik Monsen Trondelag and 
West Country
October 20
Cornelius Enge Nordland Not stated 23 "During election 
campaign.”
Sverre Stostad North More 25 Sept-10 Oct 23
Johan Falkberget Sot Trondelag Sept-Oct 27 A famous writer
Olav Scheflo Rogaland 21 Sept-6 Oct 17
Harald Langhelle Trondelag October 10
Komelius
Bergsvik
Hordaland Sept-Oct 35
Anders Buen More 19 Sept-7 Oct 23
Olav Scheflo Trondelag October 15
Lars Moen Oppland 4-13 October 13
Rolf Gerhardsen Trondelag and 
Hedmark
September 13 ForAUF
Albert Moen Nord Trondelag 4-8 October 8
Johan Jensen Buskerud October 26
Nils Steen Buskerud Not stated 30 "During election 
campaign."
Olav Saeter Hedmark 27 Sept-5 Oct 15
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Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
Paul Dahlo Trondelag October 23
Kristian Rothaug Sor Trondelag 11-19 October 10
Alfred Madsen North Norway 28 Sept-6 Oct 12
Johan Schvingel East and
Northwestern
country
Not stated 12 Assuming there 
was one in each 
town. The film 
’’Poison Gas" was 
shown at the 
meetings, which 
3,000 people 
attended.
Kristian 
Kristens en
South and 
Southwest 
Country
Not stated 13 Same as above, 
but 5,500 people 
attended.
(Source: DNA Annual Report 1930, pp. 12-18.)
These tours were planned by central office and do not represent the entirety of 
meetings held in any particular place, as more campaigning was conducted by the relevant 
district party or local chapter as well. More than a third of the speeches made during the 
tours took place in “problem areas” for DNA, that is to say the South and West Country, 
counter-cultural regions where evangelical or pietistic Christianity was strong.44 This was a 
particular hindrance to DNA in the 1930 election in which the capitalist parties, as 
mentioned, succeeded in making religion an issue. Because Socialism challenged the 
established order which had a Christian component to it, there was antagonism of ideas 
between these two faiths. An editorial in Arbeiderbladet, though, relating to an article in the 
Agrarian-supporting Nationen, claimed that while the capitalist parties preached 
Christianity, the workers' parties practised it, i.e. its tenets of pacifism and helping the
44 Apart from the strong influence of low-church Christianity, counter-cultural areas were often also marked 
by large numbers of nynorsk speakers. There were few social divisions in these areas, in contrast to the 
hierarchical areas where class was important. Cf. Vilhelm Aubert ‘Sosiale klasser og lag’ in Natalie Rogoff 
Ramsoy and Mariken Vaa, Det norske samfunn. Bind 1 (Oslo, Gyldendal, 1975), pp. 152-153.
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poor.45 For unconnected reasons DNA did not do well in the county of Nordland in the 
interwar period, though it greatly resembled the two other counties constituted as Northern 
Norway. Nordland was not counter-cultural, and like the areas where DNA prospered it 
was ridden by class divisions 46 It took DNA three years to mobilize the fishermen of 
Troms, but more than thirty to achieve the same in Nordland. A possible reason is that the 
latter had more industry than the former, and the party accordingly appealed more to 
factory workers than fishermen.47 If Nordland is counted with the other backward areas for 
DNA, a little more than half of the centrally directed speeches were made where the party 
was weak. This may have been to counteract the more limited ability of the district parties 
there to campaign successfully. It is not known whether this was true also in 1930, but in 
the two later elections the backward areas were overfunded by the centre compared to the 
heartlands. From the skimpy evidence available it seems that DNA’s tactics involved a 
conscious attempt to tackle the areas of greatest difficulty.
Oslo
The capital had a structure and a culture much more congenial to DNA than the 
areas which were mentioned above. Class conflict was not necessarily more prevalent here 
than in other hierarchical areas, but social differences were very visible. The western parts 
of the city were dominated by black-coated workers and professionals, while the East End 
mostly contained manual workers. Mirroring this segregation, the Conservatives and 
Labour were the only major parties with the Liberals running in a very poor third place. 
Naturally as an urban centre there was a much larger tertiary sector, and DNA thus had to 
attract a wider base of people if it was to become pre-eminent. As a result some efforts 
were made to appeal to white-collar workers as early as 1930, which was at odds with the 
central campaign. Due to the local nature of the appeal and to keep the treatment of the 
capital’s elections in one place, it is proposed to discuss the issue here rather than in chapter
45 Arbeiderbladet 25 September 1930, p. 3.
46 A study of why DNA’s breakthrough in Nordland was retarded is Svein Lundestad, Arbeiderbevegelsens 
politiske gjennombrudd i Nordland og Troms (Bodo, Hogskolesenteret i Nordland, 1988). One of his 
explanations, not mentioned elsewhere, is simply that party organization in Nordland was rudimentary. There 
was little continuity of leadership, the county party was poor at recruiting and a lot of time was spent on 
keeping the apparatus and its newspaper alive (p. 100).
47 0yvind Bjomson, Pa klassekampens grunn (1900-1920). Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge 2 (Oslo, 
Tiden, 1990), p.222.
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4.
The Oslo chapter of DNA took Sunday 28 September 1930 as the fully-fledged 
starting date of its campaign. From that date onwards until polling day on 20 October, with 
the exception of two Saturdays (4 and 11 October), there were meetings with invited 
speakers across the capital every day.48 The resources available to the party included 4,000 
posters, a copy of the film "Poison Gas" and two of "Forward to Victory" 49 Most indoor 
meetings had a film showing, thus "Poison Gas" was shown seven times and "Forward to 
Victory" 40 times. The former was billed as the great attraction at the huge meeting 
marking the opening of the campaign, in a session that included speeches by Alfred 
Madsen, Magnus Nilssen, as well as party chairman Oscar Torp.50 Madsen and Nilssen 
were respectively candidate no. 1 and 2 on DNA’s list for Oslo.
Oslo DNA spent 36, 380 kroner (£ 2,000) during the campaign.51 2, 590 kroner 
were spent on transporting materials and hiring automobiles. Cars were used for bringing 
people to polling stations, and on 12 October ten trucks decorated with red flags and posters 
drove in a procession through the town.52 This joint action with AUF featured Labour youth 
agitating through loudspeakers and a brass band on two of the trucks. It was part of DNA’s 
plan to be entertaining as well as informative when campaigning. Mobilization through 
creating a spectacle can be seen from the action whereby two cars decorated with posters 
drove through the districts where most of the workers lived playing music on the Saturday 
and Sunday before polling day. An advert was placed in Arbeiderbladet urging party 
members who owned automobiles to make these available on election day, and some were 
hired out of the funds of the chapter.
Although entertainment designed to draw the masses to DNA played a vital part in 
electioneering, it was frequently stated that nothing could beat contact with individual 
electors. Canvassing began on 6 October and lasted for a fortnight.53 Distributing 
Arbeiderbladet was among the most pressing tasks of the canvassers, and a total o f264,
000 copies were in fact given away. This was a relatively new method of electioneering,
AQ
Cf. Oslo DNA Annual report 1930, pp. 34-37.
49 Ibid., p. 34.
50Arbeiderbladet 27 September 1930, p. 4.
51 Oslo DNA Annual report 1930, p. 47.
52 Ibid., p. 34.
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and was significantly expanded in 1930 over what had taken place in 1927. There were 11 
electoral offices spread around the capital, divided about equally between the strong Labour 
areas in the east of the city and the west where the party was weaker. This electoral 
decision replicated the agitation tours across the country, with significant emphasis on the 
counties where DNA had hitherto done poorly. The first report of the canvassing did, 
however, point out that attendance was particularly buoyant at the offices in the eastern half 
of the city, while not so good in the western.54 It therefore asked new canvassers primarily 
to report to the latter districts.55
Electoral appeal in Oslo
By far the majority of DNA’s propaganda was directed at “the little people” 
(smakarsfolket) of town and countryside. Oslo did not represent an exception to this rule, 
since there as elsewhere DNA existed to serve the interests of the workers. But towns were 
the bastions of the Norwegian middle classes, engaged in services and trade, and Labour 
could not completely ignore these people. They were outnumbered by workers in the 
population, but in Oslo the middle classes were relatively more numerous than in the 
country at large. Intellectuals had long played an important role in DNA, furnishing it with 
chairmen like Ludvig Meyer (1897-1900) and Kyrre Grepp (1918-1922).56
It will presently be seen what Oslo DNA’s reaction to this state of affairs was, but 
directly linked to the question of appeal, the Party held special meetings for women, maids, 
teetotallers, commercial clerks, civil servants and those employed by local government.57 
Commercial clerks, civil servants and local government officials may be subsumed under 
the category of white-collar workers. They were DNA’s bridgehead into the middle classes 
to the extent that the party wanted to gain support in this section of society. In 1929 the 
Association of Commercial Clerks (Norges handels- og kontorfunksjoncerers forbund) had 
joined the AFL, and this meant it was partisan in favour of DNA during the election.
53 Ibid., p. 33.
54 Arbeiderbladet 8 October 1930, p. 1.
55 Herbert Tingsten has proved that workers living in middle-class districts are less likely to vote than those 
who live in working-class areas. Quoted in Gabriel 0idne ‘Sosial og politisk struktur i Oslo. Del I: 1906- 
1937’,Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 11 (1970), p. 151.
56 Cf. Edvard Bull sr. ‘Arbeiderbevaegelsens stilling i de tre nordiske land 1914-1920’, Tidsskriftfor 
Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 1976/1, p. 23.
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Labour had something to offer white-collar workers, and it was in Oslo that the relevant 
arguments emerged. At a cross-party meeting for commercial clerks held in Agrarian 
House, the trade unionist Alfred Madsen represented DNA and spoke about the party's 
policy in relation to a law on apprenticeship.58 The apprenticeship law would prevent the 
overproduction of clerks. The Conservatives were against a bill and possibly for this 
reason, or because of the Association of Commercial Clerks’ newly established ties with 
AFL, the meeting decided by 350 to four votes that office workers should vote DNA.59 The 
justification given in the resolution was that white-collar workers were wage earners and 
thus had their interests represented by DNA.
DNA had previously shown some concern for civil servants. This was predicated on 
their conflict with their employer the state over unionization and terms and conditions.
Civil servants had faced salary cuts, and the state had refused to implement a court 
judgment ordering it to raise salaries in line with agreements made and recognize the union. 
As a consequence the short-lived Labour government of 1928 promised to put relations 
between civil servants and the state on a new footing. Thus it did not come as a bolt from 
the blue that DNA in 1930 argued that civil servants should support it. In a meeting for 
them also held in Agrarian House but under Labour auspices, DNA’s representative said 
that the capitalist parties had roughly the same view of civil servants.60 They were 
contemplating abolishing the civil service laws which would weaken job security and 
worsen other conditions of employment.
A comprehensive overview of these points was provided by Omar Gjesteby of the 
Association of Commercial Clerks. He wrote that the occupation was often regarded as a 
half-way house between the classes.61 In bygone days it was seen as a stepping stone to 
becoming self-employed. Most young people entering the occupation harboured such 
hopes. Unfortunately, without "wealthy parents or kind uncles" the chances were slim, and 
most clerks must expect to remain wage earners all their lives. So white-collar workers 
were no longer in a position of superiority, indeed most manual workers had caught up with
57 AAB: ‘Oslo Arbeiderparti Beretning og regnskap 1931’ in Oslo Arbeiderparti Beretning 1931-35, p. 35.
58 Arbeiderbladet 17 October 1930, p. 1.
59 Ibid., p. 2.
60 Arbeiderbladet 16 October 1930, p. 13.
61 Arbeiderbladet 15 October 1930, p. 8.
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them owing to their greater understanding of the solidarity and organizational principles. 
Manual and office workers were equally exploited and must consequently make common 
cause in the search for better living standards.
One may wonder if it was not counter-productive to stress the similarities between 
manual workers and clerks, because if the latter voted for the capitalist parties it can be 
assumed one of the reasons was to affirm their superiority over other workers. Another way 
of looking at this would be to stress the cultural similarities between white-collar workers 
and the wealthy, who derived benefit from the rule of the capitalist parties. They dressed 
the same way and spoke standard Norwegian, whereas workers and peasants used their 
dialects or sociolects. DNA was evidently hoping that in a time of great need true classes 
based on economic interests, rather than status groups based on style of life, would reassert 
themselves. The arguments retailed did not pre-suppose extensive interaction between 
white- and blue-collar workers, and each had their own trade unions. The message was that 
they had common interests, however, as wage earners whose recognized party Labour was. 
By its support for the apprenticeship law DNA sought in fact to enhance the status of clerks 
by providing them with better education and restricting entry into the occupation, which 
would have social as well as economic consequences. In this way the circle could be 
squared. Clerks had their interests looked after by DNA, but could continue to think of 
themselves as somewhat different from other workers.
The national campaign
The only source for a regional campaign which is readily available is an interview 
with the leader of DNA in the county of Akershus, which surrounds Oslo. Trygve Lie was 
later to be a person of considerable influence within the party, and he was described as the 
dens ex machina of the campaign in his county.62 He stated that the party's electoral 
newspaper would be distributed to the villages during that week, and that there would be a 
local version of it covering Akershus issues. These two would continue to be spread across 
the county to "the home of every worker and smallholder." The local branches were 
responsible for the canvassing, and had been instructed to identify how many copies they 
needed of the newspapers. In the parts closest to Oslo Arbeiderbladet was also handed out,
62 Arbeiderbladet 20 October 1930, p. 11.
105
as were everywhere the brochures produced by the party centrally. In direct contradiction of 
the idea that he was running the campaign, Lie claimed that the local branches had great 
autonomy and campaigned as they saw fit. His role, then, must have been more as a 
surveyor of what was going on than its initiator.
A second interview printed in DNA's main daily may cast some more light on how 
the campaign was run. It was with chairman of the party Oscar Torp, who assumed 
continued progress and greater representation in Parliament.63 The journalist painted a 
picture of a bustling atmosphere in headquarters, newspapers arriving one moment and 
being expedited the next. The party publishers dealt with orders from out of town 
continuously, and sent materials away by post and rail. Torp claimed that the campaigning 
was proceeding very well. Plans for it had been laid at the National Executive's meeting 
during the summer and those plans had been adhered to. The real starting point, he said, 
had been the conference of agricultural workers, about which a film had been recorded. 
Apart from the campaigning tours listed previously, there had been "weekend trips" by 
speakers starting in or based in Oslo. But only one strand of the campaign was directed 
from the centre, as Torp had no plan of the meetings arranged by the local branches or the 
county parties. As for the speeches, throughout the nation interest had everywhere been as 
great as in 1927, and in some places attendance had increased considerably.
DNA did in fact receive more votes than in 1927, so it is not surprising that the 
atmosphere was thought to be good and spirits high beforehand. The capitalist parties, 
however, were increasing the temperature of the contest, and, judging by the result, 
probably having not a little success at their own meetings. DNA felt that it had rebutted the 
scare stories about secret weapon deposits, unconstitutionality and the abolition of 
Christianity spread by the likes of General Gulbrandson and Captain Riiser-Larsen, but 
evidently the mud stuck. While DNA's campaign was highly professional, well-organized 
and to the point, the agenda was being set by its opponents, who had apparently principled 
questions to put to the voters. Moreover, there had been a relative economic upturn between 
1927 and 1930, although unemployment began rising again in 1929. (Thus DNA in 
retrospect blamed its defeat on the depression giving the forces of reaction easier
63 Arbeiderbladet 11 October 1930, p. 1.
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conditions.64) The 1930 election was characterized by class action on both sides. DNA 
insisted it was a party of working-class struggle by removing the reference in its 
programme of principles to wishing to gain the majority of the population behind it. The 
capitalist parties, meanwhile, tried to unite all those who had even the slightest stake in the 
nation through its rhetoric, serving to distinguish “us”, the decent people, against “them”, 
the atheistic revolutionaries.
The success of its opponents takes nothing away from the skill and careful planning 
that went into DNA's campaign, evident also in its conclusion. Sunday 19 October 
represented a real climax with more meetings than ever before and several noteworthy 
features. One was a torchlit parade from Birkelunden Park to Young's Square (the main 
assembly point for the labour movement) arranged in conjunction with AUF.65 The 
purpose of this was to act as a magnet on the workers who lived along the route. 3,000 
"young workers" took part in the parade to merge with large crowds in the Square and the 
adjoining streets. Arbeiderbladet estimated that 40,000 people took part in the subsequent 
rally. Finn Moe, the intellectual, Oslo DNA’s secretary Einar Gerhardsen and Alfred 
Madsen gave short speeches. Madsen was wildly applauded for his "long live Oslo run by 
the workers, Socialism and the emancipation of the working class."66 The Internationale 
was sung followed by entertainment relayed by loudspeakers. That was not quite the end of 
DNA's preparations for the election. On polling day an editorial in Arbeiderbladet was 
addressed to women, the party clearly fearing many would abstain.67
The result of the election was a triumph for the capitalist parties, each of which got 
a larger share of the vote than in 1927.
AAB: DNA Annual report 1930, p. 5.
65 Ibid., p. 34.
66 Arbeiderbladet 20 October 1930, p. 1.
67 Ibid., p. 3.
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Table 2.3 The parliamentary election 1930.
Party Share of the vote (change 
from 1927)
Parliamentary seats 
(change from 1927)
Liberals 21% (+2.3%) 34 (+3)
Conservatives 30% (+4.5%) 44 (+13)
Agrarians 15.9% (+1.0%) 25 (-1)
DNA 31.4% (-5.4%) 47 (-12)
Communists 1.7% (-2.3%) 0 (-3)
(Source: Berge Furre, Norsk historie 1905-1940 (Oslo, Det norske samlaget, 1971), p. 320.)
The first headline in Arbeiderbladet stated that DNA had held on to its votes from last time. 
In fact, there had been an increase of 16, 000 in the counties, though balanced by a decrease 
o f4, 000 in the towns.68 Nevertheless, 12 seats in Parliament were lost. What had happened 
was that the capitalist parties had successfully mobilized their reserves against Socialism. 
The turnout had risen by 4.5 percentage points to 77.6 %.
DNA's initial reaction to the result was to affirm it was not really a defeat, though it 
conceded the capitalist parties had scored a victory.69 The party had advanced the most in 
those parts of the countryside where the class struggle was most pronounced. This led to a 
high level of politicization and was beneficial to Labour, but in the egalitarian and counter- 
cultural West political consciousness was low and support for the party weaker.70 In the 
towns the sway of the non-socialist press was greater, and it had frightened those who were 
middle-of-the-road. It also sought to deprecate the capitalist triumph, noting that the 
election was fought in a panic-like state and that fear had prevailed. But it admitted DNA 
may have lost some votes on the back of the change in the programme. The historiography 
sees 1930 as a great defeat and explains it by DNA’s renewed radicalization. For instance, 
it is claimed that “workers turned their backs to a revolutionary programme formulated in 
the internal party dispute,” but this ignores that the party gained votes.71
68 Arbeiderbladet 22 October 1930, p. 1.
69 Ibid, p. 4.
70 Stein Rokkan ’Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition and National Integration’ in Joseph La Palombara 
and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1966), pp. 251-252.
7f Hans Fredrik Dahl ’Arbeiderbevegelsen og offientligheten’, Tidsskrift for Arbeiderbevegelsens historie
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Eight days later Arbeiderbladet grappled with this question of whether it had been 
right to remove the reference to "the majority of the people" in the programme of 
principles.72 It now argued that whether the words were there or not, implicitly DNA sought 
to win all the people for its Socialist and revolutionary ideas. It repeated the thinking 
behind the elimination of the words: winning a parliamentary majority would be illusory if 
not based on real organs of power, i.e. the workers’ organizations. The development came 
in conceding and repeating that it had lost some votes on this occasion due to conference's 
decision to remove the reference to the "majority of the people.” Even more revealing was 
that it cared, the logic behind the change being that votes did not matter so much. The 
newspaper reintroduced DNA's new preferred version of "the working people", which the 
party would seek to win. It added that in the recent election it had laid the groundwork for 
that task.
Conclusion: The 1930 election 
1927 was more vital to the future of Labour than 1930.73 Owing to the reunification 
with the Social Democrats the former election was the first since 1918 when it had been 
able to appeal on the basis of class rather than ideology. From 1930 onwards DNA's 
electoral campaigns became more extensive each time. The plan for how they were fought 
remained the same, however, as will be seen in the remainder of the chapter. The country­
wide effort was drawn up during the summer of 1930 by the National Executive. It included 
tours to all parts of the country by veteran speakers and a date for the start of the election 
(28 September). The documents are not extant, but one would expect that they will have 
included binding for county parties and possibly for newspapers from Head Office. (The 
newspapers may have been funded at other times with a view to the campaign.) Apart from 
that, county parties were left to their own devices and could electioneer as they pleased 
within broad parameters laid down by the party’s bodies and conference. The county parties 
bought electoral materials from DNA centrally and were also given some free of charge.
1979/1, p. 7.
72 Arbeiderbladet 30 October 1930, p. 3.
73 Linked to the question of how radical DNA actually was 1918-1933, a debate has been raging about 
whether the moderation of the programme in 1927 or the renewed radicalism of 1930 was more typical of 
DNA’s course in the interwar period. Cf. Knut Martin Heidar ‘The Deradicalisation of Working Class Parties: 
A Study of Three Labour Branches in Norway’, Ph. D. thesis, University of London 1980, p. 35.
109
The main events in Oslo such as the official opening and the final rally were outlined or 
planned by the central party as showcases of the national campaign. Oslo DNA was in any 
case very closely linked with the central party as their offices were in the same place. 
Sectional organizations in the labour movement like AUF and the Workers’ Sports 
Association (AIF) took part in electioneering according to their own resolutions. Members 
of these were of course free to participate in the campaign as individuals. Trade unions put 
on events for their members with the purpose of making them vote Labour. AFL acted as 
paymaster channelling 75,000 kroner to DNA centrally and more to the local parties. The 
social breadth of the appeal will be treated later, but DNA spent significant resources in 
geographical areas where it had hitherto done poorly (Nordland, the South and West of 
Norway and, locally, the West End of Oslo). In all of these areas it sought the support of 
ordinary workers and peasants, not the groups who were ideologically opposed to 
Socialism.
Background to the 1933 election
The most noticeable difference between the campaigns of 1930 and 1933 was the 
vastly greater resources available in the latter, owing to AFL playing a leading role. The 
preparations for the campaign were drawn up by an Extended Finance Committee 
appointed by the Joint Committee of AFL and DNA. During its meeting on 21 September 
1933 it was stated that 409, 900 kroner had been received by the election fund, and that 
262,100 kroner had been paid out already.74 In retrospect the accounting shows that 551, 
400 kroner (c. £ 28,000) was spent by DNA centrally during the election.75 This compares 
with a sum in the region of 75, 000 kroner in 1930. It is somewhat easier to describe the 
1933 election because more papers are in existence.
For the 1933 election the AFL agreed to levy dues on the union federations 
equivalent to a daily wage for every employed member.76 There was no subterfuge this
74 AAB: Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge., LOs saksarkiv 1934, sak nr. 2-34, Da 0140, folder marked 
Finanskomiteen sak 525 1933 9 1934.
75AAB: Summary of expenses in connection with the electoral work autumn 1933 in Archive: 
Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1933, sak nr. 553-754, Da 0139, folder marked Stortingsvalget 
Sak nr. 601 1933.
76 Decided in AFL-DNA Joint Committee 13 July 1933. See AAB: Archive:Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, 
LOs saksarkiv 1934, sak nr. 2-34, Da 0140, folder marked Finanskomiteen sak 525 1933 9 1934.
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time. The justification for AFL directly taking part in the election was the number of anti­
union measures introduced by the governments of the capitalist parties. A memorandum, 
unfortunately neither dated nor signed, in the AFL files for 1933 shows the thinking behind 
trade union intervention. There had been a meeting composed of the Secretariat of AFL, the 
Central Committee of DNA, the executives of AUF and AIF, DNA's parliamentary group 
and the executives of the regional joint trade organization for Oslo and Oslo DNA to 
discuss how to combat the new employment law relating to boycotts.77 The law forbade the 
blockade of enterprises with fewer than ten employees which refused to grant wage
7Ragreements, or where only a minority of the workers demanded an agreement. Originally 
the Agrarian government had wanted to outlaw all blockades, but the law was moderated 
by a new Liberal government in 1933. There were also serious plans for state adjudication 
of ballots on wage agreements. Bad enough in themselves, these regulations were seen by 
many in the movement as the thin edge of the wedge in defeating trade unionism, and thus 
laying the groundwork for the introduction of fascism in Norway.
DNA’s eminence grise Martin Tranmael put it like this at the 1933 conference: "The 
reaction that is most dangerous is not the fascist monkeys. They are easily seen through. 
The reactionary capitalist parties are much more dangerous in their attempts to create a 
Norwegian form of fascism."79 And he added that the coming election would be crucial 
because if DNA did not advance significantly, it would be grist to the mill of its opponents 
and the result would be a reactionary or fascist period.80 Only if the party seriously sought 
power and made its demands understandable, could that be avoided. Those demands were 
summed up in the slogan "all the people in work", and AFL naturally agreed and could play 
a full role in the mobilization for victory.
State of the labour movement
DNA had wind in its sails going into the 1933 election. At the end of 1932 the party
77 AAB: Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1933, sak nr. 201-290, Da 0136, folder 
marked Samarbeidskomiteen sak nr. 235 1933.7RBerge Furre, Norsk historie 1905-1940, p. 203.
79 Protokoll overforhandlingene pa Det norske Arbeiderpartis 29. ordincere landsmote i Oslo 26-28 mai
1933 (Oslo 1934), p. 39.gnDNA Conference report 1933, pp. 43-44.
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had 1, 879 chapters rising by 246 during 1933.81 In 1932 it had 87, 315 members, but there 
were 95, 327 by the end of 1933. Apart from reunification with the Social Democrats in 
1927, there had not been such an expansion of the organization since 1918. In 1932 a new 
section of the labour movement had come into existence: the Workers' Educational 
Association, Arbeidemes Opplysningsforbund (AOF). (Previously the educational work 
had been coordinated by a board with members from the party and AFL.82) AOF felt it 
played some part in the election of 1933 and was contributory to the resulting victory.83 It 
encouraged labour organizations to run election instruction courses, sending materials for
Oi
those attending free of charge from its offices. 75 such meetings were held across the 
country with a total of 2,416 course participants. During the campaign itself, AOF 
distributed the party election film entitled “All the People in Work” to about 70 chapters.85
Party chairman Oscar Torp reviewed the progress since 1930 in his speech to 
conference. In that year, he emphasized, DNA had repeated its strong showing of 1927, and 
in the last three years AFL had grown by 26,000 members and the party by 11,000 
members.86 By the end of 1933, a month and a half after the election, AFL had a 
membership of 157, 524 (up from 153, 374 on 31 December 1932).87 At the same time 
AUF had 21,000 adherents in 410 chapters, which meant that 85 chapters were founded 
during 1933.88 It continued expanding in conjunction with the election campaign when 
AUF organized its own tours around the nation, giving a total o f296 speeches. Its 
magazine Arbeiderungdommen was released in a new and improved format.
Of all these indicators for how the labour movement was progressing, the most 
crucial were the figures for AFL. This was not just because of the funding it made possible, 
but its financial outlays and growing membership proved that it was recovering from the 
great lockout of 1931, which had ended in a draw. That conflict had had the potential to
81 AAB: Det norske Arbeiderparti. Beretning 1933' in Det norske Arbeiderparti. Beretning 1930-33 marked 
328(481)15 N81 be, p. 8.
DNA Conference report 1933, p. 11.
83 AAB: 'Arbeidemes Oplysningsforbund 1933. Beretning for det ferste arbeids&ret' in Arbeidemes 
Oplysningsforbund beretning 1932-38 marked 374.2(481)Ar 15b, p. 3.
84 AAB: AOF Annual report 1933, p. 32.
S5lbid., pp. 60-61.
86 DNA Conference report 1933, p. 7.
87 Arbeidemes Faglige Landsorganisasjon. Beretning 1933. For sekretariatet ved Halvard Olsen, Alfred 
Madsen og Elias Volan (Oslo 1934), p. 137.
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drain the coffers and scupper the organization of AFL since it lasted from February to 
August 1931, involving 60,000 workers and resulting in a loss of 7.5 million working 
days.89 (Another 26, 000 workers had been locked out for part of this period.90) In contrast 
AFL was floored by the Great Strike of 1921, when it eventually had to accept cuts in 
wages of 17%, and in the aftermath of which it lost 50, 000 members or more than a third 
of its pre-conflict total.91 The lockout of 1931 had been part of employers’ and their allies' 
attacks on the labour movement, which provided the impetus for AFL's participation in the 
1933 election. Perhaps it was the most serious measure, as the Boycott Law ended up by 
being less inimical to labour than the “Workhouse Laws” of 1927, which specified the 
workhouse as punishment for whoever persecuted strikebreakers.
The influence of the press is harder to quantify than that of the trade unions, since it 
did not contribute financially but only ideologically to the campaign 92 It presents a mixed 
picture because on the one hand Arbeiderbladet increased its sales and subscriptions, 
particularly in the last six months of the year, but on the other DNA had two newspapers 
fewer in 1933 than three years before 93 Out of its remaining 43 newspapers, 21 were 
dailies, one was published four times a week, 12 were published three times a week, eight 
were published twice a week and one was a weekly.94 Since 1930 plans for a nationwide 
version of Arbeiderbladet had been realized, and From as it was called was distributed to 
65, 000 households for some considerable time prior to the election.95 In addition, DNA's 
magazine The 20th Century (Det 20. Arhundrede) was issued ten times during the year,96 
The Woman Worker (A rbeiderkvinnen) 12 times a year, The Labour Youth 
(Arbeiderungdommen) every fortnight and The Children's Magazine (Bamebladet) once a 
month. The party press had a direct role to play in the election campaign. With funding 
from AFL, a bureau was set up to channel standardized written propaganda and pictures to
88 DNA Annual report 1933, p. 48.
RQKjeldstadli, Et splittet samfurm 1905-35, p. 184.
90 Furre, Norsk historie 1905-1940, p. 1%.
91 Ibid, p. 151.
92 For labour press circulation see chapter 5, p. 254.
93 DNA Annual report 1933, p. 50, p. 51.
94 Ibid., p. 51.
95 Ibid, p. 50.
96 The magazine’s title was highly topical when it was first published in 1901 by the Oslo youth organization. 
It was later taken over by Oslo DNA and then by DNA centrally. Zachariassen, Fra Marcus Thrane til Martin 
Tranmcel, p. 136.
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the press.97
Planning the campaign 
The funding from AFL enabled a very wide range of activities and sub­
organizations to have money channelled towards them. Table 2.4 shows how the money
98was spent.
Table 2.4 DNA central expenditure 1933.
Item Grant (kroner)
County- and district parties 126,082. 55
The Party press 107, 769. 60
From (national version of Arbeiderbladet) 73, 088. 29
Electoral newspapers 19,499. 73
Workers’ Sports Association (AIF) 9, 125. 00
Labour Youth (AUF) 12, 950. 00
Women’s sections 4, 687. 05
Workers’ Educational Association (AOF) 10, 000.00
Brochures and flyers 81,648. 70
The election film 28, 904. 50
Posters 6, 135.26
Canvassing and meetings 47, 708. 12
Miscellaneous inc. grant to Forestry and 
Agricultural Workers’ Union
23, 778.48
Grand total 551,377. 28
(Source: AAB: Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1933, sak nr. 553- 
754, Da 0139, folder marked Stortingsvalget Sak nr. 601 1933.)
97 DNA Annual report 1933, p. 51.
98 DNA’s total expenditure was 551,423.45 kroner according to the most complete record in the archival 
source above, but the table has been quoted verbatim.
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The reasoning behind the grant to the Forestry and Agricultural Workers’ Union was that 
agitation in the countryside was particularly important to counteract the possible rise of 
fascism, to which DNA imagined peasants were especially susceptible.
Trade union involvement in the campaign was more extensive than in 1930. The 
day-to-day running of the campaign was in the hands of the central party and the county 
and local parties (especially Oslo DNA which was responsible for the most visible part of 
the national campaign). But the lines along which they worked had been drawn up by the 
Joint Committee of AFL and DNA, the Extended Finance Committee which supplanted the 
Joint Committee, along with the working executive of it. The Extended Finance Committee 
that was set up consisted of two representatives from the regional joint trade organization 
for Oslo and its environs, two from AFL's Secretariat, two from Oslo DNA, two from AIF, 
two from AUF, in addition to the Joint Committee itself." The composition of the 
Extended Finance Committee was unanimously approved by the deciding body of AFL’s 
Secretariat on 14 July 1933.100 This meeting also agreed the financial arrangement for the 
funding of the election campaign, i.e. extra dues amounting to a daily wage for an 
employee, incumbent on every federation and to be paid to AFL as soon as possible. The 
formal justification for this— given in the undated, unsigned memorandum— had been 
stated in its earlier meeting of 3 July.101 The Boycott Law would put great difficulties in the 
way of trade union organization. The Secretariat wished to discuss the appropriate response 
of the organized working class, and it was agreed that all means should be utilized in the 
election campaign and to extend the workers' political and trade organizations.
Because DNA saw itself as a movement rather than just another party, there was no 
definitive point when ordinary activity ceased and electioneering started. Taking the long 
view, the annual report states that preparations for the election got underway as early as 
October 1932.102 In that month nationwide agitation was started to put the organization on a 
good footing in advance of the election year 1933. The momentum behind this carried 
through to January and February, which normally were dull months for the party. Enlisting
99 Minutes of meeting of the Joint Committee 13 July 1933 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs
saksarkiv 1934, sak nr. 2-34, Da 0140, folder marked Finanskomiteen sak 525 1933 9 1934. 
inn Cf. AAB: Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, Protokoller 1933-1934, Ac 0009, AFL 
Forhandlingsprotokoll 1 Januar-31 Desember 1933, pp. 158-161.
101 Ibid., pp. 135-137.
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new members and trying to expand the organization continued after the conference of May 
1933 with notable meetings held during the summer. Even so, August 1933 marked the 
conscious start to the campaign with tours of the country.103 The first wave of these tours 
was completed in the middle of September, according to party secretary Hjalmar 
Dyrendahl. After that campaigning would intensify with more tours, more stand-alone 
speeches and work done by the local parties.
The 1933 campaign was fought with seriousness and efficiency. The brochures 
for the election were to be printed in a million copies in total, the programme in half a 
million. There would be a special manifesto to women in addition to 200,000 copies of 
’’Women's Electoral News". Both the Labour Youth (AUF) and the Workers' Sports 
Association (AOF) were coming out with their own leaflets. In the countryside the party 
would send an election newspaper to every household, as would the party press in the 
towns. The central party had sent questionnaires to local branches to find out which 
households did not subscribe to a Labour newspaper. As evidence of the smooth running of 
the party machine, Dyrendahl mentioned that they received information about subscriptions 
in every local authority in Sogn og Fjordane in the West Country, which he adduced as an 
example of where DNA was weak. The trade union movement would print their own 
brochures, and every federation’s magazine would have an election special.
The election
It was previously suggested that the number of speeches held in an election year 
acts as an index of how much effort was put into the election. This is despite many of those 
taking place long before the campaign. It is not an election statistic, therefore, but a total of 
5, 578 speeches were given during 1933, compared with 4,455 in 1930.104 In reality the 
figure would be higher since not everything was reported, but that was also the case in 
1930.105 Most agitation took place from the middle of August and lasted until polling day 
on 16 October. In table 2.5 only the tours related to the campaign are included. The purpose
102 DNA Annual report 1933, p. 73.
103 Arbeiderbladet 12 September 1933, p. 9.
104AAB: DNA Annual report 1933, p. 10.
105 In the small county of Vestfold more than 100 speeches were given, but probably including some of those 
tabulated below. Sverre Hjertholm, Arbeiderbevegelsen i Vestfold. Trekkfradenpolitiske ogfaglige 
arbeiderbevegelse 1906-1956 (Drammen, Vestfold DNA, 1956), pp. 217-218.
116
is again to present a country-wide overview to provide a balance to the main focus on Oslo 
and its environs. It is also useful to investigate whether there was a pattern to the areas 
chosen.
Table 2.5 Campaigning during August, September and October 1933.
Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
Oscar Nilssen Hedmark Sept-Oct 41 "Last month 
before election."
Thina Thoiieifsen Hedmark October 7
Johannes Boe Oppland Sept-Oct 82 "Last month 
before election."
Lars Moen Oppland 23 Sept-15 Oct 27
Martin Smeby Oppland 23 Sept-15 Oct 29
Bjame Borgan Oppland October 17
Olav Steinnes Telemark 21 Sept-15 Oct 32
Allred Udland Vest-Agder Sept-Oct 45
Aasmund Kulien Vest-Agder October 10
Torvald
Haavardstad
Vest-Agder Sept-Oct 19
Torvald
Haavardstad
Aust-Agder Sept-Oct 30
Torbjom
Henriksen
West and South 
Country
September 22
Thina Thorleifsen Rogaland September 16
I.K. Hognestad Rogaland 17 Sept-15 Oct 41
Johannes Boe Rogaland Early September 19
Gerhard
Tothammer
Rogaland Not stated 36 "Before the 
election."
Lars Moen Buskerud August 15
Komelius
Bergsvik
Hordaland 21 Sept-15 Oct 37
KnutOpdal Sogn og Fjordane October 29
Trygve Lie West and South 
Country
October 12
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Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
Halvard Olsen West and South 
Country
October 9
Halvor Storhaug West Country 1 Sept-15 Oct 52
Olav Steinnes Sogn og Fjordane 17 Sept-1 Oct 20
Olav Oksvik Sogn og Fjordane September 11
Anders Lothe Sogn og Fjordane Sept-Oct 56
P. Thorvik More, Sogn og 
Fjordane
26 Aug-7 Sept 15
Olav Sseter More September 23
Peder Alsvik North More Not stated 27 "During election 
campaign.”
N. P. Skrede Romsdal 5 Sept-15 Oct 20
Hans Ystgaard North More October 15
Thina Thorleifsen Sor Trondelag October 5
Johan
Nygaardsvold
Sor Trondelag Sept-Oct 25 Became PM in 
1935.
Adolf Salbubaek Sor Trondelag September 31
Johan Wiik Nord Trondelag 20 Sept-15 Oct 32
Andreas Graven Nord Trondelag October 15
Sverre Stostad Nord Trondelag September 20
Kristian Rothaug Nord Trondelag September 15
Bjame Borgan Nord Trondelag 13 Aug-17 Sept 39
Sigrid Syvertsen Nordland and 
Nord Trondelag
26 Aug-13 Sept 22
Johan
Nygaardsvold
North Norway 19 Aug-5 Sept 26 See above.
Johan Wiik Nordland September 34
Andreas Moan Nordland 13 Sept-15 Oct 39
Olaf Johansen Nordland 25 Aug-27 Sept 45
Gitta Jonsson Finnmark October 18
Peder Holt Finnmark October 8
Kristian Berg Finnmark 20 Aug-16 Oct 79
Fredrik Monsen Finnmark and 
Troms
5 Aug-12 Sept 52
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(Source: DNA Annual report 1933, pp. 10-18.)
In its annual report for 1933, unlike in 1930, DNA ordered its agitational tours by 
county, and table 2.5 proves that the party took the whole country in its stride. More than 
two-fifths of the party’s campaigning took place in the counter-cultural and consequently 
difficult areas of the South and West Country, such as Agder, Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn 
og Fjordane and More og Romsdal. In the north of the country, DNA’s local weak spot 
Nordland received much more attention than Troms where the party was strong. Relatively 
little attention was paid to good counties for DNA like Buskerud and Telemark in the east 
of the country. They were visited by only one speaker each. There is no consistent pattern 
that the best counties were neglected. Nord Trondelag was visited by six speakers during 
the election.
DNA saw itself as fighting fascism and reaction at the same time. Its crisis policies 
geared towards full employment and its organizational extension sought to undermine the 
appeal of fascism to ordinary people, and by combating the capitalist parties, it tried to stop 
the imposition of reactionary measures from above.106 DNA's policy here, repeated from 
one of the closing statements of the 1930 campaign, was no mere trick to fool the voters. It 
genuinely believed in its own rhetoric about the danger posed by fascists and reactionaries, 
as evidenced by its calling for a Scandinavian conference of labour movements to discuss 
how to fight against fascism.107 The perceived danger also provided the impetus behind 
DNA's own reconciliation with democracy. Until reunification with the Social Democrats 
in 1927, it had in principle believed in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Scepticism about 
bourgeois democracy had not entirely receded even in 1933, but as Tranmael said at the 
conference referring to dictatorship, ''In times like these we must not play with fire."108 The 
new tactic was to blame the capitalist parties for being anti-democratic because they had 
taken away the right of those on the dole to be councillors, and DNA opined that their 
voting rights might be next.
106 For a scholarly view identical to DNA’s see Einhart Lorenz, Arbeiderbevegelsens historie. En innforing. 
Norsk sosialisme i intemasjonaltperspektiv. 2. del. 1930-1973 (Oslo, Pax, 1974), p. 18. He argues that 
fascism and reaction were not just represented by Quisling’s National Socialists but by the other capitalist 
parties. Their “continual attacks on elementary civil rights” turned the labour movement into the protectors of
democracy.
107 Minutes of Joint Committee 16 November 1933 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 
1933, sak nr. 201-290, Da 0136, folder marked Samarbeidskomiteen sak nr. 235 1933.
119
In its dealings with the public DNA began positing democracy as a laudable 
institution. One of its brochures was simply called “Democracy” and treated the subject in a 
complimentary manner as did “Society—The Voter’s Reference Guide”, which explained 
the political system. Rule by the people was set up against dictatorship, a state of affairs 
which should be avoided. Another brochure was called “Norway under the Greenland 
Dictatorship”, which referred to privately funded Norwegian imperialism on Greenland.
The title was a misnomer, but clearly signified that DNA did not agree with such 
adventurism. If democracy was no longer spumed, the explanation was that the party felt it 
could achieve something through parliamentary means.109 This came out in other brochures 
produced for the election like “All the People in Work”, “All the People’s Struggle against 
Crisis and Need” and “The Road is Clear”. With three remaining brochures "A Saturday 
Shopping Trip", "Out of the Speculators' Nets" and "The Farmer and the Election", these 
were printed in 960, 000 copies.110 Two resolutions from the conference on respectively 
the crisis in the countryside and fascism were printed in 200,000 copies each. While 400, 
000 copies of the programme were printed in the main Norwegian language, for the first 
time, another 70,000 copies were made for nynorsk speakers. This was calculated to boost 
DNA’s chances in the counter-cultural areas where the minority language nynorsk was 
often spoken. A booklet containing the programme of principles, working programme and 
manifesto were distributed in 5,000 copies. There were thus vastly more electoral materials 
than three years before, but the above did not represent the totality of DNA’s production.
An election newspaper called "The People in Work" was sent to every household in the 
countryside, a total of 370, 000 copies.111 In the towns grants from the election fund 
allowed Labour newspapers to be given away free to potential voters over a lengthy 
period.112 150, 000 copies of the women's newspaper were printed. AUF and AIF mass 
distributed election specials of their newspapers. In keeping with the desire to have a 
visible presence across the country, 150,000 pins of red flags were distributed and three
108 DNA Conference report 1933, p. 41.
109 Or according to a different explanation, the labour movement found itself under such pressure due to the 
offensive of employers and their political allies that it was forced to accept democracy as a means of reducing, 
not abolishing, exploitation. Vidar Keul and Knut Kjeldstadli ‘DNA— fra folkelig bevegelse til 
herskerapparat’ in Kjeldstadli and Keul (eds.), DNA—fra folkebevegelse til statsstotte, pp. 104-105.
110 DNA Annual report 1933, p. 74.
U1 Ibid, pp. 74-75.
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posters received a printing run of 60, 000. A total of 12 copies of the election film "All the 
People in Work" existed, of which five had sound, and 100,000 copies of the election song 
were spread.
Finance
It was openly acknowledged that it was the generous financial support of AFL 
which made all of the above possible. But AFL not only funded the party centrally, it also 
gave direct aid to local branches and other groups with a stake in the outcome. At the height 
of the election campaign the Secretariat of AFL announced to the Extended Finance 
Committee that it had granted 10,000 kroner to regional trade organizations for 
agitation.113 In the same meeting of the Committee a further 5, 500 kroner was granted to 
nine different regional joint trade union organizations (samorganisasjoner) for agitation 
during the election. Bergen Arbeiderblad received another 1, 000 kroner to "deliver special 
trade union notices for the election campaign," probably collating and printing this 
information in the newspaper. Many such grants could be adduced. These sums were 
specifically for electioneering, but more money was forthcoming as straight grants and 
may, or may not, have been spent on promoting DNA during the campaign.
With independent organizations receiving grants and having their own remits it was 
impossible to keep track of just what they did and how the money was spent. But AFL did 
try to keep some control of what was happening. AUF asked for 7,950 kroner on top of the
5,000 kroner which the Extended Finance Committee had budgeted for its use, and this 
was in fact granted.114 Before that, however, the chairmen (Alfred Madsen, here 
representing AFL, and Oscar Torp) were asked to look more closely at how the money had 
been spent. Thus a letter was written by Madsen to AUF on 27 September asking for 
further details, and AUF's answer provides real insight into how it ran its campaign.115
112 Ibid., p. 75.
113 Minutes of meeting of the working executive of the Extended Finance Committee 21 September 1933 in 
Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1934, sak nr. 2-34, Da 0140, folder marked 
Finanskomitten sak 525 1933 9 1934.
114 Minutes of the working executive of the Extended Finance Committee 21 September 1933 in folder 
marked Finanskomiteen sak 525 1933 9 1934 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksakiv 1934, 
sak nr. 2-34, Da 0140.
115 Folder marked AUF agitasjon 1932-1933 in Archive: Arbeidemes Ungdomsfylking, Korrespondanse A-B, 
1932-1956, Da 0002.
121
There were four elements to the organization's exertions: 1. tours in every region, 2. the 
printing of a separate poster, 3. a brochure containing its National Executive's address to 
the youth of the nation, and 4. the election issue of Arbeiderungdommen}16 As for the other 
components 5,000 copies were printed of the poster and 80,000 of the address to youth,
117though unlike the poster it had not yet been distributed to the chapters. The election issue 
of Arbeiderungdommen had been printed in 30,000 copies, and was being sent out to the 
chapters.
Oslo
The nature of the sources again ensures that Oslo provides a lot of the details to 
complete the picture of the election of 1933. By the end of that year Oslo DNA had 129 
chapters (up from 125 the year before) and 38,004 members (up from 36, 501 in 1932).118 
In addition AUF had ten chapters in the city.119 Like elsewhere the trade unions played a 
more active part in this election than in any preceding i t.120
It is possible to quantify the difference AFL made to the campaign in Oslo because
171the local party had originally budgeted for an expenditure of 50,000 kroner in total. That 
was how much the party thought it would receive from individual trade unions, party 
members and the central party. When in fact the AFL levied extra dues amounting to 6 
kroner for members in full-time employment and 3 kroner for part-time workers (equivalent 
to a daily wage), 40, 000 kroner (£ 2, 030) made its way to Oslo DNA from this source. 
Since most of the funds provided by AFL were spent where DNA's organizational structure 
was weak, this was a welcome contribution. With extra dues being levied, individual trade 
unions had less money with which to fund local electioneering, but even so Oslo DNA 
received 29, 890 kroner from this source. The money was either collected from members on 
a voluntary basis, granted by the trade union from its funds or, in one case, was the result of
116 Loc. cit.
117 One writer operates with the figure of 10,000 posters, but the archival source suggests otherwise. Teije
Halvorsen, Partiets salt. AUFs historie (Oslo, Pax, 2003), p. 175.
118 Oslo Arbeiderparti. Beretning og regnskap 1933 (Oslo, DNA, 1931), p. 4.
119 Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 35.
120 Ibid., p. 15.
121 Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 22.
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i 92 •a levy on the trade union's members for yet more dues. Oslo DNA’s expenses in this
election amounted to 65, 210 kroner (£ 3, 310).123
The electioneering in the nearby county of Akershus was in many respects as 
impressive as that in Oslo. Coordinated by a different local party it nevertheless managed to 
hold 18 large open-air meetings during the summer even in smaller towns.124 Its canvassers 
also enrolled in a preparatory course before beginning the task, and were in action earlier 
than in Oslo. 50,000 brochures had at an early stage been distributed to the local branches 
in minor towns along with extra copies of the local press. The number of meetings with 
speeches would grow in the run-up to polling day. About 60 meetings would take place in 
Aker alone during the election campaign (the town closest to Oslo, and actually part of its 
conurbation). Both local party members and well-known DNA figures like Oscar Torp and 
Martin Tranmael would be speaking at meetings in the county.
In Oslo after the official opening of electioneering on Sunday 24 September there 
were public meetings every day until the election on 16 October, with the exception of 
Saturday 30 September and Saturday 14 October.125 There was an increase of the level of 
activity with regard to meetings over 1930, but in that year also a very full list of meetings 
had been held. In 1933 the party held 121 meetings under its own auspices in Oslo with a 
total of 188 speeches.126 This compares to 91 meetings with 148 speeches in 1930.127 The 
main reason for the rise in the numbers is because the campaign started earlier with more 
events leading up to the formal opening of the election. Both the earlier open-air meetings 
and the indoor election meetings were very well attended. Oslo DNA estimated that 50, 000 
people had been to those held outdoors and 52,000 to the indoor meetings. The tally does 
not include attendance at the final open-air meeting on 17 September (28,000 people), or 
the 45,000 who turned up to the end of campaign rally on 15 October.128 With a few 
exceptions all the official campaign meetings were full, and in most cases some people had
Cf. Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, pp. 57-58.
123 Ibid., p. 55.
124 Interview with Akershus DNA election secretary Thor Hoilund, Arbeiderbladet 29 September 1933, p. 10.125Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, pp. 19-21.
126 Ibid., p. 18.
127 Oslo DNA Annual report 1930., p. 35.1 iSL Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 19.
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to be turned away.129
The theatrical aspect of the campaign probably had some bearing on the outcome. 
The newly started Workers' Motor Club (Arbeidemes Motorklubb) arranged a procession of 
motorcycles through the town displaying the party's posters.130 The day before the election 
13,200 small red flags were given to the children who attended meetings. 85, 000 copies of 
the election song were allotted in Oslo as a flyer. All the open-air meetings included torch- 
bearing boy scouts allied to the labour movement, also carrying red flags. Sunday 17 
September marked the end of the first phase of the campaign. A mass party was held then at 
Young's Square featuring a speech by Magnus Nilssen, the parliamentarian.131 The climax 
of the campaign in Oslo, and a great show of strength by DNA to the country at large, was 
the final mass rally also at Young's Square on Sunday 15 October, the day before the
1 27election. 45,000 people took part according to Oslo DNA's retrospective estimate. The 
adjoining streets were also crowded. Among other meetings one in Circus World Theatre 
had to close its doors an hour before the meeting was due to begin on account of every seat 
being taken. Several thousand people nevertheless stayed outdoors in the rain to hear the 
speeches and entertainment relayed from the theatre through loudspeakers.133 The rally 
closely followed the precedent of 1930 with a torchlit parade, singing of the Internationale, 
etc. It certainly created a favourable impression, because the next time the Conservatives 
took a leaf out of DNA’s book and held a rally themselves.134
Electoral appeal in Oslo 
As in 1930, there were events for special interest groups. There were 78 meetings 
for members of particular trade unions, not counted as Labour meetings although the local 
party did provide the speakers.135 Included in this tally were three meetings for commercial
129 Ibid., p. 18.
130 Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 22.
131 Arbeiderbladet 18 September 1933, p. 1.
132 Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 19.
133 And hundreds braved the rain in the small town of Rjukan, Telemark to hear the speeches in an equivalent 
rally. At Rjukan SOD youths took part in the torchlit parade, and entertainment was provided by the party’s 
“Election Cabaret”. Heidar ‘The Deradicalisation of Working Class Parties’, Ph. D. thesis, University of 
London 1980, p. 320. It would have been interesting to have more instances of final rallies across the nation.
134 Rolf Danielsen, Borgerlig oppdemningspolitikk 1918-1940. Hoyres historie 2 (Oslo, Cappelen, 1984), pp. 
294-295.
Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 18.
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clerks in association with the local chapters of their union and one for railway clerks (civil 
servants). In addition, there were meetings for women, convened with the women’s section, 
youth, young sportsmen, a meeting for students with the student section of DNA, two 
parties for maids and five parties for the elderly (organized in tandem with the women’s 
section). A novelty was meetings held in cinemas with a speaker and a free showing of the 
election film.136 One trade union meeting attested to the unprecedented interest with which 
this election was followed, namely that for workers in hotels and restaurants, which was 
held at night.137 Invitations to the parties for maids were circulated to 10, 300 addresses 
along with a ballot paper and letter.138 Another 14,000 letters were sent to the elderly with 
a ballot paper, and 11, 000 youths who were voting for the first time received a letter 
containing a brochure written by AUF.
As the main party newspaper, naturally Arbeiderbladet was utilized to gain votes 
for DNA. There were occasional notices seeking to gain support from white-collar workers 
like in 1930.139 These attempted to show real economic advantages accruing from increased 
support for DNA, counteracting perceived status considerations which might make them 
vote for a capitalist party. There were also the beginnings of concern about agricultural 
workers. Their bad living conditions were brought up including low wages, long working 
hours and poor housing.140 What is interesting about the electoral appeals in Oslo is that 
they provided a trial run for the national campaign three years later. Apart from women and 
the young no attention was paid in the written propaganda to the other categories of people. 
That all changed in 1936 when maids, hotel and restaurant staff, the elderly, clerks and 
agricultural workers each received a brochure to themselves.
The end of election
On this occasion DNA was rewarded for its efforts. The outcome of the election 
was the opposite of 1930 with every capitalist party stumbling, DNA advancing greatly and 
even the Communists improving their performance a little.
Arbeiderbladet 9 October 1933, p. 16.
137 Ibid, p. 10.
138 Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 22.11Q
E.g. 5 September, p. 12; 12 October, p. 6.
140Arbeiderbladet 13 October 1933, p. 10.
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Table 2.6 The parliamentary election 1933.
Party Percentage of votes (change 
from 1930)
Parliamentary seats 
(change from 1930)
Liberals 17.6% (-3.4%) 25 (-9)
Conservatives 21.8% (-8.2%) 31 (-13)
Agrarians 13.9% (-2.0%) 23 (-2)
DNA 40.1% (+8.7%) 69 (+22)
Communists 1.8% (+0.1%) 0(0)
(Source: Berge Furre, Norsk historie 1905-1940, p. 320)
With 69 out of 150 seats, DNA was getting close to a majority in Parliament. Its 
interpretation was that town and country had given it a clear vote of confidence and that the 
election had been a damning indictment of reaction.141 It particularly thanked women and 
the young for what they had done during the campaign and for their votes.142 Although it 
did not receive a majority, three days after the election DNA's Central Committee agreed 
that the party should ask for power. A letter was sent to the Liberal Government of Johan 
Ludwig Mowinckel requesting its immediate resignation, but he refused, claiming that 
Parliament must decide the issue when it was summoned in due course. In the end 
parliamentary guile had to be utilized by DNA, and with the break up of the capitalist 
united front over the crisis in the countryside, Johan Nygaardsvold was asked to form a 
Labour government in March 1935.
Conclusion: The 1933 election 
Because the campaign, particularly in Oslo, had been well run also in 1930, it does 
not leap to the eye that the contest of 1933 would necessarily improve the fortunes of DNA. 
But there were some important differences. In 1930 DNA spent 36,380 kroner on its
141 Arbeiderbladet 17 October 1933, p. 1.
Mi tu a ,Ibid., p. 3.
126
campaign in Oslo, in 1933 the figure was almost twice as high —65, 210 kroner (£ 3,
310).143 Election preparations went on for longer, there were more meetings, more 
publications, more props and a higher numbers of canvassers (showing greater enthusiasm 
independent of funding since they were not paid). Across the country AFL's intervention 
and much more generous funding made a profound difference because most of the money 
was channelled to undeveloped areas for the party. The figures for central party expenditure 
speak volumes— 551,400 kroner in 1933, while it had only 75, 000 kroner at its disposal in 
1930. The campaign was planned and run initially by the Joint Committee of AFL and 
DNA, then by the Extended Finance Committee which was its extension. The latter body 
disproportionately contained people from the capital. With increased AFL involvement 
came greater central control. In 1930 the local papers were given some money for the 
election months and told to get on with it. In 1933 they were sent standardized written 
propaganda and pictures for inclusion in their editions. AUF, and possibly other 
organizations which went over budget, were asked to state on what the extra money would 
be spent. On the other hand, when component parts of the labour movement such as a 
particular joint trade organization asked for funds, they were often given some with no 
questions asked. Consequently, it cannot be said with certainty that the money was spent on 
electioneering. Co-operation between local branches and the central party was more about 
effective campaigning than control. On the basis of returned questionnaires from the 
districts, DNA could pinpoint who should receive free subscriptions to Fram, which was 
the national edition of Arbeiderbladet. The regional parties were still allowed great 
autonomy to campaign, within broad parameters set by the Extended Finance Committee. 
Thus in Oslo the local party appealed much more to clerks and non-unionized workers like 
maids and waiters than was customary nationally. The regional parties paid for electoral 
materials to DNA centrally, but since they were given grants from the same source, this 
was just a means of ensuring efficiency.
Psychologically the attitude to electioneering was more positive in 1933 than in 
1930. In 1930 DNA wanted to do well, but had seemingly reverted to ideas of extra- 
parliamentary action as the way forward. In 1933, by contrast, one of its slogans was "The 
majority and governmental power to Labour", and it felt it had to do well in order to save
Oslo DNA Annual report 1930, p. 47; Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 55.
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itself, the class for which it stood and maybe the petite bourgeoisie of the countryside to 
which it had devoted so much attention. As DNA and AFL wrote in their joint May Day 
manifesto: "It cannot be denied that the victory of fascism in Germany casts a shadow over 
today's demonstration [...] Democracy and the labour movement have thereby suffered a 
great blow which has put their very existence at stake."144 Still not fully believing in the 
concept of democracy, DNA undertook in its own mind to act as its saviour.
Background to the 1936 election
The salient features of the campaign in 1933 had organizationally been the much 
greater support from AFL and the marshalling of DNA's forces under the theme of "all the 
people in work", a constantly repeated slogan which was easy to understand. The novelty in 
1936 was that the party had been in government since March 1935. A deal with the 
Agrarians had allowed a Labour government to be formed.145 It sought to stimulate the 
economy by fiscal measures and putting people in work. The difficulties of farmers were 
addressed through a package of subsidies and a measure to increase the demand for butter. 
But DNA was forced to accept a sales tax, which of course acted against the expansion of 
the economy. Its long-standing agricultural policy had been to improve conditions for the 
poorer and middling cultivators, but with the Agrarians setting the terms the richer farmers 
benefited more.
In any case new tactics were necessary.146 DNA argued that its counter-crisis 
policies were working, but that it needed a majority to implement them fully. For instance, 
it had a poster proclaiming that "80, 000 unemployed demand a Labour majority" (see 
illustration 6). The capitalist parties would concentrate on hindering DNA gaining that 
majority. (In fact, especially the Conservatives would once again try to unite the capitalist
DNA Annual report 1933, p. 31.
145 See Harald Bemtsen (ed.), Johan Nygaardsvold. Dagboker 1918-48 og utvalgte brev ogpapirer 1916-52 
(Oslo, Aschehoug, 1998). Nygaardsvold’s diary entries for the 4th, 10th and 27th March 1935 describe the 
emerging consensus with the Agrarians (p. 102, p. 105). E.g. 4 March, “I understood these terms to be: high 
subsidies for com, butter to cost 3 kroner a kilogram and independence for the milk, pork and egg 
associations. [...] They will accept somewhat higher expenditure against the crisis, but in return we have to 
accept a sales tax and everything they demand for agriculture.”
146 Although some were repeated from 1933. Nygaardsvold continued to claim that “the choice is between 
Socialism and Nazi-ism”. The reasoning was that without DNA’s crisis policies fascism would triumph and 
that the capitalist parties were flirting with Nazi-ism. Odd Sverre Norrene, 'Arbeiderpartiet og 
Stortingsvalgkampen i 1936', Cand. Philol. thesis, University of Oslo 1978, p. 90.
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parties in a scaremongering campaign, but it did not work anymore.147) This time, probably 
unlike 1930, DNA welcomed being the centre of attention and wanted the election to be a 
referendum on its government.148 The Agrarians had co-operated in the counter-crisis 
measures, but DNA must point out that they had acted as a brake on these. In 1936, unlike 
on the two previous occasions, there was complete harmony between electoral appeal in the 
capital and nationally. Nevertheless, since all the efforts at gaining support from the middle 
classes described below pertained to Oslo, the information has been placed here rather than 
in chapter 4.
The campaign was even better funded than in 1933. This was despite DNA being in 
serious pecuniary difficulties merely a year before the election. On 8 August 1935 Oscar 
Torp gave an ultimatum to the AFL Secretariat: unless 25,000 kroner (£ 1,250) were paid 
to DNA by 10 o'clock the next day, its activities would cease. He also demanded to know 
how much AFL had received from its increase of dues for members, and wanted assurances 
that the money would not be spent on settling AFL debts.149 No explanation exists for why 
this problem had arisen. The money was indeed forthcoming, the payment being sanctioned 
by AFL vice-chairman Konrad Nordahl as there was no time to call a meeting of the 
Secretariat, And on 20 September 1935 AFL paid another 50, 000 kroner to DNA as a 
contribution to the latter's press and educational work.150 Because almost all of the election 
campaign was paid for by AFL and its federations, however, the actual finances of DNA do 
not matter much. 1936 proves the limits of money in attaining political objectives.
Although DNA made some progress, it did not achieve the majority it wanted despite an 
unprecedented level of spending. Possible reasons why will be discussed in the conclusion. 
The above situation also illustrates DNA’s total financial dependence on the Trade Union 
Confederation. Only with serious funding from AFL was it able to establish itself at above 
40% of the votes and thus become the governing party. On the other hand, AFL obviously 
needed DNA to wield influence on political matters so the relationship cut both ways.
147 Lorenz, Arbeiderbevegelsens historie. 2. del. 1930-1973, p. 51.
148 Brochure by Arbeidemes Opplysningsforbund, p. 1 of third manuscript in folder marked AUF agitasjon 
1936-1938 in Archive: Arbeidemes Ungdomsfylking, serie Korrespondanse A-B, 1935-1959, Da 0003.
149 Letter from I. B. Aase to the AFL Secretariat 13 August 1935 in folder marked Det norske Arbeiderparti 
Sak nr. 173 1935 106 1936 (304,1934) in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1935, sak nr. 
172-270, Da 0155.
150 Letter from I. B. Aase to DNA 20. September 1935 in loc. cit.
129
State of the movement
The contest of 1936 exceeded the previous two in scope and dimension. Throughout 
the year there was an intensive recruiting and training drive, so that 424 new chapters and 
20, 783 new members were brought into the party.151 By the end of the year DNA had 
3,146 branches and 142, 790 members. The areas organizationally most problematic for the 
party, i.e. Vest-Agder, Rogaland and Nordland, were worked on from the beginning of the 
year.152 The first two were counter-cultural, while Labour support just had not taken off in 
Nordland. Work was also done in areas where DNA support was high, but the organization 
not correspondingly strong. That was the case for parts of 0stfold and Oppland. AFL was 
expanding rapidly and was attempting to bring in new groups like fishermen, trappers and 
maids, spending at least 20, 000 kroner in so doing.153 Former domestic servant Thyra 
Hansen was employed by AFL on 15 September, during the election, to lead the organizing 
of maids and she travelled on a coastal tour between 26 September and 13 October.154 By 
the end of the year 19 chapters of her trade union for maids existed. The whole of AFL 
grew from 224, 340 members at the end of 1935 to 276, 992 members on 31 December 
1936. As for AUF the organization grew to around 32, 000 members during 1936, a total of 
122 new chapters were set up, but 23 were forced to close.155
Contrary to the other indicators, one fewer newspaper existed in 1936 than in 
1933.156 On the other hand, DNA now had 26 dailies as against 21 during the last election. 
The five new papers were located in Oppland, Ostfold, Nordland, and two in More og 
Romsdal.157 This might indicate that DNA’s focus on the counter-cultural areas was paying 
off, as only the first two were in traditionally good DNA areas. All the special interest 
publications continued as before, except that The Children's Magazine (Bamebladet) had 
changed its name to Fram-Kameraten. For the first time the children's organization,
151 AAB: Det norske Arbeiderparti. Beretning 1936 marked 329(481)15 N81be, p. 4.
152 DNA Annual report 1936, p. 8.
153 Arbeidemes Faglige Landsorganisasjon. Beretning 1936. For sekretariatet ved Olav Hindahl og Lars 
Evensen (Oslo 1937), p. 4.
154 AFL Annual report 1936, p. 34.
155 DNA Annual report 1936, p. 86.
156 Ibid, p. 78; cf. DNA Annual report 1933, p. 51.
157 Cf. DNA Annual report 1936, pp. 79-80; DNA Annual report 1933, pp. 51-52.
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Framfylkingen, played a part in the election as drama groups, choruses, etc. during the 
entertainment part of the meetings.158
A summary of the labour movement's better organizational standing can be found 
in a table reproduced from a booklet by AOF.
Table 2.7 Membership in labour organizations 1933 and 1936.
Organization 1933 1936
DNA 95,000 122,000
AFL 157, 000 225, 000
AUF 21,000 30,000
AIF 36,000 62,000
(Source: Brochure by AOF in folder marked AUF agitasjon 1936-1938 in Archive: 
Arbeidemes Ungdomsfylking, Korrespondanse A-B, 1935-1959, Da 0003.)
(The figures do not exactly match those given above because it was earlier in the year.) 
Using the index of the number of speeches given during the year, a measure of the intensity 
of the campaign, in 1936 there were 8, 197 officially recognized ones compared to 5, 578 in 
1933.159
Financial preparations 
On 20 February 1936 a joint meeting of the AFL Secretariat and the DNA Central 
Committee met to discuss the plans for the election and its financing.160 As in 1933 it was 
decided to levy 6 kroner on every AFL member in full-time work and 3 kroner on those in 
part-time work. This was confirmed in a joint meeting of AFL federations with 
representatives of DNA present.161 The latter meeting also agreed a budget of 800, 000
DNA Annual report 1936, p. 88.
159 Ibid., p. 40.
160 Minutes of 20 February 1936 meeting in folder marked Stortingsvalgkampen 1936 sak nr. 301 1936 in 
Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs Saksarkiv 1936, sak nr. 280-482, Da 0167.
Minutes of 28 February 1936 meeting in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, Protokoller 1936-37,
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kroner (£ 40,200) with which the trade unions would fund DNA's electoral campaign.162 
AFL would grant 300,000 kroner directly and the remaining 500,000 kroner would be 
paid by the federations, themselves deciding whether to levy extra dues on their members 
or to pay straight from their funds.
This vast sum did not represent the entirety of AFL's support in the contest. For 
instance all of the district organizations of AFL were granted sums ranging from 250 kroner 
(£ 12 6s) in the case of Romsdal to 2,000 kroner (£ 100) in the case of Bergen and its 
environs (usually 500 or 1, 000 kroner) for electoral purposes once the contest was 
underway. Fairly large sums were directed towards the party press, an average of 2,640 
kroner (c. £ 130) a newspaper included in the funding for DNA.164
Planning the campaign 
Through the Joint Committee AFL played a vital part in the framing of the 
campaign. Early in the year the draft of a plan went out to all the party's local branches.165 
The plan laid out specific tasks to be performed at various stages of the year. January and 
February would witness a series of public meetings connected with the Labour 
Government's budget proposals. Posters would be put up with the slogan "Better conditions 
through the Labour Government." A short brochure would be published with extracts from 
the debate following the state opening of Parliament, along with a flyer about taxation on 
the interest of bank accounts. AOF would be responsible for these. At the same time work 
would start in the West Country and Nordland on gathering addresses for free subscriptions 
to From during the election. These were some of DNA's least successful areas.
March and April were the months for the county parties and local branches to draw 
up plans for the election based on the main framework. These plans, taking local conditions 
into account, were to be sent to DNA centrally. The necessary committees were to be set
Sekretariatets protokoll 1936, Ac 0011, pp. 84-85.
162 The actual grant amounted to 864,306 kroner. This is the figure upon which the calculation in chapter 5 is
based. Cf. Sekretariatets protokoll 1937, p. 24 in loc. cit.
163 Minutes of meeting of working executive of Extended Finance Committee, 2 September 1936 in folder 
marked Stortingsvalgkampen 1936 sak nr. 301 1936 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 
1936, sak nr. 280-482, Da 0167.
164 List m loc. cit. Reproduced as appendix 3 showing payments in 1933 and 1936.
165 Folder marked Samarbeidskomiteen in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs Saksarkiv 1936, sak 
nr. 33-45, Da 0163.
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up, the tasks apportioned and co-operation with the trade unions, the youth organization, 
the sports association and the rest of the labour movement initiated. From 15 to 22 March 
there would be a nationwide campaign to gain new subscribers to the party press. May Day 
had to be prepared as an important occasion in "the workers' struggle to win the political 
power." May was also the time to begin collecting addresses for the free subscriptions to 
Fram in all areas other than the West Country and Nordland. The party conference would 
be held from 22-24 May and was set to be an integral part of the wider campaign. 
Organizational and technical questions would be discussed by representatives of the county 
and local parties invited to the conference.
In June, July and August, and preferably as early as possible, nominations for the 
party lists for Parliament should be arranged. As in 1933, these summer months would 
otherwise be dedicated to open-air meetings.166 September and October were the months of 
actual electioneering and canvassing. This would follow along the same lines as in 1930 
and 1933, except that the indoor meetings would have more theatricals, including 
performances by the children's organization Framjylkingen. The end of the election 
campaign should be marked by special events, preferably outdoors, across the country (as 
had been done in Oslo on the previous two occasions).
The quoted document by itself answers the question of how DNA fought the 
election of 1936. It also lays bare the extent of central control involved. On this occasion, 
the centre wished to approve the campaigning plans decided upon by the regional parties.
In the absence of documents from 1930 and 1933 it cannot be stated with certainty whether 
this was a new development. There is a good reason for thinking it may be. This time the 
party had the advantage of knowing exactly what its goal was: to gain seven new 
parliamentary seats, giving it a majority. According to AOF these seven were most likely to 
be gained in Oppland, Vestfold, Aust-Agder, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane, More og 
Romsdal and Nordland.167 It followed that the county-wide campaigns in these places were 
especially important. DNA therefore had to make sure the relevant plans were up to scratch.
166 These could be spectacular affairs. On 21 June 1936 an outdoor meeting was held at Borrehaugene in 
Vestfold attracting 10,000 participants. During its 1933 campaign, meanwhile, a similar meeting held on 20 
August at Slottsfjellet in the same county numbered 4,500 spectators. Hjertholm, Arbeiderbevegelsen i 
Vestfold, p. 226, p. 224.
167 Brochure by AOF, p. 1 in folder marked AUF agitasjon 1936-1938. Archive: Arbeidemes 
Ungdomsfylking, Korrespondanse A-B 1935-1959, Da 0003.
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And if parties in other counties where the chances of winning additional seats were lower 
made too costly plans, DNA could advise that they cut back before awarding them grants.
If rightly conceived, this is still not a staggering degree of control from the centre.
By 1936 AOF, the party's educational branch, had come of age and played an 
important role in the election. Not only did it hold courses on electoral preparations and for 
canvassers,168 but it was instrumental in deciding on the means of propaganda to be used. 
Haakon Lie, later a legendary party secretary, was its leader, and he talked about the issue 
in a debate at the party conference. He argued that there should be a manifesto, because he 
thought it essential to crystallize the campaign around simple themes that anyone could 
understand.169 He pointed to the success of Lenin's propaganda before the Revolution, and 
the example of Hitler before the Nazi seizure of power in Germany.170 DNA had long ago 
learnt the art of appealing not just to reason but to the feelings through songs, flags, torchlit 
parades, insignias, etc., but Lie wanted to go even further and tone down the politics in 
favour of creating an impression.171 He demanded shorter political speeches, but more 
decorations such as strategically placed red cloths, banners, posters, pictures of labour 
leaders and flowers, all in good lighting. "Even the frame around the meeting must appeal 
to the feelings and create the atmosphere which is the first precondition for a successful 
meeting."172 There must be music at every meeting, he stated, and more advance 
publicity.173 Basically Lie wanted every meeting, wherever it was held, to be a miniature 
copy of the rallies of which the party arranged a few during each election. He quoted Finn 
Moe, a party intellectual and editor of its magazine The 20th Century {Det 20.
Arhundrede), who had formulated five rules of propaganda: 1. it must be simple and easy to 
understand, 2. it must make a sympathetic impression, 3. it must not rest, 4. it must be
168 © •Arbeidemes Oplysningsforbund 1936. Beretning for det femte arbeidsaret, pp. 16-17 in Arbeidemes
Oplysningsforbund. Beretning 1932-38.
1 DNA Conference report 1936, pp. 65-66.
170 Ibid, p. 65.
171 Thus when the party consciously started focusing on the aesthetic side of its message in 1934, it claimed its 
propaganda was developing rather than changing. The object of the “new” methods was for DNA to extend its 
appeal among the masses and to create “belief and enthusiasm.” Lill-Ann Jensen ‘I hammerens tegn. Nye 
agitasjons- og propagandaformer i norsk arbeiderbevegelse p& 1930-tallet’, Arbeiderhistorie 2002, pp. 103- 
104.
172 Brochure by AOF, p. 3 in second manuscript in folder marked AUF agitasjon 1936-1938. Archive:
Arbeidemes Ungdomsfylking, Korrespondanse A-B, 1935-1959, Da 0003.173Loc. cit. p. 3, p. 5 of second manuscript.
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agile, and 5. it must be positive.174 More controversially, long after the events described 
here, Lie explained that he and others had read Hitler's Mein Kampf over and over again to 
gather ideas for the running of the campaign.175
Because DNA was not just a party but part of a wider movement that represented 
the working class, it had the ability to create a sense of belonging. The labour movement 
consisted of people with very similar life experiences, and it could offer social and 
recreational activities to suit anyone. During elections it sought to draw others in, often by 
relaxing its self-evident bonds to the working class, talking about "the working people" or 
"the little people" instead. Of course the policies mattered, and they were to the benefit of 
these people, but the practical policies had not changed so much since 1918 when the party 
was less popular electorally. It was by regaining its role as the party of moderate, ordinary 
workers and small property owners through reunification with the Social Democrats, as 
well as its impressive campaigning, that it grew. In 1936, incidentally, the Communists 
fielded candidates in Bergen only because it wanted to enable its supporters elsewhere to 
vote DNA.176
AUF also buckled down to a long campaign. Asking for 5, 000 kroner (£ 250) as an 
initial payment, it outlined its plans to the Joint Committee of AFL and DNA.177 During 
spring there would be instructional tours to the local chapters to put them on a footing for 
the election. Among other things, its newspaper Arbeiderungdommen would be issuing a 
special election edition in at least 100,000 copies. There would be youth meetings across 
the country with speeches by AUF, in which participants would be handed a slim brochure 
containing an appeal to young voters. A standardized programme for these meetings would 
be worked out by AUF's propaganda section and sent to the organizers. Lastly it intended to
174 Loc. cit. p. 2 of second manuscript.
175 Norrone, 'Arbeiderpartiet og Stortingsvalgkampen i 1936', Cand. Philol. thesis, University of Oslo 1978,
p. 20.
176 The Communists attacked DNA in writings like Arvid Hansen, Arbeiderbevegelsens politiske kurs (Oslo, 
Intemasjonalt arbeiderforlag, 1936). But their criticism was tempered by actually wanting the Labour 
Government to continue. After finding faults with its budget, the book declared: "But this does not mean that 
we attack the Labour Government. We certainly do not want a bourgeois government in the present 
government's place [...] Compared to previous capitalist governments the current government is in several 
ways an improvement." (p. 14.) Bergen was a Communist stronghold based on their being the leading 
Socialist party there for some years after the split from DNA in 1923. Finn Olstad, Arbeiderklassens vekst og
fall. Hovedlinjer i 100 firs norsk Yustorie (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1991), p. 101.
177 Letter from AUF to Joint Committee 2 March 1936 in folder marked Stortingsvalgkampen 1936 sak nr.
301 1936 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs aksarkiv 1936 sak nr. 280-482, Da 0167.
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try forming more theatre troupes (known as "drama gangs" from a Russian model) for 
entertainment at the election meetings. Estimated costs for these plans amounted to 15, 500 
kroner. The request for money was passed on to the Extended Finance Committee.178 In the 
event, all of the ideas mentioned above came to fruition. 290,000 copies of the brochure
1 70for youth were printed, as were 150,000 copies of Arbeiderungdommen's election issue. 
Additionally, the Oslo and Akershus chapters organized a course for its members on how to 
fight the election with the help of AOF.
The meeting of the Joint Committee of AFL and DNA on 14 February 1936 was the 
first discussing the campaign for which records are available. The above-mentioned 
monthly plan was laid before it, along with the question of funding.180 The plan was 
discussed and accepted with some remarks that are not further specified. It was suggested 
that the election should be led by an Extended Finance Committee as on the two previous 
occasions.181 The day-to-day running of the campaign would be in the hands of DNA 
centrally. A meeting on 1 April 1936 suggested that 100, 000 kroner be set aside for the 
working executive of the Finance Committee for grants to various projects preparatory to 
the campaign. It may have been from this sum that AUF received what it needed, as both 
the April meeting and one on 7 March had items on the agenda relating to the 
organization's application for money.182 At the second meeting the Workers’ Sports 
Association (AIF) also claimed 5,000 kroner (£ 250) as an advance on its election time 
payout. This was in keeping with a plan made up by one of its leaders, Rolf Hofino, who 
wanted the campaign to start earlier than in 1933 and for the two youth organizations AUF 
and AIF to be involved from the start.183 Apart from the election the Joint Committee 
devoted a lot of time to discussing and implementing the unionization of maids, fishermen,
178Letter from Joint Committee to AUF 19 March 1936 in loc. cit.
I7QDNA Annual report 1936, p. 86.
180 Minutes of Joint Committee 14 February 1936 in folder marked Samarbeidskomitteen in Archive:
Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1936, sak nr. 33-45, Da 0163.
181 Cf. DNA Annual report 1936, p. 57. There called "Election Committee".
182 The issue, like the funding, was decided at a meeting of the federations 28 February 1936.Folder marked 
Representantskapet sak nr. 244 1936 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1936, sak nr. 
132-275, Da 0166.jOl
Letter from AIF to AFL Secretariat and DNA Central Committee dated 17 December 1935 in folder 
miarked Arbeidemes Idrettsforbund sak nr. 113 1935 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 
1935, sak nr. 71-113, Da 0153.
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farm workers, smallholders and the unemployed.184
The Extended Finance Committee was inaugurated on 1 April.185 Two weeks later it 
accepted the applications of AUF and AIF for 5, 000 kroner each.186 It also guaranteed that 
100, 000 kroner be put into an account named election fund 1936, in accordance with the 
Joint Committee’s wishes. This money would preferably have been received from the 
federations, but AFL clearly wanted the funds to be available early on for the pre-election 
campaign. Five days later it was decided that AFL should open the account with 100,000 
kroner itself, if it was willing.187 A late meeting also considered whether to produce a giant 
poster of Nygaardsvold, and this did go ahead.188 DNA wished to capitalize on the trust and 
the perceived level-headedness associated with its chief of government.
The election
As before central direction lay behind the scheme of veteran speakers being sent 
across the country. Although DNA claimed to believe in the concept of a year long 
campaign, in the table below only those tours forming part of the orthodox electoral contest 
have been included. In listing them the aim is to present a snapshot of the national 
campaign.
Table 2.8 Campaigning during August, September and October 1936.
Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
Oscar Nilssen Hedmark 17 Sept-18 Oct 35
P.E. Vorum Hedmark October 12 "Last week 
before election."
184 Cf. Minutes 14 February, 1 April (maids), 15 April (fishermen), 28 May (farm workers), 3 July 
(smallholders), 18 August (maids), 12 October (farm workers), 2 September (the unemployed).Also see 7 
November (smallholders, maids) and letter from DNA to the Joint Committee asking it to discuss a plan to 
organize farm workers, fishermen, farmers and smallholders dated 26 November 1936.Folder marked 
Samarbeidskomiteen sak nr. 37 1936 in Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1936, sak nr.
33-45, Da 0163.
185 Minutes of Extended Finance Committee 1 April 1936 in folder marked Stortingsvalgkampen 1936 sak nr.
301 1936, Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1936 nr. 280-482, Da 0167.
186 Minutes of Extended Finance Committee 15 April 1936. Loc. cit.
187 Minutes of Extended Finance Committee 20 April 1936. Loc. cit.
188 Minutes of Extended Finance Committee 2 September 1936. Loc. cit.
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Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
Martin Smeby Oppland October 25
Olav
Meisdalshagen
Oppland October 11
Lars Moen Oppland September 16
Lars Moen Oppland October 34
Olaf Johansen Oppland October 7 "Last week 
before election."
Ggil Hemes Oppland October 15
Johan Jensen Oppland September 9
Johan Jensen Buskerud Sept-Oct 31
Konrad Knudsen Buskerud Not stated 30 "During election 
campaign.”
Nils Steen Buskerud Sept-Oct 27
T. Haavardstad Telemark September 20
Olav Versto Telemark Sept-Oct 42
Olav Oksvik Aust-Agder September 16
T. Haavardstrand Aust-Agder October 31
Nils Hjelmtveit Aust-Agder Sept-Oct 16
Olaf Johansen Vest-Agder September 35
P. Thorvik South Country October 12
Konrad Nordahl Rogaland, South 
Country
October 21
Nils Hjelmtveit Hordaland,
Rogaland
20-27 September 9
A. G. Tothammer Rogaland 1 Sept-18 Oct 57
I. K. Hognestad Rogaland 15 Sept-18 Oct 40
Sverre Krogh Hordaland October 23
Neimi
Lagerstram
Hordaland September 14
Olav Vegheim Buskerud 26 Aug-10 Sept 17
Isak Flatabo Hordaland Not stated 33 "During election 
campaign."
Bjame Borgan Hordaland Sept-Oct 40
Alfred Hjellestad Hordaland October 21
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Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
Komelius
Bergsvik
Hordaland October 33
Ole Jensen Rong Hordaland 15 Aug-19 Oct 34 "Until the 
election."
Trygve Bratteli Sogn og Fjordane October 20
Anders Lothe Sogn og Fjordane 22 Aug-18 Oct 84
Lars Moen Sogn og Fjordane September 15
Johan Jensen Sogn og Fjordane 19 Aug-9 Sept 23
Johannes Bee South Mere September 21
Oskar Andersen South Mere September-
October
20
Oskar Andersen Romsdal September-
October
15
Lars Sandnes South Mere 16-27 Sept 17
Peder Alsvik Mere og 
Romsdal
Not stated 31 "During election 
campaign."
Johan Wiik Romsdal September 17
N. P. Skrede Mere og 
Romsdal
Sept-Oct 31
Ivar Aarseth Romsdal September 20
Bjame Borgan North Mere August-
September
25
Oscar Nilssen North Mere August 13
A. R. Skarholt Trendelag Sept-Oct 70
Harald Langhelle Ser Trendelag October 11
Adolf Salbubsk Ser Trendelag Not stated 54 "During election 
campaign."
Johan Wiik Nord Trendelag Sept-Oct 24
Sverre Stestad Nord Trendelag October 15
E. Asgard Nord Trendelag Aug-Oct 44
Gunnar Sand North Norway 26 July-10 Sept 59 Leader of AUF.
Alfred Madsen Finnmark, Troms 
and Nordland
8 Aug-4 Sept 25
Eivind Reiersen Nordland 5 July-27 Sept 73
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Agitator Area Dates No. of speeches Notes
John
Kristoffersen
Nordland October 51
H. O. Wika Nordland Not stated 29 ’’During election 
campaign."
Hans Ystgaard Nordland August 10
Alfred Skar Nordland October 30
Jens Steffensen Nordland Sept-Oct 34
Andreas Moan Nordland 8 Sept-19 Oct 43
Aldor
Ingebrigtsen
Nordland August 18
Thina Thorieifeen Nordland and 
Troms
September 23
Sverre Stostad Nordland 28 Aug-17 Sept 38
Sverre Stostad Troms 18 Sept-27 Sept 22
Halvdan Koht Troms and 
Nordland
2 Sept-13 Sept 21 The Foreign 
Secretary.
Aldor
Ingebrigtsen
Troms 6 Sept-18 Oct 60
Alfons Johansen Troms Sept-Oct 39
Kristian Berg Troms September 23
Kristian Berg Finnmark Sept-Oct 56
A K. Mikola Finnmark Sept-Oct 24
Gitta Jonsson Finnmark October 10
Alfons Johansen Finnmark September 20
(Source: DNA Annual report 1936, pp. 10-23. Undated tours not included.)
In keeping with the intensity of the 1936 campaign this is a much longer list than for the 
two previous elections. Every single county was covered including Troms in northern 
Norway, which was somewhat neglected in 1933. Among the electoral materials this time 
were brochures giving full details of ten areas, which were the counties to which DNA 
wanted to devote extra attention.189 The brochures were for Oslo, Oppland, Hedmark, Vest-
too
Arbeiderbladet 1 October 1936, p. 4.
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Agder, Rogaland, Hordaland, More og Romsdal, Sogn og Fjordane and North Norway 
(Nordland, Troms Mid Finnmark).190 In only five out of seven cases do these match the 
counties AOF identified as most likely to yield gains. It is likely they were chosen on the 
basis of diverging somewhat from average Norwegian conditions. Half of these were 
counter-cultural, Oslo had a much larger tertiary sector than the rest of the country,
Oppland and Hedmark were ridden by class conflict to a higher degree than elsewhere and 
North Norway was a region to itself.
It was previously established that DNA made serious attempts to attract people in 
the counter-cultural areas and other places where it was weak. This, of course, continued in 
1936, which was an election precisely about reaching out to new groups in order for the 
government to obtain a majority. More than two in five speeches were held in the counter- 
cultural areas. Around 375 speeches were made in Nordland during those centrally directed 
tours, which is more than one in five of the total. Throughout the 1930s DNA clearly 
wanted to be a party for all of Norway. Beyond trying hard to be successful in every region, 
in 1933 it had a legendary slogan “Town and Country Hand in Hand,” which was 
sometimes used also in 1936. The only slogan DNA had produced which was even more 
famous was naturally “All the People in Work.” And the counter-crisis measures again took 
centre stage. It was claimed that the Government had created jobs for 70-80,000 people. 
Although it was admitted the international economy was moving in the right direction 
anyway, the interventionist policies of Nygaardsvold’s government were much 
emphasized.191
By 1936 Einar Gerhardsen had regained his old position of secretary of DNA, 
which he had previously held 1923-1926. In an election interview, he stated that the party's 
preparations had been ongoing for three years, so that the actual election only represented 
the final furlong.192 The materials being distributed across the country, the films being 
shown, the schedule of theatrical performances had long ago been expedited from the 
office. The atmosphere was nevertheless hectic in the headquarters of the party due to last- 
minute adjustments and responding to issues thrown up in the campaign. He said two of the
190 DNA Annual report 1936, p. 59.
191 Tore Pryser, Klassen ognasjonen (1935-1946). Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge 4 (Oslo, Tiden,
1988), p. 55.
192 Arbeiderbladet 9 October 1936, p. 1.
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brochures, "The Norwegian State" with a print of 290,000 copies and "Work and Safe 
Conditions for Everyone", of which 129,000 were printed, were the main publications.193 
He also mentioned the brochure "Norway for the People", which had been distributed in 
100, 000 copies and for which the central party was still receiving orders. Three posters 
were part of the arsenal, one of Nygaardsvold (illustration 7), one specifically for the 
country and one for the towns. These had been sent out in respectively 27, 000,24,000 and 
12, 000 copies. The giant version of the Nygaardsvold poster was meant to be affixed to 
Labour headquarters around the nation. As usual party newspapers were distributed as 
propaganda, with free subscriptions to either Fram or the local paper being sent to people 
nominated by the local branches. In addition, the party owned 47 film projectors able to 
entertain with either the rural film "Norway for the People" or the urban "Building the 
Country".194 Copies of these had also been sent to a number of cinemas. Most of these 
features were not new in 1936, but AOF played a greater part in this election than in 1933. 
(It had more experience by then since it was only set up in 1932.) It was the organization 
responsible for the films, and it also distributed the props for meetings which were so 
essential according to its leader.195
The election materials spanned wider than before, though much consisted of the 
usual publications. The manifesto was printed in a total of 540,000 copies, counting both 
the standard Norwegian and the nynorsk editions.196 On top of that came a brochure 
containing the programme of principles, working programme and manifesto with another
50,000 copies. A whole book containing Labour’s point of view, facts and figures as well 
as a complete set of materials was printed in 5,000 copies.197 The two main brochures and 
pamphlets for peasants and fishermen were made available in both languages.198 These 
were published in 640, 000 copies and were lengthy affairs. 11 smaller brochures were 
made available in a total print of 1 million. A separate leaflet was designed to counter the 
appeal of the capitalist Society Party in 20,000 copies. The Society Party was singled out
193 rt w ?Ibid., p. 3.
194 See chapter 4, pp. 230-232.195For the distribution of the film projectors see AOF's proposal in folder marked Stortingsvalgkampen 1936 
sak nr. 301 1936, Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs Saksarkiv 1936 sak nr. 280-482, Da 0167.1Q£
DNA Annual report 1936, p. 59.
197 This was Olav Vegheim, Fra kaos mot plan i Norge. Material samling valget 1936 (Oslo, DNA, 1936).
198 DNA Annual report 1936, p. 59.
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for this treatment because, like DNA, its appeal was based on counter-crisis measures. The 
brochures devoted to particular counties had a total print of 180,000. The women’s 
electoral newspaper was distributed in 230,000 copies. Up to 70,000 households received 
free subscriptions to Fram, and in the towns plus some semi-rural areas, the local 
newspaper was given away free in the last few weeks of the election as part of the 
canvassing. As was earlier noted, DNA’s electioneering remained the same in outline, but 
with greater and greater resources.
Oslo
It remains to look at Oslo and its environs for a complete picture of the last interwar 
election. Early in the year the plan for the campaign was drawn up .199 Barring May Day 
the first major event of the year was a great street party in Young's Square, tied in with the 
end of the conference on 24 May. Apart from the major figures of Oscar Torp and Martin 
Tranmael, speeches were given by guests from the Swedish, Danish and Finnish labour 
movements.200 This indicated DNA’s return to the family of Nordic Social Democratic 
parties, unlike when it was in its revolutionary phase. There were 15 open-air meetings 
between 26 August and 20 September throughout the city.201 These must be considered 
parts of the election campaign proper, since they were staged under the two election 
slogans of "Work and safe conditions for everyone!" and "Norway for the People!", though 
they were regarded as a preparatory phase to it. Theatrical performances formed part of 
these meetings, which concluded with a second street party on 20 September.
Oslo DNA received the same sum from the election fund as in 1933: 40, 000 kroner 
(£ 2, OlO).202 Since DNA centrally could draw on greater funds than in 1933, this means 
that an even larger proportion of the money was spent elsewhere, probably in the 
countryside. Even so, the Oslo chapter spent more than in the last election: 86, 820 kroner 
(c. £ 4, 350) compared to 65,210 three years before 203 It could afford to do so because 
more money was forthcoming from individual trade unions: 41,140 kroner as against 29,
1 O Q
Oslo Arbeiderparti. Beretning og regnskap 1936 (Oslo 1937), p. 19.
200 Oslo DNA Annual report 1936, p. 20.
201 Ibid., p. 22.
202 Ibid, p. 64.
203 Ibid, p. 65; Oslo DNA Annual report 1933, p. 55.
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900 in 1933.
A novelty were election theatre performances which became so popular that after 
some time it had to charge for entry to regulate demand.204 A troupe of professional actors 
played a live version of the film "Building the Country". The unemployed were admitted on 
Mondays and Tuesdays, presumably without the 0.5 krone charge. All of the indoor 
meetings included a showing of the election film. Without exception the meetings featured 
music, theatrical performances by "drama gangs", entertainment from artists and public 
singing. This was in complete accordance with the directives laid down by AOF 205 
Likewise the meeting places were decorated with flags, banners, napkins on podiums and 
slogans. The function of the entertainment, and especially the singing, was to engage with 
the audience and make it feel a sense of belonging. In times of long-standing economic 
crisis and a high level of conflict within society, this was a considerable point in DNA's 
favour.
Electoral appeal in Oslo
The brochures and the films that were produced prove DNA’s awareness of the 
need to reach out to centrists and the middle classes if it was to achieve the parliamentary 
majority it wanted. Hitherto it had confined itself to addressing civil servants and other 
white-collar workers, and somewhat half-heartedly at that. Thus announcements of interest 
to the intelligentsia were reported in Arbeiderbladet, including invitations to meetings. One 
such event, for technicians and engineers, took place on 10 September, in which Einar 
Gerhardsen talked about how the help of these professionals was needed in building the 
new state 206 While DNA originated among “the little people” it now sought the support of 
the entire community, he said.207 Among the old and new interest groups for which Labour 
convened special meetings were: agricultural workers, architects, artists, charladies,
204 Oslo DNA Annual report 1936, p. 23.
205 Brochure by AOF, p. 3 of second manuscript in folder marked AUF agitasjon 1936-1938, Archive: 
Arbeidemes Ungdomsfylking, Korrespondanse A-B, 1935-1959, Da 0003.
206 Arbeiderbladet 11 September 1936, p. 3.
207 This was not the first time such a claim had been made for DNA. After the conference in 1901, 
Arbeiderbladet, then called Social-Demokraten, announced: “From being a pronounced class party it is 
becoming a universal organization, inviting all classes to join and put the religion of justice in pole 
position.f...] Social Democracy from being a sharply defined worker’s party is becoming a people’s party.” 
Halvard Lange, Fra sekt til parti. Det norske Arbeiderpartis organisasjonsmessige ogpolitiske utvikling fra
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hospital staff, hotel and restaurant workers, maids, lawyers, physicians and various kinds of 
clerks.208 Publicity was given to Labour's insistence that it believed in democracy, such as 
AFL leader Olav Hindahl's speech on 15 September at Young's Square or Oscar Torp’s 
speech on the wireless on 5 October 209 Hindahl said democracy must be extended also to 
the social and economic spheres, which was DNA's tactic against anyone reminding it of its 
revolutionary past. The fact that Torp was able to broadcast a political speech in itself 
represented a small victory for DNA, whose relationship with the controllers of the radio 
had previously been strained. The nationalization of broadcasting in 1933 allowed the party 
line to come more to the fore. This was especially true after 1934, and in return DNA’s 
speakers moderated what they had to say 210
Labour did not merely passively seek the votes of the middle classes this time. It 
attempted to incorporate them into its planned future state. A precedent had been set by the 
Association of Commercial Clerks joining AFL in 1929. By now support for the party was 
spreading among white-collar workers. A meeting of the Association's representatives in 
Oslo on 16 September called on all clerks to vote DNA and to take an active part in the
911election. Naturally Arbeiderbladet was pleased to publicize the appeal. Labour also
attempted to attract students and graduates, explaining that it had chapters for various 
disciplines which formed a joint association led by the barrister Arne Aake Ording.212 The 
socialist work among students was well underway with societies at most higher educational 
establishments and in many schools.
Scientists and academics had never known a government with such a welcoming 
attitude to them before, according to Ording in a meeting organized for intellectuals 213 It 
had even given Parliament its renaissance, making it a bulwark against unpleasant 
reactionary tendencies. The people were now more conscious of its importance. Thus he 
presented DNA as the mediator between ordinary folk and the state's political institutions. 
Assuming those present believed in the system, he implied that the common man now did
1891 til 1902 (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1962), p. 195.
208 Cf. Oslo DNA Annual report 1936, pp. 24-30.
209 Arbeiderbladet 16 September 1936, p. 8.; Arbeiderbladet 6 October 1936, p. 2.
2,0 Rolf W. Hansen ‘Arbeiderbevegelsen og kringkastingen 1925-1940. Fra konflikt til samarbeid’, Tidsskrift 
for Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 1979/1, passim p. 132, p. 139, p. 150.
211 Arbeiderbladet 17 September 1936, p. 15.
212 Arbeiderbladet 30 September 1936, p. 3.
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so too because of DNA's success. Consequently it was adding legitimacy to parliamentary 
democracy.
As stated above 1936 was the year in which convergence was established between 
the countrywide appeals and those in Oslo. DNA in the capital had pioneered some degree 
of communication with civil servants and clerks owing to their sheer numbers, which meant 
that they could not be ignored.214 But in that year a new local appeal was effected, namely 
to shopkeepers. A brochure was produced by DNA centrally for this group, but was only 
for use in Oslo. It was sent by post to all of the 5,000 shops in the city. This appeal was, 
however, tempered by shopkeepers being portrayed in an unflattering light in both the 
election films, including “Building the Country” which was intended for the towns. This 
dual message probably arose from DNA being uncertain about whether employers were a 
suitable target group for a workers’ party. Previous appeals to other middle-class people 
had also been hesitant, witness that to white-collar workers in 1930.
The end of the election
The grand finale to what DNA conceived as its year-long campaign was the 
traditional mass rally at Young's Square the day before the election. It followed the 
precedents of 1930 and 1933 closely, but there were also some new costly features 215An 
aeroplane spelled out the message "vote DNA" in the sky. Headlights illuminated the 
headquarters of the party, while the 40, 000 participants were surrounded by flags, banners 
and the torches of the youth organization. Einar Gerhardsen gave the first speech 
expounding how town and country, clerks and workers, men and women, young and old, 
technicians and intellectuals from every discipline had joined the party to create a better 
society. In other words, Socialism had become an ideology for everyone. This theme was 
echoed in the second speech by Martin Tranmael. "We are living through a sea change of 
historic proportions," he said. "The death knells are tolling for bourgeois society, tomorrow 
the Norwegian people will undertake its funeral!" At the end of the meeting the crowd 
refused to leave, with only a few thousands trickling away. Those who remained were able
213 Arbeiderbladet 16 October 1936, p. 2.
214 The brochure for Oslo stated that 27% of the workforce there were clerks. Cf. AAB. ‘Oslo’ in Brosjyrer 
dtgitt av Det norske Arbeiderparti Stortingsvalget 1936, p. 5.
21 Arbeiderbladet 19 October 1936, p. 2; Oslo DNA Annual report 1936, p. 24.
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to watch "Building the Country” projected onto the fa$ade of the party headquarters.
In spite of such rousing rhetoric and the unparalleled resources expended on the 
campaign, DNA did not obtain the majority in Parliament it so earnestly desired. Although 
advancing to 42.5%, it only picked up one new seat. Most of its 2.4 percentage points 
increase can be put down to the equivalent 1.5 drop in the support for the Communists, who 
gave Labour a clear field everywhere except Bergen. This suggested that in the present 
climate DNA had reached its maximum level of adherence. DNA's own electoral 
calculations showed that it would have received 79 seats out of 150, and thereby a majority, 
had it not been for the electoral alliances between the capitalist parties.216 A change to the 
voting system instituted by them in the previous parliamentary period had allowed unused 
votes for one party to be transferred to another 217
Conclusion
The 1936 election was so well funded and fought that if it could not produce a 
majority for DNA, it is hard to think of a campaign that would. The circumstances were 
particularly favourable to the government. Unemployment was falling, economic activity 
was increasing and industrial relations had been put on a much better footing by the Main 
Agreement of 1935 between AFL and the employers’ organization NAF {Norsk 
Arbeidsgiverforening). The Communists gave passive support to the Labour Government 
and their voters active, though probably temporary, support. Where DNA came unstuck 
was by not being able to prevent capitalist bartering over votes among themselves. The new 
amendment to the electoral law worked like the previous, two-round majoritarian system 
had done before 1920 though not to the same extent. For its part DNA fought the election 
along the lines of 1930 and 1933, but on a greater scale and with more resources. There was 
almost certainly a greater degree of central control in 1936, necessitated by targeted 
campaigning in areas where it thought it could gain new seats. (The caveat has to be made 
due to more documents on this being extant for 1936 than the other years.) With a modicum 
of supervision and control, it is still fair to stress the relative autonomy of the regional
216 Arbeiderbladet 21 October 1936, p. 13. Academic research agrees that DNA would have gained up to nine
more seats in 1936 if it had not been for the electoral alliances. Bjom Kristvik and Stein Rokkan
‘Valgordningen’ in Politiske valg i Norge. En artikkelsamling (Oslo, Universitetsfbrlaget, 1966), p. 23.
217 Cf. DNA Annual report 1936, p. 61 for details of this extensive network of alliances.
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parties. And many affiliated organizations like regional groupings of AFL and the joint 
organizations (samorganisasjonene) participated without being under the command of 
DNA at all. The plans of AUF were scrutinized because it asked for more money, but if the 
original payment had proved sufficient it would probably have been left to its own devices. 
The Extended Finance Committee knew that AUF and the Workers’ Sports Association 
(AIF) performed useful campaigning anyway.
1936 witnessed a Labour campaign that was designed to win hearts as well as 
minds. That is why music, theatricals, films, banners, posters of Nygaardsvold and other 
props played preponderant parts. It had been much the same in the other two elections 
described, but 1936 marked the high point of this type of electioneering. It was the first 
election in which there had been any kind of focus on personality.218 DNA had not been 
fully conversant with this feature of modem campaigning, but Nygaardsvold’s attraction 
lay in his honest working man’s persona. He acted as guarantor that if DNA got more 
powers it would not misuse them. The majority did not materialize, however, and two 
possible reasons have already been given; the network of capitalist electoral alliances and 
DNA probably getting close to the ceiling of its maximum possible support. It had not yet 
acquired the mantle of being the party of the state, which in the post-war period was to give 
it the increment of another few percentage points and thereby a majority. Perhaps it should 
have sought to communicate with non-unionized workers earlier than in 1936 to get more 
of these behind it. But it cannot really be faulted for excellent electioneering in that year. 
By again polling above 40 % of the votes, DNA put great distance between itself and its 
opponents. Its nearest rivals were the Conservatives on 22. 6 % and the capitalist parties 
were disunited as ever. The interwar political struggle had been won by DNA, although it 
had been forced to tone down its Socialism in favour of crisis management as the basis of 
its appeal.
Looking at the three elections described herein together, it is striking how similarly 
they were fought. Even in 1930 the campaign was led by an extended finance committee 
with trade union and party representation, though it was semi-secret due to Communist and 
non-aligned workers also belonging to AFL. In that year there were also some theatrical
218 Lill-Ann Jensen and Svein Damslora, Bildetsom vapen. Norsk arbeiderbevegelses bruk av bildet i kamp 
ogagitasjon (Oslo, Tiden, 1984), p. 145.
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performances as part of the open-air meetings. DNA had a formula for electioneering, and 
while greater enthusiasm and funding allowed progressively more propaganda, meetings, 
props, canvassing and entertainment, there were few developments from 1930 to 1936. 
Though in 1930 there was some uncertainty over how important elections were, DNA was 
naturally good at campaigning. This was a consequence of the party culture. 
Demonstrations, marching, banners, singing and not least trying to draw others in, were 
mainstays of the labour movement. The real turning point in DNA’s fortunes over this 
period came in 1933 when AFL decided to throw its full weight behind the party’s bid for 
governmental power. The Trade Union Confederation chose to do this because the 
capitalist parties were stepping up the legislative pressure on labour. It had great misgivings 
about the Boycott Law of 1933 and there was talk of state adjudication of wage ballots. In 
the climate generated by the great lockout of 1931, which AFL had survived, these attempts 
to curb labour were blown out of proportion. The Boycott Law had been moderated by the 
incoming Liberal government of 1933, and was in any case no more hostile to the unions 
than the much-hated “workhouse laws” of 1927, which stimulated no great electoral 
counterdrive.
The elections of 1930, 1933 and 1936 were run as follows. DNA centrally produced 
electoral propaganda. It accepted a handout from AFL in addition to the support it received 
for its newspapers and general activities. It sold this propaganda to the regional parties (and 
gave some away for free), but these organizations received funding from DNA centrally in 
conjunction with the election. Preparing for the elections took many months, and long in 
advance as well as during the campaign, the network of newspapers received money for 
propagandists purposes. In 1933 and 1936 they were furnished with stories they should run 
and pictures they should print. Apart from limited supervision by the Extended Finance 
Committee, regional parties were left to electioneer in peace according to the general 
outline drawn up by DNA centrally or the Joint Committee of AFL and DNA.
DNA centrally took a back seat once its preparations had been completed. It 
followed die campaign and entered debates arising from it, but the most visible part of the 
national campaign was the responsibility of Oslo DNA. This included large street parties 
and the final rallies the day before the election. Party conferences were held triennially and 
always in Oslo during election years. Because the national party and the Oslo chapter had
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offices next to each other in the same building and due to the importance of the capital, 
these two entities in practice often merged. To ensure a full-blown national dimension to 
electioneering, however, DNA centrally sent veteran speakers on tours of the country. 
These included persistent focus on the difficult areas for the party, the counter-cultural 
South and West and the northern county of Nordland.
The entire labour movement took part in campaigning. The youth organization 
(AUF) and the Workers’ Sports Association (AIF) were active along with trade unionists in 
canvassing. They also produced additional propaganda, especially election editions of their 
magazines. Regional joint organizations (samorganisasjoner) also performed some 
electioneering. The role of the Workers’ Educational Association (AOF), once it had been 
set up in 1932, was preparatory. It was additionally responsible for the production of the 
election films. In 1936 the children’s organization Framfylkingen played an active part. It 
members formed “drama gangs” and choruses for theatricals, which were a unique and 
largely novel contribution to the art of helping voters make up their minds.
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Chapter 3. The Electoral Appeals of the British Labour 
Party in 1929,1931 and 1935.
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to explore which social groups Labour sought to gain 
for its cause during the elections of 1929,1931 and 1935. By examining the written 
propaganda it is hoped to discover of whom Labour sought to create a base, and whether 
there were any changes in the course of the differing circumstances of each election.
The evidence suggests that the party did indeed broaden its appeal in this time span, but 
in a way which was driven by circumstances. Women were especially a target group in 
1929 after those under 30 had received the vote in 1928, less so but still to an important 
extent in 1931 and 1935. Middle-class people were particularly favoured in 1931 when 
many of them had received salary cuts. Nevertheless the Labour Party of 1935 was a 
more wide-ranging body than in 1929, or at least had ambitions to become so.
Appealing beyond the core group of industrial workers is relevant from a 
comparative point of view, because an ideal type of social democracy lists as a 
necessary factor in the success of such a party the extent to which it managed to form a 
broad social coalition.1 This ideal type is formulated according to the history of all of 
Europe, but does it apply also in Britain? In the early twentieth century Britain was 
overwhelmingly a working-class nation. By design Labour was the party of the trade 
unions and sought to represent “workers by hand and by brain.” The former alone 
would be enough to carry Labour to victory on a permanent basis if little more than half 
of them voted for the party consistently. But although Labour was set up to look after 
their interests, revisionists emphasize that the proletariat is not necessarily attracted to 
Labour politics, and claim that working-class demands could be echoed or even initiated
1 E.g. the hegemonic Swedish Social Democratic Party considered itself a “people’s party” as early as 
1900. Before the Great War it had reached out to small farmers and left Liberals, and thus it was a natural 
progression when it made cross-class appeals in the 1920s and 1930s. Sheri Berman, The Social 
Democratic Moment. Ideas and Politics in the Making o f Interwar Europe (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1998), p. 29. If such an alliance is necessary to govern, it is clear Labour did not come 
close to achieving a majority between the wars. It apparently did not receive noteworthy support outside 
the areas where industrial trade unionism was strong (mining, heavy industry, textiles). Gareth Stedman 
Jones, Languages o f Class. Studies in English Working-Class History 1832-1982 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 244.
2 According to Matthew Worley, more than 75% of die population were manual workers throughout the 
1930s. Labour Inside the Gate. A History o f the British Labour Party between the Wars (London, I. B. 
Tauris, 2005), p. 171.
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by the Liberals and Conservatives as well.3 Another reason why Labour would not be 
assured of a majority on the basis of one section of the population, albeit by far the 
largest, relates to the dynamics of electoral choice over time. Voting often makes a 
habit,4 and Labour received merely 6.4 % of the popular vote in December 1910, 
although the franchise was extended after the Great War. Also, a voter might see his or 
her religion or nationality as more important than class. Consequently a manual worker 
might easily opt for one of Labour’s opponents. It will be seen below that the party 
spent a lot of resources arguing its case to the disadvantaged, which would not have 
been necessary if it could be certain of their votes. Thus the question of to whom 
Labour appealed clearly matters.
Introduction to the 1929 election
There was a lot of material produced for this election. Newspapers, flyers, 
election statements, pamphlets and coverage in the Daily Herald constituted the basis of 
the appeal. In what follows particular attention has been devoted to the flyers and 
election statements because they unequivocally belonged to the contest. Unlike the two 
later occasions, there was a Speaker’s Handbook with relevant facts. It was intended to 
be used for campaigning, but was low on specific targeting of potential voters. It is 
possible to deduce from the length of coverage, however, that Labour was particularly 
aiming for the votes of the unemployed, rural workers, trade unionists and pensioners. 
These may be construed as sub-groups of the working class, which establishes what the 
Labour base was in 1929.
The unemployed were dealt with firstly by the claim that their numbers had 
decreased by 185, 626 during Labour’s first government in 1924, taking insurance 
changes into account, and secondly by listing the improvements Labour had made when 
in power to the scheme of unemployment insurance itself.5 Of course any appeal 
directed at the unemployed on the basis of these claims would also be an appeal to those
3 Mike Savage and Andrew Miles, The Remaking o f the British Working Class, 1840-1940 (London, 
Routledge, 1994), p. 74. They adduce P. F. Clarke’s classic thesis about the “New Liberalism” in 
Lancashire, an attempt by the Liberals to gain working-class votes between 1900 and 1914. The following 
is no proof, but based on “not unreasonable estimates” it is claimed the percentage of working-class 
electors voting Conservative was 37 % in 1922, 33 % in 1923,47 % in 1924,31 % in 1929, 56 % in 1931 
and 50 % in 1935. Geoffrey K. Fiy, ‘A Reconsideration of the British General Election of 1935 and the 
Electoral Revolution of 1945’, History 76 (1991), p. 54.
4 Michael Kinnear, The British Voter. An Atlas and Survey since 1885 (London, Batsford Academic and 
Educational, 1981), p. 11.
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who thought they might lose their jobs. The strategy with regard to agricultural workers 
was to show that Labour could raise their wages. The 1924 Labour government had 
restored Wages Boards in the countryside with the task of setting minimum rates, as it 
was realized trade unions were too weak in this sector to make a difference.6 Next it was 
pointed out that 150, 000 houses were needed in rural areas, but that the only significant 
construction of these had taken place as a result of the 1924 Wheatley Act, whereas the 
Conservative Rural Housing Act of 1926 had only succeeded in reconditioning 343 
houses.7 The wretchedness of country life for the poor was brought out by a citation of 
government statistics showing that 19.9% of children there suffered from impaired
A
physique. The appeal to pensioners did not just mean the elderly, but included widows 
and orphans who should be secured a better livelihood.9 For the trade unionists Labour 
promised to ratify the Washington Hours Convention of 1919, reducing working 
hours.10 There would be trade boards in unorganized industries with powers over hours 
and wages.11
Judging from the actual propaganda, there were two groups that Labour
particularly sought to attract in the 1929 election.12 They were agricultural workers and 
11women. In the election Labour produced 66 old or new leaflets of which 14 directly 
concerned rural voters and nine can be identified as being aimed at women.14 In 
addition to the leaflets particularly intended for them, an overwhelming majority of 
Labour candidates made reference to women in their campaign literature, especially as
5 University of Manchester: The Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC), Labour Party 
Archive, LP/ELEC/1929/1. Labour Speaker’s Handbook passim p. 3, p. 10.
6 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
7 Ibid., p. 66.
8 Ibid., p. 74.
9 Ibid., pp. 78-81.
10 Ibid, p. 20.
11 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
12 According to one writer Labour deliberately sought to broaden its base and extend its electoral appeal 
before this election. Duncan Tanner ‘The Labour Party and Electoral Politics in the Coalfields’ in 
Campbell, Fishman, Howell (eds.), Miners, Unions and Politics 1910-1947 (Aldershot, Scolar Press, 
1996), p. 82.
13 After 1925 two of its three special campaigns had been based on winning the support of these. The 
remaining one consisted of agitation against the Trade Disputes Bill. E. A. Rowe, ‘The British General 
Election of 1929’, B. Litt. thesis, Oxford University, 1959, p. 79.
14 Labour began concentrating on the countryside a few years prior to the election. In Chris Cook’s view
it is essential to realize how little success the party met with in rural constituencies before that. The Age o f 
Alignment. Electoral Politics in Britain 1922-1929 (London, Macmillan, 1975), p. 23.
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new voters.15 It was in the context of the “flapper” vote being granted that women took 
on a special significance to the parties, and not just those below 30 who were 
enfranchised some months before the election. And if Labour was to continue 
expanding it must put up candidates in as many rural areas as possible; naturally in 
order to get anywhere it had to present attractive policies. A little extra effort was 
needed since Labour’s origins lay in industrial constituencies.16
The rural classes
The message to agricultural workers was a simple one, and of the hundreds of 
appeals the formulation of W. H. Marwick, the candidate for Dumfriesshire, may be 
chosen at random: “The land, as the basis of national life, must be brought under 
National ownership. [...] Socialism has a real message for the rural worker: it offers 
him an equality of opportunity which he has never yet enjoyed, in wages, housing, and 
land settlement.”17 In one leaflet the party went straight to the point, detailing what it 
thought agricultural workers demanded.18 The first two items, namely good wages and a 
safe job, were not trivial because wages were deplorably low in this sector of the 
economy, much behind that of industrial workers, and without trade unions to support 
them the farm hands could be fired at will. The third demand of a “free cottage” related 
to a crucial aspect of the existence of such workers: just as they could lose their job by 
getting on the wrong side of the farmer, they lived in “tied cottages” which were let to 
whomever did their job. Thus losing the job meant having to move out as well, whether 
or not they had anywhere to go.
Labour pledged to end the system of entailed accommodation, and the leaflet 
reminded the potential voters that Wages Boards were (re)introduced by Labour’s 
Minister of Agriculture, Noel Buxton, in 1924. These had been instrumental in raising 
the threshold of wages from 25s. to 30s. a week, and Labour promised that they would 
go higher. A very similar leaflet repeated these assurances in a slightly different form.
15 Only 55% did so according to a study of the electoral addresses of Labour candidates. But almost every 
male candidate printed an addendum on the address from a female relation and these were meant to 
highlight women’s issues. See Rowe, op. cit., p. 208.
16 “There is a growing appreciation in die Labour Party of the vital importance of the agricultural problem. 
At this moment it has committees at work on the rural problem, which are trying to evolve plans for the 
revival of British agriculture.” Philip Snowden, I f  Labour Rules (London, Labour Publishing Company, 
1923), p. 44 in LHASC box 329.12.
17 LP/ELEC/1929/1. Folder marked 1929 GEN. ELECTION SCOTLAND + WALES BOROUGHS 
COUNTIES.
18 LP/ELEC/1929/1. Leaflet 197 in folder marked JN 1055 A6.
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This offered more extensive benefits. It again listed the main demands of farm workers 
as higher wages and freedom from the “tyranny” of the tied cottage, but this time went 
on to mention payment for overtime, a guaranteed week’s work, a comfortable dwelling, 
a plot of land of one’s own and the chance of educating one’s children through 
scholarships and better local schools.19
So Labour’s message to this group was a threefold one: it promised higher 
wages, better security and the chance of social mobility. An example of the third motif 
can be found in a flyer about agricultural education and research. Here the purpose was 
to tempt rural workers with a good education for their children, and the party explained 
that necessary motor transport and scholarships were part and parcel of that. It also held 
out the possibility of personal advancement and a more stimulating job. “Farm workers, 
farm managers, and agriculturalists in every capacity now require to know far more 
about their calling than was customary even twenty-five years ago, and the need for 
training becomes more apparent every year.” This implied that agricultural workers 
would have their job enhanced and be given more responsibility. The flyer went on to 
claim that there were several instances, especially in Scotland, where former farm 
workers had become leaders, advisors or authorities in agriculture.
In those leaflets which were aimed at farmers, nationalization of land and greater 
control of the agricultural economy were put forward as advantages. Labour claimed 
that the state could act as a better landlord than private individuals. It said that the 
farmer needed up-to-date equipment, modem bams and cowsheds and other buildings in 
good repair. Also a well-drained soil, which the state could achieve more efficaciously, 
and a fair price for his produce were required. This would include stabilizing the price 
of meat and wheat through import boards (a possible contradiction of Labour’s oft- 
repeated slogan of free trade and an untaxed breakfast table, for the benefit of the 
workers), thus giving farmers a more predictable income. “When the farmer sows, he
A |
will know what price he will get at the harvest.” It would encompass cutting out 
middlemen, who took a significant slice of the farmer’s earnings, which was also the 
theme of a different flyer. Primarily intended for the fanner, it nevertheless claimed that 
the farm worker would have his share of the farmer’s higher income when the “useless
19 Leaflet 185 loc. cit.
20 Leaflet 199 loc. cit
21 Leaflet 198 loc. cit
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profiteering middleman” was dispensed with.22 Labour generally tried to appeal to all 
sections of the countryside, while reserving the greatest effort for the labourers who 
were deemed its most likely supporters.
One group engaged in the primary sector of the economy was all but neglected. 
Just one leaflet was addressed to fishermen, and the party’s only promise was to set up 
an inquiry into the industry.24 Labour had not thought out any policies relevant to them, 
which was a consequence of the smallness of the occupation and its geographically 
restricted range. It did make clear that the object was to develop fisheries and improve 
life for fishermen, but the need for an inquiry and the lack of concrete policies must 
have given the impression that Labour did not prioritize this group highly.
To combine the two target groups of women and countryside inhabitants, Labour 
produced a flyer directed at farm workers’ wives.25 To counteract deference, it 
mentioned that the ballot was secret. It repeated the issue of the Wages Boards that had 
been set up in 1924, and promised to keep faith also in 1929. It stressed that Labour had 
always believed in the enfranchisement of women now completed. The message was 
otherwise the same as those leaflets which were gender-neutral: better housing, greater 
security and educational opportunities for the children.
Women
The second target group of women was of course a varied one, and Labour 
needed a strategy for reaching out to them. It was not enough that most candidates 
stressed how long Labour had been in favour of votes for women. That was a settled 
issue. William H. Martin, candidate for South Aberdeen, argued, however, that the 
struggle for women’s emancipation went on. He said Labour could secure equal pay 
for men and women in industry, and mentioned the prevention of maternal mortality as 
another issue of great importance to the party. Part of the Labour strategy came through 
in the leaflet “Why Women should Vote Labour.”27 Here it based its claim to be the 
women’s party on being the children’s party and the peace party. Labour thought such
22 Leaflet 186 loc. cit.
23 This could make it more difficult to gain support from farmers, as one of the National Farmers’ Union’s 
demands was repeal of the Agricultural Wages Act. However, the Conservatives were not going to 
comply with this either, and seemed to refuse safeguarding and all but temporary and restricted subsidies. 
Rpwe, ‘The British General Election of 1929’, p. 29.
24 LP/ELEC/1929/1. Leaflet 272 in folder marked JN 1055 A6.
25 Leaflet 227 loc. cit.
26 Folder marked 1929 GEN. ELECTION SCOTLAND + WALES BOROUGHS COUNTIES.
27 Leaflet 12 in folder marked JN 1055 A6.
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policies were especially attractive to female voters. In another flyer Labour appealed to 
women as mothers. It demanded “better nursing and doctoring care for the mothers, 
medical and dental advice and treatment throughout pregnancy, open-air nursery 
schools where wanted from two years of age.”28 It also made more general demands like 
healthier homes and the supply of milk for mothers and babies.
Some of the most strident rhetoric consisted of juxtaposing women’s justified 
demands with severe Government cutbacks. As Susan Lawrence MP wrote in the Daily 
Herald: “Mr Chamberlain has told us plainly that he cut down the milk grant for 
nursing and expectant mothers, ‘in view of the general need for economy.’ The 
Government had relieved the super taxed, it had to take the money somewhere. So it 
took a drop of milk from the babies.” Not directly aimed at women, but probably 
intended to help sway the female vote, was a leaflet urging parents to vote Labour for 
the sake of the children.30 (It has already been shown that Labour based its claim to be 
the women’s party on the basis of children’s issues.) Tory “economies” had curtailed 
opportunities in health and education. Implicit in this is that it was talking about less 
privileged children, but it was precisely the class dimension to the arguments that made 
the rhetoric so charged. In any case in 1929 Labour seldom appealed to anyone but the 
less privileged. Believing itself to have the nation’s interest at heart, and able to field 
candidates from a variety of backgrounds, it nevertheless thought of certain people as 
“theirs.”31 Therefore appeals to women were particularly meant for working-class 
women.
The appeal to women could be further subdivided into categories based on their 
practical interests. Hitherto it has been shown how they were appealed to as (new) 
voters and parents, but Labour had other means of attracting particular groups of women. 
The 1929 Elector, a campaign magazine published for two issues, carried on page 2 of 
its 15 May edition “The Housewives’ Comer”. It began by stating that bacon had 
recently increased in price by 4d. a pound. Labour had asked a question in Parliament 
about this, but was told by the Tory Government that it would not “stop any profiteering
28 Leaflet 203 loc. cit.
29 Daily Herald Special General Election Edition May 1929, p. 1. Loc. cit.
30,Leaflet 218 loc. cit.
31 In “mixed” or middle-class areas Labour often fielded a professional as its candidate. Stuart Ball, 
Andrew Thorpe and Matthew Worley ‘Elections, Leaflets and Whist Drives: Constituency Party 
Members in Britain between the Wars’ in Matthew Worley (ed.), Labour's Grass Roots. Essays on the 
Activities o f Local Labour Parties and Members, 1918-45 (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), p. 16.
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that might be going on.” The term harked back to the Great War, and was meant to 
imply excessive capitalist greed. Starting with pots and pans it went on to list household 
items on which the Conservatives had put taxes: buttons, silk and artificial silk 
stockings, babies’ frocks made from same, lace, matches, cutlery, etc. The report 
claimed that a Labour government would stop profiteering on such items. The second 
issue of 22 May is more positive about why housewives should vote Labour: abolition 
of food taxes, better maternity benefits and nursing, improved school and medical 
services, more generous pensions for widows, houses for rent and work not doles for the 
housewife’s husband.
For working women Labour produced a leaflet which talked about the waste of 
unemployment, how young men without incomes could not marry, and how 3,000 
mothers (most below 35) died in childbirth every year. Lastly, there was focus on the 
pension system, how it cost the employed worker a substantial amount and yet did not 
provide adequate maintenance for widows and orphans. For these reasons “working 
women will vote Labour.”34 The tenor of this leaflet would suggest it was written for 
young women, a group that often dropped out of the labour market upon marriage. 
Cleverly it played upon sympathy for widows, while at the same time voicing 
dissatisfaction with paying pension contributions as working women.
One group of working women whom the Labour Party prepared a flyer 
especially for was maids. It may also have been intended for male servants in part, but 
towards the end of the message it explained that the Conservatives and Liberals 
managed to exclude household workers when they agreed to votes for women above 30 
in 1918. The leaflet urged those in domestic occupations to remember their proletarian 
origins and not consider how their employers would like them to vote. It instead asked 
these women to think of their own families and the home “you hope to have some 
day.”35 Jessie Stephen, the party’s candidate for South Portsmouth and herself a former 
maid, devoted a great deal of space to this group in her campaign statement. She 
believed that many of these women and girls could not find employment in their own 
trades. She promised that Labour would bring them within the purview of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act, which would provide for them when out of work. Like
7,21929 Elector 15 May 1929 in folder marked JN 1055 A6.
33 1929 Elector 22 May 1929, p. 2. Loc. cit.
34 Leaflet 214 loc. cit.
35 Leaflet 195 loc. cit
36 Folder marked 1929 G. ELECTION ENGLISH BOROUGHS.
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Labour did when appealing to groups it feared might not vote for it, she stressed that the 
ballot was secret.
The only aspect of Labour’s appeal to women that was universal to the gender 
was the peace issue. In the second issue of The 1929 Elector, Margaret Bondfield MP 
had an article entitled “Women won’t have a War Government.”37 The main role in life 
for women who did not have jobs was traditionally to bring up children, but their sons 
and, for that matter, their husbands were at serious risk of dying on the battlefield. So it 
was assumed women were mostly pacifists, and Labour’s anti-war stance was the kind 
of principled issue which made the party attractive beyond its ordinary adherents. The 
other near-universal part of women’s lives Labour could use in its appeal was respect 
for maternity and the rights of children. Probably all women, regardless of their 
personal circumstances, would agree that “every mother should without fear have the 
chance of bringing healthy children into the world.”38 That was what Ishbel MacDonald 
said in the same issue. And these children should be granted at least a good primary and 
secondary education.
The working class
As explained above Labour had core voters at the heart of its message, and 
almost all of its rhetoric was directed at these without there being any great need to say 
often who they were.39 Labour promised to reorganize the mining industry under public 
ownership in a flyer which also attacked the Tories and Liberals for their failure to carry 
out the Sankey Report recommendations during the Coalition ministry.40 Factory 
workers were tempted with the pledge of safety legislation which would hopefully 
prevent the 150, 000 accidents a year leading to death or disablement41 Appeals were 
couched at gender and age groups within the population of industrial workers, namely 
women and the young, reinforcing the channels of communication between the party 
and these groups of individuals.
371929Elector, 22 May 1929, frontpage. JN 1055 A6.
38 Loc. cit., p. 4.
39 Out of the three main parties, Labour made the most explicit class appeals. It did not restrict itself to an 
“ideal type working class,” but it did attack a stereotyped ruling class— landowners, big businessmen, 
profiteers and the rich. William L. Miller, Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918 (London, Macmillan, 
1977), p. 37. See for example the section “Poverty and Wealth” in the Labour Speaker’s Handbook 1929, 
p. 51.
40 LP/ELEC/1929/1. Leaflet 244 in folder marked JN 1055 A6.
41 Leaflet 257 loc. cit.
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When Labour talked about youth it was specifically as workers that they were 
addressed. A flyer about the young was subtitled “Youth and Unemployment”.42 It 
promised to create employment by gaining markets abroad through friendly relations 
with other powers, useful public works, and taking 400, 000 teenagers out of the labour 
market by increasing the school leaving age to 15, while also providing maintenance 
grants for the extra year. While concluding that “Labour offers the young security and a 
fair chance in life,” it also dealt with the reverse side of the coin briefly, in other words 
the elderly. And devoting another flyer to them, Labour promised adequate pensions 
instead of “the present meagre sum and guardian relief’ and cottage houses instead of 
the workhouse 43
The essence of Labour’s policies was to improve the lives of the proletariat on 
issues like housing, employment, health and education.44 It was not the privileged who 
were at risk of ending up in the workhouse at advanced age, who stood to lose by 
industrial accidents or who needed an extra year at school. While all of the community 
might profit if youth unemployment were reduced or if deaths in childbirth declined, it 
is easy to see that the working class would be the main beneficiaries.45 And when 
Labour addressed the housewife and pointed out that bacon had increased in price by 4d. 
a pound, it was the working- class housewife to whom it was talking. Labour appealed 
to proletarians covering all life stages, work and family life and future opportunities.46
Labour made a joint appeal to working-class consumers, receiving as it did 
valuable assistance from the co-operative movement47 The Daily Herald General 
Election edition of May had an article in it by Alfred Barnes, the leader of the Co­
operative Party, in which he urged co-operators to vote Labour.48 The basic ideals of 
both were identical, he said, in the first election in which the Co-operative and Labour 
parties had entered into a conscious alliance. Those candidates who represented the Co­
42 Leaflet 226 loc. cit.
43 Leaflet 221 loc. cit.
44 Worley, Labour Inside the Gate, p. 15.
45 Thus whether through class consciousness or the broad image of the party suggesting it would improve 
a voter’s living standards, Labour usually stood to gain by workers going to the poll. Cf. Duncan Tanner, 
Political Change and the Labour Party 1900-1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 82.
46 Compare this with an approach based on analysis of the electoral results: In 1929 “it was less dependent 
upon its ‘core’ supporters than ever before. It captured nearly 75 seats for the first time of which many 
were Tory strongholds. The party’s appeal had somehow expanded.” Duncan Tanner ‘Class Voting and 
Radical Politics: the Liberal and Labour Parties 1910-1931’ in Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor (eds.), 
Party, State and Society. Electoral Politics in Britain since 1820 (Aldershot, Scolar Press, 1997), p. 120. 
Note that Tanner considers only industrial and mining seats to be the “core.”
47 The movement’s purchase of Reynolds News was a boon to Labour, which thus gained a Sunday 
newspaper sympathetic to it. Rowe, ‘The British General Election of 1929’, p. 80.
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operative Party on a Labour ticket explained why their fellow members should support 
them. W. Hirst in Bradford South, for instance, talked about how trusts and combines 
were menacing the movement and necessitated co-operators’ being directly represented 
in the House of Commons.49 He cited the example of the Conservative Minister of 
Health who had prevented the co-operatives issuing dividend vouchers on prescriptions, 
as evidence of how his movement might be disadvantaged in future.
The middle classes
In 1929, for the first time in its manifesto, Labour attacked the Government over 
policies acting against the interests of someone other than the workers, namely the extra 
indirect taxation on “wage earners, shopkeepers and lower middle classes.”50 
Considering the last two as one, to what extent was the appeal borne out in the rest of 
the electoral materials? The Labour Speaker’s Handbook had a section about de-rating 
among coverage of the “Tory budget, 1929-1930.”51 This was a measure cutting the 
rates on agricultural land and large business premises. Since shops and family 
businesses did not benefit from this policy, it opened up possible avenues of appeal for 
Labour. Thus it produced a leaflet, “Tories Hand out Gifts”, which showed Baldwin 
offering a cheque for £ 4, 000, 000 to a tail-coated capitalist with the legend “British 
Chemicals” on his trousers, while an apron-clad greengrocer looks on enviously as he 
“had none.”52 This was aimed at householders and shopkeepers, who were told about 
reductions to a quarter in the rates for large employers, while “their [own] rates are 
likely to increase eventually because of the Tory scheme.” A. V. Alexander, the Co­
operative Party candidate for Sheffield Hillsborough, had printed a personal version of 
it and used it in his campaign.
Beyond this it would not be true to say that Labour made it a priority to attract 
lower middle-class support during the 1929 election or from groups above that in 
society. Apart from the one mentioned, there was a second leaflet on de-rating as
48 P. 11 found in folder JN 1055 A6.
49 Folder marked 1929 G. ELECTION ENGLISH BOROUGHS.
50 Quoted in F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British General Election Manifestos 1918-1966 (Chichester, Political 
Reference Publications, 1970), p. 55. Labour did, however, have leaflets for teachers and white-collar 
workers in the 1923 election. Dominic Wring, The Politics o f Marketing the Labour Party (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 26-27.
51 LP/ELEC/1929/1. Labour Speaker’s Handbook 1929, facing p. 1.
52 LP/ELEC/1929/1. Leaflet 223 in folder marked JN 1055 A6. Note that the accompanying text makes it 
clear that the correct figure is £ 400,000.
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benefiting the rich and working to the detriment of small businesses.53 But Ramsay 
MacDonald made it clear that changing the De-Rating Act would not be among his top 
priorities.54 Implicitly the petite bourgeoisie was not considered among those sections of 
society who had anything to lose by Labour rule. The voicing of their concerns in the 
manifesto is proof of that. Very few candidates attempted to woo any part of the middle 
classes. William Cormack in the Hillhead constituency of Glasgow mentioned his 
concern for shopkeepers and householders.55 Wilfred Whiteley in Birmingham 
Ladywood’s appeal to the lower middle class was taken straight from the manifesto.56 
Thus, out of all the available campaign materials for individual candidates, only three 
made a pitch for petit bourgeois voters in their constituencies. While undoubtedly at 
least the Labour leadership sought to govern with the interests of the entire nation in 
mind, apart from their occasional wooing of farmers (which was really part of its rural 
campaign primarily directed at agricultural workers), those higher up than small 
property owners were never approached. This only changed when it was realized 
Socialism provided a way of winning both professional and manual workers.57
Conclusion: The 1929 election 
Appendix 4 contains a list of topics dealt with in the election statements and, 
confirming the findings above, it will be seen that 100% of them dealt with 
unemployment and 94% with pensions. Other notable issues were peace which came 
across in 97% of these messages, 48% of candidates particularly stressed the topic and 
half promised disarmament. It has been professed that “Labour tended to appeal to the 
electorate from a moral perspective that endeavoured, simultaneously, to be relevant to 
the everyday concerns of its constituents.” This was easy to do since a lot of the moral 
perspective was that the disadvantaged had the right to a better life. 45% of the 
statements, according to the list, dealt with agriculture, but this must be understood in 
the context of the very large number of urban candidates who had nothing to gain by 
focusing on this. Labour’s tactics were called “stratified electioneering”. This meant
53 Leaflet 224 in folder marked JN 1055 A6.
54 Daily Herald 6 May 1929, p. 1.
55 Folder marked 1929 GEN. ELECTION SCOTLAND + WALES. BOROUGHS COUNTIES.
56,Folder marked 1929 G. ELECTION ENGLISH BOROUGHS.
57 And this is why clause 4 was introduced in the first place. Ross McKibbin, The Evolution o f the Labour 
Party 1910-1924 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 97.
58 Ball, Thorpe and Worley ‘Elections, Leaflets and Whist Drives’ in Worley (ed.), Labour’s Grass Roots,
p. 18.
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that each section of the electorate was addressed in language that it found easy to 
understand, emphasizing points of interest for the section and subordinating matters that 
were “dull or unpleasant.”59
The rural classes, particularly farm workers, and women were especially 
targeted in 1929. Both groups were necessary for the continued growth of Labour. 
Besides this the base consisted quite naturally of the working class. These people in 
their varying guises as the unemployed, pensioners, housewives as well as trade 
unionists were implicitly at the root of almost every electoral appeal. The lower middle 
class was also supposed to be a target group in this year. Thus there were two leaflets 
about de-rating, and the case was made also in the occasional speech as provided for in 
the Speaker’s Handbook. The appeal was tepid, though. Hardly any candidates bothered 
to take it up and Labour’s leader essentially made it clear that the petite bourgeoisie 
were someway down the list of priorities. Appeals to other middle-class people did not 
occur except in the case of farmers. The one exception to this were the “little letters” 
printed in the Daily Herald which were reasoned appeals to teachers, businessmen and 
shopkeepers. Each of these only appeared once. They were designed to sway people 
who were deemed to be sceptical about the party or whose support would be especially 
welcome, and thus included new female voters, Tory working men, domestic servants, 
fishermen and habitual abstainers.
Summing up, there were few surprises about the 1929 electoral appeals. The 
most striking feature is the thorough attention paid to the countryside. The number of 
Labour candidates was, however, rising with each election, from 514 in 1924 to 569 in 
1929, and with this trend it was obvious that Labour would have to try its hand in seats 
where there was no Trades Council and perhaps only a weak constituency Labour party. 
If the local branches in agricultural districts were small, it made all the more sense for 
propaganda and attention to be directed from party headquarters.
Introduction to the 1931 election 
1931 was the election Labour did not want to fight. It lost its leader and some 
senior figures in its government due to the political and financial crises, and the 
literature which had been written for an autumn campaign had to be pulped.60 It was to
59 Labour Organiser XI (August 1931), p. 144. This is an article by Sidney Webb reprinted from 
November 1922.
60 Labour Party Reports o f Annual Conferences. 32nd Report (London, Labour Party, 1932), p. 63.
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have formed the basis for the general election materials, but suddenly became obsolete. 
The election was fought largely on trust with the National Government asking for a 
doctor’s mandate to take whatever measures it felt the economic situation required. 
Labour’s real plan was to limit the scale of the defeat, and from that it may be expected 
that it would fall back on its established supporters. This is not exactly what happened 
as for electoral appeal, though there was some truth in it as for the seats that were 
contested. But although temporarily withdrawing from many difficult constituencies, 
Labour continued to frame its appeals widely. From the issues that were mentioned in 
the statements it can be seen how the party chose to present itself. 93% were in favour 
of free trade and thus against tariffs, 96% wrote about the cut in unemployment benefit 
and 75% about the salary cut for civil servants, which Labour opposed.61 Naturally 
unemployment continued to be a major issue as 71% of statements mentioned it, while 
67% talked about wages or the general standard of living.62 A great majority of Labour 
candidates said they were in favour of the nationalization of the Bank of England (76%) 
and lesser numbers mentioned other sectors or industries that should be nationalized. In 
what follows leaflets and candidate’s addresses will be used to give further details of 
Labour’s electoral appeal.
The rural classes
As was shown in the 1929 election rural dwellers were much in focus as 
potential Labour voters. To what extent were they a target group again two years later? 
During 1930 the party published a total of 20 new leaflets, and of these at least five 
concerned countryside issues. The salient points about these were provided in the 
Notes for Speakers. They emphasized public land ownership and control, and for 
agricultural workers the provision of untied cottages, unemployment insurance and a 
National Wages Board to look into conditions of employment.64 The first two points 
were repeated later in a section especially for farm workers along with the Labour 
Housing (Agricultural Workers) Act and the 40,000 houses which should be built. 
Farmers’ concerns would have been described in the leaflets published in 1930, but
61 Andrew Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 220.
62 Ibid., p. 221.
63 Despite just 6.1% of the occupied population earning its living from the land. Ross McKibbin, The 
Ideologies o f Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 
279. The explanation of Labour’s apparent lack of a sense of proportion was that there were still 86 
constituencies with more than 30% agriculturists. Kinnear, The British Voter, p. 120.
64 LP/ELEC/1931/1. Notes for Speakers, p. 1633 in folder marked SERIALS JN 1055 1931.
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which could not be used in the election due to the radically changed circumstance. They 
were among the people Labour thought of as “useful” in the countryside along with 
their employees and some professionals, possibly including vets, lawyers, bankers, 
teachers and parsons.65 Although the historical literature tends to portray Labour as 
opportunistic in its concern for the land and mostly out to win votes,66 the party had 
genuine plans for the country. Since these were analogous to its industrial plans, they 
were scarcely less important.67
As for those materials which made it onto the campaign trail, a noteworthy 
leaflet is headlined “Tell Them This Story in the Village Inn.” It explained how 150, 
000 farm workers, tired of their lack of opportunities, had left the land in the previous 
ten years. When Labour was in office it passed a Land Act allowing farm workers, the 
unemployed, ex-service men and others to settle on allotments and become 
smallholders.68 Before being driven out Labour provided for 64,000 applicants to settle 
on the land, and had prepared to place another 120, 000 when the National Government 
took over and ended the policy as an economy measure. This was a well-worded 
statement because it showed that Labour was leading farm workers to a better life, 
whereas their successors in government did not have any such measures.
In the flyer “’National Government’ Attacks Farm Workers” Labour showed 
that their opponents were promoting illegality in the country.69 Since many employers 
were not observing Labour’s 1924 Agricultural Wages Act, in October 1929 the new 
Labour government had appointed a team of special investigators to make enquiries on 
every farm, visiting each district systematically. The team found that one in five farmers 
was paying less than the minimum wage. The National Government had dismissed the 
special investigators, and only Labour could pledge to bring them back and strengthen 
the Wages Act. A second leaflet also juxtaposed National Government inaction or 
worse with Labour’s positive policies for the agricultural worker. Appealing to these 
workers in the boldest way possible, it said that their wages would be cut, working
65 Labour Organiser X (July 1930), p. 120. Note that the author goes on to question whether all farmers 
really are needed.
66 Nicholas Mansfield, English Farmworkers and Local Patriotism, 1900-1930 (Aldershot, Ashgate,
2001), p. 162, p. 190. Ray Groves, Sharpen the Sickle! The History o f the Farmworkers ’ Union (London, 
Porcupine Press, 1949), pp. 218-219.
67 Nationalize the land, turn farmers into “managers” and raise living standards for agricultural workers. 
Seep. 180.
68 LP/ELEC/1931/1. Leaflet 319 in folder marked JN 1055 A6.
69 Leaflet 324 loc. cit.
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hours extended and thus their standard of living lowered.70 The justification for this 
claim was that the National Government had already cut the pay of “tens of thousands” 
of employees. It also mentioned that unemployment benefit had been reduced, resulting 
in 800,000 workers being handed over to the Poor Law. The aim of this flyer was to 
scare farm workers, working against the general sense of national calamity put about by 
the National Government. The reverse page listed what Labour would do for 
agricultural workers. Among the policies listed were abolishing tied cottages, 
introducing a scheme of unemployment insurance, safeguarding wages and providing 
allotments and smallholdings.
Agricultural interests, including those of the farmer, often appeared as priorities 
in each candidate’s statement to the voters.71 Dan Chater, seeking election in South 
Hammersmith, quantified Labour’s ambition of land settlement to half a million men
77more becoming smallholders, thus giving new opportunities for the urban poor. This 
would take place within the context of land nationalization. Chater, who was a Co­
operative candidate, saw “co-operation, efficiency and scientific marketing” as the key 
to the goal of greater food production. He mentioned farmers and agricultural workers 
as the groups he hoped to benefit, although not specifying how. Edward Stocker in East 
Dorset held up the prospect of a repeal of the Agricultural Wages Act if the National
TXGovernment was returned, basing his gloom upon the dismissal of the inspectors.
Based on the demographic make-up of the constituencies, some candidates 
prioritized farmers in their statements. Saffron Walden’s S. S. Wilson promoted a 
coherent argument related to the land, talking about what the Labour government had
7 Adone including land drainage, afforestation and the marketing of agricultural produce. 
Given a majority, he said, there would be bulk purchases of commodities and import 
boards to stop unfair competition. Both farmers and consumers (“the housewife”) would 
be protected against speculators. In Macclesfield D. Scott Morton mentioned farmers 
before agricultural labourers; the former must be protected against “the rapacity of the 
landlords.”75 He also wanted to do away with middlemen.
70 Leaflet 323 loc. cit.
71 Labour simply assumed it was entitled to represent rural workers and formers, unlike many European
Socialist parties which grudgingly came to the conclusion that they could do so. McKibbin, The Evolution 
o f the Labour Party 1910-1924, pp. 150-151.
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The only mention of the fishing industry along with agriculture came from E. J. 
C. Neep in the Lowestoft division of East Suffolk.76 As Lowestoft was an important 
centre for fishing, there were many electors there who made their living from it. Neep 
pointed to the special committee set up by Labour on how to improve conditions for 
fishermen, and promised that Labour would institute a thorough examination of their 
problems. This was the policy from the last election. E. J. Pay in Rugby mentioned that 
badly paid agricultural workers were a menace to industrial workers since the 
countryside was “a hunting ground for cheap labour” for employers in other
77industries.
On the whole, these comments and concerns may be taken as representative of 
how Labour appealed to the countryside during the 1931 election. There was real 
continuity with the preceding election despite the differing circumstances. Farmers 
received more attention previously, but this can easily be attributed to the loss of 
literature associated with the secession of the Prime Minister. Agricultural labourers 
were very much a target group in both elections. In 1931 there were many mentions of 
import boards to control the prices of agricultural produce.78 Although probably 
intended to work in tandem with land nationalization and associated with emerging 
Socialism, they did contradict the frequent insistence that Labour was a free trade party, 
as mentioned by Snowden in his notorious “madcap finance” anti-Labour speech.79
Women
Women, who were singled out for special consideration in the previous election 
campaign, often had appeals addressed to them in 1931 as well. One of these illustrates 
well that Labour ostensibly ran against protectionism. Entitled “Tariffs and the 
Housewife” it claimed that the National Government’s desire for a free hand would
O A
mean “dearer food and therefore less food. Since housewives often managed the 
budget of a family, this point about tariffs was addressed to them in particular, a 
standard Labour device. Exactly the same argument was made in the leaflet “This is for
16 Loc. cit.
77 Loc. cit.
78 Dr Haden-Guest of Wycombe specifically said import boards but not tariffs, which would foil in their 
object. Loc. cit.
79 Import and export boards were in the manifesto, but were made little play of by Labour candidates, 
anxious to present themselves as free traders. Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931, p. 248.
80 Leaflet 308 in folder marked JN 1055 A6.
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you Madam”.81 Here there was talk of how bread, butter, bacon and cheese would all be 
more expensive ‘Svhen the Tories impose food taxes.” The message was to vote Labour 
to make one’s money go further— an example of what was identified as its typical 
policy of improving the purchasing power of working people. In a leaflet on the Labour 
government’s achievements, pensions for women were the first measure described.82 
Thousands of women, the party claimed, were unjustifiably denied a pension by the 
Conservatives. Labour’s Pension Act of 1929 would ultimately benefit more than 500, 
000 widows and old age pensioners, including widows who were left out of the previous 
Act.
The Notes for Speakers did have a section headed for women campaigners, 
explaining how they should urge their sex to support Labour. The reasons given were 
not gender specific, though. Labour was a united party with all of the people’s 
movement behind it— political, industrial and co-operative— with a clear programme. 
(This was obviously meant to contrast with the National Government’s various 
component parts and diffuse policies.) Perhaps the aims of that programme were 
thought to be more to the taste of women: national welfare, family security, 
international peace and co-operation. In actual fact the real agitation to women is to be 
found later under the section for housewives.84 Here it was claimed that cuts in grants to 
health and education authorities would deprive necessitous mothers and babies of milk 
and hungry children of school meals. For housewives the speakers were to use scare 
tactics. With wage and unemployment benefit cuts compounded by price rises, 
especially on imported goods after Britain left the gold standard, “the outlook is a 
terrible one.”85
In the personal statements of the candidates, women were much in evidence, and 
like in 1929 there was usually half a page or so written by the candidate’s wife or 
female relation (unless the candidate herself was a woman). This presented a kind of 
family to family appeal, and was probably intended to ensure that everyone in a 
household voted the same way. These notes were usually of a general nature. In contrast
81 Leaflet 314 loc. cit.
82 Leaflet 304 loc. cit.
83 Notes for Speakers, p. 1663 in folder marked SERIALS JN 1055 1931.
84 The appeal to working women was somewhat compromised by the Labour government’s decision to 
restrict married women’s eligibility for unemployment benefit. Savage and Miles, The Remaking o f the 
British Working Class, 1840-1940, p. 87.
85 Notes for Speakers, p. 1665 in folder marked SERIALS JN 1055 1931.
168
there was W. Barratt’s statement for the constituency of Northeast Bethnal Green.86 He 
stressed that he was against cuts in maternity grants, as they would make the women 
and children of that area suffer. Ben Smith, Labour candidate for Rotherhithe, appealed 
to women on the basis of resisting cutbacks in public expenditure on health and benefits 
for mothers and children. He also promised to make every effort to prevent maternal 
mortality. Alfreda H. Maynard, the wife of the candidate in East Fulham, Sir John 
Maynard, mentioned these concerns, and also the 300, 000 widows a year whom Labour 
had secured pensions.88
Overall there was a tendency of appealing to women by name, but not to hold 
forth policies that were particularly relevant to them as women. As an example take the 
brochure “To the Womenfolk” by Eva Bowen, wife of the candidate J. W. Bowen in 
Crewe.89 Although beginning by stating that “this is our election” the rationale for 
voting Labour appeared to be the standard reasons of decent wages, comfortable houses 
at moderate rents and improved educational facilities. Actually what she was doing was 
appealing to the working class, which might find all of these policies attractive. But, as 
discussed before, these appeals tried to put in clear language the experience of 
proletarian women, and class situation was still more important than gender. Elsie Price, 
the wife of the candidate in Whitehaven, wrote: “If my husband was unemployed, I, 
being the mother of children, would vote for a man I considered the correct mouthpiece 
to voice our interests.”90 In other words, women should vote according to her husband’s 
interests and those of her family.
Women were still a target group in 1931, as they had been in 1929. Appeals to 
them were a matter of course. But centrally there is no doubt that women received less 
attention than in 1929.91 Out of the 20 leaflets produced by the party in 1930, which 
were mostly discarded owing to the special circumstances, not one can be attributed as 
being intended particularly for women from the title. Because there was no stimulus to 
prioritize women in 1931, as there had been two years before (the “flapper” vote), they 
were somehow lost from view. There is much to suggest that Labour was driven by
86 LP/ELEC/1931/2. Folder marked 1931 GEN. ELECTION LONDON.
87 Loc. cit.
88 Loc. cit.
89 LP/ELEC/1931/2. Folder marked 1931 GEN. ELECTION ENGLISH COUNTIES.
90 Loc. cit.
91 Cf. Pamela Graves, Labour Women. Women in British Working-Class Politics 1918-1939 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 149.
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circumstances in choosing to whom it would make a special effort in addition to the 
core voters.
The working class
Given the issue on which Labour was forced out of office (cuts in 
unemployment benefit) and the crisis atmosphere in which the subsequent election was 
fought, it might have been expected that Labour would fall back upon its most loyal 
following. This was not exactly what happened; the party continued to reach out to 
other sections of the electorate. But naturally part of its central campaign was targeted at 
workers in industry, trade unionists and co-operators.
An uncorrected proof of a leaflet entitled “The Attack on the Wage Earner” 
rehearsed the main arguments along this line of appeal.92 Voting for Labour meant 
protecting the workers’ standards of living. The National Government, which was 
nothing but the Tory party under a new name, had already cut the wages in the public 
sector and had raised contributions for unemployment insurance. A million workers had 
been thrown onto the Poor Law. The National Government wanted to introduce tariffs, 
which would make food dearer. Against all these hostile measures, the solution was to 
“Stand by your Union Leaders. Defend Yourself! Vote Labour.”
A flyer devoted to the issue of coal was intended to extricate Labour from being 
seen as responsible for the prevailing conditions in the industry. It reminded the voters 
that Labour did not have a majority when it passed the Coal Mines Bill in 1930. Thus it 
could not implement its policy of nationalization. The bill was heavily modified by the 
opposition and, moreover, when Labour took over in 1929 coal was in a “state of 
chaos.” The cotton industry received a similar flyer noting that the industry had 
experienced a severe depression since 1920.94 Here Labour had a lot less to offer, 
though, describing how in 1929 Labour set up a special commission. Its policy was the 
centralization of the industry with uneconomic units of production being eliminated.
This might have been a sensible policy, but does not sound very attractive.
A much clearer message was provided under the title of “You don’t want Lower 
Wages!”95 Concentrating on identifying MacDonald with Toryism, it stated that the 
National Government would significantly reduce wages, increase the cost of living by
9^  Leaflet 310 loc. cit.
93 Leaflet 325 loc. cit.
94 Leaflet 311 loc. cit.
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tariffs and food taxes and lay new burdens on industry by forcing the pound back to the 
gold standard. All these policies were designed to increase the incomes of the rich at the 
expense of the poor, and favouring the rentier over the producer. The same argument 
but only applied to wages was to be found in a flyer stating Labour’s opposition to 
dictation from the bankers.96 It was headed “Wages Must Come Down” and reminded 
the public that the Conservatives and Liberals were pledged to implement the bankers’ 
policy of cuts.
As an example of what the branches could do, take the plea to trade unionists to 
support Labour issued by the Paddington Trades Council and Labour Party. It opened 
dramatically by stating that the National Government had declared war on the workers.
It was the cuts in unemployment benefit which qualified for this description, the sheet 
noting further that on 12 November a total of 352,000 individuals— “our people”— 
would be pauperized by subjection to Public Assistance Committees, the means test and 
Poor Law administration. Of course this was highly frightening also to those workers 
currently employed as they could be next. There then followed a claim that the policy of 
the National Government would be that of the employers’ organizations, who were 
preparing the way for “the most tremendous wage-cutting campaign the workers have 
ever experienced.”97 In the worker’s own interest, therefore, he should vote Labour. The 
branch then revealed something about how it saw the national party: basically the party 
of the trade unionists and workers, a people’s party.
The co-operators were responsible for their own propaganda. Much of it was 
distributed through their candidates, but some was in newsletters covering a wider area. 
The York Equitable Industrial Society published what must be a free election newsletter, 
although dated November 1931. Here the Labour candidate for York, Fred Burgess, a 
life-long co-operator, explained that the aims of the Co-operative and Labour parties 
were identical.98 He claimed that Labour had kept its hands clean over the recent events, 
and said the future of co-operation relied upon the return of a Labour government. If 
that was an exaggeration at least one important thing was held in the balance for co- 
operators, namely their dividend. The paper warned that for years the Conservatives had 
been advocating a tax on co-operative profits, and private traders’ organizations had
95 Leaflet 318 loc. cit.
94 Leaflet 312 loc. cit.
97 LP/ELEC/1931/1 folder marked JN 1055 A6 1931.
98 LP/ELEC/1931/1. York Equitable Industrial Society ltd. Vol. 34-Local, No. 117 November 1931 in 
folder marked JN 1055 A5 1931.
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lobbied governments with this goal in mind. Thus, as the headline put it, “Your 
Dividend is in Danger! An Urgent Call!”
Both for the trade unions and the co-operators Labour served as a bulwark 
against undesirable developments. Given the economic crisis, the cuts and the panic 
atmosphere in which the election was fought, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
messages were relatively defensive, not providing a wholesale endorsement of Labour’s 
own policies. A further consideration in this regard was that MacDonald’s two minority 
governments had been able to accomplish relatively little. And while in its manifesto 
Labour assured its followers that it was confident of victory, the party, the trade unions 
and other sympathizing organizations were in reality fighting a rearguard action to 
diminish the scale of the defeat. Labour’s own Notes for Speakers gives as the reason 
for the election the Tory wish to kill Labour." Some pages later it was stated that 
Labour was too strong in Britain, and bankers and capitalists could not tolerate this in 
the world financial centre. The election was called in order to destroy the labour 
movement.
Labour knew well enough that it must curry favour with industrial workers and 
their families, to whom in one role or another the majority of their propaganda was 
directed, especially if those of analogous status in other sectors of the economy (like the 
primary sector) are included. In one leaflet J. R. Clynes, home secretary in the previous 
Labour government, explained the party’s attitude on this well. He said Labour was not 
the narrow class party which it was often accused of being.100 On the other hand, the 
working class was so large a part of the nation as to nearly be the nation itself. Despite 
the almost automatic concern with workers, a few notable examples of Labour’s pitch to 
them are worth noting.
In Finsbury Tom Williams, rather unusually for Labour candidates, came across 
as an intensely class conscious worker. He asked who should rule— Parliament or the 
bankers— then described himself as the son of a miner who had laboured in the trade 
unions, party and co-operative movement for the improvement of life for the workers. “I 
am happy in this election to be fighting the battle of the class to which I belong.”101 
Dave Andrews, candidate for South Poplar, promised to strive for “a full and healthy
99 Notes for Speakers, p. 1664 in folder marked SERIALS JN 1055 1931.
100 LP/ELEC/1931/1. Leaflet 313 in folder marked JN 1055 A6 1931.
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life for all members of our class.”102 Later he underlined that “We working people have 
the power, would we but learn to use it, to rid our lives of the spectre of want and 
unemployment.” It was not their opinions which stood out, but their clear identification 
of themselves as ordinary workers. Most candidates instead strove to appear somewhat 
elevated by using whatever titles they possessed. They could be deferential too. In 1929, 
H. B. Lees-Smith, even printed praise from the Conservative Home Secretary Sir 
William Joynson-Hicks on the first page o»f his election brochure. Perhaps 
respectability was what Labour needed to .gain support from more privileged people.
The middle classes
In 1931 the cuts of the National Government gave Labour the opportunity to 
more truly represent the workers “by hand and by brain”, that is, reaching above the 
working class into the petite bourgeoisie amd propertyless intelligentsia. The previous 
decade had witnessed efforts to gain the middle classes for the party, including a Daily 
Herald campaign in 1925.104 In the same year a contributor to the Labour Organiser 
urged increased attention on teachers, who were vulnerable to the right-wing press’s 
attacks on “progressive education”.105 Win*iing over non-traditional Labour voters did 
not amount to a shift in policy, but it was a shift in practice.
So a flyer describing who a Labour vote would help save put the teachers 
first.106 Next followed servicemen, third were the police. The other groups mentioned 
were, in order, the unemployed, the workers and salaried officials, and lastly, the 
persons with small or fixed incomes. One may argue about the exact class or status 
affiliation of these groups, but it is difficult to gainsay that together they spanned 
beyond the working class. It is worth noting that once the Labour Party began asking for 
support from these groups, once it had clearly stated that it wished to represent them, 
then the propaganda against wage cuts and some of the other materials hitherto 
associated with the working class, may have chimed with the new target audiences as 
well.
102 Loc. cit.
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Contrary to this, however, the middle classes may not have recognized 
themselves when the TUC issued its “Call to the Workers” in the run-up to the general 
election.107 Signed by Walter Citrine, it lambasted the National Government for the cuts 
in the salaries of teachers, civil servants and the police. But when it addressed its 
audience as “fellow workers” and asked it to reinforce its industrial strength by voting 
Labour, it cannot have intended to persuade the aforementioned groups.
Among the candidates the overwhelming majority pledged to restore the cuts in 
wages, salaries and benefits of the affected groups. In order to appeal to the division of 
the workforce called the middle classes, though, it was necessary to mention some 
occupations associated with them, the more explicitly the better. For instance, Henry 
Smith of Hampstead pledged to restore the government economies at the expense of
1 Oft . _ ,public servants, and would work for the progress of the less well paid of them. This
was not so clearly aimed at attracting middle-class support because he could be talking 
about postmen. In contrast, Dr Haden-Guest of Wycombe in Bucks specifically wrote 
about the middle classes by name when he claimed they were threatened. His 
constituency was experiencing a rise in the number of such people. He said they must 
avoid economic entrenchment which had been tried for some years in Germany with 
disastrous consequences for precisely this group, who had sunk “into the mass of
| AQ
unskilled workers” while the country had been brought to the brink of bankruptcy.
There was, however, one group which Labour had claimed to speak for in its 
1929 manifesto, but the appeals to which were somewhat stunted, namely the lower 
middle class. On this occasion it was much more in evidence. Dr Alfred Salter was the 
candidate for West Bermondsey and the Bermondsey Labour Magazine published his 
comments that Labour was against the economy measures because they laid the burden 
of meeting the crisis upon the working and lower middle classes.110 In Mile End John 
Scurr said the National Government’s variation of allowances for income tax had hit the 
small shopkeeper very hard (and also the professional man).111 Arthur Wiltshire of 
South Dorset was one of many who made the point that shopkeepers suffered when
107 Folder marked JN 1055 A8 1931.
108 LP/ELEC/1931/2 Folder marked 1931 GEN. ELECTION LONDON.
' 109 Folder marked 1931 GEN. ELECTION ENGLISH COUNTIES.
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wage earners had less money to spend.112 J. W. Bowen of Crewe claimed the National 
Government had raised taxes for the lower middle and working classes.113
The appeals to small property owners were usually based on the damage to their 
businesses caused by National Government policy.114 A particularly well put appeal was 
by Fred Longden of Deritend in Birmingham.115 The manufacturer and shopkeeper 
could expect fewer orders under the National Government, but higher taxes to cover the 
budget deficit and higher rates to fend for the increased number of destitute. Charles 
Fox of Gloucester said the small trader must choose between being crushed by the 
combines or joining with the people’s movement.116 J. R. Clynes, who has already been 
mentioned on this issue, produced a brochure to businesspeople, shopkeepers and
117tradesmen in the constituency of Platting. He urged them to break free from the 
monopolists and help make them pay more back to the nation, and moreover, to realize 
that wage earners and businesspeople had mutual interests.
There was no shortage, then, of appeals to the lower middle class, and some of 
the above aimed higher up the social scale too.118 Most of the appeals targeted at 
professionals were to be found under the heading of resistance to the cuts in salaries. 
Candidates varied between themselves on how much they stressed the plight of the 
unemployed and the possible hardship of the educated.119 A different approach to 
winning votes from the middle classes could be witnessed in George Lansbury’s East 
End constituency of Bow and Bromley.120 In an area dominated by workers, he played 
upon the sympathy of ministers of religion and social workers for the unemployed. 
Charles Duncan of Clay Cross said the National Government was balancing the budget 
by throwing burdens on the poor and middle-class families.121 He underlined the 
enthusiastic support of the House of Lords for these measures, holding forth a class
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dimension to the crisis and trying to make those in the middle come down on the side of 
Labour. Many more examples could be appended, but the vital point is that 
professionals as well as the lower middle class were addressed.
Liberals
Another new development in 1931 was that Labour began consistently urging 
Liberals to come over to the Party. Again this was driven to a great extent by 
circumstances. The genius of the National Government’s campaign was that its 
component parts formed a kind of cartel, dividing up the seats among themselves, 
isolating the opposition (primarily Labour) and taking advantage of the first-past-the- 
post electoral system. Because its rhetoric was ostensibly national over special interest 
groups, it was something with which nearly everyone could identify. To counteract this, 
Labour’s only hope was to break down the colossus by stressing the class dimension of 
the crisis, try to hold onto their existing voters and gain some new ones.122 Since the 
Liberals had uncomfortably submerged their identity into the National Government, 
aware that their policy of free trade was bound to lose against the stronger 
Conservatives’ protectionist stance, they created an opening for Labour to appeal to 
normally Liberal voters on the basis of the former.123
While there was very little central direction in this, the case for trying to gain 
support from the Liberal electorate on the basis of free trade made itself, especially after 
David Lloyd George had broadcast a speech reinforcing that appeal from his home on 
15 October. Independent Liberal Lloyd George had said that he would not hesitate to 
vote for a free-trade Labour candidate against a protectionist. A great many Labour 
candidates quoted from this speech in their personal electoral materials. The basis for 
appealing to Liberals nevertheless went wider. Dr R. A. Lyster, Labour’s candidate for 
Winchester, mentioned peace, disarmament, the League of Nations, taxation of land 
values before his opposition to protection, tariffs and food taxes in his “Open Letter to 
Liberals”. Ernest Winterton in Loughborough concentrated on education, temperance
m  As demonstrated by the Questions released by the Labour Party Press and Publicity Department to be 
used against National candidates. JN 1055 A6.
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reform and healthy homes as the means to achieve this end, although these reasons were 
mentioned on the level of banality. (“They are keen on education. So am I.”)125 
Robert Young in North Islington quoted Lloyd George’s opinion that the
i ‘’i f *election was a “Tory ramp,” which was exactly what Labour believed. Young 
promised to fight food taxers. Sometimes the plea to Liberals would go far enough for 
an alliance to be formed. In South Devonshire Major D. Graham Pole received an 
endorsement form the late Liberal candidate E. J. Johnson, not specifying exactly why 
Liberals should vote for Pole, but criticizing the Conservatives heavily.127 Frank Wynne 
Davies of Stroud used the fact that he was an ex-Liberal to urge all those of progressive 
thought to support him, and appended quotes from Lloyd George.
Since “Liberal” was an ideological affiliation, it is not surprising that Labour 
should offer ideal benefits to these voters when trying to persuade them to vote Labour. 
Free trade was by far the most important element, with other policies having a role in 
reinforcing a progressive alliance between individuals and the Labour Party. The latter 
was aided by there only being 24 contests between Liberal Nationals and Labour. In the 
20 contests that were straight fights between a Liberal and a Labour candidate, there 
was no telling reason why Liberals should switch allegiance unless they distrusted their 
candidate on the tariff question.
Conclusion: The 1931 election 
Thus, it is evident that Labour’s basis for agitation became wider in 1931 than it 
had been in 1929. The focus on attracting Liberals, even as Labour was undergoing 
severe trauma and having its very existence challenged, confirmed its replacement of 
the Liberals as the party of the left in the two-party system. This had been an ongoing 
process since 1918 and its goal in the 1920s.129 By appealing seriously to the middle 
classes, Labour began to follow through the implications of its claim to stand for the 
entire nation. And it found it could do so easily on the basis of its own attitudes and 
ideology when the National Government cut salaries. In common resistance to an attack
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on living standards, Labour hoped to forge an alliance stretching from the unemployed 
into the bourgeoisie. It should be remembered, though, that some candidates were less 
keen than others on the idea, and concentrated on appealing to the disadvantaged out of 
these groups, ignoring the more fortunate. For those candidates there was no change 
from 1929.
While Labour reached out to important new groups, there were some who were 
less in evidence in 1931 than in 1929. Farmers were still appealed to in rural 
constituencies, but no specific campaign was directed at them centrally. It is possible 
that they would have received more attention had the election been fought at the time of 
Labour’s choosing. The party continued to try to rally agricultural workers with leaflets 
produced by the party machine, instructions to candidates and locally directed appeals.
Women remained a target group for Labour and were appealed to as working 
women, housewives or widows.130 They continued to be a highly significant electoral 
group, but the focus on them was less intense than it had been in 1929. This can be laid 
at the door of the crisis atmosphere in which the election was fought, or simply that 
1929 provided an extra impetus since the last section of the female population was 
enfranchised in time for it.
When the votes had been counted and it was clear that Labour had suffered a 
great defeat, a number of explanations were offered with regard to the party’s 
campaigning strategy. Labour had not been ready to fight an election, but its method of 
wooing the voters had hardly changed much from 1929 when it did well. Its defeat gave 
opponents the chance for ideological point scoring. Izvestia, the official organ of the 
Soviet Government, said it was on the cards that the Conservatives would win as 
Henderson’s programme was merely intended to attract the labour aristocracy and the 
lower middle class.131 The Notes for Speakers took the upbeat view that Labour had 
obtained nearly seven million votes for Socialism. In the next few years the strategy of 
the party would be to persuade people to become Socialists, rather than seek the
1 1 9ephemeral support of those who “are swayed by sentiment.”
130 But were disproportionately blamed for Labour’s poor result. It was thought that female electors had 
“succumbed” the most to the propaganda of the National Government. Labour Organiser XI (November 
1931), p. 203. Also see p. 217 of die same issue where young people “particularly the young women” are 
blamed.
131 The Times, 29 October 1931.
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Introduction to the election of 1935
And indeed the 1935 election was fought much more on ideology.133
International affairs were highly important, and made for a campaign more about
principles and broad lines than was the case in 1929 and 1931.134 Although Labour’s
campaigning mirrored that of the other parties and could be summed up as “election
address, election meetings, canvass, poll card and polling day arrangements”,
1theoretically it should not be like this. Unlike the Liberals and Conservatives it had
some fundamental convictions about which it needed to persuade the electorate. Labour
published leaflets with titles like “Murder from the Air” (Disarmament) and “End the
1Financier’s Dictatorship”. This might be thought to make it harder to pinpoint exactly 
from whom they sought support, because ideologically convinced Socialists could be 
found in all walks of life. This is true to the extent that a larger proportion of the 
propaganda had general themes. Creating and expanding an electoral base occurred 
largely independently of grand ideas. But in 1935 54% of Labour candidates wrote
1 ^ 7about Socialism in their statements, compared to just 8% in 1929. It was after 1931 
and the financial crisis that a planned Socialist economy gradually became Labour’s 
most marked policy. It had previously downplayed its ideology in order to appear more 
“respectable”.138
The rural classes
In 1935 Labour fielded 552 candidates, which was a distinct improvement on 
1931. It had long wanted to do well in the countryside, and now it contested difficult 
constituencies again, which meant that rural dwellers could act on the propaganda and 
go and vote Labour if so inclined. As an introduction to the party’s policies the leaflet
132 Notes for Speakers, p. 1745 in LP/ELEC/1931/1 folder marked SERIALS JN 1055 1931
133 Socialism, and its corollary nationalization, was one of the most talked about issues of the election. 
This was in keeping with Attlee’s goals for the campaign. Tom Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts the 
Opposition. The British General Election o f1935 (London, Croom Helm, 1980), p. 169.
Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, The Growth o f the British Party System. Volume I I 1924-1964 (London, John 
Barker, 1965), pp. 111-112.
135 Labour Organiser XV (September 1935), p. 161.
136 Labour was very attuned to the role of the financial sector in capitalism. Partly this was the result of 
the fell of its government in 1931. In April 1932 a G. D. H. Cole-prepared digest of the thoughts of 
leading Labour figures concluded there was unanimity on the need for “immediate control of Finance.” 
Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright, ‘Labour and the Lessons of 1931 ’, History 63:207 (1978), p. 48.
137 Stannage, op. cit., p. 291. Rowe, ‘The British General Election of 1929’, p. 207.
138 Matthew Worley ‘Building the Party: Labour Party Activism in Five British Counties between the 
Wars’, Labour History Review 70:1 (2005), p. 83.
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“What Rural Britain Wants” summarized Labour’s main objectives. These were 
prosperous farms, well-paid agricultural workers, maintenance for the rural unemployed 
and a working economy (thriving shops and prosperous markets).139 Naturally doing 
away with the tied cottage and providing housing at low rent remained a priority for 
Labour. The reverse side went into more detail about policy, explaining nationalization 
of the land, settlement on the land and the national plan for the countryside.
The Notes for Speakers put Labour’s understanding of the countryside 
succinctly. The landlords of huge estates were not occupiers of the land, but they 
drained off the best of it in rents while leaving some of it derelict.140 Farmers were the 
next link in the chain, and they enjoyed no security of tenure. This in turn was passed on 
to their labourers, who were eking out a very tenuous existence. For this reason Labour 
concentrated on gaining farmers and agricultural workers for its cause, and would 
eliminate landlords through nationalization. It thus had policies designed to benefit the 
farmer and wanted to protect him from middlemen who took part of his profits, and 
sometimes against foreign competition through import boards. It had even more 
concrete, understandable policies for the labourers: greater security and higher living 
standards through untied cottages, higher wages, allotments of land and educational 
opportunities.
It was mainly farmers who were sceptical about Labour’s agricultural policies, 
so a flyer was produced to set their minds at rest. Meeting the challenge of the 
Conservatives, it dealt with the assertions that Labour would farm from Whitehall, was 
out for “control”, and would “nationalize.”141 The flyer explained that the State would 
take the landowner’s place, find the necessary capital, provide good conditions and 
security of tenure for the farmer. Under Labour the farmer would get on with farming, 
but would not be a landowner. Maybe as part of the conscious attempt to build 
Socialism instead of just winning the election, it ended with an appeal to join the Labour 
Party and support trade unionism.
By 1935, however, it was becoming clearer that Labour could not make much 
headway with farmers.142 Quoting the Notes for Speakers, Ernest Davies of
139 LP/ELEC/1935/1. Leaflet 42 in folder marked GENERAL ELECTION 1935 LABOUR PARTY.
140 Notes for Speakers, p. 57. Marked JN 1055 A8 1935.
141 Leaflet 15 in folder marked GENERAL ELECTION 1935 LABOUR PARTY.
142 Under the National Government a number of marketing innovations had been brought to farming. 
Agriculture Minister Walter Elliot’s schemes were not particularly popular, but the disaffection did not 
take the shape of voting Labour as its reforms were even more wide-ranging. Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts 
the Opposition, p. 163. Cf. Mansfield, English Farmworkers and Local Patriotism, 1900-1930, p. 197. In
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Peterborough in his campaign statement revealed that the National Government had 
given farmers £ 45 million a year in direct and indirect subsidies. These were not in any 
way helping the agricultural labourer, whose wages had been falling since 1931, 
although now restored to that level.143 In addition many were paid less than the 
minimum wage, as the inspectors Labour had appointed had been dismissed by the 
National Government. For these reasons or for others, “[t]he Labour Party puts the 
interests of the farm worker before that of the farmer or the landlord” according to 
Davies. He did, nevertheless, repeat Labour’s policy of cutting out middlemen to make 
sure the farmer received a decent price for his produce. His final appeal was to farm 
workers only, whom he promised better houses, pensions at 60 and a higher standard of 
living.
The booklet “Fifty Reasons Why You Should Vote Labour” gave reasons why 
the classes of the countryside ought to support the party.144 Many of these were 
rehashed from previous elections, but some of the facts at least were new. Number 32 
was agricultural wages, and Labour promised to increase them gradually through a 
scheme of a National Wages Board. It acknowledged that the National Government had 
accepted the principle of unemployment insurance for most workers, but said it did 
nothing about it in the outgoing Parliament.145 In number 33 Labour pointed to its 
record over rural wages, in number 34 it promised to build 40,000 cottages at low rent. 
The latter point was based on Labour’s Housing (Rural Authorities) Act which 
remained on the Statute Book. Number 35, though, was a new element in Labour’s rural 
policy: the abolition of tithes. This would be effected gradually over 15 years, as the 
tithes would be redeemed on the same basis as compensation for the nationalization of 
land. In the mean time there should be a sliding scale linking tithes to prices. Because 
the Ministry of Agriculture’s index of agricultural prices had been falling in recent years, 
it would imply a lighter burden.
the 1920s many farmers clamoured for state intervention, but they could not bring themselves to vote 
Labour.
143 Folder marked 1935 GENERAL ELECTION ENGLISH COUNTIES.
144 Marked JN 1055 A6 1935.
145 Labour’s thunder was stolen by the Government announcing it would raise the school leaving age, 
increase child allowances and include agricultural workers in the unemployment insurance scheme. See 
Stannage, op. cit., p. 168. Craig (ed.), British General Election Manifestos 1918-1966, pp. 78, 80. Its only 
possible response was to cast doubts on the Government’s willingness to do so. It also argued it was 
pointless to raise the school-leaving age to 15 if local authorities could permit children of 14 to work. 
William Thomas Morgan, The British General Election o f1935. Reprintedfrom the South Atlantic 
Quarterly, Vol. XXXVII. No. 2. April 1938, p. 119.
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The greatest problem for Labour was that the National Government had lavished 
subsidies on farmers. They had not passed these on in the form of higher wages, and 
thus it was increasingly clear to Labour that it could not expect much support from them. 
They had a vested interest in the present state of society, and furthermore as Labour 
became more Socialist in inspiration, it could not but notice that farmers were 
employers. Candidates differed in how much emphasis they put on attracting them, 
probably in accordance with the demography of their constituencies. Labour continued 
to believe that its majority would come from the rural seats, but in the present election 
there were something like 200 urban divisions which it needed to win back.146 W. 
Simcock of Stone claimed that the higher food prices were not benefiting the farmer, so 
the subsidies were not really working.147 In its official propaganda Labour did try to 
gain the farming vote, but its admission of those great subsidies being received by the 
group must have made most candidates less sure of success. The agricultural workers 
unquestionably remained a Labour target group.
Women
Women are the second audience which have been looked at from election to 
election. Just one leaflet was especially intended for them in 1935, namely “Housewives 
Look at This”. Labour, however, considered women to be more concerned about 
children and health issues than men, and there were a further two flyers about these 
matters. The comparative lack of propaganda from the party machine should not be 
considered a downplaying of women as electors, because Labour’s literature in 1935 
was concentrated to a large extent on issues of war and peace, internationalism and 
ideology. Unlike 1931 the party’s Notes for Speakers gave comprehensive reasons why 
women should vote Labour.
The opening remarks made the assertion that women were more acutely affected
14ftby the injustices of the present economic system. The rest of the text was divided into 
arguments for housewives, mothers and working women. To the housewife they pointed 
out that the National Government had doubled food taxes. Labour was primarily talking 
to the working-class housewife here, a fact which it acknowledged openly. It promised
146 Labour Organiser XV (July 1935), pp. 139-140.
147 Folder marked 1935 GENERAL ELECTION ENGLISH BOROUGHS. In contrast the Government 
claimed food prices were lower, farmers were receiving 15% more for their produce than two years ago 
and agricultural workers had the highest wages for ten years. This could only be the effect of the subsidies. 
Stannage, op. cit., pp. 163-164, Craig, op. cit., p. 77.
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to remove the food taxes. To the mother it held out a comprehensive maternity service, 
for which plans existed when it was thrown out of office.149 It reminded them that the 
National Government had abolished free secondary schooling. The working woman was 
wooed with plans for proper legislation in regard to safety, health and ventilation.150 
This held true for both industrial and office workers. Labour added that the National 
Government caused hardship to unemployed married women in the Anomalies Act.
“Housewives Look at This” was directed at the core Labour female voter with 
allegations that the National Government has increased food taxes by £ 19.3 million 
from 1931 to 1934.151 While it was right to control the supply of foodstuffs, its policy 
was to make the poor pay. The health leaflet concentrated on issues of interest to 
women such as maternal mortality, health insurance benefits for women, nursery 
schools and maternity and child welfare.152 Labour would establish a public health 
service, which would include all of the priorities it was accusing the National 
Government of neglecting. Because most of the issues related to children in some form, 
it was primarily to mothers that Labour was able to appeal with this flyer. In any case 
Labour was promising to provide good maternity services, nursery schools and school 
meals for everyone, not just the certifiably under-nourished. While these would be of 
most use to working-class women, it is possible sympathy votes could be had on the 
basis of these as well. As Harold Greaves in the constituency of Camborne said, Labour 
appealed to women “in every section of the community, because it offers them peace, 
and for their children the hope of health and happiness.”153 The leaflet to parents was 
not gendered at all, but dealt with the education of children.154
In essence this concluded Labour’s appeal to the female sex in the 1935 election. 
There was very little beyond new facts which was novel. 1935 confirms that women 
were indeed one of the most important target groups for Labour, as there was much 
fewer materials designed to secure the support of other groups which have previously 
been dealt with. As Socialists Labour believed in welfare, and having few economic 
ideas beyond nationalization it was inevitable that the provision of decent services 
should occupy such a large part of the party’s policies. Labour believed that its incipient
148 Notes for Speakers, p. 47. Marked JN 1055 A8 1935.
149 Ibid., p. 50.
150 Ibid., p. 51.
151 Leaflet 37 in folder marked GENERAL ELECTION 1935 LABOUR PARTY.
152 Leaflet 38 loc. cit.
153 Folder marked 1935 GENERAL ELECTION ENGLISH COUNTIES
154 Leaflet 39 in folder marked GENERAL ELECTION 1935 LABOUR PARTY
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welfare state could attract women, and therefore it considered itself a woman’s party. 
The targeting of women in 1929 was thus not entirely opportunistic. All the time 
Labour’s electoral wooing of women was based on a perception of their unique needs, 
their role in the family, prospects to be part of the economy and their perceived interests 
in peace and opportunities for children.
The middle classes
In 1931 a new development of great import was discovered, namely the wooing 
of the lower and professional middle classes. Together with the very close attention paid 
to rural voters, this had the potential of turning Labour into a truly national party. It was 
already a people’s party in that it looked after the interests of common people more than 
it worried about advantages for industry and commerce. After 1931 Labour continued 
focusing on those who were better off than workers. This can best be seen in Sir 
Stafford Cripps’s pamphlet from 1933 “Are You a Worker? Where the Middle Class 
Stands” and another effort from 1934, Lawrence Benjamin’s “The Position of the 
Middle Class Worker in the Transition to Socialism”.
Cripps’s pamphlet attempted to enter into the mindset of middle-class people, 
much like an article in the London News had done before the 1929 election.155 
Beginning carefully he underlined that Labour sought a classless society, not one in 
which the present position of the classes were reversed.156 He went on to question 
whether there could be any middle position between capitalists and employees, stressing 
that this class division is not based on birth or even wealth.157 Small property owners 
should remember that any day under the present system they might be thrown into 
unemployment and impoverishment.158 Cripps said this was a much greater worry than 
that their small savings or house might be lost, traditionally their reason for throwing in 
their lot with the capitalist parties. He also reminded them that “hundreds and 
thousands” of these petit bourgeois people were now claiming unemployment benefit or 
were on the Poor Law, while the large capitalists were using the aforementioned savings 
to prop up the profits of private enterprise.159 Security was the main reason why the 
middle classes should support Socialism. An argument which he advanced was that
155 See chapter 1, p. 46f.
156 Are you a Worker? Where the Middle Class Stands, p. 3 in LHASC box 329.13.
151 Ibid., p. 5.
158 Ibid., p. 6.
159 Ibid., p. 7.
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state employment had always been seen as the safest way to make a living. This held 
true for the civil service, the colonial and Indian services, the army, the police or local 
government.160 Under Socialism, of course, the State would be the only employer, and 
everyone would partake of these secure conditions. Therefore the real choice every 
elector had was between safety and security under Socialism, or his savings preserving 
him from destitution under capitalism. Naturally there were a great number of ideal 
factors as well such as the plight of others, the opportunity to serve the community, the 
poor living and housing conditions under capitalism and the war which would inevitably 
follow from the anarchy of international capital.161 Cripps thus united two strands 
within recent Labour thinking: the renewed emphasis on Socialism and the need to 
communicate with the more prosperous members of the nation.
Lawrence Benjamin, naturally enough, was also out to reassure professionals 
that they would not lose their livelihood under Socialism. Neither would they be 
brought down to the conditions presently prevailing for labourers.162 On the contrary, 
the aim was to “level up” the lower paid to the position and status of professional 
workers. While there would be a transfer of ownership from the relatively few to the 
entire public, the personnel of these industries, both skilled and manual, would continue 
as before. It would be possible to raise the many without lowering the educated 
because Socialism would mean an expansion of national output. This was a completely 
reasonable assumption at the time, since capitalism was associated with the economic 
crisis. In addition, Socialism presented attractive prospects for those who were engaged 
in society’s civilizing work— the middle classes— and Benjamin went on to enumerate 
almost all of these people.164 He promised that Socialism would make provision for the 
economic and social status of every useful professional worker, and would liberate him 
from having to struggle to keep himself and his family in decent circumstances.165
Cripps and Benjamin were able to present coherent arguments why the middle 
class should not be afraid of the Labour Party, and moreover advanced reasons why in 
fact their lives would be better under Socialism.166 Neither of them really addressed the
162 The Position o f the Middle-Class Worker in the Transition to Socialism (London, Labour Party, 1935), 
pp. 15-16 in LHASC box 329.13.
Ibid, p. 10.
'“ Ibid., p. 16.
165 Ibid, p. 17.
166 With what success is another question. It is possible that Labour’s image as the party of the working 
class may have made it unthinkable for the bourgeoisie to vote for it. Contrary to its intentions stressing
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concerns of small property owners, though, what is called the lower middle class. 
Cripps’s mention of these was to make the purely negative point that their situation was 
not good under capitalism either, but what future did they have under the common 
ownership of the factors of production? In reality, Labour could not accommodate this 
group if it was going to stress its Socialism, which is why in 1935 it all but neglected 
the petite bourgeoisie.
In 1931 some candidates began stressing the unity of interests between wage 
earners and shopkeepers or small manufacturers. The last two could not sell their goods 
if workers were left unemployed or received serious pay cuts. This was still an entirely 
valid argument, but judging by the available election addresses, fewer candidates did so. 
Frank Anderson of Whitehaven did make this point, and he also told house owners that 
their rates were higher because the Government refused to “accept liability for the 
unemployed on relief.”167 William Hirst in Bradford South produced an election 
newspaper, in which an imaginary shopkeeper explained why he would be voting
1 Afi .Labour. This shopkeeper had previously voted against the party, but was now on 
board because the spending power of his customers mattered to him. He represented 
how the party thought about this occupation, and it assumed small property owners had 
voted for Labour’s opponents out of status consciousness. There were no centrally 
produced brochures for the lower middle class, although it could be argued that much of 
the information about health, education and such matters would be equally applicable to 
this group as to wage earners. From the available material it seems Labour reverted to 
its 1929 practice, which was to be conscious of this group, but not to focus much effort 
on it.
As shown above, Socialism was no hindrance to paying attention to the needs of 
professional workers; indeed the ideology in itself had something to offer. Often the 
altruistic reason of wishing to abolish the extremes of wealth and poverty was appended 
as well. Hirst’s Bradford South election paper also included a fictitious architect and he 
made this point, although saying that the narrow interests of his profession would lead 
him to support Labour anyway, as the party wanted large housing developments. While 
in For Socialism and Peace there was no special mention of the petite bourgeoisie, in it
Socialism may have alienated the latter, and in any case, Labour did not have the leadership to match the 
National Government. Jack Reynolds and Keith Layboum, Labour Heartland. A History o f the Labour 
Party in West Yorkshire during the Inter-war Years 1918-1939 (Bradford, Bradford University Press, 
1987), p. 126.
167 Folder marked 1935 GENERAL ELECTION ENGLISH COUNTIES.
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Labour “appeals to the technician and the professional man, because it believes that it 
can offer them a wider and more creative opportunity of public service than is theirs 
today.”169
Two examples of appeals to professionals will be appended. The fact that both 
candidates are mentioned elsewhere in sections about 1935, is telling proof that there 
was not a plethora of such appeals. In the constituency of Stone, W. Simcock claimed 
that the professional classes were turning to Socialism. They were doing so out of 
concern about the lack of security for their future and that of their children. Moreover,
1 7 0“the lesson given in the Churches every week is the Socialist lesson of unselfishness.” 
Harold Greaves of Camborne quoted the appeal to the middle classes from the 
programme in his statement to the electors.171 While professionals were becoming a real 
target group for Labour, it is not a matter of doubt that a great many candidates left 
them out of their campaigning. The party was not offered automatic opportunities to get 
across to the middle classes this time, as the cuts in teachers’ and civil servants’ salaries 
had been restored. There was no centrally directed propaganda aimed particularly at this 
section of society.
While there were not many more direct appeals to the professional middle class 
than to small property owners, the general tendency of the campaign gives the 
impression that this was somewhat incidental and possibly a result of deficiencies in the 
archival materials. The former were mentioned in the programme, and appealed to at 
length in two pamphlets, the latter were not. Professional workers could easily be 
encompassed in the Socialist nation that Labour wanted to build, while the petite 
bourgeoisie was a side-effect of private enterprise. The middle classes continued to be 
less favoured as potential voters than core groups.172 Co-operators were much more 
often mentioned in candidate statements, but this was possibly because Labour had a 
concrete policy: repealing the co-op tax. (In a similar way the middle classes were more 
in evidence when Labour promised to reverse their salary cuts in 1931.) It is 
conceivable that Labour failed to distinguish more positively between professional
168 Folder marked 1935 GENERAL ELECTION ENGLISH BOROUGHS.
169 For Socialism and Peace. The Labour Party’s Programme o f Action (London, Labour Party, 1934), p. 
3 in LHASC box 329.12.
170 Folder marked 1935 GENERAL ELECTION ENGLISH BOROUGHS.
171 Folder marked 1935 GENERAL ELECTION ENGLISH COUNTIES.
172 Without it being the fault of Labour in any way, the results of the 1935 election were more marked by 
the class factor than any election held up to that time. First and foremost this was caused by the 
disintegration of the Liberals. Kinnear, The British Voter, p. 52.
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workers and labourers, believing that both would recognize themselves as wage earners 
or workers. Hus, if so, was a failure of rhetoric. When Herbert Morrison said that the 
Labour Party promoted all who labour, the clarification that this included doctors, 
directors and civil engineers was in fact a necessary one.173 But enough materials exist 
for the conclusion that the middle class continued to be seen as potential Labour voters 
by the organization and its candidates.
Liberals
Another indication of Labour’s emerging role as one of the two main parties, 
which paradoxically began in 1931, were the appeals to Liberals. As was also seen, the 
check to Labour fortunes in 1931 made it profile itself as more of a Socialist party in 
1935. It turned its fire on the National Government, as might be expected, with at least 
seven flyers attacking all aspects of its record and two out of seven pamphlets also 
essentially indictments of the current incumbents in office.174 Since Labour centrally 
concentrated on showing up the National Government, it did not issue any propaganda 
designed to sway Liberal voters to its cause. It was left to the individual candidates to 
attempt this if they wished.
Cuthbert Thomson was the candidate for Roxburgh and Selkirk, and he said that 
nationally Liberalism had given way to Labour and would do so in the Borders as
1 7<well. This meant that he realized the Liberals were still a force to be reckoned with in 
his constituency and in Scotland.176 But instead of harking back to the past, Liberals 
should give their support to Labour. The most noteworthy rhetoric was to be found in 
the statement of H. B. Lees-Smith of Keighley, who had the advantage of having been a 
Liberal MP for nine years.177 He could thus say with special authority: join with Labour 
to further your political aims; I did it. He also had the luck not to face a Liberal
173 Folder marked 1935 GENERAL ELECTION ENGLISH COUNTIES. And he argued that such 
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6:2 (1995), p. 180.
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candidate in his constituency. On the League of Nations, disarmament, peace, 
unemployment, housing and education, he claimed the Liberals had been voting with 
Labour during the last Parliament. So beyond the vague assurance that progressive 
Liberalism was best served by Labour today, which was what the other candidates said, 
he was able to give some proof for why this should be so.
On the whole, though, the appeals to Liberals were unimaginative and ritualistic. 
And there were very few of them, scarcely going beyond what has been outlined here. 
Liberals were not really a target group in 1935, by no means as much as they had been 
in 1931. Perhaps it was their withdrawal from the National Government which made 
Labour judge that their voters were not likely to support another party. Apart from Mr 
Lees-Smith’s, all of the appeals bore the hallmark of being throwaway lines, simply put 
there to try all possible avenues to get votes. There were no instructions from central 
office on how to frame appeals that might tally with Liberal supporters. In fact, there 
was a warning about diluting the party’s message in order to appear more attractive to
• 17fiLiberals. It was thought to be a bad idea to stress free trade to the exclusion of 
Socialism, as it risked confusing committed Labour voters. In sum it would be fair to 
conclude that Labour candidates were always aware that as they replaced the Liberals 
(and the process was not completed in 1935), they had the opportunity of making new 
gains within this group, but, paradoxically perhaps, it was in 1931 that Labour seriously 
tried to do so, while only displaying a token interest in 1929 and 1935.
Conclusion
The electoral materials in 1935 produced centrally dealt with the broad issues, 
and were seldom tailor-made to particular groups. There is no section above about 
industrial workers or core groups because even they did not seem to be favoured in the 
brochures. There was less written propaganda in 1935 than on the other occasions, and 
what exists must be read carefully to see who the intended target groups were. Appeals 
to the classes of the countryside continued, but it was now officially accepted that 
farmers would not turn to Labour in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless some appeals 
to the occupation took place in 1935 and 53% of all candidates mentioned agriculture in 
their statements. Agricultural workers were still a priority for Labour, and they as well 
, as farmers had been targeted since 1929, the first of the elections looked at herein.
178 Labour Organiser XV (July 1935), p. 134.
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IThere were questions about how opportunistic Labour’s appeal to women had 
been in 1929, owing to the lack of a follow-up in 1931.1935, however, confirmed the 
seriousness with which Labour regarded this demographic group. The incipient welfare 
state the party planned to create was the main benefit Labour offered women. It 
included such features as a public health service with nursery schools, maternity 
services, school meals for everyone, etc. The reduction of maternal mortality was held 
forth as a great priority, and there would be health insurance benefits for women. It was 
still thought that Labour’s anti-war stance would be popular with women, and this was 
one of the ways in which females of higher social standing might be persuaded to vote 
for the party. Otherwise it was understood that the appeal to women was primarily to 
that section of the working class.
The aim of attracting middle-class people had really only taken off in 1931. It 
happened in conjunction with cuts in salaries by the National Government, but three to 
four years later Labour explained what Socialism and the society it hoped to build 
offered professional workers. The main theme was security. The appeals to the middle 
class were not great in number, though, but by 1935 it was a standard point of view that 
Labour was a party also for them. The lower middle class of small property owners, on 
the other hand, largely disappeared as a target group despite being designated as such in 
1929 before Labour started wooing professionals. Ideological considerations were 
behind this development. In 1935 Labour presented itself as a markedly Socialist party 
and there was no room for small businesspeople. Some candidates continued to make 
the assertion that the turnovers of the petite bourgeoisie relied on the wages of the 
workers being kept high. Even so Labour’s position reverted to that of 1929 when it was 
conscious of this group, but paid little attention to it. And in 1935 it did not honour them 
with a brochure, either.
In 1931 many candidates had attempted to win votes from Liberal supporters. 
This once again was occasioned by current events, in this case the intervention of Lloyd 
George in the election with the assertion that Liberals should vote for free trade 
candidates everywhere, not supporters of the National Government. In 1935 far fewer 
Labour candidates attempted to woo Liberals. Those who did generally said that Labour 
was the new progressive force in politics, and that there was no room for a third party.
I:
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As a result of the above considerations, it may be seen that Labour presented 
itself as a wider, more national party in 1935 than in 1929.179 Farmers and the petite 
bourgeoisie were not really expected to be part of the social coalition Labour was trying 
to build, but urban and rural workers, professionals, co-operators and some ex-Liberals 
were meant to carry the party forward. 1931 was a turning point also when it came to 
electoral appeals, and paradoxically as the party was experiencing severe trauma its 
outreach was at its greatest. In 1929 the party was too workerist to bring in new groups 
and in 1935 its ideological stance often crowded out the individual targeting of many 
sections of the community. Nevertheless, it is possible to see a change in Labour’s 
attitudes during these three elections. The rural classes were important to the party 
throughout this period, and when the middle class was included in 1931 it was clear that 
Labour was finally living up to its pledge of representing “the workers by hand and by 
brain.”
179 But note that studies of by-elections between 1932 and 1939 as well as the 1935 election, have 
confirmed the resilience of the pattern of group support created in 1931. D. H. Close, The Realignment 
of the British Electorate in 1931’, History 67:221 (1982), pp. 403-404.
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Chapter 4. The Electoral Appeals of the Norwegian 
Labour Party in 1930,1933 and 1936.
Introduction
In chapter 2 it was described how DNA campaigned during the elections of 1930, 
1933 and 1936. This chapter examines the propaganda used. It looks for appeals in the 
brochures, leaflets and films produced by DNA. It shows how the party argued that the 
relevant group should support it, and includes both analysis and narration of the contents of 
the materials. A lot of the pamphlets were written specifically for some group, and here the 
appeal of course is crystal clear. But other appeals occurred in a more circumstantial way. 
The matter is investigated from first principles and as in chapter 2 coverage is 
chronological, i.e. election by election.
The main question is to whom the electioneering was directed. From whom did 
DNA hope or expect to gain its support? Were there any developments over time? Electoral 
appeal was covered briefly in chapter 2 for Oslo as the capital diverged from the national 
case. As by far the most important local party, Oslo DNA acted as the avant-garde and its 
appeals to new groups were later taken up across the nation. This was true for both non- 
unionized workers and clerks.
The 1930s mark the point when DNA emerged as a party of government. It thus 
reached Stein Rokkan’s fourth threshold, that of executive power, in 1935 when for the 
second time in its history, it formed a government.1 Unlike the short-lived experiment of 
1928, this one was meant to last. Rokkan’s notion of stages sheds some light on this 
development as the years were marked by DNA’s increasing integration into society. In 
1930 its programme of principles seemed to imply that it was at least as interested in 
uniting its core constituency of industrial workers as in winning the election. In 1933 it 
would initially reform society rather than overthrow it, while in 1936 it was the governing 
party and accepted what it had previously seen as bourgeois symbols of statehood, such as 
the national anthem and the flag. Significantly, its integration into the political system
1 Rokkan with Campbell, Torsvik and Valen, Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Comparative 
Study o f the Processes o f Development (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1970), p. 79.
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resulted in the workers’ integration into the nation. This understanding is that of the Social 
Democratic tradition of Halvdan Koht and other historians.2 Why did these changes come 
about? There are three main reasons: 1. the fear of fascism after Hitler’s rise to power in 
Germany in 1933, 2. the stalemate in industrial conflict after the lockout of 1931 and 3. 
medium-term developments promoted deradicalization anyway: leaving the Comintern in 
1923 and reuniting with the Social Democrats in 1927.3
Introduction to the 1930 election 
In 1930 DNA’s materials consisted almost exclusively of pamphlets, which seemed 
to be its preferred method of reaching out to the voters in written form. Only “Vote with the 
Norwegian Labour Party” was in the medium of a leaflet.4 An interesting point in this 
regard is that pamphlets used for electioneering imply sincere communication with the 
voters. They cost more to produce and take longer to read than mere flyers. Although 
regular newspapers and one designed specifically for the election were also used, DNA was 
expecting the voters to make a bit of effort to find out what it was offering. And yet in a 
succinct way the only leaflet sums up the kind of rhetoric used by DNA in the 1930 
election. It was a year marked by class action on both sides of the political divide. Thus 
“Vote with the Norwegian Labour Party” was addressed “to the working class of Norway” 
and signed by AFL leader Halvard Olsen as well as DNA chairman Oscar Torp. Never 
before, it announced, had it been so clear in an election that the political struggle was 
between two classes: the ruling bourgeoisie represented by the capitalist parties and the 
population of workers represented by DNA. It was clear that workers, smallholders and 
fishermen belonged to one and the same class. They were united also in having DNA to 
speak for them, for the party had striven to better conditions for fishermen and the 
inhabitants of the countryside. DNA had consistently opposed the return of the krone to the
2 Hallvard Tjelmeland, ’Avradikaliseringa av Det norske Arbeiderparti i mellomkrigstida. Ei historiografisk 
drafting’, Cand. Philol. thesis, University of Tromse, 1982, pp. 213-214. In 1814 only the privileged were 
members of the nation, but during the 19* century peasants began to be included. The carrier of their claims 
was the Liberals. In the 1930s workers were also included in this “imagined community”. Cf. Knut Martin 
Heidar ‘The Deradicalisation of Working Class Parties: A Study of Three Labour Branches in Norway’, Ph.
D. thesis, University of London 1980, pp. 167-168.
3 For the lockout see chapter 2, pp.l 12-113. The medium-term factors are the subject of Tjelmeland, op. cit.
. 4 Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Biblitek (AAB), Oslo: ‘Stem med Det norske Arbeiderparti’, marked q329 
(481)15 N81 br 1930.
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gold standard with its attendant misery for the three groups (due to necessary deflation of 
the economy and loans having to be repaid at higher rates). The only mention of farmers 
{bonder), though, was in connection with the Agrarian Party having betrayed them.5 There 
was no direct suggestion that they vote DNA, probably because farmers were deemed not 
to belong to the working class.6 This message, intended for core supporters, was modified 
somewhat by the pamphlets. Nevertheless it provides a salient introduction to this particular 
election. If it is borne in mind as a tendency, it serves to distinguish 1930 from the other 
two elections. DNA did not abandon the sentiments expressed in the leaflet, but the 
language was more conciliatory later. The three groups mentioned, considered as the 
workers of town and country, constituted DNA’s original base. Hereafter it will be seen to 
what extent it desired to add to it.
The working people
One brochure, “The Labour Party and the Election 1930”, was a handbook for 
activists according to its complete title.7 It began by supplying DNA’s programme, which 
justified why peasants and fishermen were in fact proletarians, as assumed in the statement 
above. They were forced under the domination of capital, which attained power over their 
land and livelihood (through mortgages). By demanding interest and profit from their work 
it exploited them ever more severely, and peasants and fishermen must therefore fight side 
by side with employees.8 This was a Marxist justification for why they came into this 
category. The main goal of the Norwegian Labour Party was to protect the daily interests of 
the working class, and to take the struggle to the point where “the working people” were 
masters of the land and the factors of production, and free from capitalist exploitation.9
“The working people”, a term central to all of DNA’s campaigning in the 1930s, 
roughly equalled the workers by hand and by brain {handen og dndens arbeidere) who
5 Bender means both peasants and farmers in Norwegian. The term has been translated according to context.
6 Traditionally it had been difficult for the Socialist labour movement to co-operate with farmers. During the 
Great War farmers were blamed for causing starvation among workers by raising the prices of agricultural 
products. These food shortages had ironically caused greater radicalization among workers and in labour 
circles. See Jorunn Bjorgum, Martin Tranmcel og radikaliseringen av norsk arbeiderbevegelse 1906-1918 
(Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1998), p. 352.
Arbeiderpartiet og valget 1930. Handbokfor agitatorene (Oslo, 1930).
* Ibid., p. 3.
9 Ibid., p. 4.
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were not capitalists or closely allied to the state (e.g. bureaucrats and officers). It functioned 
as a wider alternative to “working class”, taking in those whose status was higher and those 
who were self-employed but not privileged.10 “The working people” were the sections of 
society DNA claimed to speak for, and to which it consequently appealed. When treating 
the 1936 election, it will be discussed whether the term began encompassing more people 
as DNA gained support from new quarters.
A further example of DNA’s projected unification of these varying groups came 
through its use of the term “the little peopl&fsmdkdrsfolket). This was indicated in its 
description of the votes in Parliament in 1929 relating to the crisis of debt in the 
countryside. It demanded that all forced auctions of the homes of these people of humble 
means (an exact synonym) be stopped, and that councils as well as “the little people” be 
allowed to obtain relief through the law.11 These passages were underlined in the original. It 
went on to claim there was no way of debt relief but reduction, and that the debtor must be 
allowed to remain in control of his property.12 Fishermen were also in need of debt relief 
and support to improve production and distribution, and thus the term took on its full 
meaning as the workers of the country.13 Using the term “little people” aided these groups 
in recognizing themselves, as they may not have considered themselves “workers”.
The working class
Unionized workers in towns were, however, DNA’s most secure supporting group. 
The campaign’s only leaflet was addressed by name to them, and they were collectively 
members of the party. They knew what DNA stood for and if they did not, the programme 
declared the party was theirs. In any case, the appeal occurred through measures intended to 
improve their economic and cultural conditions of life. For instance, DNA produced a 
pamphlet devoted entirely to housing issues, promising to reintroduce controls on rents in 
large towns. These had previously been on the statute book, but had been repealed by the
10 This distinction was employed also by the Swedish Social Democrats. In the parliamentary election of 1911 
in Blekinge province, they chose the term “working people” over “workers” in some of their messages to the 
voters. Mary Hilson, Political Change and the Rise o f Labour in Comparative Perspective. Britain and 
Sweden 1890-1920 (Lund, Nordic Academic Press, 2006), p. 195.
11 Arbeiderpartiet og valget 1930, p. 23.
. 12 Ibid., p. 24.
13 Ibid., p. 32.
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rcapitalist parties with effect from 14 April 1931 (for the smallest apartments in Oslo, 14 
April 1934).14 In the manifesto it promised to remove the labour-hostile legislation known 
as “the workhouse laws”, because it made anyone persecuting strike-breakers liable to be 
sent there.15 It also offered support for building one’s own home and for co-operative house 
building. Moreover, an extension of social legislation including sickness and accident 
insurance, and support of workers’ sports were offered. Many of these were not just of 
benefit to the working class, but would assuredly improve its quality of life and economic 
circumstances, as would free books and materials at school.
There was one particular section of the working class that DNA laid special 
emphasis on, namely youth. In the employment section of its manifesto, DNA mentioned 
the safeguarding of proletarian youths’ working and living conditions before the repeal of 
“the workhouse laws“.16 Youth were referred to very early in DNA’s election brochure 
about rationalization and unemployment, where it was asserted that almost a third of the 
unemployed were below 25.17 The same text noted that the number of workers under 18 
had been reduced from 18, 667 to 10, 953 between 1915 and 1928.18 This was no indication 
that training and education for youth had improved, but a matter of destitution. No 
argument was given, but the logic was probably that as the number of jobs had contracted, 
the young had been squeezed out of the labour market to make room for breadwinners. In 
the statement to the electorate, DNA blamed the plight of youth and their increasing 
hopelessness on the capitalist parties.19
The rural classes
Even before 1930 smallholders and fishermen were given an equal position with the 
urban working class in DNA’s written communications.20 And, if they were not considered
14 K. F. Dahl, Husleiereguleringen og stortingsvalget. Frem tilforsvar for hjemmene (Oslo, Det norske 
Arbeiderpartis forlag, 1930), p. 15.
15 Arbeiderpartiet og valget 1930, p. 100.
16 Ibid., p. 100.
17 Alfred Madsen, Rasjonaliseringen og arbeidslosheten. Kamp mot den sfgerpende utbytning (Oslo, DNA, 
1930), p. 3.1R
Ibid., p.10.
19 ‘Stem med Det norske Arbeiderparti’.
20 It has been claimed that in the West Country and parts of the South, DNA presented itself as a party for 
industrial workers only. The brochures described in this chapter, which were used across the nation, belie this.
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as entirely “working class”, it is highly debatable whether their role was intended as merely 
a passive one of voting for the party, as has been argued.21 As early as 1930, before DNA 
had achieved real influence, it stressed the education of country youth as a high priority. In 
the handbook for activists, it reminded the reader that the Labour government of 1928 had 
wanted to spend 300, 000 kroner on free school materials in the country and 80, 000 kroner 
in the towns. It will later be seen that it criticized fishermen for not forming unions.
The stress on gaining the peasantry and fishermen for DNA can be seen from the 
fact that three out of seven brochures produced for the 1930 election were devoted entirely 
to them, beyond the many references to the classes of the countryside in those other 
publications. “The Land and the Peasants” was among these pamphlets, and it began with 
the admission that the peasantry had shown little interest in the ideas connected to the 
Socialist movement23 Thus the Labour Party, which was working for a Socialist state, had 
had little support from the ordinary farmer. The second pamphlet, however, was billed as a 
disclosure of the Agrarian Party’s betrayal of the people.24 Thus DNA consciously entered 
the territory of the Agrarians in search of new votes, and it knew there was a genuine 
opportunity because in 1927 DNA had made significant gains in the countryside.25
How then did DNA argue that these segments of society should vote for it? It tried 
to show that traditional Socialist remedies would benefit at least the poorer farmers. 
Ownership of land, which should have protected against hunger and destitution, instead 
served to keep the debt-ridden farmers down.26 Their creditors now had a greater 
entitlement to the farmers’ produce than they themselves, since they had claims on their 
land. Thus none would derive more benefit from socialization than the farmers, it was
Gabriel 0idne ‘Litt om motsetninga mellom Austlandet og Vestlandet’ in Politiske valg i Norge. En 
artikkelsamling (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1966), p. 102. It is, however, probably true that DNA failed to 
expand much beyond workers in those areas. Knut Kjeldstadli ‘Arbeiderbevegelsen og andre folkelige 
bevegelser’, Arbeiderhistorie 2000, p. 20.
21 Inger Bjomhaug, ‘Arbeiderbevegelsen— en folkelig bevegelse?’, Arbeiderhistorie 2004, p. 179. She 
believes DNA intended to reform and develop the working class, but had no such plans for their other
supporters.
22 Arbeiderpartiet og valget 1930, p. 71.
23 I. K. Hognestad, Jorden og bonderne (Oslo, DNA, 1930) , p. 3.
24 K. M. Nordanger, Landsbygda og valget. Gjelds og skattepolitikken i lys av partienes stilling. En avsloring 
o n  bondepartiets folkebedrag (Oslo, DNA, 1930).
25 It gained 77,395 new votes in the rural areas compared to 25,483 in the towns. (A rise of 52% and 22% 
respectively.) Ivar Arne Roset, Det norske Arbeiderparti ogHomsruds regjeringsdannelse i 1928 (Oslo,
; Universitetsforlaget, 1962), p. 63.
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claimed. A second line of argument was that only 6% of farmers owned more than 25 acres 
of cultivated land. By far the largest number of peasants were smallholders, working 
farmers who subsisted from their own toil. “In other words, the peasants are workers aid 
belong to the rest of the working class.”28 “Peasants, support the Norwegian Labour Party,” 
was the underlined message. And there was an indirect appeal to look at Socialism again, 
too, as it was mentioned that only under a different system would the exploitation of 
farmers and other workers stop, no matter how much was done for profitable production or 
how many parliamentary speeches were made.29
It is possible to conceive of all country dwellers as peasants, as a status group 
having a similar style of life and allegedly common interests, in a nation-state that was 
becoming increasingly industrial.30 The Agrarian Party promoted this view, a tactic made 
easier by any farmer’s ability to associate himself with its name, no matter how small his 
affairs. In actual fact, though, the countryside was stratified by classes, and it became the 
task of DNA to point out that the Agrarians only worked for the largest and richest 
farmers.31 It was able to provide a long list of Labour proposals for improving the 
conditions of the less privileged country dwellers, with the appended remark that the 
Agrarians had voted against every single one of these in Parliament. What then were the 
distinctive features of DNA’s policies in the countryside? One characteristic idea in 1930 
was to cut 10 million kroner from the defence budget (“the useless military”), and spend it 
on land settlement and cultivation.32 It declared in its manifesto that it wanted the 
Smallholding and Housing Bank to be strengthened so as to provide interest-free mortgages 
for land settlement and cheap loans.33 Further, there would be land for homeless families 
and building materials at reduced cost. And, confirming that DNA had no interest in the
26 Hognestad, Jorden og bondeme, p. 7.
27 Ibid, p. 22.
28 Loc. cit., p. 22.
29 Ibid., p. 23.
30 This can be seen from the declining proportion of farm workers within the proletariat. In 1910 they 
constituted 22.9 % of all workers, declining slowly to 21.5 % in 1920 and 18.0% in 1930. Stefano Bartolini, 
The Political Mobilization o f the European Left 1860-1980. The Class Cleavage (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 476.
31 DNA thought of maybe six categories of peasants determined by the amount of land owned. Knut
Kjeldstadli,’” Arbeider, bonde, vfire haere...” Arbeiderpartiet og bondene 1930-1939*, Tidsshiftfor 
Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 2/1978, p. 75.
i Nordanger, Landsbygda og valget., p. 13.
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support of larger farmers, great swathes of property in land and forests would be 
nationalized if they were not suited for the management of a single farmer.
Fishermen
As mentioned, fishermen received a brochure to themselves, but being very much a 
part of DNA’s concept “the working people44, their interests were also addressed in the 
pamphlet about rationalization and unemployment. Here it was argued that an industrial 
revolution had taken place in fishing.34 Motorized fishing boats, expanded fishing areas, 
new methods and equipment had dramatically increased production. But at the same time 
the working fisherman was suffering from more uncertainty and less prosperity than before. 
In other words, he had been proletarianized; growing production was just one side of the 
coin, the other being increasing despondency in the homes of the fishermen. It also served 
as an explanation for why a Marxist and Socialist party should take an interest in them.35 
And just as DNA sought to make fishermen feel as labourers and therefore its natural 
constituency, so it attempted to make them class conscious. As one author noted: by 
coming under capitalism they were forced to reflect not just on their own woes, but on the 
economic conflict of the entire people.36 Socialism was indeed evident in the party’s 
intentions for the fisheries. Fishing companies would be nationalized and collectivized.37 
Co-operation among fishermen would be promoted, with applications for the take-over of 
bait and oil distribution, the establishment of cold storage plants, the buying of equipment, 
admittance to fishing stations and the granting of credit. On a national level, DNA wanted 
control of distribution including exports, and would work to establish greater markets 
abroad.
Socialism was also the order of the day in the pamphlet written especially for 
fishermen. Noting that they were more exploited and lived under worse conditions than 
almost any other occupation, the pamphlet laid the greatest blame for this on the lack of
33 Hognestad, Jorden og bondeme, p. 32.
34 Madsen, Rasjonaliseringen og arbeidslosheten, p. 8.
35 At the beginning of the interwar period roughly 3A of fishermen owned their own means of production and 
were therefore petit bourgeois rather than workers. Karl Egil Johansen, ‘Proletar eller sm&borgar? Fiskarane i 
politikk og samfunn’, Historisk Tidsskrift 81:2 (2002), p. 379.
3 6 , ,  , . 0Madsen, op. a t., p. 8.
'  37 Arbeiderpartiet og valget 1930, p. 49.
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fishermen’s trade and political associations.38 The remedy would be organization in co­
operation with the AFL. This would look after the fishermen’s interests, and make for 
social and economic progress. But equally vitally, it would strengthen the class front 
politically. DNA’s idea that fishermen were one of the most grievously exploited groups in 
society was not mere rhetoric without foundation. Statistics for 1929 showed that fishermen 
had experienced a loss of income compared to industrial workers. Their average income of 
1,351 kroner a year was not even half that of the wages of factory workers at 2, 813 kroner, 
although primary occupations produced their own food.39
DNA realized that the coastal districts had previously been dominated by the 
capitalist parties, but hoped that the destitution of these areas would make fishermen look 
again at the struggle between the ideas of capitalism and Socialism.40 Certainly the 
capitalist parties had proved reluctant to support DNA’s proposals for greater expenditure 
to support small farmers, smallholders and fishermen who were in danger of losing their 
homes.41 This was also the case for DNA’s plans for tariff improvements beneficial to the 
fishing population 42 A very significant policy was outlined some pages later, reforms to 
sickness insurance for fishermen. Currently it was difficult for workers from Troms county 
to get hospital treatment if they fished from Lofoten in the county of Nordland and vice 
versa 43 The low income that those engaged in fishing received also meant DNA could 
appeal to them in die same way as to the more traditional working class.
Perhaps surprisingly for electoral propaganda, DNA gently chided the fishermen for 
hitherto not having shown an interest in organizing themselves.44 Voting and sitting back 
was not enough.45 Other workers had reasoned in this way, and because of their unions, 
were doing better economically than fishermen. Some of the latter still did not believe they
38 AAB: Fiskeme og valget. Samvirke og plan— eller gjeld og avhengighet. Marked q329 (481)15 N81 br 
1930, p. 4.
39 Knut Kjeldstadli, Et splittet samfunn 1905-35. Aschehougs Norgeshistorie 10 (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1994), p.
109.
40 Fiskeme og valget, pp. 3-4.
41 Fr. Monsen, Awcebning eller militarisme? (Oslo, DNA, 1930), p. 28.
42 Fiskeme og valget, p. 14.
43 Ibid., p. 17.
44 The fishermen had founded an association in 1926, but it was only in the 1930s that it gained enough 
members to have any clout. Aksel Zachari as sen, Fra Marcus Throne til Martin Tranmcel. Det norske 
Arbeiderparti fram til 1945 (Oslo, Tiden, 1977), p. 319.
45 Fiskeme og valget, p. 18.
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had common interests with industrial workers, but who except employees would be the 
consumers of the products of smallholders and fishermen? (This was a fore-shadowing of 
the insight that led to counter-crisis proposals in 1933.) The appeal ended with the rousing 
statement that fishermen were class comrades, who should help forge the weapon needed to 
look after their own interests.46 They should join the fight to vanquish capitalist 
exploitation.
Summary
What is striking from reading these communications with peasants and fishermen is 
the emphasis DNA put on theoretical justification in appealing to them. It did not just say: 
vote for us and we will improve your lives. Instead it provided an invitation to join in the 
class struggle, and while its brochures do contain various policies attractive to their target 
groups, an underlying argument is that they are workers and hence they must support DNA. 
As such DNA indisputably showed it was still a Marxist party besides being a Socialist 
one, despite the reunification with the Social Democrats three years earlier. Much has been 
made of DNA’s decision to leave out of the programme its intention to “unite the working 
people and thereby the majority of the population” in favour of the first four words only,47 
but in actual fact this approach showed there was no contradiction in the two alternative 
phrases. By being a worker’s party, it was automatically a people’s party, although the 
theoretical construct of “the working people” was needed to smooth out the rough edges.48 
And the “majority of the population” was mentioned three times in the campaign’s only 
leaflet in a positive light as something to which the capitalist parties stood in opposition.49 
The synopsis of the rationalization of the fishing industry— remarked on in two 
publications— and the description of the land as really the property of financiers,
Ibid., back page.
47 E.g. See Per Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til makt (1920-1935). Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge 3 
(Oslo, Tiden, 1987), pp. 544-547. Einhart Lorenz, Arbeiderbevegelsens historie. En innforing. Norsk 
sosialisme i intemasjonalt perspektiv. 1. Del 1789-1930 (Oslo, Pax, 1972), p. 186.
48 Thus there is not such a great distinction between the two concepts as is sometimes thought. But the debate 
about whether DNA should be a workers’ party or a people’s party went back a long way. The revision of the 
programme in 1901 took out “the emancipation of the working class” in favour of “the people’s economic 
emancipation.” It also replaced “workers” by “the working people” and emphasized that the party was also for 
“less prosperous traders, industrialists and farmers.” Edvard Bull jr., Arbeiderklassen i norsk historie (Oslo,
, Tiden, 1947), p. 170.
49 Maurseth, op. cit., p. 543.
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convincingly make the claim that fishermen and farmers had become proletarians since 
they worked for the profit of others.50
White-collar workers
Could DNA make the same claim for clerks mid officials? It would have been easy 
to do so, as the party operated with the expression “workers by hand and by brain” {handen 
og andens arbeidere).51 The task of proving that white-collar workers are proletarians is 
much easier than for farmers and fishermen, since the first-mentioned do not own their 
means of production even in name.52 Nor were they much better paid than blue-collar 
workers. Figures for 1929 showed that in industry the average clerk made 2,994 kroner 
compared to the factory worker’s 2, 813 kroner.53 Lastly, in the same year the Association 
of Commercial Clerks (Norges handels- og kontorfunksjoncerers forbund) had joined die 
AFL.54 In spite of these weighty reasons, there was a real scarcity in appeals to white-collar 
workers by DNA in 1930. There were no pamphlets intended for them, and the few appeals 
that occurred were spread around.
The Labour government of 1928 had declared in its accession statement that it 
would negotiate with the unions of the civil servants to secure the eight-hour day and 
satisfactory work conditions.55 It was reproduced as an electoral appeal in the handbook for 
activists. There was also a reminder of the bad blood between the capitalist parties and civil 
servants, caused by the former refusing to accept the outcome of wage negotiations until 
forced to do so by the courts.56 The programme of the Labour Party did state that white- 
collar workers as well as manual workers were forced by unemployment and penury into a
50 This had been an agreed argument since reunification with the Social Democrats in 1927. Kaare Fostervoll, 
Norges sosialdemokratiske arbeidar-parti 1921-1927 (Oslo, Det norske samlaget, 1969), p. 123. It was often 
claimed that the Social Democrats were “semi-bourgeois” while DNA was “almost entirely” a proletarian 
party. If so, the formulation must have satisfied both groupings. Edvard Bull sr. ‘Arbeiderbevaegelsens stilling 
i detre nordiske land 1914-1920’, Tidsskrifi fo r Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 1976/1, p. 26.
51 See for instance Hognestad, Jorden og bondeme, p. 3.
52 Kjeldstadli’s understanding from reading the programme of 1930 is that clerks were part of “the working 
people”, though he says there is uncertainty about this. ‘"Arbeider, bonde, vfire haere.. Tidsskrifi for 
Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 2/1978, p. 15.
53 Kjeldstadli, Et splittet samfunn, p. 109.
54 Torgrim Titlestad, Stavanger. Norges rode by (Stavanger, Varmen, 1989), p. 82.
55 Arbeiderpartiet og valget 1930, p. 86.
56 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
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pressing, demeaning dependency on the capitalist class.57 This would support the argument 
that clerks and officials were part of “the working people” in DNA’s conception, which 
was unclear in 1930. White-collar workers were mentioned along with labourers in the 
brochure about rent control.58 They were probably the second most likely Labour voters in 
urban constituencies, hence the occasional appeals to them in Oslo as was discussed in 
chapter 2.
However, on a national level, briefly referring to this group did not add up to 
anything like a coherent appeal. White-collar workers were neglected. There was nothing to 
make them pick up any of these writings to find that they had been referred to in passing. 
Probably this was a result of senior Labourites’ tendency to think in terms of status, despite 
the Marxist leanings, which made it more conceivable that peasants should vote DNA than 
adherents of the privileged urban culture. There was something to be said for that. In Oslo, 
at least until the rise of DNA to power, even lowly clerks tended to vote for the 
Conservatives.59
Liberals
There was, however, an indirect way in which DNA could persuade some of the 
clerks and civil servants to shift their allegiance, and that was by concentrating on habitual 
Liberal voters. Especially outside Oslo many of them supported the Liberals, as did 
peasants and fishermen. Thus DNA dealt with the Liberals in their brochure about fishing, 
hoping to loosen that occupation’s association with them. Its main criticism was that the 
Liberals had brought down the Labour government of 1928. In this connection DNA 
asserted that the Liberal Party had cast aside its mask, and strode forth as a party of 
capitalist power.60 This was not the way Liberals liked to think of their party at all. They 
had long been careful to dissociate themselves from attempts to forge middle-class unity 
against the labour movement, seeing themselves as a “third way”.61 Country Liberals were
57 Det norske Arbeiderparti, Lover, program og retningslinjer (Oslo 1932), p. 21.
58 Dahl, Husleiereguleringen og Stortingsvalget, p. 7.
59 Gabriel 0idne, ’Sosial og politisk struktur i Oslo. Del I: 1906-1937’, Tidsskrifi fo r samfunnsforskning 11 
£1970), p. 129.
Fiskeme og valget, p. 5.
, 61 The Liberals declined to join a coalition of the capitalist parties in 1928. They did not think many of their 
policies would be im plem ented in this way, and if they refiised there was a good chance that they could form
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far from being privileged, and had little to gain from being part of a bourgeois bloc. DNA 
went on to claim that the incumbent Liberal Government of Mowinckel were caretakers in 
the Conservative interest. It used inverted commas when it described the Prime Minister as 
a Liberal in its only leaflet.62
Such allegations were potentially lethal to the Liberals because they were 
traditionally the party of “the little people“.63 While their legendary leader Johan Sverdrup 
had wanted all power to be vested in Parliament, DNA thought it was beginning to dawn on 
some of their partisans that this was a mere fiction.64 DNA had used a debate in Parliament 
to sketch its own understanding of society. Democracy was today a caricature. It was bluff 
that power was vested in Parliament. Tens of thousands of Liberal voters ought to realize 
this. Furthermore a Liberal, Mr. L. Hansen had said there would be a good deal of 
sympathy for disarmament in his party throughout the country, but whether it was 
practicable needed greater consideration.65 Since disarmament was one of Labour’s most 
emphasized policies, this lukewarm endorsement was yet another proof of Liberal 
vacillation. The party was not to be trusted. It was hoped Liberal voters would see that there 
was a great chasm between what their party claimed to stand for and what it actually did. 
The prospects of that happening were potentially good. It seems that in the 1927 election 
many hitherto staunch Liberals in the countryside voted Labour.66 They sought relief from 
the crisis that had engulfed them, and may have seen Labour as the heir to the Liberals, a 
one-time radical party which had spearheaded the struggle of peasants and teachers against 
the traditional elite.
The election film
A summary of the policies and attitudes of DNA in 1930 can be found in its 27- 
minute silent film “Forward to Victory”. Here disarmament was the leading issue. Norway
a minority government alone. Bull jr., Arbeiderklassen i norsk historie, p. 308.
62 ‘Stem med Det norske Arbeiderparti’
63 DNA had an advantage over the Liberals when appealing to people of humble means. At this stage it, 
unlike the Liberals, did not claim to be a party for the entire people and could thus look after certain groups’ 
interests better. Svein Lundestad, Arbeiderbevegelsenspolitiske gjennombrudd i Nordland og Troms. En 
sammenligning mellom to ulike fylker med scerlig vekt pa vilk&r for oppslutning om sosialistiske partier i
perioden 1900-1940 (Bodo, Hogskolesenteret i Nordland, 1988), p. 40.
64 Fiskeme og valget, p. 6.
6SIbid, p. 11.
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could not stand up to any of the great powers anyway, and Sweden and Denmark were the 
nation’s friends. Thus it would be better to spend the defence budget of 40 million kroner a 
year on building railways in the south and extreme north of the country.67 It would help the 
farmers of Agder and Rogaland as well as northern fishermen to distribute and sell their 
goods. Or the money could be spent on cultivation, land allotments and extending other 
railways.
The election campaign of 1930 was marked by the capitalist parties’ massive 
mobilization against DNA with accusations that it was anti-Christian and unpatriotic. DNA 
responded with the brochure “The Conservatives and the Fatherland”. It argued that the 
Conservative Party was not quite as patriotic as it liked to think, with its history of 
supporting the union with Sweden and its supporters’ tendency to put profit before nation. 
The election film dramatized how a ship-owner Wilhelmsen, who had called the workers 
traitors, registered his ships under the flag of Panama for commercial advantages.
Conclusion: The 1930 election 
DNA’s first campaign of the 1930s represented a continuum, as far as electoral 
appeal was concerned, with the 1920s. It communicated primarily with workers, peasants 
and fishermen. “The working people” was an extended working class, and the party had 
sought its votes going back a long time. In 1921, for instance, while DNA was still a 
member of the Comintern, its conference of 25-27 March had decided to form chapters of 
activists to agitate in nearby areas where the party was weak, especially with the view to 
organizing agricultural workers, working farmers (arbeiderbonder) and fishermen. In a 
report to the Comintern 16 months later the National Executive, while refuting the 
International’s slogan of “worker and peasant government” as unsuitable for Norway,69 still 
promised to continue the agitation among agricultural workers, smallholders and fishermen 
with the view to extending its understanding of and sympathy for Communism, as DNA 
called its ideology then.70 Apart from agricultural workers, who largely disappeared from
66 Harald Bemtsen, I  malstrommen. Johan Nygaardsvold 1879-1952 (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1991), p. 263.
67 AAB: ‘Frem til seier. DNA’s film til Stortingsvalget 1930’, marked v. 324.5 (481) F.
6* AAB: Det norske Arbeiderparti. Boks 1. D. Ferkrigsarkiv (1887-1940) Vestfold (4824). Letter from tile 
Central Committee signed Kyrre Grepp and Trygve Lie to local branches. Dated 8 April 1921.
69 Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til makt (1920-1935), p. 292.
70 AAB: Det norske Arbeiderparti. Boks 5. D. Forkrigsarkiv (1887-1940). Statement from the National
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view, the target groups were the same nine years later. DNA’s base consisted of unionized 
industrial workers at the core, while peasants and fishermen were co-equal but taken less 
for granted. Therefore more propaganda had to be written for them. They were not simply 
shown a list of attractive policies and urged to vote DNA. Instead, they were exhorted to 
form trade unions and join the class struggle, uniting with other working-class people. 
Voting Labour was simply a step in the right direction. Thus it can be seen that the debate 
at the party conference in 1930 about parliamentary democracy and how important 
elections were, did not primarily result in de-emphasizing the campaign.71 Instead it had an 
effect on what the message to the voters was. DNA proclaimed that there were no easy 
solutions. Fishermen must strengthen the class front, and peasants must look again at 
Socialism. The above debate had another effect. There were hardly any appeals to white- 
collar workers or middle-class people.72
Introduction to the 1933 election 
Unsurprisingly 1933 did not break the continuum, but at the ideological level 
DNA’s campaign seemed totally divergent from the past, or at least from 1930. The party 
still proclaimed the improvements it would make to the lives of workers, peasants and 
fishermen, but this was now set in the context of crisis management rather than 
mobilization for the class struggle.73 In the autumn of 1930 the Depression had not yet 
made its effects known in Norway, though times were not good. By 1933 economic 
conditions had deteriorated with unemployment above 30%, and DNA was the party that 
decided to meet the Depression head on. It had a history of formulating counter-crisis 
measures stretching back to “the working people’s crisis demands” in 1921 in tandem with
Executive probably August 1923. And organizations catering especially for rural youth who had moved to the 
cities were set up in Oslo and elsewhere. Teije Halvorsen, Partiets salt. AUFs historie (Oslo, Pax, 2003), p. 
116.
71 See chapter 2, pp. 91-92.
72 “In the early phase of growth the party was essentially a coalition of workers, smallholders, and fishermen 
without any appeal to middle-class voters, whether of the old or new stratum. The decisive change came in 
the thirties with the rise of the party to a position of political dominance [...]” Stein Rokkan ‘Norway: 
Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’ in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western 
Democracies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966), p. 99.
73 Stavanger DNA’s proposals for the radicalization of the programme were decisively rejected. These 
encompassed stronger links with the Soviet Union, workers’ councils as kernels of a future Socialist republic 
and reintroduction of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a guiding principle of the party. Titlestad,
Stavanger. Norges rode by, p. 56.
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the AFL.74 DNA was also the only untried alternative, for the Agrarians had been in power 
between 1931 and 1933.
Again DNA’s materials consisted largely of pamphlets, though there were more 
leaflets than just the one this time. The most important brochure by far was Ole 
Colbjomsen’s “All the People in Work!”, the cover of which also displayed DNA’s second 
most famous slogan “Town and Country Hand in Hand”. Colbjomsen was a party 
intellectual and international economist who is seen as the main architect of Keynesian 
solutions to the Depression in Norway. The pamphlet was a summary of Colbjomsen’s and 
the geographer Axel Somme’s book A Norwegian Three Year Plan, which was also 
published in 1933 but after the election had taken place. Planning and counter-cyclical 
economics were not the full impetus behind why DNA in 1933 became Social Democratic 
for the first time in the interwar period. The fear of fascism played a large part as discussed 
in chapter 2, but whatever the reasons Socialism would now come about through reformist, 
parliamentary steps. A periodic renewal of the programme had taken place in 1933, and the 
programme remained in force until 1939, thus in the 1936 campaign also. In its opening 
remarks DNA declared itself the political organ of the Norwegian working class, and stated 
its goal as a “Socialist, classless society ruled by the workers by hand and by brain.”75
The working class
Beyond its central pledge to ameliorate unemployment, most of DNA’s appeal to 
the working class was to be found in its proposals for social legislation. As described in the 
manifesto, this included unemployment benefit to be paid for by contributions from the 
state, the local authorities, employer and employee.76 Old age pensions, which had been 
passed in principle by Parliament, must come into force. Other forms of benefit were also 
promised: an improvement in sickness benefit, accident benefit to be extended to all 
occupations which qualified for social benefit and the introduction of child benefit.
74 It has, however, been claimed that the earlier counter-crisis measures were different in kind. The 1921 
proposals can be seen as mere palliatives intending to show that the labour movement had something other 
than Socialism to offer poverty-stricken workers. See Heidar ‘The Deradicalisation of Working Class Parties’, 
Ph. D. thesis, University of London 1980, pp. 58-59.
75 AAB: Det norske Arbeiderpartis prinsipielle program. Arbeidsprogram. Stortingsprogram marked B329 
(481) 15 N81 pr. 1933, p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 8.
207
Employers’ duties in regard to incapacitated workers would be increased, as part of 
accident benefit, and protection for the employee extended. Since unemployment was the 
principal issue for the party, appropriately there were proposals for work sharing: the six- 
hour day introduced by legislation and the retirement age for civil servants to be brought 
down to make way for the young.
Women
The propaganda fell into line with what had existed in 1930. There was a pamphlet 
for fishermen and two for peasants. But unlike on the previous occasion there was also a 
brochure intended for housewives. This was a gendered appeal to the working class, not a 
statement to all women. As the brochure said, “it must be self-evident to every working- 
class housewife that she on the day of the election 16 October supports the party that looks 
after her interests.”77 One of the aims of the leaflet was to counter indifference to the 
political process by relating the issues to household management. It claimed that it was the 
meagre budget of the housewife that supported the expenses of the state— administration, 
the military, failing banks, interest to the wealthy men and capitalist institutions that owned 
bonds, etc. The capitalist parties had in recent years implemented unfair taxes on “the 
working people” such as import and indirect taxes (increasing the poor man’s taxes by 110 
million kroner), while reducing tax to their own benefit— on high incomes— by 170 
million kroner. A bag of sugar bought on an ordinary Saturday would be five times as large 
if the state had not put such an exorbitant import tax on it.
DNA claimed that housewives were most affected when illness, old age, 
unemployment and poverty struck at a family. The state should spend more money on a 
sensible and humane social policy. The class rhetoric continued as DNA pointed out that 
the state’s expenditure on sickness benefit, old age benefit, unemployment and suchlike 
amounted to around 10 million kroner a year, while servicing the national debt and the 
military cost about 121 million kroner a year. Housewives were finally asked to support 
their families on the day of the election by voting DNA. Written for women, this appeal 
articulated the perceived demands of the working class, peasants and the poorer section of
77 AAB: ‘En lordagshandel’ reproduced in K. M. Nordanger and Alfr. Aakermann, Det norske Arbeiderparti 
og valget. Stortingspolitikken 1931-1933, marked 329 (481) 15 N81br 1933.
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the middle class and contrasted these to the privileges of the wealthy.78
Youth
The appeal to women was new, but a different demographic group had been 
mentioned relatively often in 1930, namely youth. On this occasion it was even more vital 
to make these sympathetic to DNA, because the party feared that otherwise unemployed 
youth could become the vanguard of fascism in Norway.79 The parliamentary manifesto 
outlined in 1933, the year of Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, was evidence of that. It 
held forth “a struggle against political speculation in the plight of unemployed youth. The 
unemployed youth must receive free occupational training and be given a place in the 
labour market.”80 This was as self-evident as demanding that farmers, smallholders, 
fishermen and labourers must be relieved of their debt, 81 but peasants were also thought to 
be susceptible to fascism. As DNA’s parliamentary leader Johan Nygaardsvold said, albeit 
in 1935, “If workers and peasants stand together, democracy triumphs. Otherwise reaction 
takes hold of the peasants and also some of the workers.”82
No brochure or flyer was aimed specifically at the young, but their predicament 
was often mentioned throughout the material. The debate after the state opening of 
Parliament in 1932 was quoted in a leaflet about economic policy and the crisis. 
Nygaardsvold had shown much concern in the debate for the youth of the countryside who 
did not have work and were thus superfluous.83 He reminded Parliament that it was six 
years since Labour had first proposed using funds to create work for the young.84 It had 
time and again raised the issue and made suggestions for the alleviation of the problem of 
youth unemployment, with no other result than that youth remained workless. DNA’s crisis 
plan gave a figure of 3 million kroner to be used for employment-related courses and the
78 Although the appeal spanned beyond the working class, the Women’s Section of DNA always declined to 
act in unison with women outside the labour movement. Ida Blom ‘Introduction’ in Helmut Gruber and 
Pamela Graves (eds.), Women and Socialism. Europe between the Two World Wars (New York, Berghahn 
Books, 1998), p. 417.
79 Kjeldstadli, Et splittet samfunn 1905-1935, p. 218.
80 Det norske Arbeiderpartis prinsipielle program. Arbeidsprogram. Stortingsprogram, p. 15.
81 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
82 Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til makt (1920-1935), p. 577.
83 ‘Den okonomiske politikk. Stortingets stilling til krisen’ in Nordanger and Aakermann, Det norske 
Arbeiderparti og valget, p. 35.
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implementation of works especially for youth.85 Colbjomsen himself described it as too 
little by far, but said that if spent intelligently it would increase the nation’s production, and 
create hope and motivation where despair and suicidal tendencies now reigned.
The rural classes
Peasants and fishermen were highly important target groups in 1933 as well. DNA 
continued to favour smaller farmers, the 80-90% with about 12 acres or so, and noted that 
the Agrarians wanted lower subsidies for these people.86 The Agrarian Party’s policy was 
redistribution from the average farmer to the larger corn-producing farmers. DNA’s 
understanding of the plight of the peasants had developed since 1930. Noting that a very 
large percentage of the farmers who retained possession of their properties were indebted 
up to the full value of their farms or even above, it perceived that the threat of eviction lay 
like a shadow over their minds.87 The novelty was the clear diagnosis of this state of affairs 
as resulting from lack of purchasing power on the part of workers and clerks. They were the 
great majority of consumers, but the reduction in economic activity and the lower wages 
meant they were not able to buy the quantities of milk, butter, eggs, cheese and meat which 
they needed, and of which the farmers could easily produce more.88
Appeals to unity based on common interests were probably more convincing than 
merely stating that peasants and workers were both part of “the working people”. Asking 
farmers to see their crisis as part of a wider picture therefore advanced the issue. If wages 
were reduced the prices of farm produce would decrease and the crisis worsen. This was 
stressed in a brochure addressed to peasants.89 It also put paid to the Agrarian Party’s 
solution: lower wages for workers and more subsidies to the largest farmers. Instead, DNA 
asked the worker and peasant, the fisherman and clerk to understand that they were 
dependent on each other, and therefore should solve the economic and political difficulties
84 Ibid., p. 36.
85 Ole Colbjemsen, Hele folket i arbeid! Det norske Arbeiderpartis kriseprogram (DNA, 1933), pp. 26-27.
86 ‘Den okonomiske politikk. Stortingets stilling til krisen’ in Nordanger og Aakermann, Det norske 
Arbeiderparti og valget, p. 59.
0 7
Colbjomsen, Hele folket i arbeid!, p. 5 and p. 6.
%% Ibid., p. 6.
, 89 Ole Oisang, Bonden og valget. Krisen i jordbruket. Arbeiderpartiets og Bondepartiets krisepolitikk (Oslo, 
DNA, 1933), p. 9.
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together. Only when the workers by hand and by brain had found a common policy would 
dawn break in the nation.
Such was the basis of trying to reach out to peasants in 1933. That is not to say there 
were no concrete practical policies aimed at the countryside. In February DNA had 
launched its new crisis plan, including extra spending on agriculture and forestry to the tune 
of seven million kroner and debt relief to peasants and fishermen of four million kroner.91 
These were voted down by the capitalist parties. Going back longer, in 1931 DNA had 
proposed to reduce interest for debtors in the Smallholding and Housing Bank to 3%, with 
the same arrangement for borrowers in the Mortgage Bank (Hypotekbanken) in comparable 
circumstances.92 This was also voted down. Its policies for peasants at the election 
comprised support for the peasant’s right to ownership of the land, land allotments with 
secure work and life conditions for the new cultivators and effective measures against 
interest exploitation, such as debt settlement with real improvements for farmers.
DNA’s pamphlet for fishermen was written by parliamentarian Kristian Berg, 
whose trade was fishing. Entitled “Out of the Speculators’ Nets”, it explained that the party 
wanted to liberate the fishing industry from exploitation,93 a reference partly to the banks 
and partly to the middlemen who bought the fish. Colbjomsen’s crisis plan listed 1.5 
million kroner for contributions to fishermen for the purpose of acquiring equipment.94 The 
reasoning was that at the present time the majority of fishermen were so needy, they could 
not afford to maintain their current means of production, nor obtain such new tools as they 
required. Their incomes were far below those of pre-war times.95 It had become necessary 
to support fishing communities by extraordinary works programmes, so for the fiscal year 
1932-33 DNA had proposed 1.5 million kroner for this purpose.96 The capitalist parties had 
blocked the measure, but in June 1933 the Government had agreed to consider Berg’s other 
suggestion for the State to build roads and harbours in the coastal districts to inject credit 
into these hard-pressed communities. Implicitly this could be presented by DNA as proof
90 Ibid., p. 10.
91 Ibid., p. 22.
92 Ibid., p. 20.
93 Kristian Berg, Ut av spekulantenes gam. Fiskemes interesse ved Stortingsvalget (Oslo, DNA, 1933), p. 20.
94 Colbjomsen, Hele folket i arbeid!, p. 28.95
Berg Ut av spekulantenes gam , p. 3.
96 Ibid., p. 7.
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that its policies were working somewhat in opposition, notwithstanding the meanness of the 
capitalist parties.
DNA had a few remaining proposals calculated to gain support from fishermen. In 
1932 it had suggested raising the harbour budget by one million kroner, increased to 1.2 
million the following year.97 The explanation was that far too many shipwrecks happened 
near badly maintained harbours; fishermen had to struggle to save both their boats and their 
lives if they were forced to moor at these. Equally the party wanted to improve lighthouses, 
fog signals and the other infrastructure of the sea, having proposed respectively 435,000 
and 425,000 kroner extra for this purpose in 1932 and 1933.98 As with the youth 
unemployment crisis money, it was not imagined to be adequate, but DNA claimed it had 
set the sums low to enable the capitalist parties to join it in promoting these concerns. This 
was adroitly argued because it proved that DNA was not merely engaged in playing to the 
gallery, and since the proposals nevertheless failed, showed up the other parties as hopeless 
on these issues. DNA’s agitation to fishermen fitted in well with the general theme of the 
campaign. “Wake up peasants and fishermen,” it proclaimed, “the time to strike down your 
organizations will come once the fascists have finished with the trade unions.”99
White-collar workers
A status group that may have been part of “the working people” and as such were 
officially a target group for DNA, were the white-collar workers. They were not much in 
evidence in the election of 1930, but three years later DNA campaigned under the slogan of 
“The Majority and Governing Power to the Labour Party,” and every vote would count. 
There was no leaflet specifically written with them in mind, so it may be concluded 
immediately that they did not merit as much attention as peasants and fishermen. But DNA 
did acknowledge this time that office workers, staff in restaurants and hotels and others
97 Ibid., p. 9.
98 Ibid., p. 10.
99 Gunnar Ousland, Helefolkets kamp mot krise og nod. Arbeiderbevegelsen gdrforan (Oslo, DNA, 1933),
p. 23. One of these organizations, The Smallholder Association (Smdbrukerlaget), was steadily orienting itself 
away from the Liberals and towards Labour in the 1930s. This was especially true from 1933 when the 
leadership was replaced. The Association wanted to be linked to a rising movement, and it took up active 
, crisis policies of its own. Olav Rovde ‘Bonde-, smabrukar- og arbeidarrorsla i konflikt og samarbeid’, 
Arbeiderhistorie 2000, p. 64, p. 66.
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were taking their places under the banner of trade unionism.100 Colbj0 msen mentioned 
clerks as well as workers when writing about the “great mass of consumers” lacking 
purchasing power.101 Equally when he talked about the bourgeois alternative to DNA’s 
crisis policies, he said white-collar workers must be prepared to accept lower wages if they 
allowed the other parties to pursue their “let it slide” policies.102 Summing up the crisis 
programme, he opined that workers, clerks and fishermen understood that the old attitude 
of doing nothing about the most important question of the day had failed, and that it was 
the labour movement’s way out of the crisis which would work.103
The title of a pamphlet published for the election gives a very good indication of 
how DNA regarded its campaign: “All the People’s Struggle against Crisis and Need. The 
Labour Movement in the Lead”. DNA saw workers with their party and superior 
organization leading clerks and officials in the direction that was beneficial to all. In the 
actual pamphlet, the writer conflated the blue- and white-collar workers as one class.104 
They were marked by not possessing property, and amounted to about half the population 
according to the census of 1920; 1, 263, 864 persons with dependants out of 2,652,894 
Norwegians.105 The writer was enthused by the successful unionization of clerics and office 
workers, who had taken a lead in recent wage struggles.106 Civil servants and local 
government workers were also unionizing and forming ever stronger organizations. The 
appeal, set within the undercurrent to the contest, was such: “Arise all blue and white- 
collar workers from land’s end to land’s end. Your freedom and lives are at stake. The 
election this year will provide the answer: For or against Fascism!”107
This essentially concluded DNA’s appeal to white-collar workers in the 1933 
election. Bringing society out of the crisis through increased spending was of benefit to all 
employees, and the attractions that were offered to workers were equally applicable to the 
present group. For those who read through DNA’s materials, it would become clear that a
100 ‘Den ekonomiske politikk. Stortingets stilling til krisen’ in Nordanger and Aakermann, op. cit., pp. 156- 
157.
101 Colbjemsen, Hele folket i arbeid!, p. 6.
1 0 2  t u  a  nIbid., p. 7.
103 Ibid., p. 42.
104 Ousland, Hele folkets kamp mot krise og nod, p. 4.
105 Ibid., p. 7.
106 „ . ,
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good case could be made for white-collar workers to vote for it in their own interests. That 
still begs the question of why DNA did not make the case more forcefully. It was becoming 
clearer that clerks and officials were part of “the working people”, but it was still not 
certain that they were. That in a nutshell sums up DNA’s appeals to.white-collar workers in 
the 1933 election. Like three years before, there were no real attempts to gain the support of 
the professional middle class.
Conclusion: The 1933 election 
As in 1930 DNA released an election film. It was closely connected to die main 
theme of the campaign and thus bore the title “All the People in Work!”. It showed long 
queues of unemployed in the towns and peasants being forced to sell their homes.108 With 
regard to its targeting of potential voters, there was hardly any development between 1930 
and 1933. It is possible to detect a slightly greater focus on gaining white-collar workers for 
the cause in the latter year, and in any case the whole tenor of DNA’s campaign was more 
suited to these people in 1933. That can also be said for peasants and fishermen, neither of 
whom were known for their revolutionary sympathies. Workers, peasants and fishermen 
remained the core target groups of DNA, and the appeals to women or the young were to 
subdivisions of these people. There was continued emphasis on these groups organizing 
themselves to push through their justified claims in 1933, especially in the brochure “All 
the People’s Struggle against Crisis and Need”. In line with DNA’s growing belief in 
bourgeois democracy, however, it now had a parliamentary solution to the most pressing of 
their problems called counter-cyclical economics. It followed that their votes could achieve 
much alone. In spite of the differing theoretical underpinnings to the campaigns of 1933 
and 1930, it was the same people from whom DNA hoped to gain support. As previously 
argued ideology played little part in how campaigning was conducted, and it also seemed to 
have only minor effects on whom DNA addressed.
Introduction to the 1936 election 
1936 was DNA’s hardest fought election thus far, which is reflected in the available
AAB: Bente Bogen and Tron 0grim (eds.), De vil ta jentene vare. Valgfilmer 1928-1936. Unmarked
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propaganda.109 There was much more of it and it spanned a wider range than before. Only 
in 1936 can a real development be discerned in the attempted creation of its social base, 
though it happened along lines that were suggested by the election of 1933 in Oslo and 
nationally. This essentially means focus on white-collar and traditionally non-unionized 
workers. The ideology of the campaign remained as in 1933 with DNA proposing remedies 
for emerging from the economic crisis, but now it was in government and its appeal was for 
a parliamentary majority. Wanting this majority so that it could implement its policies 
without hindrance, was one of two reasons why the appeals went wider. The other was that 
DNA believed it was establishing hegemony and that a new era had come.110
Being in government allowed DNA to show it was doing something to defeat the 
crisis. Previously it could only quote figures for what it would like to do, but now the sums 
represented real accomplishments. It claimed that it had proposed 26 million kroner more 
for counter-crisis measures than the previous government had done.111 In the manifesto 
DNA declared its intention of pursuing economic policies to raise the purchasing power of 
industrial workers, cultivators and the workers of the countryside to enable them to buy 
each others’ products.112 Fishermen should be unionized according to existing county 
organizations, to be united in Norway’s Fishing Association.113 This body was to be given 
the protection of the law. Fishermen were to be granted the right to attend trade schools and 
social insurance on the same terms as other workers. Thus it may immediately be 
established that DNA continued to favour these groups especially. “Better conditions in 
country and town” in practice meant promises to secure the conditions of life and increase 
the purchasing power of blue and white-collar workers by higher wages, and of peasants
video.
109 It was probably also the most strenuously contested election in Norwegian history. Turnout was 87.5 % in 
the cities and 82.6% in the countryside. Stein Rokkan ‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting 
Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’ in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives (London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967), p. 399.
1,0 Witness Tranmael’s speech at Young’s Square 10 September when he said he wanted Mowinckel’s 
government, which DNA had displaced, to be the last capitalist government in Norway. Arbeiderbladet, 11 
September 1936, p. 18.
11 AAB: Arbeid og trygge M r fo r (die! Arbeiderpartiets politikk og program marked 329 (481) 15 N81br 
1936, p. 12.
112 AAB: Det norske Arbeiderpartis prinsipielle program. Arbeidsprogram. Stortingsprogram. marked 329 
, (481) 15 N81 pr 1936, p. 12.
Ibid., p. 13.
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and fishermen by profitable prices on agricultural produce and fish.114 Youth were pledged 
better training for work and a reduction of the voting and qualifying age for membership of 
elected bodies from 23 to 2 1.115 With white-collar workers now added, DNA’s established 
social base continued to be “the working people”. They had logically belonged in the 
category all the time, and demographic sub-groups like youth and women had long had 
specific appeals directed at them.
The expanding base 
In practice, the appeals spanned wider than before, and this was mirrored by 
theoretical justification of which groups were considered as potential sympathizers. One 
historian has put the figure at nine out of ten Norwegians in 1936, up from seven or eight 
tenths in 1930.116 He claims not to have explicit evidence as to who the new groups were, 
but suggests they may have been medium-sized farmers relying on some wage labour 
though also working themselves. In addition, small owners of capital in the towns were 
now included, again under die proviso that they themselves worked. Lastly, he suggests, 
some were businesspeople, the liberal professions and all but the top bureaucrats.
On the other hand, there is straightforward evidence which shows exactly whom 
DNA attempted to gain the support of in class terms in 1936. This is to be found in the 
brochures published for particular counties, which begin with information about the 
economy in each one. For the county of Hedmark, for instance, the classes DNA identified 
were as follows with their relative numbers: employees (57%), white-collar workers (6%), 
farmers and other small producers who did not employ others (29%), capitalist-oriented 
people like larger farmers, forest owners and others who employed blue or white-collar 
workers, rentiers and bureaucrats (9%).117 All but the last-mentioned constituted “the 
working people” whom DNA thus designated as more than 9/10 of the population of 
Hedmark, adding that “it has the power, if it wants it.” Equally for Oslo, the social classes 
DNA identified and their proportions of all inhabitants were: employees (62%), white- 
collar workers (27%), small producers who did not use hired help (2%) and larger
114 Ibid., p. 16.
115 Ibid., p. 8.
116 Kjeldstadli, ‘’’Arbeider, bonde, v&re hasre. . Tidsskrifi for Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 2/1978, p. 151.
117 AAB: Hedmark marked 329 (481) 15 N81br 1936, p. 5.
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I
producers who employed blue or white-collar workers (9%).118 Again DNA explained that 
more than 9/10 of the population of the city was part of “the working people”, who might 
take power if they wanted it. In every brochure that exists, it was concluded that “die 
working people” constituted close to or just above 9/10 of that county, so the figure of 9 
tenths of Norwegians as worth appealing to, seems correct. But farmers and other producers 
who employed labour were not included, whether they themselves worked or not. The Oslo 
brochure hinted that white-collar workers ifunksjoncerer) were the same as “workers by 
brain”, and thus included doctors, teachers and other educated individuals who were 
employed by others.119 As such they were part of “the working people“, but they cannot be 
placed in that category with absolute certainty. The reason is that some of the county 
brochures (e.g. Vest-Agder, Rogaland and Sogn og Fjordane) substituted “clerks” Qavere 
funksjoncerer) for white-collar workers, and therefore the class of propertyless intelligentsia 
disappears. They might have been considered among those with capitalist interests, as 
“higher white-collar workers” which either meant bureaucrats or professionals.120
Non-unionized workers 
The countryside had people who were unequivocally part of the working class. For 
the first time, at least in the 1930s, DNA produced a leaflet designed for agricultural 
workers.121 They had never played a leading role in the labour movement.122 They ran the 
risk of being neglected when DNA reached out to those higher up the economic ladder in 
the country, but now the party promised improvements to their condition through the
118 ‘Oslo’ in Brosjyrer utgitt av det norske Arbeiderparti Stortingsvalget 1936, p. 5.
119 /bid., p. 4.
120 Although seldom appealed to, they had been a remote part of DNA’s base for many years. A 1921 election 
poster demanded power to “those who build the countoy and perform useful tasks“: workers, clerks, local 
government employees and civil servants. Knut Kjeldstadli and Victor Keul (eds.), DNA—frafolkebevegelse 
til statsstette (Oslo, Pax, 1973), p. 16.
121 Since the founding of DNA in 1887 it had been obvious that agricultural workers must be brought into the 
party. At the founding congress and at conference in 1890 resolutions had been passed about the need to 
improve their situation by unionization and collectivization of agriculture. But they had been lost sight of for 
many years, probably due to the increased attention on smallholders. Halvard Lange, Fra sekt til parti. Det 
norske arbeiderpartis organisasjonsmessige ogpolitiske utviklingjra 1891 til 1902 (Oslo, 
Universitetsforlaget, 1962), p. 15.
122 The contemporary trade union for forestry and agricultural workers had only been founded in 1927. 
Kristian Gleditsch, Skogsarbeidemes kamp (Oslo, Fram forlag, 1932), p. 7.
217
law.123 Numbering 150, 000 men and women, unlike the rest of the working class, their 
standard of living had not risen but fallen.124 There had nevertheless been an improvement 
in the last year, according to DNA. While it was necessary to pursue the trade union route, 
the State would help out by ensuring reasonable wages, lower working hours, nutritious 
food and habitable dwellings. This, explained DNA, was as natural as the help that farmers 
had received from the state. Probably because communication between the party and these 
voters had been so limited, it was repeated that trade unionism would help
1OKimmeasurably. The first priority, though, was securing their votes, so the party twice 
urged farm labourers to support DNA.
It would not be true to say that maids had been completely neglected previously. 
Special meetings or parties had been held in Oslo on the two previous occasions. This time 
there was a leaflet written for them, making maids a part of the national campaign.126 The 
party’s concern was that they would not vote in the election, thus it argued that everyone 
with the right to vote had a duty to do so. As with farm workers, DNA explained that maids 
had lower wages, longer working hours, less spare-time and worse working conditions than 
other employees. This could be improved through legislation: working hours made shorter 
and definite rules established for days off, holidays with wages and expenses, residence 
during illness, etc. DNA promised to settle these issues and was thus “the party of the 
maid.” The appeal ended by urging support for the party on election day. The leaflet was 
not the only means of reaching maids during the campaign. DNA printed a newspaper 
intended for women voters, which included an article by Thyra Hansen, chairman of the 
Domestics Trade Union, which had been set up earlier in the year. She mentioned that there 
were 84, 000 women in domestic service, about 65,000 in the towns and 19, 000 in the 
countryside.127 This made it the most usual occupation of any for a woman. Like the leaflet 
Miss Hansen was concerned to fight against apathy. She revealed that her trade union had
123 AAB: Landarbeideme og valget marked sm 329 (481) 15 N81br 1936.
124 Their money wages in 1935 were about a third of what they had been in 1920, while industrial workers had 
retained 60% of their money wages over the same period. Edvard Bull jr., Klassekamp ogfellesskap 1920- 
1945 (Oslo, Cappelen, 1979), p. 113.
125 In contrast to the Swedish Social Democrats, who may have prioritized farm workers higher than other
groups in the countryside. Nils Elvander, Skandinavisk arbetarrdrelse (Stockholm, Liber Forlag, 1980), p. 95.
26 AAB: Ogsa hushjelpen marked 329 (481) 15 N81 br 
, 127 Thyra Hansen, ‘Hushjelpen og valget. Hvad forslaget til lov for hushjelp g&r ut p i  Hushjelp stem med 
Arbeiderpartiet! ’, Kvinnenes valgavis, p. 3.
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sent a proposal to Parliament for a new bill regulating domestic service. It included regular 
working hours in a 48-hour week with overtime pay, 14 days’ vacation with pay plus 
expenses for domestic servants who had worked six months for an employer and the right 
not to be dismissed during illness. The period of notice would be 14 days. If DNA received 
a majority on 19 October it would take these proposals into consideration, and there would 
be a bill protecting the maid.
Continuing with DNA’s outreach to less unionized workers, a leaflet was printed for 
those employed in hotels and restaurants. DNA claimed the trade had been neglected by 
previous incumbents, but that the Labour Government had seen the potential for 
expansion.128 The lines of appeal were what the Government was doing to improve working 
conditions and how the whole trade was benefiting from Labour’s economic policies. 
Because times were looking up the tourist trade was “in roaring development,” and old 
tourist hotels were being modernized with state subsidies. From August 1936 official 
regulations had significantly improved the standards of hygiene and housing for workers. 
Representatives of the hotel and restaurant workers had themselves participated in setting 
the terms. Nothing like this had ever happened before. What these workers could gain by 
voting DNA was the eight-hour day, which the Government had proposed but all the 
capitalist parties had voted against. The Parliament to be elected would revise the law, so 
there was still the opportunity to secure it. The leaflet ended with the usual appeal for hotel 
and restaurant workers to make a declaration of trust in ‘"their own government” (emphasis 
in original) by voting Labour.
A fourth leaflet to largely non-unionized workers is interesting because it shows the 
inherent tensions between DNA’s incipient role as the party of the state and its ability to 
stand up for one of its own favoured groups, in this case lumberjacks. It is remarkable for 
not appealing particularly strongly to them.129 Instead it takes a totalizing approach, 
communicating with the inhabitants of small timber towns. It did say that the Labour 
Government had expended 36 million kroner on relief work in forests, constructing new
128 ‘Trygge k&r i hotell og restaurantfaget’ in Brosjyrer utgitt av det norske Arbeiderparti Stortingsvalget 
1936.
129 In 1932 the daily wages of a forestry worker were a third of those of an industrial worker. Hans Fredrik
, Dahl, Norge mellom krigene. Det norske samfunn i krise og konflikt 1918-1940 (Oslo, Pax, 1971), pp. 91-92.
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roads, sowing, digging ditches and on blasting and preliminary building work.130 It had 
doubled spending on the road and railway budget. During the summer 28, 000 men had 
worked on die roads and 4, 500 on railway construction. Another 12, 000 men had been in 
full-time employment cultivating the soil. “It helps a little! But we are still only at the 
beginning.” DNA’s forestry policy included more of the same, and the planned 
rationalization of forestry. This would increase profitability, and at the same time the 
standard of living and wages of forestry workers would rise. Some, but not all, forests 
would be nationalized if not managed in conjunction with ordinary farms.
The leaflet constituted the only direct appeal to forestry workers, but their case was 
referred to again. Lumberjacks and farm workers would by legislation receive the right to 
normal working hours and minimum wages, but these would be to no avail if their 
organizations were not first developed to ensure that the standards were adhered to.131 This 
was perhaps reasonable, but it was not the same message the party sent to fishermen. For 
the latter occupation the state would provide a catalogue of improvements, and while they 
were urged to develop trade unions, assistance through legislation or budgets was not made 
conditional on achieving this.
The working class
The segments of the working class considered above, could not be seen as the core 
supporters of DNA, as they were not unionized industrial workers. The propaganda showed 
that DNA continued to woo the working class, and in fact attempted to expand its base 
within it. DNA claimed that its Government was these workers’ own government, believing 
it natural that they should support it, but fearing they would abstain. The need to win a 
majority by continuing to add new votes made it imperative that DNA communicate with 
some of the least active.132 It was important that it should have real achievements to show 
for itself. According to the party’s claims, 70, 000 unemployed had found work and 25, 000
AAB: Skogsbygdene og valget marked 329 (481) 15 N81 br 1936.
131 Hedmark, p. 12. Or one could appoint special inspectors like the British Labour Party did.
132 Turnout remained low in working-class neighbourhoods in many cities and among smallholders and 
fishermen. Rokkan ‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’ in
, Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, pp. 398-399. Note that Oslo was not one of 
those cities.
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had been given relief work since its Government had been formed.133 330, 000 new workers 
had been brought under the law of the eight-hour day and nine days’ vacation had been put 
on the statute books. Duties on sugar had been reduced, giving 3.5 million kroner to 
working-class consumers (“the Norwegian housewives”). Schools had been improved by 
more lessons and more subjects, and would be further improved by the provision of free 
materials.134 Legislated protection at work had been extended to as many as had received 
the eight-hour day. The government had repealed the hated “workhouse laws”, which had 
protected strike breakers.135 It had also expanded sickness insurance to encompass seamen 
working overseas. In the same way as with old age pensions,136 the new incapacity benefit 
would ease the burden on those who had to take care of the blind or other disabled people. 
Defeating the scourge of unemployment was still the main issue for DNA, and it claimed 
that for every person the state had employed the private sector had employed three or 
four.137 When DNA decided to combat apathy in order to help it win a majority, it was 
probably especially the working class of which it was mindful.138
Youth
One group that DNA had kept a special eye on was youth. For the 1936 election it 
published a leaflet entitled “Space for Norway’s Youth! Youth Shall Build the Future 
Society”. It promised first and foremost the opportunity to work and to get an education. 
There would be an expansion of technical education for all occupations and control of 
training in the workplace.139 The leaflet promised the protection of maids and forestry 
workers, reasoning that these were common occupations held by youth. It also proposed the 
setting up of counselling offices, homes for apprentices and social benefit for the young. 
DNA’s introduction of old age pensions was a selling point also for youth, because in
i l l
‘Den norske stats organisasjon og administrasjon’ in Brosjyrer utgitt av Det norske Arbeiderparti 
Stortingsvalget 1936.
134 AAB: Valget 1936. Sporsmal ogsvar. Det norske Arbeiderparti marked 329 (481) 15 N81 br 1936, p. 17.
135 Arbeid og trygge kar fo r alle/, p. 26.
136 See pp. 222-223.
137 Valget 1936. Sporsmal ogsvar, p. 14.
138 “Bring abstainers to the ballot box for by far the majority of these belong to the working class.” Arild 
Sol berg, Arbeiderungdommen, 24 October 1936, p. 16.
139 ‘Plass for Norges Ungdomf Ungdommen skal bygge framtidens Samfund’ in Brosjyrer utgjtt av Det 
norske Arbeiderparti Stortingsvalget 1936.
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principle DNA wanted such pensions to be payable at a retirement age of 65, creating new 
job opportunities for young people. The Labour Government had proposed and secured an 
extra allocation of 2.5 million kroner to the amelioration of youth unemployment on top of 
die 1.5 million kroner allocated in 1935.140 The money was spent partly on work and partly 
on training. The most important point made was that since the economy was improving, 
there were more opportunities for the young.141
As was shown previously, DNA had an active and powerful youth league and thus 
an automatic means of appeal to the younger age groups. Arbeiderungdommen was their 
weekly newspaper, whose election issue contained some more directions for the young. The 
most strident appeal therein was intended for the youth of the countryside.142 It had been 
totally neglected under the rule of the capitalist parties without jobs, maintenance or future 
prospects.143 In the country only the privileged youth had access to education. According to 
the article, changing this by giving all youth the chance to pursue knowledge was one of the 
highest priorities in DNA’s manifesto. Maintenance was a demand, but the real desire was 
to get a paid job so that one could support oneself. Youth was the largest group suffering 
from unemployment, and those without work were first and foremost the working class and 
“the little people” of the countryside. By promising to help youth, DNA was making a 
pledge to the youngest among “the working people“.
The elderly
As a complement to this, DNA released a leaflet aimed at the elderly. It was 
naturally a good move for the government which had finally put old age pensions into 
effect. DNA called it the greatest social reform in living memory.144 160, 000 people above 
the age of 70 would profit from its implementation. Having achieved the principle, DNA 
would now attempt to increase the pension and reduce the age limit. In DNA-run Oslo the 
sum payable was higher than the national rate, but with contributions by the state it should
140 Kvinnenes valgavis, p. 2; Arbeid og trygge kdrfor alle!, p. 21.
141 Arbeid og trygge k&r fo r alle!, p. 22.
142 Probably because the youth league was weaker there than in urban areas. It thus made sense to use the 
newspaper to couch appeals that might otherwise not have been made. In 1935 Arbeidemes Ungdomsjylking 
had chapters in 60 out of 65 towns, but only in 269 out o f647 local authorities in the country. Halvorsen,
Partiets salt, p. 200.1 Arbeiderungdommen 24 October 1936 , p. 16.
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be easier for poorer local authorities to raise the amount as well. While the leaflet 
concluded that “We elderly also vote Labour,” DNA was clear that the advantages of the 
reform were shared between these, the families of “the little people” and the young. 
Families would be relieved of part of the burden of looking after their old relatives, and 
jobs would be opened up for the young. DNA insisted that parents would be able to spend 
more on food, clothes and the education of their children as a result of the pension. Thus it 
was underlined that children and youth would gain too. It could be seen as a transfer 
payment to “the little people.”
Women
Continuing with DNA’s appeals to subgroups of “the working people”, in 1933, as 
noted above, DNA had published one leaflet particularly designed for women. In 1936 
there was a much greater focus on the different interests of female voters. This was part of 
the effort to make less certain voters (e.g. non-unionized workers) support DNA and secure 
its majority. Thus it published an election newspaper for women, and also made a leaflet 
aimed at housewives or female voters. Knowing that women were more likely to abstain, it 
was hoped they would realize how important this particular election was.
As in 1933 safe homes and conditions for children were the themes of the leaflet 
mentioned above. It suggested that nobody suffered more from unemployment in the family 
than the housewife. Furniture and objects that had been gathered over years were sold or 
taken to the pawnbroker’s.145 The suffering of these women had gone unrecognized. The 
Labour Government, however, had already done much in the struggle against 
unemployment. Appealing directly to the reader, the leaflet said she could aid those in 
need, by helping to give Labour the majority it required for putting all the people in work. 
The leaflet mentioned the social legislation DNA had brought in, and looked forward to 
unemployment, disability and child benefit and a better sickness benefit. The coming of a 
modem welfare state was thus used as an argument for women to support the party. Lastly, 
DNA offered “housing for the people.” In Oslo alone 40-50, 000 people were forced to live 
in overcrowded and insalubrious houses, while in the country the conditions were even
AAB: Vi eldre marked sm 329 (481) 15 N81 br 1936.
145 ‘Trygge k&r for bam og hjem’ in Brosjyrer utgitt av Det norske Arbeiderparti Stortingsvalget 1936.
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worse. Primarily for the children’s sake, but also for the sake of mothers and families, DNA 
would build new homes. And it would expand the educational system too, so that every 
child regardless of birth or rank could be given the same opportunities in life.
In the main brochure (Arbeid og trygge kar fo r allel) women were told how DNA 
had actively engaged in women’s liberation, opening up all areas of society to them.146 
DNA’s technique of appealing to women was to imagine itself in their place. Thus in 1933 
it spoke to her as a consumer doing the family shopping and in 1936 as the wife of an 
unemployed man. It played on her feelings as social beings as well as on her perceived 
interests. Work for the young was an important demand in the newspaper; naturally this 
would satisfy the mothers of the unemployed too.147 Equally education was thought to 
particularly interest women, as the newspaper said, “We are anxious that our children get 
the best possible education.”148 In the remainder of the newspaper there were appeals to 
women in general, or “women of the working class,” and to working women. The first 
lamented that far too many women had neglected their duty on election day.149 It repeated 
most of the points from the housewives’ leaflet, ending with what was a direct appeal to the 
women working at home, in factories and offices to participate in the rebuilding of the 
nation.
Naturally the pages intended for working women dealt with employment conditions. 
They urged women to marshal their comrades in the workplace to vote if the latter were 
thought to be indifferent. They argued that having the Labour Government behind one 
made for a much happier work life. There was a rendition of the improvements it had made 
to working life since coming to power.150 Among the improvements to come it emphasized 
unemployment benefit, better hygienic conditions at work, shorter working hours (partly so 
that more people could be employed, partly because some were working too much) and the 
lowest wages must be raised— they were generally paid to women. The principle of equal 
pay was underlined. This was a gendered version of an appeal to employees.
146 Arbeid og trygge k&r fo r alle!, p. 27.
147 Kvinnenes valgavis, p. 2.
148 ^ «Ibid., p. 5.
149 ‘En appell til kvinnene\ ibid., p. 5.
150 Kvinnenes valgavis, pp. 6-7.
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The working people
In 1936 “the working people”, DNA’s appellation for its potential supporters, was 
explicitly defined to include white-collar workers and small producers.151 White-collar 
workers had long been defined within the perimeter of those who would gain by Socialist 
policies, but had often been neglected. In the main brochure they were wooed with the 
reform of economic life. It would be under the control of society to a greater degree and 
thus more regulated.152 This would put clerks and officials, and especially the less well-off, 
on parity with other workers as for security of tenure. Arbitrary dismissals and salary cuts 
would not be tolerated, and promotion would depend on seniority and experience.153 
Concluding this argument the brochure suggested that insecurity besides unemployment 
had been the main worry for blue and white-collar workers and peasants.154
The rural classes
As before peasants and fishermen were the overwhelming beneficiaries of the 
party’s propaganda efforts, and while not as certain to vote DNA as workers, had been 
there from the start.155 Solving the economic crisis remained the main priority for DNA, 
and since these groups were particularly affected by it, the appeals were likely to continue 
independently of the theoretical Socialist justification for promoting unity. The leaflet “80 
Millions to Combat the Crisis and Destitution” was a follow-up to the crisis booklet of 
1933, this time showing what the Labour Government was doing to emerge from it.
The leaflet reported that the depression had taken the form of an agricultural crisis. 
This truism was a mainstay of DNA propaganda because it justified its continuing 
concentration on country dwellers, as well as its famous slogan from 1933 also used later,
151 AAB: NordNorge marked 329 (481) 15 N81 br/1936, p. 3.
152 Arbeid og trygge karfor alle!, p. 36.
153 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
154 Ibid., p. 37.
155 DNA’s first parliamentary representatives had been voted in by the fishermen of Troms in 1903. In that 
county the party was more associated with the primary occupations than with industry, and consequently did 
better in rural areas than in the towns. Lundestad, Arbeiderbevegelsens politiske gjennombrudd i Nordland og 
Troms, pp. 33-34. Research into the preferences of new voters in the 1930s show that 73% of manual 
workers, 53% of smallholders and fishermen, 24% of farmers, 41 % of the salaried and 28% of the 
independent or self-employed supported DNA in the first election in which they participated. Rokkan 
‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’ in Lipset and Rokkan 
(eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, p. 428.
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“Town and Country Hand in Hand.” (The operative being that DNA was originally an 
urban party.156) It singled out fishermen and forestry workers as the occupations hit most 
severely by the depression; these were, in any case, probably some of the most 
disadvantaged groups in society.157 The Labour Government wanted to give farmers and 
smallholders higher pay for their work. Minimum payments for these were now guaranteed 
by it, in the same way that trade unions secured a minimum wage for blue and white-collar 
workers. DNA had always been strongly in favour of new cultivation and land allotments.
It had fought to raise the expenditure on this by 1.8 million kroner, to make this year’s 
spending a total of 5.15 million kroner. Relief work in the forests had been allocated 1.8 
million kroner, designed to provide temporary jobs for the unemployed lumberjacks. For 
die fishing industry, it was claimed, the Labour Government had marked the beginning of a 
new era. Previously it had been told to fend for itself. Now was proposed 8.65 million 
kroner for acquisition grants, loans, tax subsidies, harbour works and new infrastructure, 
etc.
As usual DNA published a booklet aimed at the peasant and one for the fisherman. 
The first of these declared the need for a radical revision of the land law.158 This must be 
implemented to satisfy the land allotment which was going on, and just as much to provide 
extra land for the smallholder, without which he would be doomed to perpetual penury.159 
Only DNA would be willing to support such a radical law, thus implicitly the smallholder 
and those hoping to settle on the soil must back the party. Furthering this line of appeal, 
DNA went on to argue that the Agrarians would do nothing for smallholders if they were 
given influence. Relying on cultivation grants as they did, the erstwhile Agrarian 
government’s decision to cut these must have been a disappointment to hundreds of
156 It alluded also to DNA’s self-proclaimed ability to overcome one of the cleavages of Norwegian society. It 
indicated that it was finding its role as the party of the state. Cf. ibid., p. 402.
157 AAB: 80 mittioner til kamp mot krise og nod marked 329 (481) 15 N81br/1936.
158 At this stage, however, the larger farmers had much less to fear from DNA. In 1930 it had been in favour 
of nationalization, but this gradually changed from 1933. The crisis agreement with the Agrarians could not 
have taken place if DNA had continued to be in favour of expropriation. In 1936 Labour was holding forth 
land ownership as a positive value and wanted more farmers to enjoy this benefit. Tore Pryser, Klassen og 
nasfonen (1935-1946). Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge 4 (Oslo, Tiden, 1988), p. 118. By then, DNA had 
stated to include largo* farmers in its proposals for debt management. Oistein Hveding ’Gjeldsforliket 
mellom Bon departi et og Arbei derparti et i 1934’, Historisk Tidsskrift 58 (1979), p. 330.
159 AAB: Bonden, jorda bans og valget marked 329(481)15 N81br 1936, p. 9.
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smallholders who had voted for that party, hoping it would raise the grants.160 But when the 
Labour Government got into office, one of its first actions had been to increase die 
cultivation grants. Only DNA could be trusted to pursue the policies necessary to make 
smallholders independent cultivators, and to give work to country youth.161 They were 
certainly among the beneficiaries of land allotments, the grants for which had risen from 
40% to 45% of the estimated costs under DNA.162 The party concluded its appeal by saying 
that only a majority for DNA would create the conditions for small farmers and 
smallholders to be lifted up to an acceptable standard of life.163 What had been done so far 
was only a beginning. Somewhat revealingly, only towards the very end of the booklet did 
DNA mention that it was working on legislation to improve life and working conditions for 
agricultural workers and servants.164 As the working class of a failing sector of the 
economy, isolated from organized help, they were at the very bottom of the pile.
DNA did make a point of opposing any part of the people’s status as a pariah caste, 
and it declared so outright in the pamphlet addressed to fishermen.165 It claimed that the 
fishermen had sometimes been living in society without any rights. DNA claimed to have 
spent ten million kroner on the fishing industry in 1935, the results of which were still 
coming through.166 In the current year the allocation was increased to 14 or 15 million 
kroner.167 And many a coastal town would take advantage of the Ministry of Social Affairs’ 
relief spending, now raised to 11 million kroner. While as usual DNA had an impressive 
list of improvements benefiting die occupation, it repeated the call for trade unions to be 
formed. Like for all exploited people, the liberation of fishermen must be their own 
work.168 It would be much easier under a Labour government, which supported the masses 
severing the bonds of oppressive economic dependency. The industrial worker had shown 
the way, having improved his living standards far above what they had been 25 years ago 
despite recession, despite pressure on wages. “It is the trade union which has made him
101 Ibid., p. 12.
162 Ibid., p. 14.
163 Ibid., p. 16.
164 Ibid., p. 31.
165 Fiskeren og valget, p. 4.
166 Ibid., p. 5.
167 Ibid., p. 6.
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strong, co-operation with class comrades.4*169
It was well worth enumerating the various advantages the Labour Government had 
conferred on the fishing industry. In 1935 it got Parliament to forgive the interest-free loans 
that had been granted for the purchase of equipment the last couple of years (which meant 
that even the capitalist parties had offered something before DNA came to power).170 These 
totalled 3.6 million shared between 25, 000 fishermen. At the same time four million kroner 
was budgeted for the same purpose, but this time as handouts. Being in government 
enabled DNA to produce a staggering amount of figures showing all it did for these 
occupations. But fishermen like peasants were highly important since 2/3 of all seats in 
Parliament were located in country constituencies (100 there to 50 in towns), and neither 
were “natural Labour voters.” More could be gained from focusing on them. Fishermen 
were a significant player in Northern Norway and the West Country, and peasants almost 
everywhere.
The middle classes
In 1936 DNA finally began concentrating on attracting middle-class opinion, after 
the hesitant approach of 1930 and 1933. One leaflet was prepared for white-collar workers, 
another for shopkeepers in Oslo, and the brochure “Healthy Finances” was probably 
intended for centrist middle-class people. White-collar workers were told that no status 
group relied as much as they on the economy being kept going.171 The flyer asked them to 
consider that the Labour Government’s policies had already led to a significant 
improvement in the economy. Between 70,000 and 80, 000 had joined the ranks of the 
employed and incomes had increased by 104 million kroner during 1935, the greatest rise 
since 1919. It also described how prudently DNA had managed the economy, reducing the 
national debt by nine million kroner and running a budget surplus of 19 million kroner for 
1935-1936. It had introduced a tax on interest to make tax evaders pay, but all the money 
thus raised went on reducing local taxes in councils with financial difficulties. Equally all 
the money raised by the sales tax went on combating unemployment. There was an
168 j i . jIbid., p. 7.
169 Ibid., p. 8
170 NordNorge, p. 18.
171 AAB: Ingen enkelt stand marked 329 (481) 15 N81br 1936.
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assumption in the leaflet that white-collar workers had a bourgeois turn of mind (almost 
certainly correct), so it portrayed the Labour Government’s successes by accepted capitalist 
standards.172 It even suggested that there would be lower taxes when full employment had 
been reached (since those in work would not have to pay so much for the unemployed). 
Lastly it encouraged white-collar workers to feel proud of their country, saying that 
Norway and the other Scandinavian nations were “leading the way,” presumably in a Social 
Democratic direction. Delegations and researchers from across the globe were arriving to 
study how these countries had become the “best run and happiest in the world” under 
freedom and democracy. These were cherished middle-class values, not really DNA’s, and 
the party did not promote nationalism when addressing industrial workers.
Taking a less status-conscious approach, the leaflet written for the small 
businessmen of Oslo compared their situation to that of blue and white-collar workers.
Their shops were their place of employment, and they worked hard there from morning till 
night (proving that DNA appreciated their contribution to society as much as that of
17^workers). The Labour Government had considered its greatest task to be putting people 
in profitable work. With work follows money among consumers, and new opportunities for 
traders. For this reason, it was claimed, most shopkeepers were registering safer conditions 
and more sales. So they were satisfied with the results of the Labour Government’s 
policies. The task in hand was to reinforce this safety. Through continuing new 
employment, DNA would create sources of income and thereby promote business life. Only 
the Labour Government was up to this task. Businessmen should therefore support DNA. 
“We too support Labour,” as the leaflet ended by proclaiming. It was fairly obvious, 
however, that there were tensions between shopkeepers and DNA. Those who employed 
others were not part of “the working people”, and might even be considered enemies as 
indicated by the two election films. Although funded nationally, this was a local appeal 
confined to Oslo. In the new state DNA was going to build, it could not afford to ignore the 
petite bourgeoisie of the towns.174 It had already made their country cousins part of its base.
172 The leaflet portrayed its target group as slightly superior to workers. Odd Sverre Norrene ‘Arbeiderpartiet 
og Stortingsvalgkampen i 1936’, Cand. Philol. thesis, University of Oslo 1978, p. 82.
1 ‘Vi handlende’ in Brosjyrer utgitt av Det norske arbeiderparti Stortingsvalget 1936.
174 These occupations were in expansion during the period. It has also been argued that DNA had noted these 
, people’s propensity to ally with the fascists in continental Europe, and wanted to prevent the same thing 
happening in Norway. Norrone, op. tit., p. 22.
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Nevertheless DNA was clearly double-minded about shopkeepers. They were better off 
than small property owners in the country, and many were Conservative voters.
There was no written propaganda aimed directly at the professional middle class. 
DNA could nevertheless expect some support from this layer of society because of its 
Socialism or crisis management policies. A brochure published a year before the election, 
designed to recruit new members, stressed precisely these two aspects of DNA’s functions. 
Entitled “Out of the Deadlock. Plan and Order”, it explained that the Norwegian Labour 
Party was the organization which primarily worked for Socialism.175 The 84, 000 party 
members belonged to the various sections of the working population— industrial and farm 
workers, fishermen and seamen, white-collar workers and workers by brain. It was 
probably right to believe that the propertyless intelligentsia were more interested in ideas 
than others. But for the entire bourgeoisie DNA published a leaflet called “Healthy 
Finances”, in which it declared that while it had spent 200 million kroner on fighting the 
crisis, and although the results had exceeded all expectations, the national debt had not 
risen by a krone.176 The point was underlined, as was the assertion that the state’s finances 
were in the best condition for 20 years. As for those middle-class people of an open-minded 
or Socialist disposition, there was a serious appeal to them in the form of a film.
The election films
“Building the Country” was intended for the towns, and gave a new perspective on 
politics for those with whom DNA had never communicated before. It was an almost full- 
length drama concerning a young unemployed engineer from a bourgeois home and his 
working-class fiancee made good, a shop assistant.177 Their union at a deep level 
symbolizes DNA’s acceptance of the established order, but the girl and her family and 
friends are instrumental in converting the engineer to Socialism.178 Outward pressures are 
even more important, though, as he struggles with his inability to get a job, then with his
175 AAB: Ut av uforet. Plan og orden. Utnytt landets rikdommer. Slutt op om Det norske Arbeiderparti, 
marked 329 (481) N81br 1935.
176 AAB: Statens finanser in folder marked Div. Brosjyrer DNA 1936 329 (481)15 N81 br 1936.
177 AAB: Olav Dalgaard, Vi bygger landet marked v 324.5 (481)V.
I7* The British Labour Party had a similar film, made by a ward party in Nottingham and called “Love and 
Labour”. It was first shown on 14 November 1934, and also featured a Socialist heroine whose young man is 
, a Tory. He is converted at a Labour meeting, the plot ends with their wedding and shows their happy home
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sfamily’s reduced circumstances when his father the banker receives a salary cut. Joining the 
labour movement, he becomes a mechanic under the influence of a trade union 
acquaintance. When the economy improves due to DNA’s crisis policies, he gets his first 
engineering position with the same firm, again due to trade union intermission. This is 
portrayed as the need for workers by hand and by brain to stand together. It is stressed that 
when jobs for workers are created, it means new employment also for technicians and 
clerks. In this film, which was meant for those unfamiliar with DNA, the labour movement 
is shown in a positive light as young and dynamic. The viewer sees it marching imperiously 
in the streets and entertaining crowds with gymnastic feats. It has mental vigour too, as 
proved by the brandishing of Marx’s Das Kapital on two occasions. A new era has come 
and those who realize it, like the engineer’s father, must turn to DNA.
Surprisingly given the party’s appeal to small businessmen in this campaign, one of 
die villains of the film is the fiancee’s employer. This shopkeeper is portrayed as a 
reactionary who is failing to come to terms with the new order of DNA in government, and 
as a profiteer who has bought half a crisis-ridden farm, which he uses as a holiday home. 
The girl, on the other hand, is a representation of how Labour liked to see itself: respectable 
and idealistic, fully the equal of her middle-class betrothed.
It may be asked why a shopkeeper is pictured even less sympathetically in the rural 
equivalent of the above film, “Norway for the People”.179 The answer is that it is set in a 
counter-cultural, nynorsk speaking, teetotal environment where merchants were local 
dignitaries. (Only in Oslo did DNA appeal to shopkeepers through written propaganda.)
The owner of the village store, Mr Berg, is shown enjoying a bourgeois lifestyle, and 
represents the capitalists in an understandable way to the fishermen who were the target 
audience for the message. Just as with die urban film, DNA here attempted to persuade 
those who might have traditional qualms about voting for the party. “Norway for the 
People” concerns the old grandfather of a fishing family who is a stubborn Liberal voter. 
His children and grandchildren, however, have rallied to the new order, and they eventually 
persuade him to vote DNA too. Most of it takes the form of dialogue in which various 
political points are raised and clarified. DNA stresses that it is a people’s party and, now
two years later. Labour Organiser XIV (December 1934), p. 219.
179 AAB: Helge Lunde, Norge fo r folket marked v. 324.5 (481)N.
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that workers have got political rights, a nationalist party at that. The strength of the party is 
symbolized by one of the young Labour men throwing Berg into the sea, after the latter has 
tried to seduce his sweetheart. Perhaps this proved that DNA was altogether more 
comfortable with the professional part of the middle class than with the business segment, 
as the village doctor is shown as a likeable fellow. It is mentioned that many educated 
people were now Labour sympathizers. The drama demonstrates how DNA makes life 
better and gives new opportunities for the characters, who represent ordinary people with 
ordinary aspirations. The young men are seeking land allotments and grandfather will get 
his pension.
Conclusion
In 1936 DNA officially and unequivocally extended its appeals to almost everyone, 
leaving only a small elite consisting of 10% of the population alone. Remaining a Socialist 
party it had no means to attract the very wealthy, employers, top bureaucrats and capitalists. 
The new, clear additions in 1936 were the white-collar workers and other members of the 
propertyless intelligentsia and small businesspeople, whom the party preferred not to be 
employers. Also, for the first time DNA made a serious effort to attract non-unionized 
workers such as farm labourers, lumberjacks, maids, waiters and receptionists. The focus 
on these was primarily caused by the need for new supporters to ensure die party got a 
majority in Parliament, so that it could carry out its policies without impediment Another 
reason was that the 1936 campaign was significantly better funded than in 1933, ensuring 
there were ample funds to produce brochures for new groups. In all cases were these 
occupations logical components of DNA’s base, as it stated it wanted “the workers by hand 
and by brain” to rule the state. The clear appeals in 1936 were adumbrated by appeals to 
some non-unionized workers as well as clerks and officials in Oslo in 1930 and 1933. DNA 
had previously shown an interest in all of the new groups except unequivocally middle- 
class people. In 1930 it recorded a film from a conference of agricultural labourers.
Reading the documents carefully from 1933, it is clear that the party would like support 
from white-collar workers, but it did not form this as a coherent appeal. DNA considered 
itself a people’s party in 1930 because of its concentration on fishermen and smallholders,
, but by 1936 there is no doubt that it was.
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To summarize this chapter in a sentence, DNA appealed to “the working people”, 
who were the labourers of town and country, peasants, fishermen and clerks. When the 
small number of progressive middle-class people are added to DNA’s supporters, it will be 
seen that the coalition exactly replicated the base of the previous party of the state, the 
Liberals before 1918. In 1930 “the working people” were wooed as a mobilization for the 
class struggle. In 1933 greater attention was paid to women and white-collar workers, 
though the lines of appeal were not altered significantly (despite die changeover to Social 
Democratic, practical counter-crisis policies). Youth were a significant target group in all 
these elections, partly because unemployment struck at them disproportionately.
Of these three elections 1933 marked a turning point for DNA and set it on course 
for its later interwar and postwar history. In terms of electoral appeal, however, it is 1936 
which stands out, because there was scarcely a broadening of the perceived base between 
1930 and 1933. Electoral appeals to all groups other than industrial workers stressed the 
benefits of unionization, and it was often pointed out that merely voting Labour might not 
be enough to effect real change. This is the true significance of speeches at the 1930 
conference which indicated that even a parliamentary majority might not be enough to 
create the desired society, if the workers did not have strong organizations of their own. 
These three elections thus make up a logical progression in ideological content, which is
i finnot visible on the surface.
180 And in 1933 DNA insisted there was continuity between the most recent programme and those of 1927 and 
1930. Especially Martin Trammel made this point in his opening speech at the conference in 1933. Hans 
, Fredrik Dahl ‘Fra nod til sejr' in Knut Kjeldstadli and Vidar Keul (eds.), DNA—frafolkebevegelse til 
statsstotte (Oslo, Pax, 1973), p. 133.
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rChapter 5. The British and Norwegian Labour Parties in 
the Interwar Period with Particular Reference to 1929- 
1936: Electoral Prospects
Introduction
There are two strands to the comparison. The first is the background to the 
elections which have been described and the context of interwar politics in general, 
especially the Depression. This strand is vital to the conclusion propounded here. Die 
second strand concerns the British and Norwegian labour movements, how great the 
resources of the parties were, and in particular to whom they appealed. The results of those 
empirical investigations are put into context in this chapter.
In this comparative and concluding chapter there are eight sections. First, there is 
discussion of the issue of success, then on explanations for it. This leads to coverage of 
how Labour and DNA fared in the interwar elections, and then moderation vs. radicalism is 
analysed as a consequence of the strength or weakness of bourgeois society in these two 
countries. The final two sections before the conclusion are comparisons of the labour 
movements and the campaigning of each Socialist party. It is at this stage that the themes of 
the empirical chapters are reverted to.
Success as the crux of the comparison 
The angle that was chosen for comparing the British Labour Party and DNA was 
that of success. Which was more successful in the interwar period, Labour or DNA, or was 
there no significant difference? And even if there was, did it ultimately matter? When the 
Second World War started in September 1939 Labour could look back upon three years in 
government. Its first government lasted nine months and its second two years and three 
months. DNA was in government in September 1939, and would continue in office until 
April 1940 when Norway was invaded. At the time, however, it had clocked up four and a 
half years in government, and its period of office had been consecutive after Johan 
Nygaardsvold became prime minister in March 1935. The ratio of length of tenure was 2:3 
, in DNA’s favour, but neither party had been much in government during the years 1919 to
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1939. As for the parties’ respective achievements, Labour was much lauded for its 
accomplishments in the field of foreign policy,1 but apart from some minor social reforms 
and usefiil rationalization schemes for the agricultural and coal industries, there was very 
little progress on the domestic front.2 As a matter of fact, Labour under Ramsay 
MacDonald believed foreign and home affairs were inter-related, so that by promoting 
good relations with foreign countries, international trade would benefit, leading to a fall in 
unemployment.3 DNA’s accomplishments were focused on social and economic matters. It 
presided over a reduction, though not the elimination, of unemployment and the 
introduction of old age pensions in 1936 and unemployment benefit in 1938.4 Whatever 
may have occurred just after the Great War and in the 1920s and 1930s may be deemed to 
have become irrelevant by both Labour and DNA gaining majorities for the first time in 
1945. After the Second World War had ended a new dawn became possible, and 
interestingly it was only in Britain and Norway that Socialist parties obtained power 
irrespective of coalition partners.5
In spite of such an argument, that the fortunes of the parties were roughly equal or 
that they did not matter much, even in the interwar period DNA enjoyed a greater measure 
of success than did Labour. This is irrespective of developments occurring long after the 
time span chosen for the present work, such as Labour’s government ending in 1951, while 
after 1930 DNA did not lose another election until 1965. It is to do with DNA gaining a 
much firmer foothold on power than Labour. In the 1930s DNA established hegemony, and 
the events of the rest of the interwar period also mattered to that outcome, as will be argued 
below. It would be true to describe what DNA achieved in the 1930s as a “social 
democratic breakthrough before World War II,”6 which had great consequences both in 
terms of policy, and in ending the state of flux which characterized Norwegian politics
1 Cf. Robert Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump. The Labour Government o f1929-1931 (London, 
Macmillan, 1967), p. x, p. xiii; R. Bassett, Nineteen Thirty-One. Political Crisis (London, Macmillan, 1958), 
p. 36, Richard W. Lyman ‘The British Labour Party: Conflict between Socialist Ideals and Practical Policies 
between the Wars’, Journal c f  British Studies 5:1 (1965),p. 141.
2 Paul Adelman, The Rise o f the Labour Party 1880-1945 (London, Longman, 1972), p. 65.
3 Austen Morgan, J. Ramsay MacDonald (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 151-152; 
David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, Richard Cohen Books, 1997), p. 500.
4 Edvard Bull jr., Klassekamp ogfellesskap 1920-1945 (Oslo, Cappelen, 1979), pp. 303-304.
5 Stefan Berger ‘Labour in Comparative Perspective’ in Duncan Tanner, Pat Thane and Nick Tiratsoo (eds.), 
Labour’s First Century (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 320.
, 6 Gosta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets. The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. xv.
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from 1918 to 1935. Norway once again had a usual party of government, replacing the 
Liberals which had played that role from the struggle for the introduction of parliamentary 
sovereignty in the 1880s to the end of the Great War.7 DNA’s leadership can be seen from 
the fact that all the parties represented in Parliament after the election of 1945 signed its 
blueprint for reconstruction, based upon wide-ranging economic planning and 
nationalization.8 Writing about Socialists outside Scandinavia, Donald Sassoon states that 
such parties did not know what to do in government even if they were in a coalition. Thus 
they “did not produce anything resembling a model or credible alternative to capitalism.”9 
The premise of Luebbert’s monumental work of comparative scholarship mentioned 
before is that the interwar years saw real contention for power between three types of 
regimes: liberal, fascist and social democratic.10 If the social democratic type of 
government differs enough from liberal capitalism to justify the term regime,11 its being 
established in the 1930s must have facilitated its continuation in the post-war period. On 
the smaller scale of the present comparison involving just two countries, it must be noted 
also that DNA’s years in government were consecutive, and that its ameliorations on the 
domestic front had a much greater degree of permanence about them. The introduction of 
old age pensions and unemployment benefit are undeniably important measures, and while 
they existed in Britain long before 1936 and 1938, that does not diminish the credit DNA 
gained by being the party to introduce them in Norway. It helped to make DNA’s hold on 
power firmer when the populace could see for itself that the government formed by that 
party was able to deliver social welfare. Indeed, the leader of the Workers’ Educational 
Association AOF, Haakon Lie, in retrospect described the Pensions Act as “the ace of 
trumps” in the election campaign of 1936.12 In addition, DNA’s government brought in a 
law on the protection of employees’ rights in 1936, replacing the previous legislation from 
1892. It made universal the improvements obtained by some trade unions such as the eight-
7 Parliamentarianism was introduced in 1884.
8 Nils Elvander, Skandinavisk arbetarrdrelse (Stockholm, Liber Fbrlag, 1980), p. 107.
9 One Hundred Years o f Socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (London, I. B. Tauris, 
1996), p. 47.
10 Gregory Lucbbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy. Social Classes and the Political Origins c f 
Regimes in Interwar Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991)
11 cf. ibid., p. 2.
, 12 Odd Sverre Norrone, ‘Arbeiderpartiet og Stortingsvalgkampen i 1936’, Cand. Philol. thesis, University of 
Oslo, 1978, p. 61.
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hour day and nine days’ holidays.13 Crucially, Nygaardsvold’s government presided over 
the halving of unemployment between 1935 and 1939 in marked contrast to MacDonald’s 
second government, which, beginning in 1929, saw unemployment rising and rising.14 
DNA did not take all the credit for the economic upturn under its government,15 and rightly 
so, since it seems to have begun in 1933, two years before DNA’s accession.16 It has 
become a truism, however, that a government is judged largely on its economic record, 
whatever the intricacies of the trade cycle. It is thus not in a deep metaphysical sense that it 
is argued that DNA was more successful in the interwar period considered as a whole, but 
merely pragmatically on the grounds of what it is seen to have achieved or been associated 
with. The debacle of 1931 when Labour lost four-fifths of its parliamentary seats, looms 
large in the explanation of why DNA should be seen as the more successful of the two 
parties, although in the election of 1935 Labour was restored to the role of a serious 
opposition party. There is no need for speculation about what might have happened in the 
absence of the Second World War, but to illustrate Labour’s predicament it might be 
mentioned that one historian believes 1931 “marked a decisive and long-term shift against 
Labour.”17 Given the result of the 1935 election when Labour had 154 MPs returned, 
compared to 288 in 1929, he sees no evidence that the party could have won the election 
after that either, if it had been held before the end of 1940 as planned.18
Explanations of success 
If it may from now on be assumed that DNA had greater success between the wars, 
the question arises of why this should be the case. As mentioned in the introduction the 
classes of the countryside have been seen as highly important to the outcome of the 
political struggle between the wars. DNA’s ability to mobilize peasants has been contrasted
13 Even Lange, Samling om felles mdl 1935-1970. Aschehougs Norgeshistorie 11 (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1998), 
pp. 45-46.
' Ibid., p. 27. Unemployment in Britain rose from 1, 533,000 in January 1930 to 2, 735,000 in June 1931. 
Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. 518.
15 Interview with Johan Nygaardsvold, Arbeiderbladet, 11 September 1936, p. 8.
16 Lange, Samling om felles mal 1935-1970, p. 41.
17 Andrew Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 4.
18 This is disputed by another scholar who sees no reason to assume that the pattern of voting established in
, 1931 and 1935 would have continued. Michael Hart, ‘The Realignment of 1931’ in Twentieth Century British 
History, 3:2 (1992), p. 148.
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with Labour’s trouble in gaining support in the countryside, and for some this is seen as the 
crux of the comparison.
DNA’s success can scarcely be put down to this. It certainly needed the support of 
smallholders and fishermen, but gaining it may be regarded as uniting DNA’s natural 
constituency. Class analysis would place these people as workers or petite bourgeoisie.
They belonged to the latter in so far as they owned their means of production (holdings, 
fishing boats), but to the former to the extent that they also worked for wages at larger 
farms. Fishing, smallholding and paid work were often combined. In the two northernmost 
counties Troms and Finnmark and the northern half of the county of More og Romsdal, 
fishermen were forced to sell their produce to the owners of fishing stations at a price set by 
the latter.19 This effectively made them proletarians, and interestingly these were the fishing 
communities where voting for DNA was prevalent. Fishermen with greater independence, 
such as those of the southern half of More og Romsdal and the rest of the West Country, 
were more likely to vote for the Liberals. In addition, the “little people” of the countryside 
had far lower incomes than industrial workers, though their disposable incomes may have 
been comparable since they produced their own food. Put differently, the other side of the 
urban-rural thesis, the incorporation of rural dwellers into the voting bloc of DNA simply 
meant that the party was gaining the support of the working class and a fair number of the 
petite bourgeoisie. This is hardly surprising, and tends to rob the urban-rural thesis of its 
explanatory power.
What then are the explanatory factors for success? As a starting point the following 
two tables show the election results for the interwar period in Britain and Norway.
, 19 Karl Egil Johansen, ‘Proletar eller sm&borgar? Fiskarane i politikk og samfunn’, Historisk Tidsskrift 81:2 
(2002), p. 348.
Table 5.1 British general elections.
Year Conservatives Labour Liberals Others
1918 22.2 % 12.1% Coalition 
47.6%, Other 
Conservatives 
6.1 %
1922 38.5 % 29.7 % 28.3 %
1923 38.1 % 30.5 % 29.6 %
1924 48.3 % 33.0 % 17.6%
1929 38.2 % 37.1 % 23.4%
1931 30.6 % Conservatives 
and National 
60.5 %, 
Samuelite 
Liberals 6.5 %
1935 53. 7% 37.9 % 6.4 %
Table 5.2 Norwegian parliamentary elections.
Year Conservatives DNA Liberals Agrarians Communists Others
1918 30.0 % 30.9 % 32.7 % Joint lists 
5.2 %
1921 33.7 % 21.3% 22.6 % 13.1 % Social 
Democrats 
9.2 %
1924 32.5 % 18.4% 20.4 % 13.5 % 6.1 % Social 
Democrats 
8.8 %
1927 25.5 % 36,8 % 18.7% 14-9% 4.0%
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Year Conservatives DNA Liberals Agrarians Communists Others
1930 30.0 % 31.4% 21.0% 15.9% 1.7%
1933 21.8% 40.1 % 17.6% 13.9% 1.8% Society 
Party 1.5
%
1936 22.6 % 42.5 % 16.4% 11.6% 0.3 % Society 
Party 2.2 
%
It will be seen that with the single exception of 1931, Labour advanced at every election 
between 1918 and 1935. The picture for DNA is more complicated, with ah initial decline 
followed by a great leap forward in 1927, another downturn in 1930 and then the election 
victories of 1933 and 1936. However, even in 1930 DNA got more votes than at the 
previous election. It faltered a little in urban areas, but this was more than outweighed by 
greater support in the countryside.20 Its seeming decline was only a relative one vis-a-vis 
the capitalist parties, which succeeded in driving large numbers of habitual abstainers into 
the polling booths, under the pretence that DNA were dangerous revolutionaries who would 
abolish Christianity.21 This leads to an important rule for both Labour and DNA: in the 
interwar period, unless it were split, the party would advance in terms o f votes at every 
election. The 1931 Labour catastrophe was caused by a split within the party, and DNA’s 
downturns of 1921 and 1924 were caused by the splits leading to the formation of 
respectively the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party.
Another very important consideration is the observation that in no English-speaking 
country did a government ruling in 1930 or 1931 survive for long; they were all swept away 
by the Depression and replaced with another alternative 22 Labour’s victory in 1929 was 
thus a Pyrrhic one, because it entailed forming a government in what would turn out to be
20 Cf. Arbeiderbladet, 22 October 1930, p. 1.
21 Hans Fredrik Dahl, Norge meflom krigene. Det norske samfunn i krise og konflikt 1918-1940 (Oslo, Pax, 
1971), p. 66.
22 Ross McKibbin, The Ideologies o f Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p. 263. If this were applicable to all other democracies it would make a rule, but the Danish 
government formed in 1929 continued through the Depression till the Second World War. The tendency does,
. however, hold for Norway.
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utterly unpropitious circumstances. However, unlike 1924, no voices in the party 
recommended turning down the King’s request.23 The Independent Labour Party wished to 
take office, although it wanted boldly to defeat unemployment whether or not there was a 
majority behind the proposed measures 24 While the Liberals, like the ILP, favoured 
progressive counter-cyclical economic policies, it is not certain that such a government 
would have survived long. But the ILP imagined there was no need to fear an ensuing 
election provided Labour had made real efforts in this direction.
The Depression was a vital factor in determining the success or otherwise of parties 
in the 1920s and 1930s. The outcome of the political struggle between the wars was 
decided primarily in the early 1930s, so the elections featured in previous chapters were 
crucial ones. It will also be noticed that there was a neat symmetry in the results of the 
featured elections. Labour won the election of 1929, but went on to lose those of 1931 and
1935. DNA, meanwhile, lost the election of 1930, but won those taking place in 1933 and
1936. The Depression came in-between the first and second election in each country, 
reversing the fortunes of the Socialist party. Why might the slump be so important 
politically? Unemployment was permanently high during the interwar period, and Labour 
had been in government also in 1924 without being able to bring it down by much. 
Nevertheless it advanced at the subsequent election. The Depression seemed to herald the 
breakdown of the liberal capitalist economic order, and thus it permitted a wider range of 
political alternatives to come to the fore. When Labour advanced at every election it was 
probably due to partisan alignment. Workers who became convinced of the rightness of the 
party’s cause had nowhere else to turn. Only an extraordinary upheaval like the financial 
crisis was liable to make them revert to one of the capitalist parties. This is a derived result 
from Labour getting more votes at every election unless it was split.
The effect of timing in coming to government
It is by no means a full explanation for the political achievements of DNA, but it 
has not gone completely unnoticed that the party was fortunate in the timing of its 
accession to government. As noted by one scholar, the election of 1930 has gone down in
23 In 1924 many Labourites thought their party would be captured or corrupted by the system they were called 
on to administer. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. 311.
24 Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931, p. 9.
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DNA’s history as “the great defeat,” but in perspective there is no doubt that the party was 
lucky to avoid governmental responsibility at the outset of an economic crisis that had not 
yet materialized fully when the votes were cast.25 Its other stroke of luck was to be thrown 
out of government in 1928 in such a way that it “united all workers.” Within a few years 
the same crisis paved the way for a genuine take over of power by social democracy. The 
Depression had a somewhat gentler effect in Britain than in many other countries,26 but in 
Norway during the years 1932-34 unemployment stood at above 30 % and during the 
winter it went above 40 %.27 This explains the intense appeal behind DNA’s main slogan in 
the 1933 election “All the people in work.”
Counter-crisis proposals had an undoubted pedigree in DNA going back to 1921 
and the joint programme with AFL.28 In the 1910s and 1920s DNA was a party regularly 
gaining more than 30 % of the votes (except when split), and in the latter decade it also 
presented a marked Socialist image. It was in the 1930s that it formulated anti-crisis 
measures that it seriously intended to implement, and went above 40 % in electoral 
contests. These had far more purchase with the voters than the rhetoric and policies 
formulated during its theoretically Marxist period. It was no longer bourgeois society in 
itself which necessitated Socialism but the economic crisis.29 DNA became the Norwegian 
equivalent of a “Popular Front”, marshalling the support of most people with progressive 
views.30 But it was only possible to widen the appeal through counter-crisis measures after 
the Depression had started. Although much of the theory behind planning and demand 
management already existed in the 1920s, the hyper-radicalism of DNA made its adoption 
unlikely, and in any case it had not yet filtered down to even politically-minded people in a
25 Bjem Gunnar Olsen, Tranmael og hems menn (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1991), p. 242.
26 Alan Booth, The British Economy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001), p.63.
27 Per Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til makt (1920-1935). Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge 3 (Oslo, Tiden, 
1987), p. 554.
28 Jardar Seim ‘Stat, parti og fagbevegelse i Norge 1920-1940’ in Jens Christensen (ed.), Nordisk 
arbejderbevcegelse i mellemkrigstiden. Stat, parti ogfagbevcegelse (Arhus, Selskabet til forskning i 
arbejderbevaegelsens historie, 1980), p. 65. Planning and Keynesian economics had a similar tradition in 
Labour. K. J. Hancock, ‘The Reduction of Unemployment as a Problem of Public Policy, 1920-29’ in 
Economic History Review 15:2 (1962), p. 342; Alan Booth, ‘How Long are Light Years in British Politics? 
The Labour Party’s Economic Ideas in die 1930s’ in Twentieth Century British History 7:1 (1996), p. 14. 
Labour and the New Social Order mentioned demand management, and it was especially popular between 
1920 and 1922 when J. R. Clynes was leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party. After 1922 the approach 
declined with the return of MacDonald and Snowden to positions of prominence.
29 Hans Fredrik Dahl, Fra Hassekamp til nasjonal samling. Arbeiderpartiet og det nasjonale sporsmal i 30- 
drene (Oslo, Pax, 1969), p. 56.
, 30 Dahl, Norge mellom krigene, p. 111.
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peripheral country. The two popularizers of planning and counter-cyclical economic 
policies in Norway were the geographer Axel Somme and the self-taught economist Ole 
Colbjomsen, who produced A Norwegian Three Year Plan in 1933. The latter simplified it 
into a brochure entitled^// the People in Work! for DNA’s use during the election 
campaign. Colbjomsen was a cosmopolitan, and his economic ideas had developed from 
exposure to Stalin’s under-consumptionist analysis while resident in the Soviet Union. He 
was also familiar with Keynes’s theories.31
Legitimate domination and the causes of moderation 
Dick Geary has sketched four hypotheses concerning relations between a labour 
movement and the state within which it exists.32 The first is that the more liberally the state 
reacts against emerging working-class organizations, the more moderate and integrated the 
Socialist party will be. The second and the third principles also concern the causes of 
moderation in the labour movement. They state that the richer and more willing a nation is 
to provide a decent standard of living for the workers, and the more employers’ 
organizations accept trade unions and deal with them, the more integrationist and moderate 
the labour movement will be. The fourth postulates that confessional loyalties hinder the 
development of a non-religious workers’ party. Or put in Weberian language: there is 
elective affinity between toleration/liberality on the part of the status order (legal and 
parliamentary institutions and employers) and moderation in the labour movement, elective 
antagonism between religious ties and the success of a Socialist party.33 On this account the 
only real difference between Britain and Norway is that the former state was more affluent 
in the period, and hence able to offer a somewhat higher standard of living for its workers. 
This can be seen from the second Labour government resigning in 1931 because it 
collectively could not agree on cutting unemployment benefit, while the government of 
DNA got credit for introducing such a benefit in 1938. It is true that Britain’s labour 
movement was more moderate, but when Geary says that the British bourgeoisie remained
31 Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets, p. 198, pp. 8-9.
32 Formulated as ideal types in Stefan Berger, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 
1900-1931 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 250-251. Cf. Dick Geary ‘Introduction’ in id. Labour and 
Socialist Movements in Europe before 1914 (Oxford, Berg, 1989), pp. 2-4, p. 7.
33 Cf. Stephen Kalberg, Max Weber’s Comparative-Historical Sociology (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), p. 
103f.
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committed to democratic politics and employers were tolerant of trade unions and willing 
to make collective wage agreements,34 exactly the same could be said of the Norwegian 
equivalents. (He does make an exception of some employers who were not so liberal, and 
again that might be said of some Norwegian employers.) Certainly the response of the State 
was fundamental to the moderation or radicalism of the Socialist party. As will be shown, 
the question of moderation or otherwise played some part in the success of these parties.
Ross McKibbin’s explanation of Labour moderation concentrates on the class it 
represented or sought to speak for, although he notes in passing that any attack by the 
Labour Party on peers or the House of Lords, and naturally suggestions by the Labour left 
that the Lords should have their powers cut or abolished, brought an anxious reproach from 
the court.35 This suggests that the Labour leadership was in a dependent relationship with 
the monarchy.36 The working class meanwhile was attached to the monarchy to a 
“surprising” degree.37 By the end of the nineteenth century the overt political role of the 
crown had ended, and it took on an “emotionally pleasing and politically uncontentious” 
ceremonial character.38 It seemed to act as a guarantor of the even-handedness of 
Parliament, another institution which the working class believed in. As McKibbin puts it, 
“the acceptability of both to the working class underwrote the existing status-order and 
preserved the country’s institutions and class-system more or less intact.”39
McKibbin’s explanations of the moderation of the Labour Party will be pursued 
here in a comparative context. In order to perpetuate itself any established order has to 
legitimate itself, because if adherence to the order is purely based on self-interest an 
unstable situation is created.40 The established order in this example means of course 
bourgeois society, which both Labour and DNA were officially committed to replacing 
with Socialism. In Weberian parlance the chance that any given command will be obeyed is
34 Dick Geary, European Labour Politics from 1900 to the Depression (London, Macmillan, 1991), p. 18.
35 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, p. 15.
36 Carl Cavanagh Hodge, The Trammels o f Tradition. Social Democracy in Britain, France, and Germany 
(London, Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 14. In feet, when King George V made MacDonald a privy councillor 
prior to appointing him Prime Minister in 1924 he complained shout the singing of the “Red Flag” and the 
“Marseillaise” at a Labour meeting in the Albert Hall a few days before. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. 
304.
37 McKibbin, The Ideologies o f Class, p. 17.
38 Ibid., p. 18.
39 Ibid., p. 17.
40 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978), p. 213. Also see 
, discussion pp. 212-215.
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called domination, and under capitalism who gives the commands and who solely obeys 
them, is primarily determined by ownership of property. The British established order was 
better at legitimating its right to continue than its Norwegian counterpart, and this had 
several important political effects. But why should the status order and institutions have 
greater legitimacy or authority than in Norway? Primarily because Britain is a much older 
nation. Traditional legitimate domination is one of the three ideal types identified by 
Weber. “Obey me, because it has always been done,” is very powerful grounds for 
authority. The ruling class of a nation-state that had only become independent in 1905 
could not make the same often unspoken appeal. It had been under the command of others 
itself just two or three decades before. While it would be a grave mistake to imagine 
Norway as an egalitarian country, it had a foreign king and queen, no aristocracy, arguably 
no gentry and, with late industrialization, manufacturers had not yet developed an 
hereditary ruling ethos.41 In ordinary language, legitimate domination is called deference. A 
good proof of the above assertion is the large number of workers voting for the 
Conservatives in Britain. Nothing similar existed in Norway. The reason behind the 
phenomenon was partly the greater attention paid to workers by the British Conservatives 
through the Primrose League and its working men’s clubs, but whether voting for that party 
in order to increase one’s living standards or for other reasons, it inescapably means 
acceptance of the established order.
As alluded to above, legitimate domination affected the Socialist party too. 
Although Labour had adopted clause IV in 1918, probably to free itself from Liberal 
tutelage by proclaiming its own ideology, it was moderate and sought to bring 
improvements to its supporters within the system. This has been interpreted by several 
writers as a belief that Socialism would be built upon the success of capitalism, not upon its 
failure 43 DNA was moderate too until 1918, but when the new leadership had come to the 
fore, and undoubtedly influenced by the Russian Revolution, it turned its back upon 
established society. (These changes existed as a potentiality before 1918, but if the status
41 When DNA examined the structure of the countryside in 1929 it found just 21 persons whom it classed as 
landowners. Kjeldstadli, " ’Arbeider, bonde, v&re haere...”’, Tidsskrift for Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 
2/1978, p. 59.
42 cf. Kenneth D. Wald, ‘Advance by Retreat? The Formation of British Labour’s Electoral Strategy’ in 
Journal o f British Studies 27 (July 1988), p. 287.
43 Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. 544, Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump, p. 47, Andrew Thorpe, A 
t History o f the British Labour Party (London, Macmillan, 1997), p. 17.
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order and Norwegian institutions had been able to legitimate themselves better, the 
Socialist party in their midst would have reverted to moderation earlier. It only did so under 
the impact of the Depression and the fear that unless it formed a government, reaction or 
fascism would triumph.44) Thus DNA sought to overthrow bourgeois society, and Martin 
Tranmasl said so publicly as late as 1936. It set no store on the conciliatory and liberal king 
or even the Norwegian nation, proclaiming that the workers had no fatherland, and since 
they owned no part of Norway, how could it be their country?45
The moderation or otherwise of the Socialist party might have had either a positive 
or negative effect upon its chances of succeeding in its aims (except that if it actually 
believed in the established order it would not change it much), but in the context of the 
1920s moderation was not an effective strategy. The economist Arthur Pigou described the 
10 % of the working population unable to find regular employment in that decade in Britain 
as the “intractable million.”46 The Independent Labour Party, which had relations with 
DNA and resembled it politically more than the latter resembled Labour,47 produced two 
schemes for curing unemployment: Revolution by Reason (1925) and the Living Wage 
(1926)48 The former was the work of Oswald Mosley, the latter one of Clifford Allen’s 
study groups which had included the renowned economist J. A. Hobson. Both sought to 
cure unemployment by increasing working-class purchasing power, and would conduct
44 This has been labelled a class compromise, which it undoubtedly was. The labour movement was under 
pressure and had to yield on certain issues, but it continued to uphold the class struggle. Finn Olstad, 
Arbeiderklassens vekst ogfall. Hovedlinjer i 100 ars norsk historie (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1991), pp. 10- 
11.
45 The moderate Nygaardsvold confided to his diary in 1934 that he felt like “a wet dog” when he as president 
of Parliament was forced to ask God to save the King and the fatherland. Harald Bemtsen, I  malstrommen. 
Johan Nygaardsvold 1879-1952 (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1991), pp. 298-299. His New Year’s wish for 1932 was 
that Norway would lose its court case against Denmark on die Greenland issue. The youth organization “was 
ready to defeat patriotism in whatever form.” DNA often mocked national celebrations. Dahl, Norge mellom 
krigene, p. 29. This hostility only ended in 1935 with its coming to government.
46 Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump, p. 1.
47 They were both members of the International Socialist Bureau based in Brussels, an organization for 
Socialists not affiliated to either the Second or Third International. (DNA joined upon leaving the Comintern.) 
For DNA’s understanding of the ILP’s aims see Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek: letters from Haakon 
Meyer to DNA dated 14 April 1926 and 28 August 1926 in folder marked 1926-27. Det norske Arbeiderparti, 
Daa Ferkrigsarkiv (1887-1940). Intemasjonale forbindelser 1896-27. James Maxton was a guest at DNA’s 
conference in 1930 which adopted the H P’s slogan “Socialism in our time”, cf. Det norske Arbeiderparti. 
Beretning 1930, p. 9; Protokoll aver forhandlingene pa Det norske Arbeiderpartis 28. ordincere landsmote i 
Oslo 14-16 mars 1930, p. 11, p. 166.
. 48 Skidelsky, op. cit., p. 47.
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some nationalization to ensure the smooth running of the schemes.49 While bold action on 
unemployment would undoubtedly have seemed like a success if it had worked, the real 
reason why moderation was liable to lead to disappointment was that it might induce the 
Socialist party to take governmental responsibility in 1929 or 1930 and preside over the 
start of the Depression. This of course is exactly what Labour did with all the consequent 
travails. Using the tendency noted by McKibbin, such governments did not usually last 
long. They ran the risk of seriously damaging the record of the incumbent party. David 
Marquand argues that there was no alternative to economic orthodoxy available, even in 
embryo, between 1929 and 1931.50 If so, it follows from his argument that a Socialist party 
had better avoid office between those years.51 Being radical enough to refuse to govern the 
prevailing order would have ensured this. And if it had had a majority and was forced to 
take on the burden, radical thinking might have ensured at least an attempt to tackle 
unemployment with an alternative economic plan.
The moderation of Labour is accounted for by the Weberian explanation of 
successful legitimate domination on the part of the established order, but in this context the 
other side of the coin is DNA’s radicalism. It proved to have a lucky break in staying away 
from government in the 1920s when there was very little the party could do. Radicalism 
was not really the reason for its adoption of counter-cyclical economic policies, though, 
that was more a product of the times. By 1933 it was obvious that something had to be done 
about unemployment, and in Norway also about the crisis in the countryside. The prices of 
agricultural produce had fallen year on year since 1924.52 Farmers, and more particularly 
smallholders, were losing their properties as they could not pay for their mortgages. The 
number of repossessions rose from 1, 987 in 1925 to 6, 578 in 1932.53 As the leader of the 
Agrarians Jens Hundseid put it: “free competition is about to become free damnation.”54 
The Fatherland Association founded in 1925 had at that time argued for the proscribing of
49 Ibid., p. 481.
50 Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. XII.
51 The premise is, however, false. The Liberals, who were a mainstream and centrist party, fought the 1929 
election on deficit financing to cure unemployment. Socialists were not considered mainstream and if they 
were bold, could have chosen any number of counter-cyclical remedies.
52 Bull jr., Klassekamp ogfellesskap, p. 20.
53 Oistein Hveding, ‘Gjeldsforliket mellom Bondepartiet og Arbeiderpartiet 1934’, Historisk Tidsskrift 59 
(1979), p. 328.
, 54 Lange, Samling om felles mal 1935-1970, p. 17.
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DNA and the Communists. By 1933 its leader Joakim Lemkuhl agreed with Colbjomsen 
and Somme that the State must create employment and bring the economy out of the rut, as 
formulated in his book Norways Path.55
The strength of the labour movements
Having provided a trajectory and background to the differences between the parties 
in the 1920s and 1930s with the most emphasis on the crucial period 1929-1936, the 
findings must be related to the actual comparison. The first two chapters in this thesis 
described how Labour and DNA fought their election campaigns, and the strength of each 
labour movement. The three elections fought by each party will be considered together 
below. Just as the trajectories form the backdrop to the three elections fought, so the power 
and influence of wider labour culture and its organizations are a good starting point for 
comparing campaigning. According to the official statistics the British population was 45, 
672, 000 in 1929, 46, 038, 000 in 1931 and 46, 869, 000 in 1935.*6 The Norwegian 
population was 2, 815, 000 in 1930,2, 857, 000 in 1933 and 2, 893, 000 in 1936.57 Since 
electoral expenses will be compared, the pound sterling was worth 18.2 Norwegian kroner 
in 1930, 19.7 in 1933 and 19.9 in 1936.58
The very core of the labour movement was the party and the trade unions. The 
following is an extract from a table showing membership of the Labour Party in the three 
relevant years.
Table 5.3 Labour Party membership.
Year Individual membership Nationally affiliated 
membership
1929 227, 897 2, 102, 948
1931 297, 003 2,061,063
1935 419,311 1, 958,204
(Source: Labour Party Report of Annual Conference 1936 (London, Labour, 1936), p. 59.)
55 Ibid., p. 19.
56 David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900-2000 (Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 2000), p. 347.
57 Statistisk drbok for Norge. 57. argang (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1938), p. 4.
58 Ibid., p. 131.
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The nationally affiliated membership includes trade unionists who belonged to Labour 
through their union. As a measure of the total strength of the movement, though, it is of 
some relevance how many people belonged to Labour’s ally the Trades Union Congress as 
well. This is given in the following table.
Table 5.4 TUC membership.
Year Membership Unions
1929 3, 673, 144 202
1931 3,719,401 210
1935 3, 388,810 211
(Sources: Walter Citrine (ed.), TUC annual reports (London, Co-operative Society, n.d.):1929, p. 79; 1931, p. 
91; 1935, p. 83.)
The equivalent Norwegian figures for DNA are to be found in the following table. All 
members of the AFL were affiliated to DNA, whether they chose to be active or not. 
Table 5.5 DNA membership.
Year Individual membership
1930 80,177
1933 95, 327
1936 142, 790
(Sources: DNA annual reports (Oslo, DNA): 1930, p. 11; 1933, p. 9; 1936, p. 51.)
The AFL was simply the industrial wing of DNA. In 1933 and 1936 each member was 
levied a day’s pay in order to finance the campaigning of the party. The membership was as 
follows.
Table 5.6 AFL membership.
Year Membership
1930 139, 591
1933 157, 524
1936 276, 992
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(Sources: AFL annual reports: 1930 (Oslo 1932) p. 105; 1933 (Oslo 1934), p. 137; 1936 (Oslo 1937), p. 171. 
End of year figures.)
Starting with individual membership of the party, Labour organized about 0.5 % of 
the population in 1929, 0.65 % in 1931 and 0.89 % in 1935. DNA, meanwhile, enlisted a 
significantly higher proportion of its compatriots, 2.85 % in 1930, 3.34 % in 1933 and 4.94 
% in 1936. In both parties membership continued to rise within the population, but at the 
last interwar election not one in a hundred British citizens were individual members of 
Labour, while almost one in twenty Norwegians had made a conscious decision to belong 
to DNA. The affiliate membership is related to the ability to raise funds, and implies some 
connection with the party. By this measure Labour comprised about 5.1 % of the population 
in 1929 and the same in 1931 and 1935, including individual membership. While party 
membership rose significantly, the number of affiliate members declined in this period, 
which is why a greater degree of penetration was not achieved. In Norway the affiliate 
membership was simply the number of people organized by the AFL, and adding these to 
DNA’s membership it is discovered that 7.8 % of Norwegians were members of the labour 
movement in 1930, 8.85 % in 1933 and 14.51 % in 1936. The figures do not leave any 
doubt that organizationally DNA was considerably stronger.
The existence of a youth organization as an appendix to the Socialist party may be 
regarded as important in wooing younger voters, who were definitely a target group for 
both Labour and DNA. It has been argued, however, that Labour showed a real lack of 
enthusiasm both in setting up and in developing the League of Youth. In fact the League 
developed spontaneously after the First World War, but the Labour leadership feared it 
might direct resources away from the main party or that it could become the point of entry 
for Communist infiltration.59 In 1933 the NEC for the first time began developing the 
League, and permitted it to join the International Union of Socialist Youth in 1931 -60 In 
worrying that the League might become a centre of opposition to the leadership, there is no 
reason to suppose that Labour had the example of DNA’s youth organization in mind. Yet 
before DNA’s youth section was refounded in 1927 as part of the reunification of DNA and 
the Norwegian Social Democratic Party, it had indeed been an alternative power base to the
59 Zig Layton-Henry, ‘Labour’s Lost Youth’, Journal o f Contemporary History 11 (1976), p. 275, p. 276, pp. 
277-278.
, 60 Ibid., p. 279.
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leadership. Support for the Comintern was especially prevalent in it, so that when DNA left 
the Third International in 1923, about 150 of the 200 branches joined the new Communist 
Party.61 But in 1933 AUF, as it was known from 1927, played a preponderant part in 
DNA’s campaign.62 In any case, membership of Labour’s League of Youth and AUF was 
as follows:
Table 5.7 Labour’s League of Youth membership.
Year Membership Branches
1929 Unknown 233
1930 c. 3,000 335
1935 c. 2, 550 510
(Sources: Layton-Henry ’Labour’s Lost Youth’, Journal o f Contemporary History 11 
(1976), p. 280, Labour annual reports 1929, p. 233; 1930, p. 28; Report of the Conference 
of the League of Youth 9 January 1932.)
Labour’s annual reports tended to give the number of branches rather than members 63 
DNA’s annual reports also give the membership figures.
Table 5.8 AUF membership.
Year Membership Branches
1930 14, 000 275
1933 21, 000 410
1936 c. 32, 000 693
(Sources: DNA annual reports: 1930, p. 44; 1933, p. 48; 1936, p. 86.)
61 Teije Halvorsen, Partiets salt. AUFs historie (Oslo, Pax, 2003), p. 15. Or possibly the split was 135:65, but 
the great majority joined the Communists.
62 Ibid., p. 175.
63 In contrast to the figures shown above it was claimed that the League of Youth had 20, 000 members in 
more than 200 branches in 1929! But the League was growing in 1931 when it joined the Socialist Youth 
International upon the basis of having 3, 000 members. The figure o f20,000 members diverges completely 
from everything that is known about the League and may be discounted. Labour Organiser DC (August 1929), 
p. 151.
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Even a cursory glance at these figures show that AUF was unusually superior in 
numbers. This of course is all the more significant given the relative size of the populations 
from which they could recruit. By comparison with DNA’s youth organization, Labour’s 
League of Youth was an amateurish affair, and the lack of precise information in the annual 
reports rather prove the point that it was not taken seriously enough. Another organization 
which mobilized many young people in both countries was the Workers’ Sports 
Association. In 1936 it was stated that more than 13,000 individuals had joined the British 
organization, which included some 380 clubs.64 The Norwegian equivalent comprised 62, 
000 members in the same year.65 Despite Norway’s small size it became the second largest 
workers’ athletics union in the world on the eve of the Second World War, only beaten by 
its Soviet counterpart.66 Besides helping to instil Labour values in the population at large, 
AUF and AIF, the sports association, were actively part of DNA’s campaigns, and it is 
probable that the League of Youth took part in some electoral tasks for Labour.
Apart from having active members in various organizations belonging to the labour 
movement, the importance of the press is obvious in gaining support for the party at 
election times or otherwise. There was no 1929 Labour Year Book in Britain, but it was 
incorporated into the publication brought out the following year. It is far from ideal not to 
have a separate list of newspapers for 1929, especially since elections were in close 
succession. For this reason it seems better to include the figures for 1928. The overall 
picture is not changed in a significant way.
Table 5.9 Labour newspapers.
Year Number of publications
1928 2 dailies, 25 weeklies, 74 monthlies, 5 
quarterlies and 1 irregular
1931 1 daily, 16 weeklies, 69 monthlies
1935 1 daily, 12 weeklies, 25 monthlies, 1 
quarterly and 11 irregulars
64 Labour Party Annual report 1936, p. 85.
65 AAB: Leaflet marked Arbeidemes Oplysningsforbund, p. 1 in Archive: Arbeidemes Ungdomsfylking 
Serie: Da-Saksarkiv. Korrespondanse A-B, 1935-1959 Da 0003, folder marked AUF agitasjon.
66 Knut Kjeldstadli, Et splittet samfunn 1905-1935. Aschehougs Norgeshistorie 10 (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1994), 
, p. 133.
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(Sources: Labour Year Book 1928 (London, Labour, n.d.), pp. 540-541, Labour Year Book 1931 (London, 
Labour, n. d.), p. 549. Royden Harrison et al., The Warwick Guide to British Labour Periodicals 1790-1970 
(Hassocks, Harvester, 1977))
It will be seen that there was a contraction between the two first years, including the loss of 
the Aberdeen Citizen which was published daily. This happened before 1930, which was 
also the case for all the folded weeklies.67 From 1930 therefore Labour had only one daily 
newspaper, but it should be noted that this was the Daily Herald, which after being partially 
leased to Odhams Press in 1930 achieved spectacular sales. In mid-1933 it became the first 
newspaper in the world to reach a circulation of two million, although the Daily Express 
equalled the achievement within days.68 Despite this outstanding success, Labour was 
worried about its network of newspapers: “The number of local Labour newspapers or 
periodicals shows little sign of increasing. Weeklies may be counted on one’s fingers, and 
as for monthlies [...] it would seem that no sooner is one fresh published by one Party than 
another gives up the effort.”69
Table 5.10 DNA newspapers.
Year Number of publications
1930 20 dailies, 1 published 4 times a week, 11 
published 3 times a week and 2 weeklies.
1933 21 dailies, 1 published 4 times a week, 12 
published 3 times a week, 8 published 
twice a week and 1 weekly.
1936 26 dailies, 1 published 4 times a week, 8 
published 3 times a week and 7 published 
twice a week.
(Sources: DNA Annual reports: 1930, p. 51; 1933, pp. 51-53; 1936, pp. 79-80.)
67 Cf. Labour Year Book 1930 (incorporating 1929 Year Book) (London, Labour, n. d.), p. 557.
68 Huw Richard, ‘The Daily Herald’, History Today 31 (Dec. 1981), p. 15.
69 Labour Organiser XIII (May 1933), p. 89.
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The newspapers of the Norwegian labour movement can thus be seen to appear with 
much greater frequency than the labour press in the United Kingdom. The huge difference 
in the number of dailies and the significant number of publications appearing several times 
a week are two noteworthy facts. They prove that there was a very good spread of labour 
news across the country.70 As a much smaller nation it was impossible for Norway to have 
a title like the Daily Herald with an enormous circulation, but in 1930 the total circulation 
of all DNA’s newspapers was 120, 000, which was a fifth of the entire market.71 In 1933 
the total circulation had risen to 192, 244 and by 1936 it was 200,000. DNA’s main daily 
was Arbeiderbladet, published in Oslo, but never the equal of the Conservative Aftenposten 
in terms of sales.72 The latter was an Establishment quality newspaper.
Finally, there is the question of funding in the election campaigns. It is known how 
much Labour spent in each year because figures are available for average expenditure per 
candidate, and the published sources explain what was spent centrally. DNA’s expenditure 
is less straightforward. The archives contain information on central fund expenditure in 
1933 and 1936, but not for 1930. And for each of these three election years it is impossible 
to tell how much local and municipal branches raised and spent. Fortunately the budgets 
and actual expenditure of Oslo DNA, by far the most important local party, are available 
for all three years. In addition, almost all money came from the AFL and was distributed in 
areas outside the capital. The only possibility of arriving at a fair estimate must be to add 
the expenditure of Oslo DNA to the central fund in each election. The small element of 
double-counting involved in reckoning funds from the central party transferred to Oslo 
DNA twice, must be taken to represent the money raised by local branches.
70 Labour would have liked to have had a similar network. William Henderson, as press secretary, thought 
provincial weeklies were more likely to attract support than a national daily. Stefan Berger ‘The Formation of 
Party Milieux: Branch Life in the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party in the 
Interwar Period’ in Matthew Worley (ed.), Labour’s Grass Roots. Essays on the Activities o f Local Labour 
Parties and Members, 1918-45 (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), p. 246. For an earlier period it has been claimed 
that the Norwegian labour movement had more newspapers per capita than in any other European country. 
HAkon Meyer ‘Arbeiderpartiet 1914-1923’ in Halvdan Koht (ed.), Det norske Arbeiderpartis historie 1887- 
1937 (Oslo, DNA, 1939), p. 281.
71 Svennik Hoyer, ‘Partiet i pressen— et omriss av arbeiderpressens utvikling i Norge’, Tidsskriftfor 
Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 1/1979, p. 18.
12 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
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Table 5.11 Labour election expenditure.
Year Number of candidates Amount spent
1929 569 £282,188
1931 490 £186, 733
1935 552 £207, 860
(Sources; Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931, p. 85. Labour annual reports;
1929, p. 221; 1932, p. 58; 1935, p. 53; 1936; pp. 98-99; Butler and Butler, Twentieth- 
Century British Political Facts 1900-2000, p. 260.)
In each of these elections Labour was heavily outspent by the Conservatives, and in 1929 
also by the Liberals.73 The method of arriving at these figures has been to add expenditure 
in the constituencies to what was spent centrally minus the grants to candidates (already 
counted in the constituencies). In 1929 Labour could if it had wished spent more. £ 9,200 
raised for campaigning went unused, and was subsequently transferred to the general fund.
Table 5.12 DNA election expenditure.
Year Amount spent
1930 £6, 120
1933 £31,301
1936 £47, 795
(Sources: Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1930, sak. Nr. 348-128, Da 0113, folder
marked DNA-Arbeiderbladet. Letter from AFL to DNA 6 September 1930; Oslo DNA annual report 1930, p. 
47; Oslo DNA annual report 1933, p. 55; Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1933, sak nr. 
553-754, Da 0139, Folder marked Stortingsvalget; Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, Serie: Ac- 
Sekretariatets protokoller, Ac 0011, Sekretariates protokoll 1937, p. 24; Oslo DNA annual report 1936, p. 65.)
In 1930 DNA’s expenditure was dwarfed by the Conservatives, who spent about £ 
31, 500, and the disparity was even greater than Labour vs. the Conservatives in Britain the 
year before.74 Some writers are operating with lower figures for central spending in DNA’s
73 If Rowe’s figures can be trusted the Conservatives seem to have spent £ 524,607 in that year and the 
Liberals £ 406, 920. He puts Labour’s expenditure at £ 256,601, which is plainly wrong. It is, however, a 
close approximation to what was spent in the constituencies. E. A. Rowe, ’The British General Election of 
1929’, B. Litt. thesis, Oxford University 1959, p. 534.
74 Rolf Danielsen, Borgerlig oppdemningspolitikk 1918-1940. H&yres historie 2 (Oslo, Cappelen, 1984), p. 
208.
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case in 1930.75 They may well be right as there is some question about how seriously DNA 
approached elections before 1933. In 1927 DNA spent less than half of its central budget 
for electoral campaigning.76 In 1933 and 1936, however, DNA was at least on parity with 
the capitalist parties individually. In order to compare Labour and DNA it will as before be 
necessary to take the size of the populations into account. DNA’s spending in 1930 was 
considerably below Labour’s in 1929 per capita. The equivalent sum in Britain would have 
been less than £ 100, 000. Since 1929 represented Labour’s most costly election, it may be 
used as a yardstick. If compared with DNA’s serious attempts to gain power in 1933 and to 
extend it in 1936, it is discovered that DNA spent considerably more relative to Norway’s 
smaller population. In 1933 DNA’s per capita expenditure was 1.77 times as high, and in 
1936 it spent 2.67 times as much by the same measure.
On the whole, the comparison involving resources and the strength of each 
respective labour movement usually favours DNA over Labour. Sometimes the disparities 
are strikingly large such as over the numbers enrolled by the Socialist party, by its labour 
movement or by youth and sports organizations. While the 1927 Trade Union and Trade 
Disputes Act did not cause Labour to suffer financially in the 1929 election, the British 
labour movement clearly was damaged over time. This can be seen most easily from the 
large difference between the numbers of trade unionists and Labour’s nationally affiliated 
membership. Separate figures are not given here for those who affiliated to Labour through 
their trade union, but even including co-operators, ILP members and Socialist intellectuals, 
Labour’s affiliate members only make up somewhat above half of the total membership of 
the TUC. Another interesting aspect, in tune with general trends, is that DNA’s figures 
continuously got better. The Norwegian labour movement expanded in these years, but 
while there are signs of improvement in 1935, the British labour movement presents a more 
complex picture. It lost newspapers and nationally affiliated members, and the TUC had 
fewer members in 1935 than in 1929 (almost certainly caused by the Depression, but the 
AFL grew during this period). Labour had its successes, though, and possibly the greatest 
was the staggering increase in the circulation of the Daily Herald. Before 1930 it had a 
circulation of about 250,000, but topped the million mark in the first week after its
75 Per Maurseth has put the amount at 68, 000 kroner, whereas in table 5.12 it has been assumed that DNA 
spent the entire donation from AFL of 75,000 kroner. Gjennom kriser til makt (1920-1935), p. 543.
76 Ibid., p. 568.
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relaunch.77 By 1931 circulation had reached 1.25 million and in September 1932 it was 1.6 
million.78 In 1933 it received an auditor’s certificate confirming that circulation was above 
2 million, and thereafter further progress was made.79
Campaigning, party structures and electoral appeals 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on interesting similarities and differences 
between the campaigning of the two parties. The most striking contrast is the confederative 
nature of the Labour Party, which had an effect when preparing for elections. In 1929 and 
1931 the affiliated Independent Labour Party and Co-operative Party joined Labour in its 
efforts. In 1935 the Co-operative Party remained affiliated to it. There were both 
advantages and disadvantages for Labour in its relations with die autonomous components. 
The ILP had its own national and central organization and a network including its long- 
established journal, the New Leader™ It could only be a benefit to Labour that the ILP’s 
resources were added to its own. In areas where the ILP was particularly strong and 
dominated local Labour organizations such as in Bradford, Glasgow and Clydeside, its 
disaffiliation in 1932 must have been a heavy blow to Labour. The blow was perhaps 
softened by the decreasing number of seats which the ILP won for Labour. In 1929 ILP 
influence was quite extensive. It sponsored 37 of the intake of Labour MPs, and another 
123 MPs had membership of the ILP.81 In 1931, when no agreement could be reached, and 
the ILP contingent was technically running independently of Labour, it returned just six 
MPs. The ILP had been the natural home in the Labour Party for individuals who had no 
trade union, but by disaffiliating it forced those of its members with ambitions to leave it 
behind. The disadvantages for Labour lay in the extra effort involved in coordinating its 
electoral activities with another organization. As was noted in chapter 1, wrangling between 
the NEC and local parties ensued in 1931 because Glasgow Kelvingrove and Camborne 
constituencies had chosen ILP candidates on the financial responsibility of the affiliate. In
77 Labour Party Annual report 1930, p. 60.
78 Labour Party Annual report 1931, p. 61; Labour Party Annual report 1932, p. 65.
79 Labour Party Annual report 1933, p. 54.
80 Gideon Cohen, ‘The Independent Labour Party, Disaffiliation, Revolution and Standing Orders’, History 
86: 282 (2001), p. 201.
81 Ibid., p. 208.
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that year no final agreement was reached between the ILP and Labour, meaning that all the 
candidates of the former were unendorsed.
As for the Co-operative Party it was a similar story. In 1929 the local co-operative 
society was often lauded for the efforts it made in campaigning for Labour candidates. That 
was irrespective of whether the candidates were sponsored by the Co-operative Party. In 
1929, 12 Labour candidates received their funding from the Co-operative Party, and of 
these nine were elected.83 Although it has been stated that the programme of the Co­
operative Party remained essentially subservient to Labour’s plans, there were nevertheless 
very real tension between the two which cost the NEC much time and effort to repair.84 The 
essential difficulty was that the Co-op Party National Executive had power over its MPs 
elected on a Labour ticket. In 1934 relations deteriorated to a crisis point, continuing into 
1935. If these difficulties had persisted, it is easy to see that the electioneering of Labour 
might have been compromised one way or another. Either the Co-operative Party might 
have disaffiliated, making it much harder to win the seats where the MPs belonged to it, or, 
if left unchecked, Labour might have been completely sidelined in those areas. DNA as a 
unitary party did not have anything like the same problems with co-operators. In the same 
year as matters were brought to a head in Britain, DNA merely instructed its members who 
also belonged to the co-operative movement to vote against proposed constitutional 
changes strengthening the neutrality of that organization.85 It nevertheless thought it 
important enough to send a circular to trade unions and local party branches on this issue.86 
It is highly unlikely that the confederative nature of Labour had any bearing on the question 
of overall success, but it is brought out as a difference emerging from the two chapters on 
how the parties campaigned.
Another difference in the campaigning strategies, though a small and relatively 
unimportant one, was that DNA relied almost exclusively on pamphlets for its written 
propaganda. Election newspapers were used by both parties, but only in a few cases did 
DNA produce a leaflet. One was “Vote with the Norwegian Labour Party” at the 1930
83 Labour Party Annual report 1929, p. 8.
84 Matthew Hilton, Consumerism in Twentieth-Century Britain. The Search for a Historical Movement 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 87.
85 AAB: Report from a meeting of the Joint Committee 5 February 1935. Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i 
Norge, LOs saksarkiv 1935, sak nr. 71-113, Da 0153.
86 Loc. cit. dated 18 February 1935.
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election, another a flyer entitled “Who is Quisling?” in 1933. By contrast, for the 1929 
election William Henderson of the Research and Publicity Committee suggested that 
Labour should stop issuing pamphlets altogether in order to concentrate on leaflets.87 But 
Labour continued to use both pamphlets and flyers during the campaigns. Several of 
DNA’s pamphlets were densely argued and required some effort on the part of the reader. 
On the other hand, there was a greater theatrical component to DNA’s campaigning than to 
Labour’s. It was there from the start as 1930 featured both amateur drama and open-air 
meetings, which had an element of show about them. These were considerably increased in 
1936 as a function of greater funding and the introduction of “drama gangs” of youngsters, 
making a spectacle of what might otherwise have been mundane political meetings. In each 
election year there was a mass rally at Young’s Square in Oslo the evening before polling 
day, attracting more than 40, 000 people every time. These were carefully choreographed to 
produce a pleasing and powerful impression in the minds of the spectators. Apart from the 
political content represented by speeches, there was communal singing, recitals and music. 
The election film was shown in nearby halls, while in Britain “Labour film propaganda was 
conspicuous by its absence.”88 In 1936 one of the two films was projected onto the walls of 
the headquarters of DNA.89 In that year especially, and to a lesser extent in 1930 and 1933, 
many of DNA’s meetings were mini-versions of the final rally. Unison singing also played 
a part in Labour’s campaigning, witness the Albert Hall rally which marked the beginning 
of the election campaign in 1929.90 The sources give no indication, however, that 
entertaining propaganda was emphasized as with DNA, although Labour clearly had the 
capacity to create a spectacle if it wanted to. There was good provision of recreation and 
leisure pursuits in the local branches, and in 1928 Labour had staged a Festival of Labour at 
the Crystal Palace. This featured “sports, dancing, community singing, organ recitals, and 
many other events.”91
87 Minutes of the Research and Publicity Committee 2 November 1928.
88 Dominic Wring, The Politics o f Marketing the Labour Party (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 
35. Though Labour used films in 1929.
89 Arbeiderbladet 19 October 1936, p. 2.
90 Daily Herald 29 April 1929, p. 1.
91 Stephen G. Jones, Workers at Play. A Social and Economic History o f Leisure 1918-1939 (London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 145. In some localities cultural pursuits may have been means to the end 
of aiding Labour expansion. Thus in Rhonda, Wales they ceased between the early 1920s and mid-1930s. 
Chris Williams, Democratic Rhondda. Politics and Society, 1885-1951 (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 
1996), p. 113.
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Having brought these circumstances out, it should be stated that major differences 
were not found in the electioneering of Labour and DNA. It was argued earlier that the 
former was more moderate, but this could not be deduced from the rhetoric employed 
during campaigning. Both parties argued for higher living standards for workers and other 
disadvantaged people, stressed their commitment to peace and claimed to be constitutional. 
It was entirely true for Labour and essentially true for DNA, but when the Norwegian party 
was deliberating among itself its greater radicalism shone through. At the party conference 
of 1930 its vice-chairman, the historian Edvard Bull, called democracy “an old superstitious 
phrase from the nineteenth century.” Three years later DNA chairman Oscar Torp said 
democracy was a “fictitious concept”, but it mattered to many from whom the party needed 
support. There is an interesting parallel in the way the two parties used rhetoric about the 
capitalist parties essentially being fascists who were dangerous to the labour movement. In 
1931 Labour claimed that if the National Government won the election, it would “naturally 
and inevitably” lead to a dictatorship.94 Ramsay MacDonald wanted to be a dictator with 
Parliament as a “Council of State on the Fascist model.” The labour movement was already 
being seen as a national menace, and the TUC as a “dangerous enemy which must be 
curbed.”95 Evidence for the above was to be found in capitalist-supporting newspapers and 
speeches made during the campaign. This is an exact parallel to what DNA claimed in 
1933. Martin Tranmael argued at the party conference that year that the reactionary 
capitalist parties were trying to create a Norwegian form of fascism.96 At a public meeting 
in the early stages of the election campaign, Socialist politician K. F. Dahl said that the 
Agrarian and Conservative press contained articles in praise of fascist governments.97 
Democracy in Norway was also at risk from a dictatorship in the fascist mould.
The question of electoral appeal to a variety of groups has been the subject of a 
chapter in each national context. Labour was by nature a party for the workers, but of 
whom exactly did it seek the support in these three elections? In 1929 Labour showed some 
concern for the lower middle class. The manifesto claimed that the Conservative
92 Protokoll overforhandlingene pa landsrmtet 1930 (Oslo, DNA, 1930), p. 45.
93 Protokoll over forhandlingene pa landsmetet 1933 (Oslo, DNA, 1934), pp. 54-55.
94 Daily Herald 26 October 1931, p. 8.
95 Ibid., p. 8.
96 Protokoll over forhandlingene pa landsmotet 1933, p. 39.
97 Arbeiderbladet, 6 September 1933, p. 6.
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Government had put massive indirect taxes on shopkeepers and other small property
98 _ »owners. This was the de-rating measure which gave tax breaks for larger industries, but 
increased them for landlords and small businesses. Women under 30 could vote for the first 
time in 1929, and Labour tried particularly hard to gain their support as well as their older 
sisters’. Nine out of 66 available leaflets were directed especially at women, and probably 
every candidate statement stressed their importance. Rural dwellers were the other main 
priority. As stated in chapter 3,14 out of 66 leaflets were intended for the classes of the 
countryside." Most of these appeals targeted agricultural workers, but several of them were 
addressed to farmers. Among the workers, subsections such as the young and the old were 
appealed to, and there was a little bit of focus on the non-unionized, including domestic 
servants and fishermen. The appeal to shopkeepers was not extensive, and there was hardly 
any attempt to attract parts of the middle classes. In 1931 some middle-class people were 
added to Labour’s perceived base, when the party promised to restore cuts in salaries. This 
did not, however, have as great a priority as restoring cuts in unemployment benefit.100 
Shopkeepers were more often mentioned as a target group than they had been in 1929. The 
rest of the desired social coalition remained the same with renewed interest in rural 
dwellers. 1935 was not wholly different, either. Between these two elections, Labour 
produced two pamphlets arguing the case for Socialism to professionals. There was a 
greater emphasis on the unity of interests between small business people and workers. 
Women continued to be in evidence as a high priority for the party. Labour was already a 
people’s party in 1929, and the subsequent elections brought something of a widening of its 
base in class terms. By far the most propaganda was directed at workers in all these 
elections.
As for DNA, the development of its electoral appeal closely matched Labour’s. For 
all three elections its target group was officially “the working people”, which comprised the 
workers, smallholders and fishermen. In 1930 the written propaganda was overwhelmingly 
directed at these, not least the rural dwellers because other parties also sought their support. 
Youth were given especial attention, but despite the last editorial in Arbeiderbladet before
98 Quoted in F. W. S. Craig, British General Election Manifestos, 1900-1974 (London, Macmillan, 1975), p. 
55.
" P . 153.
100 Thorpe, The British General Election o f 1931, p. 247.
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the election being addressed to women, the latter group was not.101 The written propaganda 
was hardly conscious of clerks, but they and the smaller group of civil servants received 
some attention in Arbeiderbladet and meetings in Oslo were held specifically for them. As 
with small property owners in Britain, it was hoped that they would vote for the party, but 
they were not prioritized to the same extent as the core groups. In 1933 the target groups 
remained essentially the same, but there was greater focus on white-collar workers in the 
election materials. Also a specific brochure was written for women, “A Saturday Shopping 
Trip”, which sought to relate politics to everyday affairs. Youth continued to be specifically 
targeted, especially as unemployed workers. DNA still did not address itself seriously to 
middle-class groups, and it was not made apparent that they or white-collar workers 
belonged to “the working people”. Only in 1936 did this change. That election saw the 
widening of DNA’s self-perceived base to nine out of ten people.102 All the groups that had 
previously been included within the social coalition remained there, of course, and some 
that had previously been neglected were concentrated on. These included non-unionized 
workers such as maids, agricultural labourers and forestry workers, each receiving their 
own brochure. It was finally confirmed that clerks were part of the “the working people”, 
and they also had a brochure to themselves. Not so much in the written election materials, 
but through Arbeiderbladet and one of the election films, an appeal was for the first time 
directed at technicians and professionals.103 They were called on to use their expertise in 
the service of the new state DNA intended to build.
It will thus be seen that major differences did not exist between Labour and DNA as 
for campaigning strategy or from whom it sought votes. In view of the established 
explanation of success, it is particularly important that Labour continuously addressed itself 
to the classes of the countryside. Whether it made any progress with them is another matter. 
1929 was its best election in terms of seats in the interwar period, but it took only five 
constituencies classified as agricultural, two of which were also mining seats.104 Kinnear 
chose to describe constituencies with more than 30 % of the occupied male population over
101 Arbeiderbladet 20 October 1930, p. 3.
102 Kjeldstadli, ‘’’Arbeider, bonde, v&re haere...”’, Tidsskrift for Arbeiderbevegelsens historie 2/1978, p. 151.
103 cf. Arbeiderbladet 11 September 1936, p. 3; 16 October 1936, p. 2 and p. 9.
104 Michael Kinnear, The British Voter. An Atlas and Survey since 1885 (London, Batsford Academic and 
Professional, 1981), p. 48.
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12 involved in agriculture in this way, and there were 86 such seats in 1929.105 Although 
Labour concluded that to get a parliamentary majority it needed more support in the 
countryside,106 the above statistics rather cast doubts on that. As a party with national 
aspirations Labour wanted to appeal to all regions, but it was not strictly necessary to gain 
the rural areas like it was for DNA in Norway. No rule in Britain stipulated that 2/3 of the 
seats in Parliament must be drawn from the countryside.
Luebbert argues that no good could come to the Socialist party from organizing the 
agrarian proletariat.107 Strictly speaking his point holds true for the present comparison. 
Labour did try to gain the support of farm workers throughout this short period, and its 
agricultural policy designed to benefit them went back at least to the early twenties.108 
DNA tried for support from this group as well, but most of the effort was directed at 
smallholders and fishermen, and it was only in 1936 that it singled out agricultural 
labourers for special attention with a brochure intended for them. But Luebbert’s argument 
cannot apply to Britain anyway, because not bringing farm workers into the party was 
preparatory to making a crisis deal with the family peasantry.109 In Britain such an 
agreement could only have been with the Liberals, who had some rural support and may 
have been the party of medium-sized farmers, at least in the Celtic fringe. When the 
Liberals held the balance of power from 1923 to 1924, however, it was too early for a crisis 
deal, and it would have required superb political skills to arrange one in 1929-1931 as the 
Depression was just getting underway. Labour had not even adopted a plan of counter­
cyclical economics, so the option simply was not there. This goes back to the point made 
earlier about Labour being too willing to govern. Had it been intact and in opposition, there 
is a chance it would have taken up some form of crisis measures since New Deal-type 
policies were formulated by progressive forces from about 1932.
In actual fact, though, this chapter has been arguing that it was not necessary to 
have an urban-rural class alliance in order for a Socialist party to attain power and govern 
successfully. It is quite logical to predicate an explanation of Socialist success on the basis
105 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
106 Daily Herald A June 1929, p. 4.
107 Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy, p. 288.
108 Philip Snowden, I f  Labour Rules (London, Labour, 1923), p. 44. Agriculture was its weakest area, but 
there was growing appreciation of its vital importance.
109 Luebbert, op. cit., p. 268.
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of what the Scandinavian parties did. Even in Britain at the time they were referred to as 
good role models,110 but the propounded thesis of the urban-rural alliance is not necessarily 
the only path to Socialist success. It was stated above that in Britain the agricultural sector 
was much smaller than in Norway (6.2 % of the UK population in the sector around 1930 
compared to 16.7 % in Norway or 20.5 % in the entire primary sector111). And 86 out of 
615 seats in Parliament were “agricultural” by Kinnear’s measure compared to 100 out of 
150 in Norway. It is an open question how much one may generalize from the Scandinavian 
situation. No doubt it is a good use of the method of formulating ideal types from several 
contexts (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) and applying them elsewhere. The explanation 
certainly casts light on the outcome of the political struggle between the wars, and has acted 
as a guide to the present work. However, when the perspective is reduced to just two 
countries and a study is performed of the trajectories of the Socialist parties, the strength of 
the labour movements and the level of funding in vital campaigns, these seem to be better 
indictors of success.
Conclusion
Summarizing such a densely argued chapter is no easy task. It was posited at the 
beginning that DNA was more successful than Labour in the interwar period, quite apart 
from its establishing hegemony in the 1930s. Its length of tenure was longer than Labour’s 
and in the ratio 3:2. Its rule was consecutive and it achieved much of what it wanted in 
office. It reduced unemployment to half of what it had been, presided over peaceful 
industrial relations (though the Main Agreement between AFL and the Employers’ 
Association NAF in 1935 was not its work),112 brought in old age pensions and 
unemployment benefit, improved employment rights and ended anti-labour legislation such 
as the “workhouse laws”. These achievements laid the groundwork for its long-standing 
governments after the Second World War. Many of these benefits accrued to Britain earlier 
than they did in Norway, but capitalist governments could take the credit. Labour’s best 
performance was in the field of international relations. It recognized the Soviet Union in
110 Arthur Greenwood’s radio address in the 1935 election campaign. Daily Herald 5 November 1935, p. 4.
111 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, p. 108; Statistisk arbokfor Norge. 57. argang, p. 9.
1,2 It came into force on 9 March 1935,11 days before the accession of DNA to power. Jardar Seim, Hvordan 
Hovedavtalen av 1935 ble til. Staten, organisasjonene og arbeidsfreden 1930-35 (Oslo, Tiden, 1972), p. 11.
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1924, and Ramsay MacDonald made the first official visit by a British prime minister to the 
United States. The Wheatley Housing Act of 1924 was, unfortunately for Labour, set aside 
by later capitalist governments. But given the huge internal problems that the British and 
Norwegian societies faced between the wars, especially unemployment, even a masterly 
foreign policy on its own cannot be seen as being of crucial importance.
As for the explanation of DNA’s greater success, it was mostly found in the 
contingency of that party being in government at the tail-end of the Depression rather than 
at the beginning. This was, however, related to the moderation vs. radicalism issue, and it 
was suggested that if Labour had been more radical it might well have achieved more. It 
would not then have found itself in the nearly impossible situation of being in a minority 
government grappling with unemployment above 2.5 million. Nor would it have ended up 
as a mere shadow of its former self in Parliament with all of its leaders except Lansbury 
gone, and a washed-out alternative for the rest of the 1930s. The example of DNA shows 
that it could have gone on to govern, provided that the Conservatives and Liberals did not 
remain bound together, holding “coupon” elections.
The moderation of Labour and the contrary radicalism of DNA were explained 
through the successful or otherwise legitimation of the social order by the State and the 
Establishment. This is offered as an alternative to Geary’s idea that an open-minded attitude 
on the part of the State and employers had this effect.113 Judging by the figures, it seems 
likely that DNA would have come to power after the 1933 election whatever the electoral 
system. Instead of the crisis agreement with the Agrarians in 1935 being the underlying 
reason why DNA became a successful Socialist party, it appears as a necessity thrown up 
by proportional representation. DNA, having the examples of similar deals in Denmark and 
Sweden before it, made a good move in the prevailing circumstances. It allowed the 
Agrarians to get most of what they wanted in return for being able to form a government 
implementing forward crisis policies.114 The crisis agreement was only a necessity due to 
proportional representation, though, and consequently the urban-rural thesis of Luebbert 
and Esping-Andersen is shown to be a local explanation, not a general one. It might still
113 Geary, European Labour Politics from 1900 to the Depression, p. 18.
1,4 Furre, Norsk historie 1905-1940, p. 240.
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apply to Germany which had PR,115 but it has little explanatory power for the United 
Kingdom. Labour’s project was not doomed from the start due to either not organizing 
enough rural dwellers, or not making a crisis deal with a party representing the interests of 
medium-sized farmers. Starting from an hypothesis that significant differences would be 
uncovered in electoral strategy or how campaigning was done, the success of these two 
Socialist parties seems instead to have been determined by labour movement strength, 
contingency and, in an incidental way, the age-old question of moderation or maximalism.
115 Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets, pp. XV-XVI.
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A p p e n d i x  1 
Labour grants to candidates in 1929 (£ s. d.)
Region Constituency Candidate Grant
Beds. Bedford C. Dixon 70/4/6
Mid Bedford H. W. Fenner 60
Luton Mrs Harrison Bell 75
Berks. Abingdon A. Reade 75
Newbury P. H. Jaques 60
Windsor A. H. Chilton 50
Bucks Aylesbury F. G. Temple 60
Buckingham J. L. George 50
Wycombe Mrs Townsend 60
Cambs. Cambridge D. R. Hardman 40
Ches. Wallasey J. D. Mack 40
Chester W. Herron 26/19/3
Northwich Mrs B. Ayrton Gould 75
Wirral G. Beards worth 51/15/0
Cora. Bodmin Paul Reed 40
Camborne H. J. Sharman 75
Northern F. E. Church 60
Penryn & Falmouth F. J. Hopkins 75
St. Ives W. Arnold Foster 60
Cumb. Northern C. A. O' Donnell 75/19/2
Penrith & Cockermouth A. Dodd 60
Derby Chesterfield G. Benson 75
West Derby W. Wilkinson 75
Devon Exeter J. Lloyd Jones 40
Plymouth Drake J. J. H. Moses 40
Plymouth Devonport Rev. D. Fraser 40
Plymouth Sutton W. Westwood 40
Barnstaple D. Mullins 60
Honiton Mrs F. R. Davies 60
Tiverton H. Wreford-Glanvill 40
Torquay H. H. Medland 60
Totnes Miss K. Spurrell 60
Dorset Eastern E. J. Stocker 60
Northern Colin G. Clark 60
Southern A. Wiltshire 50
Western T. Robins 60
Durham Hartlepool G. Oliver 59/14/6
Consett Rev. H. Dunnico 75
Essex Ilford C. R. de Gruchy 40
West Leyton Rev. R. Sorensen 25
Stratford T. Groves 40
Epping J. T. Walton Newbold 50
Romford H. T. Muggeridge 75
Saffron Walden W.Cash 60
Glos Bristol North W. Ayles 40
Bristol West Lady Clare Annesley 40
Cheltenham W. Piggot 40
Cirenc. & Tewkesb. E. W. Fredman 40
Stroud F. E. White 60
Thombury Godfrey Elton 75
Hants Bournemouth Col. M. Spencer 40
Portsmouth Cen. W. G. Had 40
Loan
36
25
267
Resion Constituency Candidate Grant Loan
Portsmouth South Miss J. Stephen 40
Aldershot J. R. McPhie 50
Basingstoke W. J. Beck 60
Fareham A. J. Pearson 50
N.Forest & Christch. G. W. Austin 60
Petersfield Mrs H. J. Massingham 50
Winchester Dr R. A. Lyster 50
Hereford Hereford H. Cooper 60
Herts. Hertford R. S. Edwards 50
Hitchin Dick Gifford 50
Hunts Huntingdon C. S. Giddins 50
Isle of Ely Maj. D. J. Freyer 50
Kent Hythe Miss G. M. Colman 40
Ashford Dr M. Follick 60
Canterbury P. S. Eastman 50
Chislehurst J. L. Thomson 60
Dartford J. E. Mills 64/14/11
Dover E. L. McKeag 50
Faversham Maj. D. Leigh Aman 75
Isle of Thanet E. Plaisted 60
Maidstone J. Morgan 100
Sevenoaks J. Hamilton Fyfe 60
Tonbridge W. F. Toynbee 75
Lancs Blackpool E. Machin 30
Bootle J. Kinley 40
Liverpool East Toxteth J. J. Cleaiy 40
Liverpool Edge Hill J. H. Hayes 40
Liverpool Walton F. A. P. Rowe 40
Liverpool Wavertree S. L. Treleaven 40
Liverpool West Toxteth J. Gibbins 40
Manchester Blackley W. A. Burke 40 (returned)
Manchester Exchange A. Moss 40
Manchester Moss Side A. A. Purcell 40
Manchester Withington Dr Robinson 40
Salford South J. Toole 40
Southport A. L. Williams 40
Darwen T. Ramsden 50
Lancaster R. P. Burnett 50
Lonsdale J. Henderson 75
Stretford F. Anderson 60
Waterloo J. Clifford Leigh 40
Leicester Bosworth J. Minto 75
Harborough E. J. Wise 60
Loughborough E. Winterton 60
Melton A. E. Stubbs 60
Lincs. Grimsby E. Marklow 40
Holland-w-Boston C. E. Snook 300
Grantham M. W. Moore 75
Rutland & Stamford H. J. Jones 60
Brigg D. J. K. Quibell 60
Gainsborough G. Deer 60 16/16/0
Homcastle J. R. Sanderson 60
Louth T. Holmes 50
London Battersea N. W. S. Sanders 40
Camberwell, Dulwich Dr C. A. Smith 40
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Redon Constituency Candidate Grant Loan
Chelsea Rev. A. G. Prichard 40
Hackney North F. G. Bowles 40
Hackney South Aid. H. Morrison 40
Hammersmith North J. P. Gardner 40
Hampstead F. E. Dawkins 20
Holbom F. W. Hickinbottom 40
Islington East Dr E. Bentham 40
Islington North R. Young 40
Islington South W. S. Cluse 40
Islington West Aid. F. Montague 40
Kensington North F. R. West 40
Lambeth, Brixton A. B. Bishop 40
Lambeth, Kennington L. W. Matters 40
Lambeth, Norwood W. O’ Brien Reeves 40
Lewisham East J. C. Wilmot 40
Lewisham West Mrs C. M. Wadham 40 44/17/7
St. Marylebone D. A. Ross 40
St.Pancras North J. Marley 40
St. Pancras South West W. Carter 20
Shoreditch E. Thurtle 40
Stepney Mile End J. Scurr 40
Stoke Newington F. L. Kerran 40
Wands. Balh. & Toot. Dr Brook 40
Wandsworth Central Maj A. G. Church 40
Wands. Putn.& Southf. J. C. Lawder 40
Wandsworth Streatham F. Hughes 40
Westmister St. George's J. C. Butler 40
Westminster Abbey J. H. MacDonnell 40 £ 17/12/8
Woolwich East H. Snell 40
Woolwich West W. Barefoot 40
Middlx. Ealing J. Maycock 40
Hornsey F. A. Wiltshire 40
Tottenham South F. Messer 40
Acton J. F. Shillaker 40
Enfield W. W. Henderson 75
Finchley J. G. Stone 40
Harrow Capt. Beaumont 40
Hendon Dr. R. Lyons 40
Spelthome F. Wilson Temple 50
Twickenham T. J. Mason 50
Uxbridge R. Bridgman 40
Wood Green E. P. Bell 40
Norfolk Norfolk East W. Holmes 75
Norfolk South G. Young 65
Norfolk South West W. B. Taylor 75
Northampto Peterborough J. F. Horrabin 75
Northumb. Tynemouth J. Stuart Barr 40
Berwick Aid Kegie 50
Hoxham E. Dunnico 75
Notts South Holford Knight 40
Bassetlaw Malcolm MacDonald 75
Broxtowe F. Seymour Cocks 80
Mansfield C. Brown 75
Newark Coun. W. Haywood 75
Rushcliffe Miss F. Widdowson 75
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Reaion Constituency Candidate Grant Loan
Oxford Banbury L. Wingfield 75
Henley B. B. Gillis 60
Salop Ludlow T. Hardwick 75
Owestry H. S, Evans 60
Shrewsbury A. A. Beach 50
Somerset Bath G. G. Desmond 40
Bridgwater J. M. Boltz 60
Taunton J. A. Sparks 60
Wells Mrs J. Davies 60
Weston-s-Mare Mrs Borrett 60
Yeovil F. C. R. Douglas 50
Staffs Walsall J. J. McShane 40
Wolverhampton E. D. R. Williams 40
Burton-on-Trent W. T. Paling 59/16/4
Kingswinford C. H. Sitch 60
Leek W. Bromfield 50
Stone G. Belt 75
Suffolk Eye Owen Aves 50
Lowestoft Capt. Basil Hall 60
Woodbridge L. Spero 60
Bury St. Edmunds P. Astins 75
Sudbury J. Shingfield 60
Surrey Croydon North G. A. Foan 40
Croydon South E. W. Wilson 40
Richmond P. Butler 40
Wimbledon T. Braddock 40
Epsom Rev. S. Morgan 50
Famham Noel Palmer 50
Guildford L. N. Worsnop 60
Mitcham Shane MacKay 75
Reigate P. H. Collick 60
Sussex Brighton W. McLaine/J. S. Cheshi 100
Eastbourne R. S. Chatfield 25
E. Grinstead T. Crawford 44/13/0
Lewes Alban Gordon 100
Rye G. Greenwood 60 £25/11/9
Horsham & Worthing Miss H. M. Keynes 75
Warwick Birmingham Duddesdon G. F. Sawyer 40
Birmingham Edgbaston W. H. D. Caple 40
Birmingham Erdington C. J. Simmons 100
Birm. Handsworth L. Anderson Fenn 40
Birmingham Ladywood W. Whiteley 150
Birmingham Moseley Dr F. G. Bushnell 40
Birmingham Sparkbrook Allan Young 250
Birmingham West O. G. Willey 40
Nuneaton F. Smith 75
Tam worth G. Horwill 60
Warwick & Leamington C. G. Garton 50
Westmorland W. Bone 60
Wilts Chippenham W. R. Robins 60
Devizes R. Sheppard 60
Westbury G. Ward 60
Worcs Dudley Oliver Baldwin 40
Worcester Kenneth Lindsay 40
Bewdley Sardius Hancock 60
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Region Constituency Candidate Grant Loan
Evesham R. Aldington 60
Kidderminster F. G. Lloyd 75
Stourbridge W. Wellock 75
Yorks Bradford North . Norman Angell 40
Dewsbury Ben Riley 40
Halifax A. W. Longbottom 65
Hull East G.Muff 40
Leeds Central Hon. R. W. Denman 40
Sheffield Hallam B. Rawson 40
Buckrose H. Vickers 59/7/0
Holdemess J. W. Hewitt 25
Scarborough H. D. Rowntree 50
Pensitone Rennie Smith 75
Pudsey & Otley A. W. Brown 60
Ripon A. Godfrey 50
Skipton J. P. Davies 50
Spen Valley H. H. Elvin 75
Wales
Anglesey Wm. Edwards 40
Brecon & Radnor Peter Freeman 75
Carnarvon Boroughs T. ap Rhys 40
Carmarthen Llanelly J. H. Williams 50
Denbigh Wrexham Prof. R. Richards 75
Flint C. O. Jones 75
Glam. Cardiff Central E. N. Bennett 40
Cardiff East J. E. Edmunds 40
Cardiff South A. Henderson 40
Llandaff & Barry C. Ellis Lloyd 75
Merioneth J. Jones Roberts 60
Monmouth Luke Bateman 75
Montgomery J. Evans 50
Pembroke W. J. Jenkins 75
Welsh University Rev. D. Richards 5
Scotland
Aberdeen Central Fraser Macintosh 50
Aberdeen Eastern Rev. J. E. Hamilton 40
Fife Eastern W. Ross Garson 65
Lanark Glasgow Pollok W. Muter 40
Glasgow Kelvingrove Coun. J. Winning 5
Midlothian Edinburgh North Miss E. Stewart 30
Kinross & Western Perth Rev. W. D. Stewart 60 £ 24/6/8
Roxburgh & Selkirk R. Gibson 60
Source: NEC minutes
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Daily (1) 
Daily Herald
Appendix 2 
Labour newspapers in 1935
Weekly (12)
Barrow Guardian
Barry Herald
Bristol Labour Weekly
Barnsley and District Labour Standard
Glasgow Eastern Standard
(Heanor and Ripley) Gazette
South Wales Voice
New Age
New Statesman and Nation
Labour's Northern Voice
Reynolds Illustrated News
Town Crier: Birmingham's Labour Weekly
Monthly (25)
(Bolton) Citizen 
Balham and Tooting Citizen 
Carshalton Labour Herald 
Central Southwark Citizen 
Country Standard 
East Kenton Log 
East Lewisham Citizen 
East Woolwich Citizen 
Edinburgh Clarion 
Gateshead Herald 
Huddersfield Citizen 
Hull Sentinel 
London News 
News and Notions 
North Camberwell Citizen 
North Lambeth Citizen 
North Southwark Citizen 
Park and Heeley Gazette 
Rhondda Clarion 
Spen Valley Pioneer 
Voice
Wakefield Forward 
Welsh Labour Outlook 
Wimbledon Citizen 
Workers' Monthly
Quarterly (1)
Commonwealth
Irregular (11)
Bermondsey Labour Magazine 
Bradford Pioneer 
Challenge
Comradeship and Wheatsheaf 
East Ham North Citizen
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Greenwich Citizen 
King's Norton Labour News 
Labour Torch 
North East Kent Chronicle 
University Forward 
West Woolwich Citizen
Source: Compiled from Royden Harrison et al., The Warwick Guide to British Labour 
Periodicals 1790-1970. A Check List (Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1977)
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A p p e n d i x  3
Electoral contributions to DNA's newspapers (kroner)
Newsoaper Location Countv 1933 1936
1. mai Stavanger Rogaland 8,500 8,500
Akershus Arbeiderblad Lillestrom Akershus 1,000 1,000
Arbeider-Avisen Trondheim Sor Trondelag 6,500 8,500
Arbeidets Rett Roros Sor Trondelag 1,000 2,000
Bergens Arbeiderblad Bergen Hordaland 9,000 5,000
Dagningen Lilleham. Oppland 2,000 3,000
Dunderlandsdolen Mo Nordland 300 300
Eidsvoll Arbeiderblad Eidsvoll Akershus 500 500
Finnmarken Vardo Finnmark 1,000 1,000
Folkets Frihet Kirkenes Finnmark 1,000 500
Folkets Rost Askim Ostfold 500 500
Folkeviljen Harstad Troms 2,500 2,500
Folio Ski Akershus 1,200 1,500
Fremover Narvik Nordland 2,000 3,000
Fremtiden Drammen Buskerud — 3,000
Halden Arbeiderblad Halden Ostfold 4,000 2,500
Hamar Arbeiderblad Hamar Oppland 4,000 5,000
Haugarland Arbeiderbl. Haugesund Rogaland 2,000 4,000
Helgeland Arbeiderblad Mosjoen Nordland 500 500
Horten Arbeiderblad Horten Vestfold 500 1,000
Kongsving. Arbeiderbl. Kongsving. Hedmark 3,000 4,000
Moss og Om. Arb. Moss Ostfold 1,500 1,500
Namdal Arbeiderblad Namsos Nord Trondelag 2,500 2,500
Nordlands Fremtid Bodo Nordland 3,000 3,000
Nordlys Tromso Troms 3,000 4,000
Nybrott Larvik Vestfold 1,500 2,000
Opland Arbeiderblad Gjovik Oppland 6,000 4,000
Rjukan Arbeiderblad Rjukan Telemark 1,500 2,000
Romerikes Blad Jessheim Akershus 300 300
Sarpsborg Arbeiderbl. Sarpsborg Ostfold 1,000 1,000
Sm&lenenes Social-Dem. Fredrikstad Ostfold 1,000 1,000
Sorlandet Kristians. Vest-Agder 3,500 2,500
Sunnmore ArbeideravisAlesund More og Romsdal 1,500 6,000
Telemark Arbeiderblad Skien Telemark 7,500 7,500
Tiden Arendal Aust-Agder 4,000 4,000
Tidens Krav Kristans. More og Romsdal 3,000 3,000
Vadso Arbeiderblad Vadso Finnmark — 500
Vestfmnm. Arbeiderbl. Hammerf. Finnmark 2,500 1,000
Vestfold Arbeiderblad Tonsberg Vestfold 4,000 1,500
Vestfold Fremtid Sandefjord Vestfold 500 500
Source: AAB: Archive: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LO's saksarkiv 1936, sak nr. 280-482, 
Da 0167, folder marked Stortingsvalgkampen sak nr. 301 1936
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Appendix 4 
Topics mentioned in Labour candidate statements
1929
Topic PercentanA
Unemployment 100
Stressed 47
Cures for unemployment:
(a) Public works (roads) 59
(b) Raise school leaving age 52
Generous maintainance of unemployed 69
Unemployment increased under Conservatives 28
Peace 97
Stressed 48
Disarmament 50
League of Nations 69
Labour's good record in international relations 70
Deterioration in international relations under Conservatives 56
Would call General Disarmament Conference 23
Peaceful settlement of disputes 51
Russia 50
Pensions 94
Education 65
Housing and slums 83
Rent Restriction Act 32
Health and Welfare Services 40
Agriculture 45
Price stabilization 34
Security of tenure 25
Nationalization 70
Mines 57
Land 29
Bank of England 25
Taxation
Labour would tax fairly 64
Conservative taxation favours rich 62
No taxes on food 43
No taxes on necessities 30
Graduated surtax 31
Chancellor's "raids" 24
Taxation of land values 31
Safeguarding equals Protection 16
Temperance 18
Empire and Commonwealth 19
Socialism 8
Red "bogey" 27
Labour democratic and constitutional 27
Devolution 8
Alternative to Conservatives is Labour 46
Liberal disunity 27
Factory Act 20
Ratify Washington Convention 29
Profiteering 21
Local government 17
Women 55
Labour record in fight for vote 41
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1931
Topic Percentage
Free trade, anti-tariff 93
Public economy
Taxation 43
Unemployment benefit cut 96
Public servants' salary cut 75
Means test 21
Socialism or anti-Socialism 34
Nationalization 15
Bank of England 76
Coal 50
Iron and steel 46
Transport 48
Land 40
Crisis
Most critical in history 2
Starvation if opponents win 6
Bankers' ramp 62
Election unnecessary or Conservative ramp 66
National Government "reactionary 42
Record of Second Labour Government 34
Personalities
MacDonald 22
Snowden 8
Baldwin 25
Simon 1
Samuel 3
Uoyd George 8
Henderson 14
Ex-ministers actions in August 14
Employment or unemployment 71
General wage level or standard of living 67
Agriculture 56
Education 34
Housing 54
Local issues 8
House of Lords 14
Electoral reform 1
Trade Disputes Act 1927 4
League of Nations 40
Disarmament 25
World disarmament conference 43
War debt and reparations 61
War in Manchuria (started Sept.) 1
No mention of foreign affairs 14
India 15
1935
Democracy, freedom 14
National Government 53
1931 crisis 12
Socialism, anti-Socialism 54
House of Lords 20
Baldwin 12
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Topic Percentage
Rearmament 29
Fear of massive rearmament 85
Empire 7
Nearness of war 49
Disarmament 71
League of Nations 90
Italo-Abyssinian war 50
"Peace ballot" 20
Germany 7
No mention of foreign affairs 2
Prosperity, cost of living, standard of living recovery 20
Tariffs, exports, trade 49
Taxation 36
Tax on co-operative societies 41
Employment, unemployment 82
Means test, public assistance 84
UAB regulations 56
Distressed areas 60
Public works, "prosperity loan" 32
Agriculture 53
Marketing 8
Land settlement 5
Coal industry wages and conditions 30
Nationalization
Coal 65
Land 66
Bank of England 69
Repeal of Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act 1927 41
Education 76
School leaving age 62
Health (e.g. maternal mortality) 60
Pensions 61
At 60 years 62
Housing 67
Built "to let* 51
Rent Restriction Act (1933), rents 16
Slum clearance 53
Sources: E. A. Rowe, 'The British General Election of 1929', B. Lift, thesis, Oxford
University 1959
Andrew Thorpe, The British General Election of 1931 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1991)
C. T. Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition. The British General
Election of 1935 (London, Croom Helm, 1980)
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Appendix 5
A Note on the Sources
The sources for the thesis have varied a fair amount. Chapter 1 was about Labour’s 
campaigning. It was based on the minutes of the National Executive Committee of the 
Labour Party, its annual reports, the Daily Herald, the London News and minutes of the 
Executive Committee of the London Labour Party. Additionally, annual reports of the 
Trades Union Congress and the papers of the London trades councils have been consulted, 
as well as the papers of MacDonald’s “National Labour” in the National Archives. 
Although other committees than the NEC have been referenced, these are all available on 
microfiche under that heading. The main weakness in the sources is the lack of information 
about the national campaign. Despite great efforts, no suitable materials were unearthed. 
With some work it was possible to estimate the expenditure of Labour in each election, but 
the sources do not explain how electioneering was conducted across the country. The 
closest it is possible to get are the details of the leader’s speaking engagements reported in 
the Daily Herald. Each constituency Labour party was responsible for its own campaigns, 
but the sheer number of branches made it impracticable to go through those papers where 
they are available. If the focus had solely been on Britain, a scientific sample of these 
would have been looked at. Certainly in 1929 at least, there was coordination of speakers 
across the country, but the details do not come out in the printed or archival sources.
Chapter 2 was about how DNA conducted its campaigning. The first point that 
ought to be made about DNA’s archives is that only a fraction of the papers from before 
1945 remain. The papers of DNA were confiscated by the German occupants after the 
invasion of Norway on 9 April 1940, and have never been returned. If they still exist, their 
whereabouts are unknown. Faced with this problem, it has been necessary to look at the 
mirror image of the papers in the collections of Arbeidemes Faglige Landsorganisasjon, 
the Trade Union Confederation. For each year AFL usually kept a folder with materials 
about DNA, but these were generally not extensive. There are therefore some gaps in 
everyone’s knowledge; for instance, it cannot be stated precisely why DNA found itself in 
grave financial difficulties in the autumn of 1935. Chapter 2 was based on the AFL papers, 
DNA and AFL annual reports, reports of the conferences of DNA, Arbeiderbladet and
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some of the papers of Arbeidemes Ungdomsfylking, the youth organization. In addition, 
Oslo provided a lot of the details, and the information was taken from the annual reports of 
Oslo DNA and Arbeiderbladet, which was a national daily but published in Oslo. A variety 
of other sources have been used marginally, such as the annual reports of Arbeidemes 
Opplysningsforbund, which is the Workers’ Educational Association.
Chapter 3 was written on the basis of boxes relating to Labour’s election campaigns 
in the University of Manchester Labour History Archive and Study Centre. These boxes 
contained the Speaker’s Handbook for 1929 and Speaker’s Notes for 1931 and 1935, 
election newspapers (both Labour and Co-operative), Labour candidate statements with 
some from their opponents, newspaper cuttings and centrally produced leaflets. In a few 
cases these were supplemented by pamphlets available elsewhere in the Archive. There 
need be no major complaints about the primary sources for this chapter. It would perhaps 
have been helpful to have a few more candidate statements for 1935, as there were fewer in 
the box than for 1929 and 1931. But it was felt that a good overall picture emerged from 
what was available.
Despite the extremely limited nature of the sources in DNA’s archive, chapter 4 
could be written without undue hindrance. This is because brochures and the occasional 
leaflet comprising the party’s electoral materials have been preserved. Most of the 
brochures exist as printed publications, and others are to be found in bound volumes. It was 
even possible to watch DNA’s election films from 1930 and 1936, and brief extracts from 
1933’s offering. Some of the films used at the time have therefore been incorporated into 
the chapter, though not all the moving pictures which DNA utilized as propaganda. Some 
were not their own, such as the German film “Poison Gas” featured in 1930. The party also 
produced an entire book in 1936 and electoral broadsheets for women in 1933 and 1936, all 
of which have been read and duly noted. It is probable that the available propaganda 
constitutes very nearly everything that was distributed in these elections, at least on the 
national level.
Chapter 5 contained a summary of the four preceding chapters drawing on all the 
sources mentioned above and the printed records of both parties such as the annual reports 
and, for Britain, the Labour Year Book. The electoral expenses have been tabulated and 
compared in this chapter, repeating the figures from chapters 1 and 2. They were calculated
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through the use of archival materials, printed sources and secondary literature. One problem 
with the entire comparison is that the Labour Year Book was not published between 1933 
and 1940. For 1935 it was necessary to calculate the number of newspapers from another 
source, and the criteria used may not have matched Labour’s own. It is a real drawback that 
Labour did not publish membership details about its League of Youth beyond the number 
of branches in existence. The two membership figures given are estimates. It is mentioned 
in the chapter that the League of Youth was never a priority for Labour, and the lack of 
information about it as well as its relative impotence prove this point. True membership 
figures would nevertheless have been illuminating.
A lot of what preceded, especially in chapters 3 and 4 about electoral appeal, 
consisted of narrative of what Labour and DNA said. One should be sceptical about taking 
everything the parties claimed at face value. In 1931, for instance, the Daily Herald 
reported that things were going very well for Labour when in fact the party was on the 
threshold of its worst-ever defeat. The Daily Herald and its Norwegian equivalent 
Arbeiderbladet were much used sources, but it is assumed that their factual reporting is 
correct. Their interpretations were designed to rally Socialist sympathizers.
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